USA > Pennsylvania > Northampton County > History of the One hundred and fifty-third regiment Pennsylvania volunteers infantry which was recruited in Northampton County, Pa., 1862-1863 > Part 4
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We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions, and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle.
By command of Major-General Hooker.
S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General."
What Hooker Found in the Desert.
It will further greatly facilitate the study of the Chancellorsville battle by gaining first a detailed account of the position and num- ber of rebels occupying the woods in all that region. There had been previous skirmishing with fragments of the army of the enemy in the neighborhood of The Crossings of the Rappahan- nock, reference, detailed, having already been made to this in the report of General Lee. That there would be some demon- strations in this region on the opening of the spring was to be presumed, and the very vigilant scouring of those forests by the rebel scouts was an indication that movements of some sort were on foot in this direction about the time Hooker was making his great preparations for the advance.
The troops confronting Hooker on his arrival in the forest country April 29th, were those that were on regular duty guarding the Fords and approaches all along the Rappahannock down to
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HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
Fredericksburg. Stonewall Jackson held the line from Port Royal to Hamilton's Crossing below Fredericksburg. The front line from Hamilton's Crossing to Bank's Ford (two miles northi of Salem Church) was guarded by General McLaws. All Fords northward from Bank's were fortified by a division commanded by General Anderson. All parts of that desert country were pa- trolled and watched by the cavalry in command of General J. E. B. Stuart. This entire line established by General Lee, to prevent the Federal army from crossing, was a long one for him to hold, and could not be strong at any point. By the vigi- lance of his cavalry Lee is said to have been apprised as early as the 28th of April (one day after our Army left Brooks Station) that Hooker was about crossing the river at Kelley's Ford, and on this information, being brought to him by Stuart with whom Lee at once advised, Stuart at once started out for Brandy sta- tion (on the road from Kelley's Ford to Gordonville) a point he thought Hooker's army would pass in order to gain Lee's rear and communications with Richmond. Finding his mistake Stuart at once made a circuit in the direction of Chancellorsville with the intention of impeding Hooker's progress, and thus prevent him from attacking Lee's scattered forces then guarding the roads in that vicinity. The Fords of Ely and United States were at the time guarded by Mahone's and Posey's brigades (as we have elsewhere stated). When these Ferry guards learned that Hooker was on the roads with a large force they hurriedly fell back towards Chancellorsville. Meantime Lee was being informed (at Fredericksburg, his head-quarters) that the Federal army had effected a crossing and at once sent up more troops to meet Hooker. Wright's brigade from Fredericksburg arrived. An- derson seeing the situation had already anticipated Hooker's ap- proach and had retired to a good position near the Tabernacle Church, and began entrenching.
Meantime Sickles' Corps (3d) had been ordered down from Hartwood Church (some distance north of the United States Ford), marched toward Fredericksburg on the north side of the river and encamped near Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg,
37
WHAT HOOKER FOUND IN THE DESERT
but on the 30th was ordered back to take position as a reserve near Chancellorsville. His army was composed of about 20,000 men. On the evening of the 30th (according to good authority) Lee, still in Fredericksburg, was ignorant of Hooker's plan. Meantime Sedgwick's feint, opposite Lee's headquarters, kept both Jackson and Lee busy guessing Sedgwick's intentions. The astute Lee, to meet the possibility of Sedgwick's ruse, and at the same time acting on the intelligence just brought him by Stuart, that Hooker was at Chancellorsville in heavy force, sent up troops to meet Hooker. Jackson was at the time at Moss Creek, below Hamilton's Crossing, and was ordered to go by forced march to Chancellorsville, where his men arrived at 10 a. m. Friday morning, May Ist. Having set his troops in motion, Jack- son rode swiftly and arrived in the neighborhood of the en- trenchments of Anderson at 8 a. m. McLaws having gotten an earlier start, arrived at about the same time as Jackson. Jack- son at once began the study of the situation, stopped all work on the entrenchments which had been hastily thrown up during the night of the 30th, and at once planned for aggressive work. About the time of Jackson's arrival, the Union cavalry under Pleasanton were engaging Anderson's pickets.
