USA > Ohio > History One hundred and eleventh regiment O. V. I > Part 7
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About a mile to the westward of town, I rode into the fields to order forward some stragglers, and was detained until dark. After dark I overtook George Stahl, Angust Burde and Frank Ludwig, of Company D, who had dropped out of ranks and were resting near the old camp grounds. Stopping for a moment to urge the men forward, I then passed on, and overtook the regiment about a half mile further on. Just as I reached the rear of the command a few straggling shots were heard in the rear, and soon we learned that Captain Van Blarcum's party had been ambushed by guerrillas, near the camp ground, and he had been shot. It turned out that of the three soldiers whom I had passed, two had been captured about the same time, and one escaped by crawling under a rebel's horse into the bushes, instead of climbing upon the horse as ordered. Captain Van Blareum was brought in during the night by our cavalry so badly wounded by a gun shot wound through the body that he was partially paralyzed, and from which he died after his re- turn home.
Captain Van Blarcum was one of the most genial and kindly men in the army. When he had the power to give relief, no man appealed to his generosity in vain. He stands well forward on the roll of Ohio soldiers, who perished in the struggle for national integrity.
General Hood, on the 20th of September, set bis army again in motion, and leaving Lovejoy Station, proceeded westward, indicating an intention to try the recapture of Atlanta by the same means which operated in driving him to abandon it. Our command was marched out to Flat Rock for a diversion, and to ascertain what, if any, enemy might be encountered in that direction.
It was not long before we learned that the rebel cavalry were
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operating in Tennessee, and all of Hood's army had broken camp and joined in a movement to the northward.
On the 29th of September, it was known that the enemy were crossing the Chattahoochee in force by northerly roads, to the west- ward of Atlanta, and soon the movement was so far advanced as to show that our lines of communication were the enemy's objective.
On the 2nd day of October, the rebel army had reached our line of railroad at Ackworth, about twenty-five miles north of Atlanta, and were tearing up the rails.
On the 4th day of October the rebels attacked Altoona, where we had a very large amount of military stores. Our command was then moved to the northward, and as rapidly as possible tried to reach the enemy then fighting to capture Altoona. We arrived upon the ground in time to learn that General Corse had achieved fame as a fighter by holding his position in the mountain against three times his own numbers. General Sherman, from the top of Kenesaw, had witnessed the nnequal contest, and over the heads of the rebel force had signaled his encouragement. We heard the thunder of the guns, but were not able to get within striking distance before the enemy withdrew, leaving over a thousand men to mark the sanguinary character of the contest.
We followed the enemy back over the grounds seamed by the intrenchments of so many battlefields, but he did not choose to offer us opportunity to attack, but rapidly pushed northward, crossing the Coosa River about twelve miles below Rome. Moving eastward with his right flank on the Oostananla River, Hood again struck the rail- 'road at Resaca. Our force at that point consisted of a few men under Col. Weber, who were intrenched and covering the railroad bridge at that point. For the purpose of ascertaining the real pur- pose of the enemy, a strong reconnoisance consisting of Garrard's cavalry, supported by our brigade, moved down the north bank of the Coosa River from Rome. About four miles from Rome the cav- alry struck the enemy, and deploying on foot with their Spencer rifles, moved to the attack. The engagement was short and decisive. The rebel mule battery, covered by the rifles of our dismounted men, could not be withdrawn, and our boys had the pleasure of seeing it captured with a dash and a halloo, and then with rattle of rifles and clatter of equipments, the Yankee cavalry in hot pursuit of the Con- federates, went out of sight in the direction of New Orleans, and it they maintained the same rate of speed last exhibited to us, would
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be due there in about 24 hours. We were afterward informed by citizens twenty miles below, that the Confederates passed there at a dizzy rate of speed, with hats off and hair flying in the wind ; that they rode into the Coosa and swam their horses to the other side be- fore they would trust themselves to rest. We learned that Hood had taken up his bridges behind him, and his men had stated that they were going back to Tennessee. Returning to Rome, we moved east- ward, reaching the railroad near Dalton. We found the enemy had preceded us, and, without assaulting Resaca, had torn up the rail- road to the northward of that point, and then retreated westward toward Villanou. The Confederate exploits here were confined to tearing up the road and capturing the small garrisons at Dalton, Tilton and Buzzard's Roost. We passed through Snake Creek gap on our pursuit of Hood toward Villanou, covering substantially the same ground we had done months before, as we approached the bat- tle field of Resaca. On our way to the westward, judges and clerks of election were chosen, and ballot boxes placed in ambulances, in which we deposited our ballots. By our votes so cast, we elected a Republican Governor for Ohio, and James M. Ashley a representa- tive in Congress from the old Toledo district.
