USA > Pennsylvania > York County > Shiloh > The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania at Shiloh. History of the regiment. The battle of Shiloh > Part 10
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The Confederates were completely outflanked to the right and left, and compelled to flee. Immediately in front of the Seventy-seventh the heights were very rough, rocky and al- most perpendicular. To climb them was a most difficult per- formance. Some of the men slung their guns across their backs, and pulled themselves up, hand over hand, by taking hold of roots and brush. They finally reached the summit,
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The Battle of Liberty Gap.
right in the midst of the camp just abandoned by the enemy. The Confederates had evidently been disturbed at their din -. ners as the Seventy-seventh's boys found many tables, set ready for the meal.
The enemy was driven more than a mile.' "The brigade halted after passing Liberty Church. Here the troops bi- vouacked. The third brigade came up, moved still farther on and established the picket line. Before the pickets could be properly posted some skirmishing was done by the advance. In it the Seventy-seventh did not participate. The constant rain of the day continued throughout the entire night. Men got what sleep they could in their beds of soft mud, until three o'clock next morning, which hour found the command. again under arms. Positive information was received that Cleburne's division had re-inforced the enemy during the night. This meant more fighting, and harder than that of the preceding day. 4
Early in the morning Willich's brigade was, ordered to the front to join the third brigade on the skirmish line. : Some desultory firing was done by the two lines, but it was not very' heavy. At ten o'clock the enemy's cavalry and 'infantry ap-' peared in force, and opened a spirited fire, which was harm- less, as they were too far away. At noon they made another- attack, which also after a sharp fight, was repulsed. Within- an hour they again advanced, in greater numbers, and opened- with artillery and musketry, straining every nerve to recover what they had lost on the preceding day. So far only the first brigade had been engaged, but, as the enemy was too strong for Willich, whose ammunition was about exhausted ;. the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania and Seventy-ninth Illinois were sent to the relief of the first brigade. The Seventy-sey-' enth was put in front with the Seventy-ninth Illinois follow- . ing, somewhat to their left. Immediately beyond where the, relief passed Willich was an orchard. then a corn field deep; with mud. About five hundred yards beyond that a creek: flowed along an irregular range of hills about one hundred feet high. As the Seventy-seventh entered the orchard, they opened fire on the enemy, who were in plain view. Charging. through orchard and corn field, about as rapidly as men could: go. they drove the Confederates before them to the hills. In
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Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
crossing the corn field the regiment was subject to a fierce and well-directed, enfilading fire from a hostile battery, posted some distance to the right. This fire was very disastrous. The regiment did not pause until it had reached the creek at the foot of the hills. Here, somewhat protected by a rail fence, it kept up the fight. The Seventy-ninth Illinois now coming up, formed on the left of the Pennsylvanians. Behind this fence the men were falling rapidly, Lieutenant Wm. H. Thomas was instantly killed there, and Colonel Miller was disabled by a minie ball in the left eye. Thereupon Colonel Rose assumed command of the brigade. The further pro- gress of the Seventy-seventh during this action is set forth in Colonel Rose's official report, which follows:
"Headquarters Seventy-seventh Regt. Pennsylvania Volunteers. In Camp at Tullahoma, July 6, 1863.
1 Captain: In compliance with orders from General Johnson, dated July 5, 1863, received to-day, I submit the following report of the operations of my regiment on the 24th and 25th of June, 1863, which is as follows:
At Murfreesborough, Tennessee, June 24, 1863, I received orders to break up my camp at 4 A. M. and march towards Shelbyville, Tenn., on the Shelbyville turnpike.