Hooker had now 64,000 men in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. and all the troops of Lee, except Early's division of Jackson's Corps, and a brigade of McLaw's division of Longstreet's Corps which were left to hold Fredericksburg against Sedgwick, were now confronting Hooker. Hooker had ordered an attack for Friday morning II o'clock. (My Diary makes a record of our Regiment going out towards Chancellorsville about 9 a. m. and soon returning to former position). Doubleday says that Hooker started out to meet Lee in 4 columns; that Slocum, followed by Howard, took the Plank Road on the right; Sykes' division of Meade's Corps, followed by Hancock's division of Couch's Corps, went by the Turnpike in the center; the remainder of Meade's Corps,-Griffin's division-followed by that of Hum- phrey's, took the River Road. French's division of Couch's Corps turned off towards Todd's Tavern. Each column was
38
HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
headed by a detachment of Pleasanton's Cavalry. One brigade of Sickles' Corps was sent to Dowdall's Tavern (known as Melzi
Copyright, 1888, by THE CENTURY CO.
Chancellor's house) and another brigade (of Sickles') was left at the United States Ford to guard against Fitzhugh Lee's Cavalry.
Hooker's Headquarters at Chancellorsville, Saturday Morning, May 2d, '63. The picture faces South. From a war-time sketch.
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WHAT HOOKER FOUND IN THE DESERT
This was the situation around Chancellorsville on the morning of May I. The chiefs of both armies were now coming face to face. As the 153d Regiment was posted on the extreme right, and all troops were obliged to move in very close columns and through the only road on the line on which the Corps was posted through that dense woods, the right of the Eleventh Corps de- ploying would not get very far down toward Chancellorsville. Our regiment was not only the last one on the right of the Corps, but was formed at right angles and in that position was exposed to the heavy mass of the enemy approaching from the west.
There seem often unknown reasons for failure in military operations while no mortal man can prove that there has not been interposition of Divine Providence. That this was so in the indecisive battle of Chancellorsville one can readily accept. In such cases it is often of great importance to reserve all judg- ment as to the issue until another or other engagements have occurred.
Hooker's plan, magnificent as it was, and without parallel, em- braced too much when it contemplated the destruction of the en- tire army of Northern Virginia. He did not sufficiently count on the powerful stimulus that moved the Confederate Army at that stage of the war. He had not been sufficiently impressed with the awful impulse that was leading them to desperation because they felt that they had far more to lose than we had to gain at that perilous hour. The defeats of the Federal Army had been, to a considerable extent depressing to the loyal people of the Union, but not sufficiently so to fully arouse them to the danger of losing their cause. Such was the preponderance of national power on account of the larger military and of the great resources of the North, that no fears were entertained by Hooker that the North would not be able to put down the Re- bellion. It was evidently in the mind of Hooker that with an army twice the size of Lee's he ought to be victorious, for on no other account could his sanguinary address to his troops, just before the battle be explained.
It cannot be gainsaid that the extreme right of the line of
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HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
Hooker, where the 153d was posted at the time of Jackson's at- tack, was weak and most defenseless in respect of a surprise by a large force, having had but the merest apology of a barricade made of a few slashed trees, and the ground where the Gilsa brigade was posted was wholly impassable for cavalry and ar- tillery, it must also be remembered that the density of the thicket prevented the seeing of an enemy one rod ahead of the line. It is also significant that so far as the number of men and their efficiency were concerned this part of the line held by the 153d Regiment was as strong defensively as much of the main line from Chancellorsville to the angle formed by the 153d in the woods. The main difficulty arose from the uncertainty of Jackson's detour. If an attack of that nature had been known (not as a possibility) positively, Hooker would no doubt have made disposition to meet it. The post would not have been left without heavy breastworks and redoubts on flank, and the support of another corps.