We followed Hood to the westward, until, on the 20th of Octo- ber, we were concentrated near Gaylesville, Alabama. We proceeded to Cedar Bluffs, on the Coosa, where we stopped long enough to take charge of a tannery and run out the stock of uncolored leather, which lay in the vats. With our saddles and trappings covered with fresh buff leather, we " looked just too cute for anything." At this point Lieutenant George McCord was sent out to the south side of the river to do picket duty, with a small detachment of men, and was captured. If there ever was any good reason for sending men to picket the unoccupied side of an unbridged river, I never knew what the reason was. As the act was thoroughly unmilitary, the usual results followed. At this point we crossed to the south of the Coosa River and returned to Rome, thence up the river to Resaca. In the meantime the damage to the railroad north of Resaca had been repaired, and Hood having appeared with his whole army on the Tennessee River at Decatur, evincing a purpose to extend his raid into Tennessee, our corps was transported by cattle car trains to Nashville, leaving Georgia on the 31st of October. During this period the rebel cavalry under General Forrest, had carried their operations into West Tennessee and had made an attack upon John-
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sonville, on the Tennessee River, to the westward of Nashville, where a very large quantity of military supplies had been concen- trated. To repel this attack, our brigade was hurried forward, and reached Johnsonville, only to find that Forrest had set fire to and sank several gun-boats, from which fire had communicated to the government sheds containing the stores, most of which had been des- troyed. Our arrival served to restore confidence to the garrison, which seemed to have become entirely demoralized. We met soldiers twenty miles away from the seat of action, still "retiring rapidly." It was said that the river navy had set fire to their own boats to save them from Forrest, who was on the opposite side of the river. It would not be easy to find an excuse for the conduct of the troops there under the circumstances.
Soon after our arrival, Forrest crossed the river some miles above Johnsonville on flat boats, and commenced his march to the south- eastward to join Hood, who by that time had crossed the Tennessee near the foot of Muscle Shoals, and was advancing northward to- wards Nashville.
As usual our command was called upon to hurry forward to meet the new danger. We were loaded into and on top of freight cars and steamed away for Nashville. As our train was running upon a high embankment, some of the cars suddenly left the track, and, for a considerable distance the wheels went bumping over the crossties until the power of the engine was overcome, and the train came to a standstill. We then found that guerrillas had misplaced rails on the track for the purpose of throwing our train down the embankment. We at once organized scouting parties, and swept the adjacent woods, but failed to find anything but the trail of the horsemen who had done the mischief. The track was soon repaired and we proceeded to Nashville. Stopping at Nashville only long enough to draw rations and ammunition, we proceeded to Columbia. on the Duck River, whither portions of our own and the 4th Corps had preceded ns.
Perhaps you have forgotten the pile of sutler stores which were upon the platform at the railway station, for the safe keeping of which, a reeruit with fixed bayonet had been put on guard. Some one may be curious enough to enquire how we knew the guard to be a raw recruit. The old soldier would classify him at a glance, but might not be quite able to explain how he did it. There was a new gun and accoutrements, new uniform, and a general air of cleanli-
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ness about the soldier. This might be taken by a novice as conclus- ive evidence of the fact, but something additional would be needed to satisfy the old soldier, for it might happen that the old soldier could show all of these characteristics, though the chances were against it.