We broke our camp, as ordered, and marched out about 6 o'clock A. M., and continued ou the Shelbyville road until we came to Wartrace road. We left the turnpike and continued on a dirt road through Millersburg toward Wartrace, until we arrived at Liberty Gap, at which place we arrived, after a toilsome march through the mud, at about 3 P. M. At this time the enemy's pickets were encountered by General Willich's brigade, . which was in advance of our own. The firing soon became quite spirited, and finally assumed the form of a skirmish, when the Twenty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, of our own brigade, was ordered forward to try the flank of the enemy, which order was promptly and spiritedly executed. In a few minutes after I received orders to move up for the same purpose. I imme- diately moved up in column by company to the main entrance of the Gap, where the enemy were posted, and then piloted by Lieutenant Sheets, of General Johnson's staff, moved up on the opposite slope of a ravine, which extended around the elliptical base of the hill, on which the left wing of the enemy was posted. I proceeded along this ravine for several hundred yards under a sharp fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, which did but little damage, until I gained what was deemed a proper position, when 1 was ordered by Colonel Miller, now in conunand of the brigade, to move directly on the enemy, who was posted on a hill of from SO to 100 feet elevation, on the opposite side of the ravine, which ravine was about 300 yards wide, quite level and muddy. I at once formed line of battle and moved half way across the ravine, throwing two companies of skir-
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The Battle of Liberty Gap.
mishers nearly to the foot of the hill, when I was directed by one of General Willich's aides that I was not far enough to the right to co-operate with his brigade. I informed him that I was acting under orders from Colonel Miller, to whom I directed him to go and bring me further instructions. Ile immediately returned with an order for me to move about 150 yards to the right, and then, as before, move up to the hill against the enemy. I did as I was commanded, and found the hill very steep, so much so that we were obliged to scramble up laying hold of the bushes and saplings in order to effect progress; in fact, it was equal to scaling the heights of Abraham, but the enemy did not offer as much resistance as I had expected, from the fire that he had kept up on my regiment from the time we had first approached the Gap, for, while we scrambled up ou one side of the hill he scrambled down ou the other side in great confusion, leaving his camps without attempting to move anything.
We pursued the enemy over the hills and up through the Gap for about a mile, as nearly as I can judge, when we were halted by order of General Johnson, and relieved by the Third brigade. We then went into camp on the slope of the hill, on the right of the road, at the entrance to the middle ravine. . We were here very much exposed to the enemy's shells, several of which came near knocking down the stacks of my muskets, but, as night was settling in we were soon relieved from annoyance and lay down and slept soundly.
. During this day's skirmish I lost one man wounded. We killed one of the enemy and took one prisoner. I do not know how many we wounded, as the enemy had every opportunity of removing them, while we were climbing up the hill. Their wounded were about all they did remove.
At night four companies of my regiment went on picket.
On the morning of the 25th my four companies were relieved from picket and we remained where we encamped the night before without any im- portant event, until about 2 P. M., when the pickets in our front, belonging to General Willich's brigade, were heavily pressed by the enemy, and soon a pretty sharp engagement ensued.
I soon received orders to hasten to their support, and we advanced rapidly to the foot of the slope, on the east side of the middle ravine, where we were joined by the Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers, of our brigade, thence to the middle of the ravine, where, by General Johnson's orders we formed line of battle, stretching across the ravine, my regiment occupying the right, and the Seventy-ninth regiment Illinois Volunteers the left. We here found two of General Willich's regiments slowly retreating, as they were nearly out of ammunition, but they were making good use of what they had left.
I here received orders to advance rapidly against the enemy, which orders were carried into execution as fast as human bone and sinew could produce locomotion. In less time than is worth mentioning we gained the low ridge running across the ravine, from which our pickets had been driven. I had no orders to halt here, and pressed vigorously on, through showers of the enemy's missiles, to the opeu plain in our front, at the exit
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Serenty-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
. from the middle ravine. This plain was planted with corn. It was about 400 or 500 yards to the opposite side, where it was bounded by an irregular ridge of. hills from 60 to 100 feet elevation. The main force of the rebels occupied this ridge, with their artillery posted on their left, on the least elevated and most sloping portion of the ridge. The position of the ridge . in my front gave them opportunity to form their main line of battle in a triangle, concaving so as to expose our two regiments to the fire of their artillery and nearly all their musketry at the same time. My men here began to fall rapidly. Colonel Miller, the commander of the brigade, was .at this time wounded, and I was left in command, but did not know it then, as he was wounded in the ravine, through which we had just passed, and I was forward with my regiment. I determined to cross the plain, through the enemy's fire, and gain the foot of the ridge, where the enemy were posted. My object in doing this was threefold: First, I had no .orders to halt; second, I would lose fewer men by gaining the point and holding it than to remain where I was; and third, I would be in close .range with the enemy, and could there make every shot count, and I also . felt confident I could drive him from the hills. I adjusted my line and assumed command of both regiments, being the senior officer. I then .rapidly advanced to the attack. No greater bravery is required in warfare .than to execute an attack like this. The plain we were obliged. to cross proved to be one of mud, where the men sunk to their shoe tops at every step, The enemy were drawn up in three lines in our front, the first,. a .strong line of skirmishers at the foot of the hills; the second, a line of battle half way up the slope, and their line or reserve at the summit. These lines, thus situated, brought their whole fire to bear upon us, besides, we were' exposed to a terrific fire of artillery from our right.