The fact that early on Saturday morning Hooker and Sickles rode along the entire line for inspection, and that the command- ing General suggested some important changes on the line of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, and recommended increase of re- serves in some places, and closed with the oft-quoted words, "please advance your pickets for purposes of observation, as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information on the ap- proach of the enemy," absolutely settled nothing. All that his ad- vice covered, Gen. Howard says, was immediately done. The tes- timony is that detacliments from Gilsa's brigade went far out for observation. Their first relief and return to the line was not fully accomplished before the enemy was upon them in force. Their contact with videttes had been the intimation that the enemy was feeling the locality and possible strength of the Federal army. From a number of reports from various Con- federate officers since the war the whole wooded territory be- tween Chancellorsville and the Furnace one and a half miles south of the plank road, and all intervening forest country in front of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, on Friday swarmed
4I
WHAT HOOKER FOUND IN THE DESERT
with fragments of infantry organizations, couriers, artillery cavalry, videttes, and the usual attendants of an army, and that all movements and skirmishings had reference to the finding and attack of the Federal army. All day Friday Jackson was busy organizing, directing, disposing his forces under the various com- manders, and completing his plans for the famous detour. Lee's opinion that Hooker's position, from the nature of the country, and the strong fortifications he had built, was impregnable, was the primary cause of Jackson's march around to the rear of Hooker. In the scheme of Jackson there was also laid the plan of gaining the roads north of Chancellorsville by way of cutting off Hooker from means of retreat across the Rappahannock. This course was very evident in the act of Stuart's cavalry forces maneuvering in the region of the fords, at the same time that Jackson was driving the broken columns of the right of Hooker's army. General Howard has informed the writer that General Fitzhugh Lee told him since the war that Jackson's lines would not have extended beyond von Gilsa's right had not he from his (Fitzhugh Lee's) reconnoitering ascertained the exact location of Gilsa and that as soon as he did so he informed Jackson and guided him to the extreme right, and that by this timely infor- mation the enemy over-lapped Gilsa's right and the 153d by at least a quarter of a mile. This accounts for the appearance of Confederates firing upon our fleeing troops from the north.
While Jackson lay suffering pain from his wounds on Satur- day night, he gave Hill, his successor, a last order which un- doubtedly had reference to the theory that much of his detour plan embraced cutting off Hooker from the Rappahannock cross- ings. He said to Hill: "Press them; cut them off from the United States ford, Hill; press them." It is plainly shown also that it was part of Jackson's plan to draw in all his forces and drive Hooker to a centralized point at or near the fields of the White house.
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HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
The Enemy's Side of the Story.
To assist the reader in grasping the key to the true situation on the Chancellorsville battleground, and what the Federal army had to confront, I produce the report of General Lee :
"Headquarters, Guiney's Station, Va., May 5, 1863.
At the close of the battle of Chancellorsville, on Sunday, the enemy was reported advancing from Fredricksburg in our rear. General MeLaws was sent back to arrest his progress, and repulsed him handsomely that afternoon at Tabernacle Church. Learning that this force consisted of two corps under General Sedgwick, I determined to attack it. Leaving a sufficient force to hold General Hooker in check, who had not recrossed the Rappahannock, as was reported, but occupied a strong position in front of United States Ford, I marched back yesterday with General Anderson, and, uniting with MeLaws and Early in the afternoon, succeeded by the blessing of heaven, in driving General Sedgwick over the river. We have reoccupied Fredericksburg, and no enemy remains south of the Rappahannock in its vicinity.
His Excellency President Davis.
R. E. LEE, General."
"Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, Sept. 23, 1863. General S. Cooper, Adjutant General :
General : I have the honor to transmit herewith my report of the opera- tions of this army from the time the enemy crossed the Rappahannock, on April 28, last, to his retreat over the river on the night of May 5, em- bracing the battles of Chancellorsville, Salem Church, etc. I also forward the reports of the several commanding officers of corps, divisions, brigades and regiments, and the returns of the medical and ordnance departments, together with a map, etc.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE, General."
The following are extracts of General Lee's complete report, dated September 21, 1863 :
"After the battle of Fredericksburg, (December, 1862,) the army re- mained encamped on the south side of the Rappahannock until the latter
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THE ENEMY'S SIDE OF THE STORY
part of April .... two brigades were .... stationed near the United States Mine (or Bark Mill) Ford, and a third guarded Bank's Ford ... the cavalry was distributed on both flanks, Fitzhugh Lee's brigade picketing the Rappahannock above the mouth of the Rapidan, and W. H. F. Lee's near Port Royal . . . Hampton's brigade had been sent into the interior to recruit. General Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps, was de- tached for service south of the James river . . . With the exception of the engagement between Fitzhugh Lee's brigade and the enemy's cavalry near Kelley's Ford March 17, nothing of interest transpired during this period of inactivity.