Added to this, was the full rounded face and hands, the delicate womanly pink and white complexion, the stiff, unfamiliar way in which he held his gun, as though it was a new acquaintance which must needs be kept at arm's length for a time; all of these were un- mistakable marks of a military infant. As soon as you broke ranks the enterprising men of the regiment huddled abont that part of the platform, as if attracted there by some uniformly operating principle of natural selection. The guard was pacing leisurely up and down in front of the goods, looking suspiciously at every one who came near his charge. When I looked again, the ice had been broken, the guard had been engaged in conversation, and soon such vivid des- criptions of battles fought, and how our particular regiment would leave the most tempting banquet ever spread to get into a fight, cap- tured the soldier's youthful imagination, and bringing his musket to a parade rest, he was in an instant surrounded by a crowd who seemed determined that his interest in military affairs, should not
flag an instant. The circle was made so compact and dense about him that the guard could not see beyond it. Then that pile of goods seemed in a moment to be instinct with life. Cheese boxes got on edge ard rolled off down the street. Kegs of cookies, biscuit, fruit and other hooped goods, soon got on the move. At length a barrel of whiskey was seized with the panic and started down town. At this juncture it was decided that the joke had proceeded far enough, and the whiskey was arrested and sent home. When the play had been so suddenly brought to a close, the soldier stories suddenly petered out, the crowd dissolved from around the guard, who resum- ed his march up and down in front of the stores, totally unconscious that a tariff for revenne only had been levied upon them.
I am satisfied that if the goods had been unguarded, not an arti- cle would have been molested. The guard was regarded both as a challenge and an indication of want of confidence, which the soldiers resented.
November 24th, 25th and 26th the rebels were pressing our lines about Columbia, trying evidently to produce the impression that they contemplated making a crossing in force at the Duck River ford at Columbia. On the night of the 27th our brigade was placed
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on the north side of Duck River to cover any retreat which might be made, and hold the crossing against ary attempted passage by the enemy. During the 28th and 29th, we were constantly skirmishing across the river at all points where a crossing was possible. Our Company, H, under Lieutenant Thompson, was sent to guard a ford on Duck River some miles below Columbia, and we did not see them again until they came in at Nashville. Having been cut off by the advance of the enemy, and compelled to make a considerable detour, they came in looking as though they had been doing cavalry duty on foot.
On the night of the 28th the rebel general succeeded in forcing a passage of the river eight miles above Columbia, driving back the cavalry there posted, and pushing his head of column toward Spring Hill. Spring Hill lies midway between Columbia and Franklin on the turnpike, over which we must retreat on our way toward Nashville.
On the morning of the 29th, the situation was so perilous that General Schofield sent General Stanley with two divisions of the 4th Corps to Spring Hill to hold the enemy in check until the balance of the troops could be withdrawn. During the day the rumbling of wagons and hurrying of troops, indicated that both officers and men recognized the gravity of the situation. By noon of that day, the rebels were attacking Stanley at Spring Hill, twelve miles in our rear, while we were under orders to hold the railroad bridge, where we were until daylight next morning, and to set it on fire when we should abandon it.
Our regiment was then deployed, and holding a full brigade front on the river, while the rebel force were on the alert to get a crossing for their artillery, as they were not able to get it over at Hney's Mill, where the infantry had crossed.
About dark we set the railroad bridge on fire, and having called in the line officers, held a council as to what we should do in the emergency.
Two negro men had come to us saying " For God's sake, gentle- men you better get outer here to-night," and it was our unanimous opinion that the contrabands were right. Abont 9 o'clock we ac- cepted the friendly guidance of the colored brethren and proceeded northward, throwing down plantation fences in our way, and mov- ing through the darkness at the best speed we were able.
At about 4 o'clock in the morning, immense camp fires to our
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right and front lit up our way, and we were soon advised that the camp was Hood's infantry, who had been repulsed by Stanley dur- ing the day. Just here we received a volley from a rebel out-post, the bullets whistling over our heads. As the boys used to say " we considered where it came from," and paid no attention to it. Soon we were marching within long rifle range of Hood's great army, and could easily distinguish the men moving around among the camp fires. .
