USA > Pennsylvania > The Pennsylvania-German in the Revolutionary War, 1775-1783 > Part 10
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finding that they could make no impression upon the American army, and utterly exhausted by the heat of the day, retired in confusion and with great loss.
The repulse of the bayonet charge of the British Guards and Grenadiers, forming the elite of their infantry, and regarded by their countrymen, ever since the days of Crécy and Agincourt, as the most formidable warriors in the world when armed with such a weapon, by a body of American yeomen, most of whom were Pennsylvanians, and not a few Pennsylvania-Germans, under a Pennsyl- vania general-men who were inferior in numbers and imperfect in discipline, who had just been rallied after an ignominious retreat-must be regarded, in the progress of the Revolution, as a prodigious historical event.
The only thing to mar the rejoicings of the day was the conduct of General Lee. He was brought before a court- martial and tried for both disobedience of orders and for misbehavior before the enemy in making an unnecessary retreat, being found guilty on both charges.
The duty of the army, for nearly eighteen months after the battle of Monmouth, consisted in ingloriously watch- ing the enemy at New York, lest they should sally forth and make destructive raids in Jersey, or should attempt to recover possession of the Highlands of the Hudson.
To that end the American army was drawn up in the form of a segment of a circle. extending from Middle- brook, in New Jersey, to the Delaware on the south, and, on the north, to Long Island Sound.
The winter of 1778-79 was passed in camp at Middle- brook, where the Pennsylvania Line suffered almost be- yond endurance, not only from a want of clothing and supplies of all kinds, but also from the payment of their wages in money of merely a nominal value.
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BATTLE OF MONMOUTH, JUNE 28. 1778.
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In June, 1779, Gen. Washington was extremely de- sirous of recapturing two forts,-one at Stony Point, on the western side of the Hudson River, and the other at Verplanck's Point, opposite on the eastern side -- which guarded the approach to King's Ferry, and which the British had forced the Americans to evacuate on the first of June. The forts were regarded as important, not only because they commanded King's Ferry, the only convenient line of communication between the New Eng- land and the Middle Colonies, but also because, standing as they did at the southern extremity of the Highlands, they gave control, in the hands of the enemy, over West Point and its dependencies to the northward.
The fort at Stony Point was built on a rocky promon- tory, on the west side of the Hudson, about one hundred and fifty feet high. Three sides of this promontory were surrounded by water, and, on the fourth, a swamp or morass, which was not passable at high tide, separated it from the land. It was guarded by three redoubts, and protected by a double abattis of logs, which extended across the peninsula. The cannon were so arranged as to enfilade any approach to the inner works supposed to be practicable. It had a garrison of about five hundred men, under the command of Col. Johnston, who was re- garded as a highly capable officer.
The troops selected for the storming of this apparently impregnable position were the men of the Light Infantry Corps, under command of Gen. Wayne, consisting, on July 1, 1779, of two regiments, or four battalions, sup- posed to form the pick of Washington's army. They were commanded, respectively, by Col. Richard Butler, the Pennsylvanian, whose coolness in action in many previous severe engagements, especially in Morgan's
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Rifle Regiment, fitted him for any emergency, by Cols. Putnam and Meigs, of Connecticut, and Col. Christian Febiger, of Virginia, the latter a Dane by birth.
The plan of attack, outlined by Washington himself, is shown in the following letter, of July 10, from the Commander-in-Chief to Wayne. With but a slight modi- fication, made necessary during the assault, this plan was fully carried out :
" My ideas of the enterprise in contemplation are these :
"That it should be attempted by the Light Infantry only, which should march under cover of the night, and with the utmost secrecy, to the enemy's lines, securing every person they find to prevent discovery.
" Between one & two hundred chosen men & officers I conceive fully sufficient for the surprise, and apprehend that the approach should be along the water on the south side, crossing the beach and entering at the abattis.
"This party is to be preceded by a van guard of pru- dent and determined men well commanded, who are to remove obstructions, secure the sentries and drive in the guard. They are to advance (the whole of them) with fixed bayonets and muskets unloaded. The officers com- manding them are to know precisely what batteries or particular parts of the line they are respectively to pos- sess so that confusion & the consequences of indecision may be avoided.
