USA > Pennsylvania > Northampton County > History of the One hundred and fifty-third regiment Pennsylvania volunteers infantry which was recruited in Northampton County, Pa., 1862-1863 > Part 5
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25
"There was not, in fact, any moment between Thursday afternoon and Tuesday morning when success was not wholly within the grasp of the Union army."
48
HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
This statement expresses an opinion; that is all. The corre- spondent continues : "The movement by which Chancellorsville was reached, and the Confederate position rendered worthless, was brilliantly conceived and admirably executed. The initial error by which alone all else was rendered possible, was that halt at Chancellorsville. Had the march been continued for an hour longer, or even been resumed on the fol- lowing morning, the army would have got clear of the wilderness without meeting any great opposing force, and then would have been in position where its great superiority of numbers would have told.
The rout of Howard's Corps was possible only from the gross- est neglect of all military precautions. Jackson after a toilsome march of ten hours, halted for three hours in open ground, not two miles from the Union lines. A single picket, sent a mile up a broad road, would have discovered the whole movement in ample time for Howard to have strengthened his position or to have withdrawn from it without loss. The blame of this surprise cannot, however, fairly be laid upon Hooker. He had a right to presume that whoever was in command there would have picketed his lines so as to prevent the possibility of being surprised in broad daylight. But even here as it was, the disaster to the Eleventh Corps should have had no serious effect upon the general result. That was fully remedied when the pursuit was checked. On Sunday morning Hooker was in a better position than he had been the evening before. He had lost three thousand men and had been strengthened by 17,000, and now has 78,000 to oppose to 47,000. The Confederate army could reunite only by winning a battle or by a day's march. The only thing which could have lost the battle of the day was the abandonment of the position at Hazel Grove, for from this alone was it possible to enfilade Slocum's line. But surely it is within the limits of military forethought that a general who has occupied a position for two days and three nights should have discovered the very key to that position, when it lay within a mile of his own head- quarters. The disabling of Hooker could not, indeed, have been
49
EXTRACT : O. O. HOWARD
foreseen ; but such an accident might happen to any commander upon any field ; and there should have been somewhere some man with authority to have, within the space of three hours, brought into action some of the more than thirty thousand men within sound, and almost within sight, of the battle then raging. How the hours from Sunday noon till night were wasted has been shown. Hooker indeed, reiterates that he could not assail the Confederate lines through the dense forests. But Lee broke through those very woods on Sunday, and was minded to at- tempt it again on Wednesday, when he found that the enemy had disappeared. The golden opportunity was lost, never to be recovered, and the Confederate army of Northern Virginia gain- ed a new lease of life."
The comment the writer has to make on the above quotation is brief for the reason that what elsewhere appears on this subject will refute some of the strong statements of the Harper authority, while the other will be confirmed. It should be very gratifying to the reader to be allowed to hear what the men have to say who conducted the conflict. Among the many excellent articles in a work entitled the "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," pub- lished in 1894, the Century Magazine people have given very clever accounts by the generals who participated in the battles. The following extracts are by Howard :
Extract: 0. 0. Howard.
"The country around Chancellorsville for the most part is wilderness, with but here and there an opening. If we consult the recent maps (no good ones existed before the battle), we notice that the two famous rivers, the Rapidan and the Rappahannock, join at a point due north of Chancellorsville, thence the Rappahannock runs easterly for two miles, till suddenly at the United States Ford it turns and flows south for a mile and a half, and then, turning again, completes a horse shoe bend. Here, on the south shore, was General Hooker's battle-line on the morning of the 2d of May. 1863. Here his five army corps, those of Meade, Slocum, Couch, Sickles, and Howard, were deployed. The face was
4
50
HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
toward the south, and the ranks mainly occupied a ridge nearly parallel with the Rapidan.
Our opponents, under General Robert E. Lee, the evening before, were about two miles distant toward Fredericksburg, and thus between us and Sedgwick. Lee had immediately with him the divisions of MeLaws, An- derson, Rodes, Colston, and A. P. Hill, besides some cavalry under Stuart. He held for his line of battle, a comparative short front between the Rappahannock and the Catherine Furnace, not exceeding two miles and a half in extent. His right wing, not far from the river, was be- hind Mott Run, which flows due cast, and his left was deployed along the Catherine Furnace road.
