USA > Ohio > History One hundred and eleventh regiment O. V. I > Part 9
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We then proceeded to tear down houses and construct a massive interior line or earthworks around Nashville, so that Hood should not be able without much tribulation, to get at the bank with which we had endowed our friend the photographer.
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CHAPTER IX.
BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, AND FINAL RETREAT OF HOOD FROM TENNESSEE.
While the events which have been set out in the last chapter were transpiring, General A. J. Smith, with about 10,000 men, had joined us from Missouri. General Steedman, with about 5,000 colored troops, had come in from Chattanooga. Some intermediate posts had been retired, and a miscellaneous lot of men absent on furlough and detail, with the odds and ends about the post, had been organiz- ed into provisional organizations, for the defence of the works. These troops could not be used to advantage offensively, but for the pur- pose of defense, in intrenched lines were available.
In the meantime, Hood had moved his forces forward shortly after the battle of Franklin, and taken position on Overton's Hill, south-east of Nashville, and upon a line from that point bearing nearly west to the river below the city.
There was no considerable demonstration on the part of the Confederates during the interval of time between the battles of Franklin and Nashville. They seemed contented to possess the rich Middle Tennessee country, as a foraging ground so long as we would permit them to stay.
The troops under General R. S. Granger in North Alabama, and those under General Milroy at Tullahoma, were concentrated at Murfreesboro, under command of General Rousseau, and numbered about 8,000. These men remained detached from the main army during the remainder of the campaign. Hood had at his headquar- ters.Governor Harris, the rebel executive of Tennessee, who aided in enforcing as rigid a conscription as possible for the purpose of filling up the skeleton organizations in Hood's command.
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As an expost facto excuse for lying in front of Nashville until we were ready to attack him, he reports that he had assurance of rein- forcements from beyond the Mississippi River, but there seems to have been little or no effort made to bring such reinforcements for- ward-if indeed there was,any considerable body of organized troops there to draw from. After the Red River campaign had ended, the troops beyond the Mississippi River, seemed to fall back upon the Southern doctrine of State Rights, that is, the right to stay at home, unless they were called to repel an invasion of their native State.
Thus were the Southern leaders hoist by their own petard. . Having inenleated the doctrine of the independent sovereignty of States, when they wanted recruits, they found that State authorities refused to allow State troops to leave the State where they were re- cruited. No nation can have an efficient army, under such a con- struction of the rights of States composing it.
Meantime Hood's cavalry, supported by infantry, tried to re- duce the posts between Nashville and Stevenson, along the line of railroad connecting Nashville with Chattanooga. In some cases he was successful, but in an attack upon Murfreesboro he was defeated by the forces stationed there, with considerable loss.
In the meantime General Thomas had been busy in organizing the irregular troops which had been concentrated at Nashville, and getting ready to strike the Confederates a blow, from which they would not easily recover.
When this work had been completed, General Thomas was pre- pared to assume the offensive. On the Sth of December a storm of rain began turning to sleet, which covered the country with a sheet of ice. This condition of things continued for several days.
The Secretary of War and General Grant had been urging Gen- eral Thomas to attack Hood and raise the investment at Nashville. General Thomas was busy organizing and equipping the new troops and the disorganized non-effectives, which had been mustered from hospitals and supply departments.
At length rumors crept through camp that General Thomas' de- lay, would result in his being relieved of command.
For a week the state of the weather enforced a further delay than would otherwise have been necessary, but the delay in our at- tack only so strengthened the confidence of Hood, that we were afraid to offer battle, that he detached most of his cavalry and one
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brigade of infantry to undertake the capture of Murfreesboro, and his foragers were scouring the country for subsistence.
On the morning of the 15th, under cover of a friendly fog which enveloped the country, we left camp and moved to the south westerly suburb of the city, and passed outside of the works.
General Steedman's command, consisting chicfly of colored troops, formed to the northwestward of Overton's Hill, which was occupied by the right of the rebel line, and was strongly fortified. Extending from Steedman's right to the westward General Wood's 4th Corps had gone into line. Connecting with General Wood's right, General A. J. Smith had placed his little 16th Corps in line of battle. Behind this position our corps formed in reserve. General Wilson, with three divisions of cavalry, formed on the right of Gen- eral Smith, and extended to the Cumberland River below.