" These parties should be followed by the main body at a small distance for the purpose of support. . . . Other parties may advance to the works by the way of the causeway & the River on the north if practicable, as well for the purpose of distracting the enemy in their defense as to cut off their retreat. .
" If success should attend the enterprise measures
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should be taken to prevent the retreat of the garrison by water, or to annoy them as much as possible should they attempt it. The guns should be immediately turned against the shipping and Verplanck's point, and covered, if possible, from the enemy's fire.
""Secrecy is so much more essential to these kind of enterprises than numbers, that I should not think it ad- visable to employ any other than light troops. If a sur- prise takes place they are fully equal to the business, if it does not numbers will avait little."
Wayne promptly made his arrangements. His " order of battle " directs the regiments to move forward in ab- solute silence; no one, on any pretense, to leave the ranks (to preserve secrecy), on penalty of being at once put to death by the officer in charge. That this was no vain threat is evidenced by the fact that one unfortunate sol- dier did step out of ranks, to load his musket, and was at once run through by one of the officers. Arrived at the foot of the hill, Col. Febiger was to form his regiment in a solid column of half-platoon front, Col. Meig's to follow immediately after Febiger, and Major-after- wards General-Hull (in the absence of Col. Putnam, on duty at Constitution Island), in the rear of Meigs. These were to form the right column of attack. The left column was formed in the same way, under Col. Richard Butler, with Major Murfrees, of North Carolina, in the rear.
Each column was to be preceded by a detachment of one hundred and fifty "picked and determined men," that on the right to be commanded by Col. Fleury (a French officer who had done much gallant service during the war), that on the left by Major Jack Stevens, of Maryland. Each was to send forward, on his march,
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an officer and twenty men, a little in advance, whose business it should be to secure the sentries and re- move the abattis and obstruction for the column to pass through. These parties of twenty men were the "for- lorn hope," and were led, respectively, by Lieut. Knox, of the Ninth Pennsylvania, on the right, and Lieut. Gib- bons, of the Sixth Pennsylvania, on the left. As the left column reached a certain point Murfrees was to separate from it, and open a furious fire on the front of the works, in order to draw the attention of the enemy from the flanking column. The right and left columns were to capture the outlying pickets, and, attacking the defenders, force their way over and around the abattis, and enter the interior of the fort by the sally-port, driving the enemy before theni.
Gen. Muhlenberg was placed in reserve. With re- gard to him, Wayne reports : " Previous to my marching I had drawn General Muhlenberg into my rear, who, with three hundred men of his brigade, took post on the oppo- site side of the marsh, and was to be in readiness either to support me, or cover a retreat in case of accident; and I have not the least doubt of his faithfully and effectually executing either, had there been an occasion for it." To the reserves was also added Major Henry Lee's battalion of light horse, and Col. Ball's regiment of infantry.
At 11.30 P. M., on July 15, the formation being completed, the word to advance was given. The right column diverged to the south for the purpose of passing the swamp and reaching the beach at the foot of the hill, and, at the same time, the left, under Col. Butler, crossed the creek for the purpose of seizing the post of a picket of the enemy and assaulting the right flank of the fortifi- cation. Major Murfrees, between these two columns,
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advanced up the slope. The right, or column led by Wayne in person, was obliged, in order to reach the abattis, to wade through water two feet deep, and this somewhat delayed the movement. Meantime, Murfrees began, as a feint, a tremendous firing of musketry. This, of course, aroused the garrison, who, in a very short time, were at their stations, striving to repel the assault with grape and musketry. This was the crisis of danger for the assailants. The forlorn hope of each column rushed forward to perform the duty assigned it, that of cutting away the abattis and removing the obstruction which stood in the way of the advance of their comrades. So fierce and terrible was the fight at this point that, of the twenty. men detailed for this service on the left, under Lieut. Gibbons, seventeen were killed or wounded in the assault, and yet, it is worthy of remark, that, so many had volunteered for this dangerous duty, it became necessary to select their numbers by lot.
The double row of abattis on the right seems to have been more readily disposed of than that on the left, where, as we have seen, resistance was overcome only after a terrible slaughter.