Why we were permitted to slip out of the mouth of the sack, which Hood could have closed at anytime, by a dash of fifteen minutes duration, is one of the incomprehensible things of history. Just as the sun rose in the morning of the 30th, we were passing through Spring Hill and could be said to be again within the Union lines. We moved on until we came to the place near Thompson's Station, three miles north of Spring Hill, where we found a lot of wagons which had been captured by the rebel cavalry and partly burned the day before. We were here mixed up with our wagon trains, which so nearly filled the pike that we could not march in our usual order in column. , Being so wearied by our constant service for three days and nights, the regiment had strag- gled badly, and was in a very disorganized condition.
Suddenly from the cast, through a gap in the hills, there came a squadron of rebel cavalry, yelling like Indians, and firing as they came. Instantly a panic seized the teamsters and stragglers, some of the drivers jumped from their mules and took to the fields, others, with shouts, with whip and spur got their teams into a dead run and went clattering down the pike. The Colonel's black horse seemed to be taken with a sudden desire to "go west and grow up with the country," and tried to bolt after the fugatives.
Lieutenant Gustavus F. Smith, of Company E, was the nearest line officer at the head of the regiment, and promptly dashing through the line of flying wagons, called to his men to follow and charge the advancing column. The example was as contagious as the panic had been, and soon we had a formidable line of skirmishers interposed between the rebels and our train.
Our rifles were ordering the rebels to halt, when, to the north- ward a section of Canby's battery wheeled out of the road, a half mile away and commeneed sending shell into the rebel ranks. In a moment they had covered their retreat with such a cloud of dust that the boys instinctively ceased firing and commenced laughing.
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Van Ilorne in his "Army of the Cumberland," says this attack was repulsed by Wood's skirmishers. He was probably led into this mistake by not knowing that our regiment was afloat npon the road and fighting upon general principles. We never heard any com- plaint when we took a job of fighting which had been assigned to another command. But when we gathered a paltry pile of lumber in North Carolina, to protect ourselves from a cruel, cold storm, the theoretical martinets held up their hands in astonishment at on piratieal western ways, and ordered us to consider ourselves under arrest. As late as the winter of 1864, common sense was a high crime on the Atlantic coast.
We reached Franklin among the last troops of the army. My recollection is that it was as late as two o'clock in the afternoon, but authorities, entitled to credit, say that the rear guard got in about noon. You remember that we found intrenchments on each side of the Franklin pike when we came in, the road-bed having been left undisturbed, so that the trains and artillery might not be delayed in moving into town. The Carter House, an ordinary sized brick house, stood on the west side of the pike just inside of our intrenchments. We moved to the north and west of the Carter House and stacked arms. Very soon afterward we were called upon for a detail of men to throw up a section of earthworks. I do not remember any occasion when it was more difficult to get a fatigue party to do the work assigned to them, than on this occasion.
You had been without sleep for the most of three nights, and had marched 23 miles, with seareely any rest since 9 o'clock of the evening before. Nature rebelled against any additional draft on her reserve forces. There is little wonder that you pronounced it unreasonable when orders came requiring you to intrench. Having marked out the line of intrenchment for the fatigue party, and waiting until, in a measure, they warmed up to the work, stimulat- ed in great measure, no doubt, by the exercise of that soldier's privilege, which was so much in vogue in Flanders, I returned to the regiment, where the men were mostly asleep.
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CHAPTER VIII.
REVIEW OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE INVASION OF TENNESSEE. BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.
When in the last chapter we followed the movements of our regiment from Atlanta through the counter-march, made necessary by Hood's aggressive, and from thence to Nashville, Johnsonville and Columbia, to Franklin, we took no account of the canses leading to'these latter movements
General Sherman had long entertained a plan, which contem- plated marching his well seasoned, and hitherto invincible army, through the heart of the Confederacy, more for the purpose of destroying the material resources of the country, and especially its transportation facilities, than of destroying its armies, as the more humane and effective means of conquering a peace.