General Hood's forces extended from Overton's Hill, a little south of westward, fronting Nashville, in an unbroken line, about three miles long, and to the westward of his continuous line, isolated knobs, or hill tops, were occupied by intrenched detachments.
When we left our lines in Nashville, the irregular troops, organ- ized for temporary service, took our places to man the works. The plan of attack contemplated a demonstration in force at the right of Hood's line at Overton Hill, and a vigorous attack upon Hood's at- tenuated left by the cavalry and General Smith's corps, and as the advance should be successful, Smith was to wheel partially upon bis left flank, thus opening a gap between his infantry and the cavalry, into which our corps was to move, and participating in the general left wheel, assist in crushing Hood's line.
Before we had time to fairly deploy our line, the battle opened by the advance of our cavalry, followed at once by the advance of Smith's command. The resistance met was not strong enough to check the attacking columns, and about noon the front line had opened sufficiently to admit our brigade, which moved up and parti- cipated in the charge, which by this time was facing nearly cast- ward, and going on the double quick, without much regard to align- ment or continuity of line. I do not here remember very distinctly the operation of other members of our brigade or division. The chase was exciting. A squadron of cavalry charged at an intrench- ment on a hill top, and meeting a hot artillery fire, turned to the sonthward, and swept on out of sight. We did our best to keep up with them, and were soon going up the ridge to the southward of the
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intrenchment, with Ad. Fulton leading the centre with the flag. Ful- ton seemed possessed with the notion that it was a general steeple race, free for all, and that the fellows who got the farthest to the rear of Hood's army, took the cake if it happened to be there.
As we were rushing on without any skirmishers in advance, we seemed to be extremely liable to run against somebody suddenly in a very undignified way. When we reached the top of the main ridge, which extended in a southerly direction from the left of Hood's con- tinuous line, we were ordered to halt, intrench, and hold whatever we had got. From the top of the ridge we saw Hood's veterans skurrying away in disorganized confusion. This ended the fighting on the 15th. From all we could see it had been a sort of " halloway pullaway " affair, with the halloway on our side, and the pullaway on theirs.
We lighted camp fires, cooked our supper, and felt exceeding well satisfied that the day's work on our part of the line, could not have been better done. During the evening, several woe-begone specimens of sonthern chivalry, came in loaded with forage, and ask- ed us to direct them where to find the 24th Mississippi. We sug- gested that their regiment bad moved camp during the day in such a hurry that they had left us no directions where they were going, but as we were inclined to be hospitable, they might stay with us. In a shy sort of way they declined, not seeming to understand that our invitation, though phrased in polite language, was intended to be peremptory. They could hardly believe their senses when at last it dawned upon them that they were prisoners. When we offered them a warm supper, the ice was broken, and they accepted the situation.
In the morning, 20 guns were put in position in our front, and the process of developing the rebel artillery on a line, which during the night they had constructed, in our front, began. Two of their batteries which answered the challenge, received the concentrated fire of our guns as long as they would reply.
A shot from one of our guns sent a rebel gun, end over end out of the embrasure. A shell struck one of their cassions, and bursting, started a small Fourth of July among the gunners, under the smoke of which, they took to the woods. To supply this rapid waste of am- munition, an ordnance wagon was soon seen coming down the road from the eastward, driven by a teamster riding the hindmost of the near mules. As he turned from the road toward the battery, a can- non shot sent his leaders to grass at once, and auchored his craft so
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effectually, that he hastily dismounted and went into the bushes after the artillerymen.
The batteries having been silenced, our gunners directed their attention to the earthworks, exploding their shell up and down the lines with such accuracy that the enemy soon ceased to show them- selves.