;... I here lost every fifth man of my command, but the bravery of these gallant men was not shaken in the least. There was not a single skulker or straggler. At the opposite side of the plain was a creek running at the base of the hills, on the nearest bank of which was a fence, where my line halted, keeping up a terrific fire on the enemy, causing their first and second lines to break toward the top of the hill like a flock of sheep, but .we were still exposed to a terrific fire from their third line, and the exhausted state of the men, caused from double-quicking through the mud, seemed to preclude the possibility of advancing my line any farther, but springing forward myself, wading the stream and waving them on, acted like a charm and on came my line with a yell. dashing through the creek gaining the. base of the hill, where we were tolerably secure from the fire of the enemy, while our fire told upon them with admirable effect. The rebels were, for a long time, determined to hold their ground and drive us back. My amumnition was becoming rapidly exhausted and I sent for re-enforce- ments.
Shortly after this, I was notified by Lieutenant Baldwin, that I was in command of the brigade, and I immediately sent an order for another regi- ment to come up to our support, and, at the same time, a request to the General to send me as many re-inforcements as he saw fit, as my men were now entirely out of ammunition. .
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The Battle of Liberty Gap.
The Thirty-fourth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, of my brigade, came up in gallant style, and suffered very heavily from the enemy's fire. At the same time the Thirty-eighth Indiana, of General Davis' division, which also suffered severely in crossing the plain, came up. The firing of the enemy, at this time, ceased, except a few straggling shots, as their lines had been broken for some time, and they retreated rapidly over the hills toward Bellbuckle.
I received orders to advance no further, and we encamped for the night on the battlefield, in the ravine.
My regiment lost, in this day's battle, one Lieutenant and three enlisted men, killed, and two Captains and 32 enlisted men, wounded. The loss we inflicted on the enemy was, without exaggeration, double that of our own. I counted nine of the rebels lying within a very few feet of each other in one spot killed by musketry, and I have no doubt that they had the usual proportion of wounded, but they were carried off. This the enemy could do easily, as their position placed their rear out of the reach of our fire.
Our officers and men behaved with the greatest gallantry, Lieutenant Colonel Pyfer, who took command of the regiment, when I assumed com- mand of the brigade, behaved throughout with the greatest coolness. Major Philips also performed his duty with great efficiency and gallantry. Cap- tains Walker of Company A, Kreps, who was wounded, of Company B, Lawson of Company C, Fry of Company D, Robinson of Company E, McDowell of Company F, Stern of Company G, and Shroad of Company K, were all in their places and behaved with unusual bravery. And where every Captain in a regiment is in his place, doing his duty, there cannot be, as there was not in this case, any skulking or straggling among the enlisted men.
We lost a valuable officer in Lieutenant Thomas of Company G, who was killed while nobly doing his duty. Such is often the fate of the brave.
The enlisted men of my regiment fought valiantly, and, with 20 rounds more ammunition, we would have needed no re-inforcements to have given the enemy a terrible rout.
I must not forget to mention Surgeon Franklin Irish, whose services, in his indefatigable attention to our wounded, were invaluable. Also an assistant surgeon, Dr. McCandless, whose services were performed with faithfulness and energy.
I have confined this report strictly to the operations of my own regiment, as the most of the time during the engagement I was in command of it, and must make my brigade report separate.
I have the honor to be, most respectfully your obedient servant.
THOS. E. ROSE,
Colonel, Comdg. Seventy-seventh Regt. Pennsylvania Vols .. Captain E. P. Edsall,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Second Brigade."
In this engagement the first brigade lost, in killed and wounded, ninety-five; the second brigade, one hundred and twenty; and the third brigade, twenty-three. The Seventy.