The last series of battles around Atlanta, had proven the tenth of his theory that with so well disciplined and confident an army, superior numbers was all he had to fear. No superior force could be concentrated against him, without fatally weakening Lee, and General Grant, in the beginning, had taken the contract to keep Lee fully employed
With Hood's army threatening a movement to the north ward, and his concentrations and plans so far advanced, that he could not change them without serious loss of both time and morale of its rank and file, General Sherman became convinced that the auspicious time had come for his march to the sea. :
Sherman's plan at the beginning of November was to send General Thomas with the 4th Corps, to Tennessee, and then sweep the old Atlanta line of communications, clear of stores and troops, north as far as Chattanooga, concentrating the posts in Thomas'
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hands. Auxilliary to this, he would order A. J. Smith's troops from Missouri to Thomas, and thus give to Thomas, with the new levies available, a force equal to Hood, and leave Hood in Thomas' hands, in case Hood should persist in his northward movement. In case Hood should follow Sherman, then Thomas would be at liberty to follow Hood, and thus get that enterprising commander into a situation, where circumstances would compel a decisive battle.
Thomas called for the 23d Corps to be sent to him, believing that his own forces would not be sufficiently reinforced from other sources, to make the defense necessary to be made, within the time which Hood would permit to elapse before he took the field aggres- sively. In this Thomas was right. Sherman yielded to Thomas' wish, and our Corps was sent back as rapidly as transportation facilities would allow.
Persuant to the plans above outlined, all of the 4th Corps were concentrated at Pulaski, Tennessee, as early as November 3d. Pulaski is SO miles south of Nashville, and about 45 miles north of Decatur, Alabama, where we had a strong post covering the junction of railroads. On the 3d of November the 1st Brigade of the 23d Corps started from Georgia to join Thomas' command.
At this time Forrest was exploiting on the west side of the Tennessee River in his advance towards Johnsonville. Hood was already at Tuscumbia, with his head of column across on the north side of the Tennessee River, at Florence, which being between Muscle Shoals on the east and Colbert's Shoals on the west, made his position unassailable by gun boats. Here he awaited the accumulation of supplies, while Thomas was straining every energy to concentrate troops enough to meet Hood's advance.
If Hood had remained in the interior of Alabama long enough to have made it uncertain whether he contemplated following Sherman, or invading Tennessee, and, in the meantime, had accum- ulated the necessary supplies and transportation for his contem- plated aggressive, before indicating where his attack was to be delivered, his chances of success would have been greatly enhanced. This course upon his part would have delayed General Sherman in his contemplated march to the sea, for the reason, that until Sherman could know that. Hood was committed to a movement northward, it would have been dangerous for him to destroy his line of communi- cations, and venture out in the enemy's country, with a trained enemy in his rear.
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Hood's movement to Florence indicated what his campaign was to be, and gave as complete notice of his intentions as though he bad made public all of his orders to subordinates. This was not generalship, because it released Sherman on the one hand, and warned Thomas on the other.
Our 3d Division moved forward by rail from Georgia and placed itself within supporting distance of the 4th Corps, near Pulaski, General Strickland's Brigade being posted at Columbia. Our brigade under Colonel Moore, and General Gallup's Brigade, of our division were hurried back from Johnsonville, our brigade going to Columbia, and General Cooper with the other going to Centerville, 30 miles west of Columbia, on Duek River. Ruger came forward with the other brigade so that we had at Columbia, and consequently at Franklin, substantially all of the 23d Corps except General Cooper's Brigade.
On the 12th of November, General Sherman having invested General Thomas with the command of the department, and with the means to get together troops enough to equal Hood's forces, cut his lines of communication and started from Rome on his march for the sea, with about 60,000 men.
He left Atlanta on the morning of the 15th of November, after destroying everything there and at Rome, which could be of any use to the enemy. The Confederate government having placed General Beauregard in command of the department consisting of Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi, as soon as he heard of Sherman's advance, ordered Hood forward into Tennessee and the contemplated movement upon Nashville commenced. If Hood had started ten days before and moved his troops upon parallel roads as Sherman did in his advance, it would have been impossible for General Thomas to have concentrated troops enough to have materially arrested his progress, until he approached Nashville, and this, for the reason that the 4th Corps and the troops of the 23d then in the field, could not have found a safe line, confronting more than one of Hood's Corps, while Hood's remaining corps, could have marched past their flanks and compelled a prompt retreat from every position taken by them.
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