Could Hooker, on the first day of May, have known Lee's exact loca- tion he never could have had a better opportunity for taking the offen- sive. But he did not know, and after the few troops advancing toward Fredericksburg had met the approaching enemy he ordered all back to the 'old position,' the Chancellorsville line. . .. On the preceding Thurs- day . .. the right wing . .. Meade's, Slocum's and mine . . . by 4 o'clock in the afternoon had reached the vicinity of Chancellorsville, where Slocum, who was the senior commander present, established his head- quarters. I, approaching from Germanna Ford, halted my divisions at Dowdall's Tavern and encamped there. Then I rode along the Plank road through the almost continuous forest to the Chancellorsville House. There I reported to Slocum. He said that the orders were for me to cover the right of the general line, posting my command near Dowdall's Tavern. He pointed to a place on the map marked 'Mill' near there on a branch of the Hunting Run, and said, 'Establish your right there.' Gen- eral Slocum promised, with the 12th Corps, to occupy the place between his headquarters and Dowdall's clearing, but, finding the distance too great, one of his division commanders sent me word that I must cover the last three-quarters of a mile of the Plank road. This was done by a brigade of General Steinwehr, the commander of my left division, though with regret on our part, because it required all the Corps' reserves to fill up that gap. The so-called Dowdall's Tavern was at that time the home of Melzi Chancellor. . .. I placed my headquarters at his house. In front of me, facing south along a curving ridge, the right of Steinwehr's division was located. He had but two brigades, Barlow on the Plank road and Buschbeck on his right. With them Steinwehr covered a mile,
5I
EXTRACT: O. O. HOWARD
leaving but two regiments for reserve. These he put some two hundred yards to his rear, near the little Wilderness Church.
Next to Steinwehr, toward our right, came General Carl Schurz's di- vision. First was Captain Dilger's battery . . . his guns pointed to the southwest and west, along the Orange Plank Road. Next was Krzyzanowski's brigade, about half on the front and half in reserve. Schurz's right brigade was that of Schimmelphenning, disposed in the same manner, a part deployed and the remainder kept a few hundred yards back for a reserve. Schurz's front line of infantry extended along the old turnpike and faced to the southwest. The right division of the Corps was commanded by General Charles Devens. Devens and I together had carefully reconnoitered both Orange Plank Road and the old Turn- pike for at least three miles toward the west. . . . He established his division-the Second Brigade, under McLean, next to Schurz's first, and then pushing on the pike for half a mile he deployed the other, Gilsa's at right angles facing west, connecting his two parts by a thin skirmish line. Colonel Gilsa's brigade was afterward drawn back, still facing west, at right angles to the line, so as to make a more solid connection, and so that, constituting, as it did, the main right flank, the reserve of the Corps could be brought up more promptly to its support, by extending its right to the north, should an enemy by any possible contingency get so far around. A section of Dickmann's battery which looked to the west along the old pike was located at the angle.
The reserve batteries, twelve guns, were put upon a ridge abreast of the little church and pointed toward the northwest, with a view to sweep all approaches to the north of Gilsa, firing up a gradually ascending slope. This ridge, where I stood during the battle, was central, and besides, en- abled the artillerymen to enfilade either roadway, or meet an attack from south, west, or north. Here epaulments for the batteries were con- structed, and cross-entrenchments for battery supports were dug, ex- tending from the little church across all the open ground that stretched away from the tavern to the right of Deven's line.
To my great comfort, General Sickles' Corps came up on Friday, May Ist, and took from our left Steinwehr's three-quarters of a mile of the Plank road. Thus he relieved from the front line Barlow's brigade, giving me, besides the several division reserves, General Barlow with 1500 men as a general reserve for the Corps. These were massed near the
52
HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
cross-entrenchments and held avowedly to support the batteries and pro- tect General Devens' exposed right flank.
As to pickets, each division had a good line of them. My aide, Major Charles H. Howard, assisted in connecting them between divisions, and during the 2nd of May, that fearless and faithful staff-officer, Major E. Whittlesey, rode the entire circuit of their front to stimulate them to special activity. Those of Devens were 'thrown out at a distance from a half-mile to a mile and stretching well around, covering our right flank ;' and the picket-posts in front on the pike were over two miles beyond the main line.