On April 14, intelligence was received that the enemy's cavalry was con- centrating on the Upper Rappahannock. Their efforts to establish them- selves on the south side of the river were successfully resisted. About (April) the 21st, small bodies of infantry appeared at Kelley's Ford and the Rappahannock bridge, and almost at the same time a demonstration was made opposite Port Royal (below Fredericksburg) where a party of infantry crossed the river about the 23rd. These movements were evi- dently intended to conceal the design of the enemy, but, taken in connec- tion with the reports of scouts, indicated that the Federal Army, now commanded by Major-General Hooker, was about to resume active operations .*
At 5.30 a. m. on April 28, the enemy crossed the Rappahannock in boats near Fredericksburg, and, driving off the pickets on the river, pro- ceeded to lay pontoon bridges a short distance below the mouth of Deep Run. Later in the afternoon another bridge was constructed about a mile below the first . . . our dispositions were accordingly made . . . no demonstration was made opposite any other part of our lines at Fredericksburg, and the strength of the force that had crossed and its apparent indisposition to attack indicated that the principal effort would be made in some other quarter. This impression was confirmed by in- telligence received from General Stuart that a large body of infantry and artillery was passing up the river (these were our corps which left Brook's Station on the 27th of April on the march to Kelley's Ford) . . during the forenoon of the 29th, that officer (Stuart) reported that the enemy had crossed in force, near Kelley's Ford on the preceding evening. Later in the day he announced that a heavy column was moving from Kelley's
*Editor's notes in parentheses.
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HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
to Germanna Ford on the Rapidan, and another toward Ely's Ford (those troops crossing at the Germanna Ford were the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, and those crossing the Ely's Ford the Fifth Corps under Meade) . The routes they were pursuing after they crossed the Rapidan converge near Chancellorsville, where several roads lead to the rear of our position at Fredericksburg.
On the night of the 29th, General Anderson was directed to proceed toward Chancellorsville, and dispose Wright's brigade and the troops from the Bark Mill Ford ( Mahone and Posey's) to cover these roads. Arriving at Chancellorsville about midnight, he found the commands of Generals Ma- hone and Posey already there, having been withdrawn from the Bark Mill Ford, with the exception of a small guard. Learning that the enemy had crossed the Rapidan, and were approaching in strong force. General Anderson retired early on the morning of the 30th, to the intersection of the Mine and Plank roads, near Tabernacle Church, (a mile or more south- east of Chancellorsville) and began to entrench himself. The enemy's cavalry (Pleasanton's) skirmished with his rear guard as he left Chan- cellorsville. The enemy in our front near Fredericksburg continued in- active, and it was now apparent that the main attack would be made on flank and rear. It was therefore determined to leave sufficient troops to hold our lines (at Fredericksburg) and with the main body of the army to give battle to the approaching column . . . and at midnight on the 30th, General McLaws moved with the rest of his command toward Chan- cellorsville. General Jackson followed at dawn next morning with the remaining divisions of his corps. He reached the position occupied by General Anderson at 8 a. m. and immediately began preparations to ad- vance."
Skirmishings.
These preparations with all day skirmishings of the cavalry and infantry along the entire southern front of our line on the plank road to ascertain our position and strength, made the impression upon us (privates) as we lay in the woods on the extreme right, that a constant battle was going on somewhere. Meantime dur- ing the night Wilcox's brigade had been ordered back to guard Bank's Ford.
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THE WOUNDING OF JACKSON
The Wounding of Jackson.
A very singular incident, and one fraught with momentous consequences, occurred at the time of the wounding of General Jackson. It was at this very time that the rebel General Stuart was busy on our rear to cut us off the road to Ely's Ford. Also at the same time General Hill was wounded. Both Jackson and Hill being disabled at about the same time, it necessitated calling for General Stuart, who was at that very hour engaged in his mis- chievous work distributing his cavalry forces on our rear to pre- vent our retreat. It was with great difficulty that Stuart found his way through the darkness and dense wilderness to come to the scene where Jackson had been injured and to assume com- mand. We quote from Lee's Report :
"Upon General Stuart's arrival, soon afterwards, the command was turned over to him by General Hill. He immediately proceeded to re- connoiter the ground and make himself acquainted with the disposition of the troops. The darkness of the night and the difficulty of moving through the woods and undergrowth rendered it advisable to defer opera- tions until morning, and the troops rested on their arms in line of battle."