In the extension and adjustment of the lines during the fore- noon, a gap had been opened between our division and our 3d divi- sion farther to the right. To fill this space, a brigade of Smith's corps was put in position facing Shy's Hill, a sharp ridge, separated from our line by a deep abrupt ravine. At this point the rebel line turned to the southward, at almost a right angle. The hill top had been pounded by our artillery at short range until the earthwork had been partially battered down. The intrenchment had been cut so far back of the crest that the fire from the rebel rifles could not command the slopes. Further to the south ward, the rebel line cros- sed another hill, thickly wooded on its western slope, but cleared be- hind. About eighty rods in rear of this last line lay the Granny White pike, bearing away to the southwest. About noon charging columns had been formed opposite the half-wooded hill in front of our 3d division, also in front of Shy's Hill on our immediate right, and our regiment, placed in advance as a charging column, to strike the enemy's line in the valley.
Wilson's cavalry were pushing their advance to the eastward beyona the right flank of our corps, and had penetrated to the Granny White pike. Stiles' brigade, of Cox's old division, moved up the wooded slope of the hill in their front, and from our position we could hear their rifles crack, and see the smoke rising over the trees as they advanced. Soon we saw the rebel line waver, and shake out its lighter footed elements, singly, and in squads. A. J. Smith, who had been keenly watching the progress of this attack from the hill top on our right, suddenly drew his handkerchief, gave it a quick toss, and the charging column plunged into the ravine in front, while the batteries continued to plant ringing blows upon the hill top, until the flags had risen nearly level with the fire, then the lan- yards dropped, and with a yell, the charging column poured over the rebel works. Then came your turn to charge, and through the ad- jacent corn field you went with a rush, and over the works pell mell without meeting even the show of resistance.
Stopping a moment to detach a guard to take the prisoners to
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the rear, you made a half left wheel, and firing as you went, pursued the fugatives into the woods.
Hood's army had gone like leaves before a whirl wind. Until it was too dark to distinguish friend from foe, the pursuit was maintained.
There had been some stubborn fighting in front of Wood and Steedman, with the advantage both of position, and heavy protecting works, upon the rebel side.
You remember the indescribable state of the roads we found in that pursuit of Hood.
How we gathered prisoners from day to day, who in most cases seemed anxious to be captured.
At length by orders of General Grant, our corps were ordered to repair to the Tennessee River, where we took transports to Cincin- nati, and thence by rail went on to Washington. Hood's army was substantially destroyed. The only organization which has ever been , known as part of it, were about 5,000 men, who joined Johnston's army and participated in the battle at Bentonville.
The next morning we pushed on after Hood's disorganized army, meeting constantly those who claimed to be prisoners, but who had become so docile that they were not even awarded a guard to conduct them to the rear.
In the battle proper at Nashville, we had captured nearly 4,000 men, and this number was increased by daily necessions as the pur- suit progressed. Forrest came in from the cast, and interposed his force, saving the remnant of Hood's army, which got across the Tennessee River into Alabama.
While the battle of Nashville has gone into history as one of the decisive victories of the war, we know too well that we went out there to gather the fruit, which we had so effectually shaken to the ground at Franklin.
In spectacular display, the battle of Nashville stands second to none in brillianey ; the strategie movements were made in the great undulating amphitheatre lying between the chain of hills which en- cirele Nashville on the south, and the Brentwood Hills lying but a cannon shot further to the southward; the batteries massed upon commanding positions in full play ; the squadrons of cavalry with drawn sabres charging up the hill sides, the infantry columns touch- ing blue to green, like grand shuttles going through the great warp of the landscape; the rapidly dissolving halos of smoke marked
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where the poka dots were being put into the great battle mantle, by the bursting shells; the isolation of the charging commands going to their work successively, hightened the interest from hour to hour ; the few hills breaking here and there, the continuity of the lines of sight, gave room for imaginative play as to the scenes behind. We were playing to the best business that ever a manager had, the city works for miles were not only full of people-men, women and children-but overrunning the works, ran down to the very foot of the slope.
We could look back and see the masses swaying back and forth as development after development demonstrated that the good work was going on. The men in blue from time to time sont up their hats to cheer us, but what of the men and women in black, who so anxiously looked on ? How those advancing bayonets of ours must have pricked the sensibilities of some of them, who had all they held dear, so firmly wedded to the destinies of the Confederacy.