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Screnty-serenth Pennsylvania Regiment.
ninth Illinois sustained the greatest regimental loss, forty- seven. The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania stood next with a loss of thirty-nine, killed and wounded, none missing, this be- ing fully twenty per cent. of their entire force engaged. Al- most this entire loss was suffered in less than two hours' ยท fighting.
On the twenty-eighth the enemy had concentrated his forces at Tullahoma, and General Rosecrans was preparing to move upon them there. On the night of the thirtieth, the army was drawn up in line, ready to give battle, when a reconnoissance to the front developed the fact that the enemy was evacuat- ing. The Union army was pushed forward, but its advance was slow, as the almost constant rains for the preceding six days made the roads almost impassable. Even the infantry could not cover more than one mile an hour. On entering the town of Tullahoma, General Johnson was placed in com- mand of it until the next forward move of the army.
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The Chickamauga Campaign.
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CHAPTER VI.
Chickamauga Campaign-Battle of Chickamauga-Night attack on John- son's Division-Seventy-seventh men prisoners-Escape from Confederate prisons.
C HATTANOOGA was the objective point of the Chicka- mauga campaign. General Rosecrans army laid along the western base of the Cumberland mountains, while Bragg's forces held Chattanooga, the mountain passes above and below the town, as well as the south bank of the Tennes- see river. Rosecrans army was made up of the Fourteenth Corps, under General George H. Thomas; the Twentieth Corps under General A. McD. McCook, the Twenty-first Corps under General Thomas L. Crittenden, and one corps of cav- alry, commanded by General D. S. Stanley.
Bragg's army was composed of three corps of infantry, com- manded by Generals Polk, Hill and Buckner, and two corps of cavalry under Generals Forrest and Wheeler. Before Bragg withdrew from Chattanooga he was joined by Walker's corps, while Longstreet's corps come to re-inforce him dur- ing the battle of Chickamauga.
Rosecrans' headquarters were at Winchester, where the Twentieth corps was established. The second division was at Tullahoma. The Fourteenth corps was at Decherd, and the Twenty-first corps at MeMinnville. The Union army was more than one hundred miles from Nashville, its secondary base of supplies.
Rosecrans decided to make a feint by sending Crittenden's corps over into the Tennessee valley, opposite to and above Chattanooga, in order to create the belief that it was his in- tention to attack the town from that direction. Meanwhile he would cross over the river with the main part of his army at or below Battle creek, and from that place get over the mountains into the rear of Chattanooga. He expected in
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Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
this way to either compel Bragg to come out to protect his line of communications, or to shut him up in the town.
To accomplish all this Rosecrans must cross the Cumber- land mountains, which have a general elevation of 2,200 feet. These and all the other mountains in his path were very steep and rugged, with very few roads that were more than mere mountain trails. After crossing the Cumberland mountains he had to get over the Tennessee river, which is deep and wide. At Caperton's Ferry, near Stevenson, it is 1,254 feet wide, and at Bridgeport it is 2,700 feet across. Bridges for crossing it were to be put at these two places. South of the river were the Raccoon and Lookout mountains, both having about the same altitude of 2,200 feet. The aver- age distance across the Cumberland mountains, on the roads travelled by the army, is about thirty miles, while it is about fifteen miles over the Raccoon and Lookout mountains.
The proposed campaign involved cutting loose from the base of supplies, carrying twenty-five days' rations and ammu- nition sufficient for two battles. in addition to crossing a wide and deep river, and moving an army to the rear of the enemy's position over two very precipitous and difficult moun- tain ranges.
The campaign opened on the sixteenth of August. Crit- tenden moved for the Tennessee valley. Minty's cavalry bri- gade operated on the extreme left, and forced a brigade of the enemy's cavalry across the river at Kingston. Minty then proceeded to make a most energetic commotion along the river above. Crittenden had occupied the Sequatchie valley, sending two brigades over Walden's Ridge into the Tennessee valley, where Wilder, with his mounted infantry brigade, joined them.
Tents were pitched for miles along the escarpment of the ridge, and fires were lighted nightly along the crest. Bugles were blown morning and evening, for a long distance up the river. Pieces of boards and other lumber were allowed to float down the river to create the impression that bridges were being constructed. A few batteries were kept circling through open spaces, where they could be seen from the south side of the river. to give the Confederates the idea that the whole Federal army was moving to occupy the other side.