Meanwhile the Confederate General Rodes had been reaching his place in the wilderness. At 4 p. m. his men were in position; the line of battle of his own brigade touched the pike west of us with its right, and stretched away to the north: beyond his brigade came Iverson's in the same line. On the right of the pike was Dole's brigade, and to his right Colquitt's. One hundred yards to the rear was Trimble's (Colston com- manding) with Ramseur on the right following Colquitt . . . followed by the division of A. P. Hill. The advance Confederate division had more men in it than there were in the Eleventh Corps now in position. Counting the ranks of this formidable column, beginning with the en- veloping skirmish line, we find seven, besides the 3 ranks of file-closers. Many of them were brought into such a position by the entanglements of the forest, and gave our men the idea that battalions were formed in close columns doubled on the center. With as little noise as possible, a little after 5 p. m., the steady advance of the enemy began. Its first lively effects, like a cloud of dust driven before a coming shower, ap- peared in the startled rabbits, squirrels, quail, etc."
53
WHY LEE DID NOT FOLLOW UP OUR RETIREMENT
Why Lee Did Not Follow Up Our Retirement Across the River.
Our forces having drawn toward the United States Ford, the place which Hooker had previously selected for the crossing in case of defeat, very naturally had strong earthworks thrown up for final defense.
Doubleday says :
"Our front gradually melted away and passed to the new line in the rear through Humphrey's division of the Fifth Corps, which was posted about half a mile north of the Chancellorsville House in the edge of the thicket, to cover the retreat. At last only indomitable Hancock (Penn- sylvania's gallant son) remained, fighting McLaws with his front line, and keeping back Stuart and Anderson with his rear line.
The enemy, Jackson's Corps, showed little disposition to follow up this success. The fact is, these veterans were about fought out, and became almost inert. They did not, at the last, even press Hancock, who was still strong in artillery, and withdrew his main body in good order.
Stuart's command had lost 7500 in his attack, and it could hardly have resisted a fresh force if it had been thrown in. General William Hays, of the Second Corps, who was taken prisoner, says they (the rebels) were worn out, and Rodes admits in his report that Jackson's veterans clung to their entrenchments, and that Ramseur and others who passed them, urged them to go forward in vain.
The new line thus taken up by the Union Army was a semi-ellipse with the left resting on the Rappahannock and the right on the Rapidan. Its center was at Bullock's House, about three-fourths of a mile north of Chancellorsville. The approaches were well guarded with artillery, and the line partially entrenched. The enemy did not assail it. They made a reconnoissance in the afternoon, but Weed's artillery at the appex of the line was too strongly posted to be forced, and Lee soon found other employment for his troops, for Sedgwick was approaching to attack his rear."
Lee in his Report, dated September 21, 1863, says of this situation :
"The enemy was driven from all its fortified positions, with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and retreated toward the Rappahannock.
54
HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
By 10 a. m. we were in full possession of the field. The troops, having become somewhat scattered by the difficulties of the ground and the ardor of the contest, were immediately reformed pre- paratory to renewing the attack. The enemy had withdrawn to a strong position nearer to the Rappahannock, which he had previously fortified. His superiority of numbers, the unfavorable nature of the ground, which was densely wooded, and the condition of our troops after the arduous and sanguinary conflict in which they had been engaged, ren- dered great caution necessary. Our preparations were just completed when further operations were arrested by intelligence received from Fred- ericksburg."
As soon as the operations in the enemy's rear toward Fred- ericksburg, where Sedgwick was pressing them, were over, and Fredericksburg had been evacuated by the Union troops, and Lee learned that our position was well fortified around the United States Ford, it was deemed inexpedient for him to assail our forces with less than the whole rebel army, which, as Lee says, could not be concentrated until they were relieved from the danger which threatened them in the direction toward Fredericks- burg. Accordingly on the 4th ( Monday) Anderson was directed to join MeLaws to impede Sedgwick's approach, the three di- visions of Jackson meantime remaining in our front about Chan- cellorsville. On the morning of the 5th the discovery was made that Sedgwick had recrossed the river below Bank's Ford, had taken up his pontoons, so that Anderson and MeLaws were hur- ried back to Chancellorsville. They reached their destination dur- ing the afternoon of the 5th. They tell it that preparations were made to assail us on the morning of the 6th, and that on advancing their skirmishiers they found that under cover of the storm and the darkness of the night our armies had retreated over the river.