The first abattis was turned by the column of Col. Febiger moving along the beach, under the immediate direction of Gen. Wayne, "spear in hand." Just as the column had climbed over this obstruction a musket shot, coming from a body of men on the hill above, who were taunting the assailants and shouting imprecations on "the rebels " as they advanced, struck Wayne and inflicted a scalp wound about two inches long. He immediately fell, and was for a short time dazed and stunned. Quickly recovering his senses, however, he raised him- self on one knee and shouted, "Forward, my brave fel-
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lows, forwardl" and then, turning to his aides, Capts. Fishbourne and Archer, he begged them to carry him to the interior of the fort, where he wished to die should his wound prove fatal. The men, hearing that their com- mander had been mortally wounded, dashed forward, climbing the rocks with bayonets ready to charge, and bore down all further opposition.
Col. Fleury, who led the right column, soon reached the flag-staff on the bastion and hauled down the English standard. He was the first to enter the fort, being quickly followed by two sergeants of the Virginia and one of the Pennsylvania regiments, all of whom had been severely wounded.
So accurately had the movements for storming the works been timed, and so perfectly had the plans and orders been carried out, that both columns of assault, as well as Major Murfree's two companies, met almost at the same time in the interior of the fort. They encountered, as they advanced, a persistent fire of grape and musketry. Not a shot was fired by the assailants (except Murfree's command, as noticed). All those killed by the Ameri- cans, and they amounted to sixty-three ( the same number as had been killed by General Grey at the so-called Paoli massacre ), were dispatched by the bayonet. As soon as the attacking columns met each other in the fort, Col. Fleury, feeling that the resistance was at an end, shouted in broken English, "The fort is ours!" the watchword previously agreed upon.
The triumphant shout of the advancing party was taken up by the troops as they rushed on, crushing all hope of resistance on the part of the garrison. With this shout were mingled the cries of the soldiers, especially of the New York Loyalists, who, a short half-hour
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before, had defied their assailants to come on, "Mercy, dear Americans, mercy !" Although no such cry had been heeded at Paoli, Wayne made use of his returning strength to stay the arm of vengeance as soon as resistance had ceased, and, it is said, not a man was killed who begged for quarter.
Tivo flags and two standards were captured, the latter those of the Seventeenth Regiment. The total number of prisoners taken was five hundred and forty-three. The British lost sixty-three killed, the number of their wounded is not given. The American loss was fifteen non-com- missioned officers and privates killed, and eighty-three officers and privates wounded.
The successful assault on Stony Point made a pro- digious sensation throughout the country. The im- mediate material gain was slight, as the post was abandoned not long after, but its moral effect, in strength- ening the tone of public feeling and the army, was incal- culable.
The campaign of 1780 began under conditions even more gloomy and discouraging than that of 1779. The Pennsylvania troops had dwindled away in the most ex- traordinary manner. By the monthly returns of Sep- tember, 1780, there were present, in the eleven regiments of foot, two thousand and five, and absent two thousand, five hundred and eleven; in other words, more than half of their strength was not present with the colors, and those who were present formed about two thirds of Washington's army. This condition was mainly owing to the financial poverty of the authorities, which prevented them from paying the troops, clothing them decently, or even feeding them properly.
With this small force Washington was obliged to
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march and countermarch between Morristown and West Point, so as to meet any assault which might be made by the British at New York, on any point of this long line.
It was determined, during the summer, to capture a
WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS, MORRISTOWN.
block-house behind Bergen Heights, which had been made a place of deposit, by the armed refugees, of stolen horses and other property, the spoils of the neighborhood. Wayne, with the First and Second Pennsylvania Brigades, and four pieces of artillery, was sent to attack it.
The following account of this expedition is given, in his letter to President Reed :
"TATOWAY, 26th July, 1780.