Jackson and Hill had not been good friends, but there in the darkness the Great Stonewall Jackson "buried the hatchet," made no mention of old scores and asked Hill to assume command of his demoralized and broken corps. Captain Taylor, now a resident of the Taylor Hill mansion, near Fredericksburg, inform- ed the writer (on a visit at his home) that at the time Jackson was wounded he (Taylor) was a guide on Hill's personal staff while the rebel troops occupied the wilderness, and that he with others who were natives of that section rendered service of pointing out the byways and paths of that wooded country. Taylor told the writer that he was present at the time when Jackson's first divisions arrived in the rear of the 11th Corps on Saturday afternoon, and that the advance was made almost immediately on the arrival of Jackson's first division. He also stated that General Hill was bending over the wounded Jackson
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HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
trying to assist him when Hill himself received the wound which disabled him also.
The writer distinctly recollects having heard on Sunday of the wounding of Jackson and that it was done by accident by his own men. This intelligence came to us on the following day after its occurrence.
Account by Captain Owen Rice.
Captain Owen Rice, giving an account of the activities of the armies on Friday and Saturday, says : "Recalled from the lines above Port Royal, Jackson at 8 a. m. had effected a junction with Anderson and McLaws, now front- ing our center and left. An advance of less than three miles east of Chancellorsville, therefore found the enemy. But no sooner had the more open country solved the difficulties of de- ployment, and rendered available all divisions in hand ; no sooner had the enemy's lines unmasked and a strong fighting position been attained, than as sudden a return to the wilderness was commanded. the brimming enthusiasm of the men cast down, every coigne of vantage resigned, the reserve artillery, at Bank's Ford, distanced by twelve miles of difficult roads, Sedgwick as far removed from support, or supporting relations, and, without serious loss or harassing resistance, the columns returned to the position last held, with the diverging roads, and open space around the Chancellor house as the defensive center.
The position as skillfully developed by the engineers in the semi-confusion of the recall, lay within the wilderness a vast tract of forest with occasional and not far-reaching clear- ings adjoining the highways and habitations, with thickets, and tangled meshes of native shrubbery, fallen trees, interlaced by creeping vines, whose rebel tenacity was scdulously asserted, thorny shrubs, briars, and festive Christmas holly, blinding pines, and lancinating scrub-oaks clustered around the standing timber far along the Orange and Culpepper Roads to the West of
47
CAUSES OF HOOKER'S DEFEAT
Dowdall's, northward for miles to the Rappahannock, and south- ward for leagues to the skirts of Spottsylvania, with irregular undulating elevations along the streams. The left securely rest- ing on the Rappahannock, and facing eastward was held by Meade, the Second Corps prolonging the line southward to the Turnpike with Hancock's division well thrust forward on an eminence overlooking Mott Run; and then curving westward, the line, in front of Fair View, held by Slocum's (12th) Corps, faced southward, on a bold elevation, flanked to the west by the less elevated but not more commanding Hazel Hill. To the west, with an interval of at least two divisions' fronts, in echelon to Slocum and in front of the Plank Road, the Eleventh Corps prolonged the south front to a point at which the road forked into the Orange Road to southwest, and the Culpepper Road to the northwest."
Causes of Hooker's Defeat.
In Harper's "History of the Great Rebellion" appears an ac- count of Hooker's defeat, of which we can say as Horace Greely did of startling articles presented to him, "Important if true." I adduce the following extracts from the Harper History as a sample of the legion of "expert testimony" witnesses in the case. The writers who never saw a battle have often been the most rhetorical and have labored hardest to show the novel reader how impossibilities ought to have been mastered. We are com- pelled to have far less respect for the man who persistently blames certain officers for the blunder of that battle, than we have for the men on whom the odium has been cast. The writer cannot be convinced that any of the Generals were designing men or willfully negligent on that momentous occasion. The narra- tor says :
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