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CHAPTER X.
REVIEW .- PURSUIT OF HOOD, AND TRANSFER TO THE ATLANTIC COAST. -ERRORS IN HISTORY OF BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.
History represents that when the lines were established for the battle, that the second line was intrenched as well as the main line. This by implication maintains that there were two lines. The fact is, that there was a light work, behind the center of the main line, about two regimental fronts in length, covering part of the reserves, but, there was no other line in sight, right or left of the pike, when the battle commenced, and there was no second line, in the military sense. There was a main line and reserves behind the center of it, and unless the inexcusable blunder of placing Wagner's two brigades eighty rods in front of the main line, is to count in making up a second line, there was nonc.
There has been many verbal representations made, to show that General Wagner was placed in front of the main line at Franklin, as a "Corps of observation," with orders to retire his two brigades if there should be an indication of an attack in force.
There is nothing in the records of orders to show what the fact is. Perhaps orders of such a nature would not be preserved. How- ever, it is claimed that he had a written order so to do, and it is customary to preserve copies of such orders.
But Wagner's officers and men deny having received or heard of such orders. Tested by the probabilities, the evidences are against such an order having been given. It has all the peculiarities of an after thought.
1st. If Wagner's orders were, to act as a corps of observation, why did his troops intrench ? Intrenchments are built for protect-
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ion of troops in action. Men can see as well without intrenchments as with them, but without them, cannot fight as well. Hence it is manifest that Lane's and Conrad's Brigades, expected to fight on that line. The intrenchment was not an after thought, because it stood there, with Wagner's men behind it, when our regiment came down the pike from Spring Hill, and, before we had been ordered to throw up our part of the intrenchment on the main line.
2nd. If a corps of observation was needed, two regiments deployed, with reserves could have covered the whole front, and observed all of the field better than two brigades could do, posted as they were in the center.
3rd. Did the other officers in command understand that such were Wagner's orders at the time? General Schofield stood in Fort Granger looking through his field-glass at Hood's men, massing for a charge. Lane and Conrad's artillery gave notice that the "Corps of observation" had an enemy under fire; and still no command went to Lane and Conrad, to retire within the lines. General [Cox was upon the ground, at our left flank, and saw the rebel infantry forming in double and tripple lines of brigades, with artillery between, and still Lane and Conrad's "Corps of observation" stood behind an intrenchment with both flanks in the air, and the flanking force in array, ready, able and willing to flank them out, and yet, no peremptory orders went to Lane and Conrad to withdraw.
If these brigades were posted as "a corps of observation," what need to keep them longer on duty, when the enemy could be readily observed from headquarters, and from the line of battle as well ?
The circumstances and surroundings all point to the fact, that as one of Wagner's brigades, (Opdyke's) was acting as rear guard for the army, retiring from Spring Hill, and, as is shown by General Schofield's dispatches, he did not contemplate any battle south of the Harpeth River, but contemplated moving his command across the river, and disputing its passage afterward, that Wagner was posted to guard against a rush by Hood's head of column upon Opdyke, as he neared the river, and would necessarily be delayed in its passage.
For the purpose of relieving Opdyke's men, who, since morn- ing had been skirmishing with an advancing enemy, and were probably short of ammunition, by posting Lane and Conrad where they were, there was ample reason. Lane and Conrad's intrench- ments would have stopped Hood's head of column, for the length of
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time necessary for turning a column by deployment into a line of battle, and while that manoeuvre was being executed, the brigades, leaving a heavy skirmish line behind, could have safely retired across the river.
It looks as though those brigades were posted there for one purpose, and when no longer needed for that purpose, were not relieved as they should have been. You remember that we were posted on the north bank of Duck River, with orders to guard the crossing. We were skirmishing there continually until next morn- ing, and yet the army moved away without relieving us, and we disobeyed orders to save ourselves from being surrounded and captured. Our continuous fire was notice enough to our commander as he moved away, that we were still on duty. Lane and Conrad's men were always seen in front of our line of battle, whenever any commander looked for the approach of the Confederates. The rank and file who were there, place this among the rest of the blunders, which were too conspicuous, on that retreat, to be wiped out by argument.