" Dear Sir:
"You have undoubtedly heard of our tour to Bergen but it is a duty which I owe to you, the troops I command & to myself, to make you acquainted with the Objects of that expedition-lest envy, Malice, or the tongue of
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Slander, should attempt to misrepresent that affair-One was to take all the stock out of Bergen Neck, to prevent the Enemy from receiving constant supplies from the In- habitants out of that Quarter-and in Case of a siege to secure to our own use those Cattle that they would In- evitably carry into New York. Another was the de- struction of a post near Bulls ferry-consisting of a Block House surrounded by a strong stockade and Abbattis, Garrisoned by the Refugees & a wretched banditti of Robbers, horse thieves, &c ---
"But the Grand Object was to draw the Army which S'r Henry Clinton brought from Charlestown into an Ac- tion in ye Defiles of the Mountain in the Vicinity of Fort Lee, where we expected them to Land in order to succour the Refugee post, or to endeavor to cut off our retreat to the Liberty pole & New Bridge; the apparent object to them was great, and the lure had like to take the wished effect-three thousand men Consisting of the flower of the British Army were embarked from Phillips-and stood down the river hovering off the land'g near Fort Lee-where the 6th & 7th Penn'a Regiments lay con- cealed with directions to let them land unmolested (giv- ing me Intelligence of the attempt) & then to meet them in the Gorge of the Defile and with the point of the Bayonet to dispute the pass at every expense of Blood, until the arrival of the first & second Penn'a Brigades when we should put them between three such forces as no human fortitude could withstand-and I may now with safety mention, that it was also designed to divert their attention from a meditated attempt upon Rhode Island, by a Combined attack by Land and Water on the French fleet & Army in that Place; this has had the effect, by retarding them four days after they had actually em-
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barked upwards of six thousand men for that purpose, it will therefore be too late to attempt anything at this period as the French will be prepared against it. . . . ' "
The enemy, not discerning the real object of the move- ment, most annoyingly asserted that the Americans had been repulsed from the block-house by a small garrison composed of Tory refugees only, and, in some scurrilous verses, called "The Cow Chase," which were widely dis- tributed, and had been written by the unfortunate Major André a short time before his capture and execution, the exploits of Wayne, and the other American officers, are ridiculed with a kind of pitying contempt which is very noteworthy. "The Cow Chase" closes with this signifi- cant verse, significant indeed when we recall the sad fate of the author:
"And now I've closed my epic strain, I tremble as I shew it, Lest this same warrior-driver, Wayne, Should ever catch the poet."
The gloomy campaign of 1780 was made still more gloonly, at its close, by the memorable treason of Arnold, in September of that year. The details of this attempt (which had so well-nigh succeeded) to betray the garrison at West Point, and its dependencies, into the hands of the enemy, are too well known to need recapitulation.
The part taken by Gen. Wayne, and the Pennsylvania Line, in defeating this treasonable scheme, however, is not so well known, and some account of it may well be in order.
His division was then stationed near Haverstraw, and, in those days when there seemed a disposition to suspect the loyalty of everyone, and when even Arnold could prove a traitor, it is satisfactory to find that implicit trust
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was placed not only in Wayne but in the men who con- manded his regiments, -- Chambers, Walter Stewart, Craig, W. Butler, Harmar, Richard Butler, with true and staunch Gen. William Irvine at their head. On their ar- rival at West Point, "having marched over the moun- tains sixteen miles in four hours without losing a man," they were placed by General Washington in charge of the post, he being well assured that they would prove its most trustworthy safeguard amidst the threatening dan- gers by which it was surrounded. The choice of the Pennsylvania regiments for such a duty, at such a time, has a significance which was very apparent at that crisis, but which has been singularly overlooked by historians.
Towards the close of the year a growing feeling of dis- content arose in the Pennsylvania Line, owing to three causes. They were, first, the non-payment of the men, or, rather, their payment in a nominal currency far de- preciated beyond what they had agreed to receive; second, an insufficient supply of provisions and clothing, with its accompanying suffering ; and, thirdly, the conviction that it was the intention of the authorities to hold all those soldiers, who had enlisted for " three years or the war," for the latter period.
It is not to any sufficient extent within our province to discuss, in detail, the events which led to the unhappy occurrence, between nine and ten o'clock on the evening of January 1, 1781, called "The Revolt of the Pennsyl- vania Line," when, with but few exceptions, the men rushed from their huts, paraded under arms without their officers, supplied themselves with ammunition and pro- visions, seized six pieces of artillery, took the horses from the general's stables, and killed or wounded many officers who attempted to suppress the uprising. Wrong as was
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their action, we must recall the sufferings of these brave men and their many just complaints which they had to offer.