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The Chickamauga Campaign.
On August twenty-first Wilder's brigade got within range of Chattanooga, on Stringer's Ridge, and opened upon it with his battery. Bragg was completely deceived, and withdrew his infantry, sending his forces up the river to defend its crossings there. Buckner, also, was ordered there from East Tennessee.
The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, in command of Colonel Thomas E. Rose, being in the second brigade commanded by Colonel Joseph B. Dodge, which was a part of the second di- vision under General Johnson, participated in all the move- ments of the twentieth corps and of the division, as it moved from Tullahoma. The regiment crossed Elk river on August sixteenth, and bivouacked, in a drenching rain, until four o'clock next morning. It then moved to Winchester, Salem and thence through Paint Rock valley and across the moun- tains, arriving at Bellefonte, Alabama, on the twenty-first. It remained there until the thirty-first, when it proceeded to Caperton's Ferry below Stevenson and crossed the Tennessee river on a pontoon bridge. Here the Thirty-fourth Illinois was detached from the brigade and left to protect the cross- ing.
On September second, the first division, followed by the second had crossed the Raccoon mountains. Two days later they took Winston's Gap at Lookout mountain, forty-two miles south of Chattanooga. The same day the cavalry crossed Lookout and descended into Broomtown valley. On the fifth the third division crossed at Bridgeport. The head of Thomas' corps, the fourteenth, was over Lookout, at Stev- en's Gap, twenty-six miles below Chattanooga, on the eighth. Crittenden, on the sixth, was approaching Wauhatchie. On the seventh Bragg withdrew all his forces, and moved them toward La Fayette, behind Pigeon mountains. Wilder crossed the river at Friar's Island on the eighth. Another brigade crossed directly into Chattanooga on the ninth. They were followed by still another brigade on the next day.
On the ninth Crittenden discovered that Bragg had evac- uated the place. The second and third divisions of Critten- den's corps passed on the south side of the river, along the north end of Lookout mountain, three miles to the right of Chattanooga, and followed after Bragg. camping that night at Rossville.
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Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
Upon leaving Chattanooga, Polk's and Hill's corps moved to La Fayette, where they arrived on the eighth. Walker's and Buckner's corps moved toward La Fayette by way of Graysville. The rest of Bragg's forces marched by way of Ringgold. Cleburne's division was posted in the gaps of Pigeon mountains. Bragg's headquarters were at Lee and Gordon's mill. On the ninth he ordered Cleburne and Hind- man to advance at midnight against General Thomas, the head of whose column was at Davis' crossroads, not far from Steven's Gap.
Rosecrans' strategy had compelled Bragg to leave Chat- tanooga, but the manner in which he was compelled to exe- cute his plans gave promise of very serious work for his arms. Bragg, with his army, extending from a few miles south of Lee and Gordon's to La Fayette, looked through the gaps of Pigeon mountains' directly upon the center of Rosecrans' army, which was then coming through Stevens' Gap on book- out Mountain, twenty miles to the right of Crittenden's corps, which was at Rossville. At the same time McCook, in the vicinity of Alpine and Summerville, was entirely beyond sup- porting distance. The roads or mountain paths compelled the separation of the corps while crossing Lookout Mountain. Cleburne and Hindman, who had been ordered on the ninth, by General Bragg to advance against Thomas at Stevens' Gap, failed to successfully carry the order into effect.
Bragg, disappointed in his attempt upon the center, turned toward Crittenden's corps on the Union left. Polk's and Walker's corps were moved toward Lee and Gordon's Mill with orders to attack Crittenden at dawn of the thirteenth. Bragg rode to the front only to find that Crittenden had crossed the Chickamauga, concentrated his corps and taken up a strong position. The ordered attack was consequently not made. Again disappointed, Bragg decided to more north, well beyond Crittenden's position, cross the Chickamauga be- tween Chattanooga and Rosecrans' forces, and attack Crit- tenden on his left, which was also the left of Rosecrans' army. Bragg's plan was to drive it back upon the Union center, which was still at. Steven's Gap. On September eleventh, when Rosecrans discovered that the rear of Bragg's forces had not moved far south of Lee and Gordon's, he saw that the
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The Battle of Chickamauga.
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