Wagner is dead. He was a fighting commander, who did not hesitate to expose himself with his men. It was said of him, that for a week after the battle of Stone River, he could shake rebel bullets out of his clothes. While this statement is a trifle exagerated, yet he was among the best of our division commanders, and had seen much more hard fighting than either General Schofield or Gen- eral Cox. A general who for three years had acquitted himself with such credit in many campaigns, as to have inspired the confidence of his superiors, was not likely to disregard such an order as the one purporting to have been given to him, especially if it was repeated, as elaimed.
Another error commonly made by those who have written about the battle of Franklin, is that in the counter-charge of Riley's and Strickland's Brigades, led by Opdyke's and White's commands, that the whole of the broken line at the center was restored, while the fact is, that less than half of it was retaken. Reiley's Brigade occu- pied the line from the Columbia Pike eastward and Strickland's Brigade from the Columbia Pike westward.
Reiley's Brigade, however, had only three regiments in line, the 12th and 16th Kentucky being in reserve. Strickland had the 91st and 123d Indiana and the 50th and 183d Ohio in line. The 183d, being a new regiment, occupied about twice as much space as
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the old depleted regiments, hence the space occupied by Reiley and Strickland stood in the proportion of about 3 to 5. Both brigades were driven from their works by the force of the original charge, under cover of Lane and Conrad's retreat. The lines covered by Reiley's three regiments was recaptured, but the line occupied by Strickland's four regiments was never retaken. Our regiment stood next to Strickland's Brigade in the line, and we saw the empty ditch, as a menace to our left flank, during the remainder of the fight. This gap in our main line enabled the enemy to mass his charging columns on the outside of the works and to partially enfilade the part of the line occupied by us. There was a very slight re-entrant immediately on our left flank, which, to some extent, protected us from this fire.
Striekland's men were, however, covering the gap by their fire from a light work 300 feet in rear of the gap, where they, in retreat, rallied. This kept the enemy from scaling the works and attacking our open flank.
This gap caused the Confederates to keep up the fight upon our part of the line, when they had practically lost all hope of breaking any other part of the line. Our firing was continued at short intervals until about ten o'clock at night. On the part of the Con- federates the disposition was manifest to re-enforce their charging column here, whenever a lull in the firing permitted.
BLUNDERS OF THE CAMPAIGN FROM COLUMBIA TO NASHVILLE.
1st. Hood was permitted to make a erossing of Duck River at Davis' Ford, six miles from Schofield's headquarters, and the arrangements for getting certain information were so faulty that for 18 hours afterward, Schofield would not believe that the crossing had been made. Very slow couriers ought to have been able to move at the rate of more than a mile in three hours.
2d. Bridge's six batteries of the 4th Corps, happened to be near Spring Hill when Hood's head of column approached that place, (having been ordered to proceed to Franklin in order to get out of the way,) and largely assisted in breaking the force of the rebel charge upon our line of retreat. The Confederate officers believed that we bad a strong force at Spring Hill, owing to the strength of our artillery fire, whereas, if Bridge's batteries had not been there, there is no reason to question the success of Hood's movement npon our line of retreat.
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If Hood's movement at Spring Hill had been effective, our army would have been in a pocket, from which it could not have been extricated without great loss, if it could have escaped capture.
3d. Instead of having a closely posted cordon of outposts from the left wing of his infantry position on Duck River, so far up the river as to secure early notice of any crossing which the Confed- erates could make, it seems that Wilson's cavalry were over twelve miles away, and, when the Confederates gained a footing on the north side of the river, Forest's Confederate cavalry drove Wilson further away from our position by intervening between our infantry and cavalry. It is said that Schofield supposed that Hood would turn down the stream and strike his left flank, and he made dispo- sition of his troops to meet such an attack, and that, when Wagner's Division was sent back to Spring Hill, the purpose was to protect our trains from the Confederate cavalry.
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