Suffice it to say that, through the efforts of Gen. Wayne and others, peace was finally restored, many wrongs were righted by the authorities, and the men once more re- turned to their allegiance.
The British, misunderstanding the motives which prompted the revolt, promptly. undertook to induce the insurgents to join them, offering many inducements to that end, but, to the lasting honor of Pennsylvania sol- diery, these offers were promptly spurned and the bearers of the proposals arrested as spies, to be turned over to Wayne.
The Pennsylvania Line was almost wholly dissolved by the revolt, and it was a long time before the people re- covered from the panic produced by it. Finally, measures were taken to recruit the regiments and reorganize the division. It was decided to reduce the number of regi- ments to six. Of the men who were retained many were veterans, having served continuously for five years. No greater proof could be given of their confidence in Wayne, and their officers, than that shown by the eagerness with which the old soldiers pressed forward to serve again under him. There seems to have been no effort made to ex- clude the former mutineers from reenlistment. Two thirds of those whose time had expired, and who had been discharged, were desirous of reentering the service under Wayne's command, and, in his own language, "were as importunate for service as they had been for their dis- charge." The trouble was not with the service, nor with the officers, but with the broken promises of the State and of Congress with regard to their pay and clothing.
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On February 26, 1731, Wayne was ordered to command a detachment of the Pennsylvania Line, which it had been determined to send as a reinforcement to Gen. Green, then in charge of military affairs in South Caro-
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lina. The detachment was to consist of details from each of the six regiments, in number about eight hundred, and the rendezvous and headquarters were established at York, Pa. It was only with much difficulty that this body could be so organized and equipped as to enable it to march southward, from York, on May 20.
Wayne joined La Fayette, on June 7, at Fredericks-
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burg, where he formed his men into two battalions, the first commanded by Walter Stewart, the second by Rich- ard Butler. These battalions, with one from Virginia under Col. Gaskin, formed a brigade, and acted as such, under Wayne's command, until the surrender of York- town.
During the autumn of 1781 La Fayette and Wayne were busily engaged in checking the raids of the English detachments sent into the interior, and also preventing the retreat of Cornwallis from Portsmouth into North Caro- lina, it being essential that the British commander should be held where he was until Washington, with his northern army, could join with the French fleet in completing his discomfiture by blockading his army.
This mode of campaigning was most wearisome. At last, on July 6, it seemed as if the long-looked for op- portunity of attacking the enemy to advantage had ar- rived. Cornwallis, moving down the James River, on his way to Portsmouth, sent a portion of his force across the river, thus cutting his army in two by a wide river, and giving his adversary a favorable chance of attacking the rear, as it remained on the left bank and north side of the James.
La Fayette directed Wayne to move forward at once and attack that portion of the force which had not yet crossed. Upon arriving at Green Spring, near the enemy, Wayne discovered that the intelligence, that any consider- able portion of the army had passed the river, was false. He and La Fayette, leading the advance, in order to make a more complete reconnoissance, had crossed a swamp by a causeway, with a force of about eight hun- dred men, before they ascertained that they had a large portion of Cornwallis' army in their front, and they soon found this force formed in battle array.
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La Fayette at once sent back to the main American army, a distance of five miles, for reinforcements, ordering those left behind to join them with all speed. "Mean- while," says Wayne, "the riflemen in the advance com- menced and kept up a galling fire upon the enemy, which continued until five in the afternoon, when the British began to move forward in column, upon which Major Galvan (a French officer in the continental service) at- tacked them, and, after a spirited, though unequal con- test, retired upon our left. A detachment of light in- fantry, under Major Willis, having arrived, also com- menced a severe fire upon the enemy, but it was obliged to fall back. The enemy, observing our small force, began to turn our flanks-a manœuvre in which had they perse- vered they must have inevitably surrounded our advanced corps, and taken position between this corps and the other portion of the army, comprising the reinforcement about to join them. At this crisis Colonel Harmar and Major Edwards, with part of the 2d and 3d Penn'a regiments under Colonel Humpton, with one field piece, having joined, it was determined, among a choice of difficulties, to advance and charge the British line, although it numbered more than five times our force."
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