55
THE THREE DAYS BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
The Three Days Battle of Gettysburg.
Gettysburg has long contributed its epic story and added its stars to the galaxy of distinguished warriors, and will for many years to come be a fruitful theme in history for the school boy and the statesman. Modestly for ourselves, but more for the glory of our Commonwealth, we wish to add the record of our part in the achievements of that world-famed battle.
On that ever memorable forced march from Emmitsburg on the Ist day of July, 1863, we soon became aware that in our northward move the time and place of collision with Lee's army was imminently near, but his destination was uncertain. How- ever, the reconnoissance of Pleasanton's cavalry had made cap- ture of a recent order by Lee affording valuable information to Meade concerning Lee's proposed invasion of Pennsylvania. Meantime Stuart in command of the Confederate cavalry was making his famous raid and his great detour and separation from the infantry gave Lee some alarm. Meade's plan was twofold. He kept in mind the protection of Baltimore and Washington, and at the same time sought the whereabouts of the Confederate army with the purpose of giving battle.
Early July Ist, two brigades of our cavalry, under command of General Buford, arrived in Gettysburg, much to the joy of the excited citizens, who had been visited the day before by some rebel soldiers. They had come in from the western direction, appearing in the neighborhood of the Lutheran Seminary. The object of their coming to town was to look for supplies, especially shoes. After examining the town and its surroundings through their field glasses they returned to Cashtown, about seven miles distant, leaving their pickets within a few miles of the town.
Having in the meantime learned from some citizens, that the Army of the Potomac was moving in the direction, Lee at once ordered the concentration of his troops who were scattered in var- ious places. On the evening of June 30th, they were encamped as follows: A. P. Hill on the Chambersburg turnpike, with two of his divisions near Cashtown, and the Third division ( Anderson's)
56
HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
at Fayetteville. Ewell (Second Corps) was at Heidelburg, with- in eleven miles. He had just returned from his visit of York, Carlisle, and the vicinity of the Susquehanna river. The Third Corps was at Chambersburg, Lee's headquarters, twenty-four miles away. The cavalry in command of the ubiquitous Gen. Stuart, was widely scattered, closing out a great detour to join the main army.
The Federal troops under General Meade, who had been placed in command of our forces two days before, were also scattered over a wide territory. Immediately on his appointment, Meade had it in mind that the collision with Lee would take place at Clay Pipe Creek, twelve miles below Gettysburg.
Buford, with nothing but his cavalry to meet the approaching troops of the enemy, knowing that the Eleventh Corps, under General O. O. Howard, and the First Corps ( Reynolds) were not far away, decided to resist the rebel advance he found at Gettysburg. Reynolds was on the Emmitsburg road about five miles below Gettysburg, and Howard was at Emmitsburg.
Before proceeding farther with the account of the initial move- ments leading up to the great battle it will be of intense interest to the reader to be informed on two very important questions at this stage of the impending battle. First, how Lee came to turn back from his advanced position near the Capitol of our State, and select Gettysburg as the possible place to meet the Union Army; and in the second inquiry, how Meade learned of the intentions and concentration of Lee.
First of all, "Maryland, My Maryland," did not dance to his piping. On the approach of the grand Rebel army she did not "breathe" out her loyal sentiments, as he hoped she would. Lee was sadly disappointed in her conduct. He had mentioned in every order to his troops not to maraud her homes, and phunder her stores, but to buy her provisions and pay for them in Confederate serip, or give a Davis Receipt for the purchase. He had counted on a secret movement behind the Blue Ridge and only guarded the gaps with sufficient cavalry to conceal his march.
General Meade.
57
THE THREE DAYS BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
For the subsistence of his vast army after entering northern soil he relied upon the forage of the country, and for that reason as well as that of the concealment of his troops, his forces moved in somewhat detached form. He was ignorant of the location and movements of Hooker up to within a few days of the last of June. Lee had touched over one hundred towns, villages and places of encampment in reaching the fertile fields of the Keystone State. His great army had come into the "Land flowing with milk and honey." How rich a boon for those half-starved, emaciated soldiers of whose condition their great General Longstreet, in liis "History of the Army of Northern Virginia," spoke in the follow- ing words : "General Lee was actually so crippled by his victory (Chancellorsville), that he was a full month restoring his army to condition to take the field." There is scarcely a report of the many made by General Lee, which does not make mention of the direful misfortune which might overtake his army if cut off from its base of supplies, and with great urgency commands all forage not needed to be conveyed to Richmond with all surplus baggage and equippage. He was now getting slowly into northern en- vironments. The atmosphere was not as exhilarating as he had hoped to find. The "genial gods" had not completed their work for his early reception, and a raging storm was now threatening his safety. Several incidents combined to give him a chill. Thoughts of home (Richmond) the defenseless citadel he had stripped to swell his marauding army, caused feelings of grow- ing apprehension for the safety of the lives, the treasures, the archives of the Capitol of the tottering Confederacy. The sym- pathy and fleets he vainly hoped for, which were secretly con- ditioned on his successful establishment of his army on Northern soil, did not now seem so near coming his way. He was not unaware that the Federal Capitol was relying on the Army of the Potomac for its protection and in repeated appeals to his Confederate dignitaries urged the organization of an army at Culpepper with a double purpose of calling off Hooker from the defenses of the Federal Capitol, and from an attack of Rich- mond. Winchester and Martinsburg were at the time being held by Hooker as outposts, and neither of them of great defensive
58
HISTORY OF THE 153D REGT.
value. Hooker, after a most successful parallel march, between the enemy and the cities of Baltimore and Washington, faithfully protected these important places and harassed the enemy's line of communication with Richmond, a possible event about which Lee was ever the most sensitive. For this purpose, however, Hooker had dispatched Slocum in support of French (at Harper's Ferry on the 26th) and now desiring to take more aggressive measures respecting Lee's movements, applied to the authorities at Washington for permission to take up the garrison at Har- per's Ferry and with the combined troops of French and Slocum, attack Lee's rear, meantime preserving their own line of retreat. Hooker's request was denied and he accordingly resented this bold refusal and offered his resignation, which was accepted. On the same day (June 28th) George G. Meade was appointed to command the Army of the Potomac.
On the same date (June 28th) in a communication of even date, Jefferson Davis, President at Richmond, refers to a letter from Lee, in which the following words occur :
"I wish to have every man that can be spared, and desire that Cooke's Brigade may be sent forward .. . if it is not needed at Richmond. I think there will be no necessity for keeping a large number of troops at that place, especially if the plan of assembling an army at Culpepper Court House, under Beauregard, be adopted."
In answer to this and in keeping with the many other alarming letters respecting affairs at Vicksburg, and other points at the South, and of the safety of Richmond, Lee says :
"Wise's Brigade is as you left it, engaged in the defense of Richmond, and serving in the country east of the city. The enemy have been reported in large force at White House, with indications of an advance on Rich- mond. Your advance increases our want of cavalry on the north and cast of the city. General Elzey is positive that the enemy intends to at- tack here. Do not understand me as balancing accounts in the matter of brigades ; I only repeat that I have not many to send you, and enough to form an army to threaten, if not capture, Washington, as soon as it is uncovered by Hooker's army."
59
THE THREE DAYS BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
There can be no doubt that these are among the strongest rea- sons for Lee's pause in his northward movement. Lee had an eye on the two cities-Philadelphia and Washington-but for very timely information that Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was concentrating in a way to cause him alarm, Lee might have had courage enough to continue his advance. It is reported that this reverse intelligence was furnished him by some stray countryman, and upon learning that some late dispositions of the Federal army would endanger liis rear and communications with Richmond, had changed his mind. While his further stay in the country amid blooming clover, ripening harvests, delightful climate could continue to offer inducements to remain North, it dawned on him that he might soon be sadly in need of ammunition from what he could learn of certain maneuvers of the enemy ; and that such useful articles as shot for heavy ordnance could not be easily found in those peaceful regions. His promptness in facing about was undoubtedly the culmination of some fears which the wise generalship of the astute Hooker helped to create in his mind. So far in the gigantic scheme of the infamous invasion, its frustration is due to the brilliant "Fighting Joe Hooker," whose name and presence had ever been an inspiration to the famous Eleventh Corps, and of the Army of the Potomac. His resigna- tion was his own suggestion, but the promptness of its acceptance has left room for inference that the act was not a matter of re- luctance on the part of the chief at the department, who could always exceed President Lincoln in the art of severing men's connection with the service.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.