USA > Pennsylvania > York County > Shiloh > The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania at Shiloh. History of the regiment. The battle of Shiloh > Part 11
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enemy was concentrating for battle. He saw at once that it placed him on the defensive, and that the concentration of his forces became of vital importance. He immediately bent every energy to this one object, namely to bring the various commands within supporting distance of each other.
McCook moved over the mountains northward, toward Thomas, and on the seventeenthi, Thomas moved toward Crit- tenden. On the evening of that same day the whole Union army was safely within supporting distance.
On the night of the seventeenth, Bragg ordered his forces to cross the Chickamauga carly the next morning and attack, but the activity of the Union cavalry and mounted infantry at the crossings of the stream, so delayed the enemy that no general attack was possible on the eighteenth. During the night Bragg got his army across the river, and early in the morning of the nineteenth, formed it in line of battle, front- ing Crittenden's corps, who were ready to receive the attack. Forrest's cavalry had been sent north to guard Bragg's right and rear against Union reserves. Just as the Confederate lines were about to advance to the attack on Crittenden, furious fighting broke out at Jay's Mill, about two miles to Bragg's right. Forrest soon appeared, asking for infantry, which was at once sent to him. Bragg's plan was again a failure and had to be changed to meet the circumstances. The reason was, that, during the night, Thomas, followed by MeCook, moved northward toward Crittenden, and, as soon as darkness would conceal their movements, they marched rapidly all night to the northward. By daylight of the nine- teenth, Thomas had reached the La Fayette road at the Kelly farm. Here Baird's division took position at daylight, and Brannan's division, without taking breakfast, moved rapidly north to McDonalds, then east toward Reed's bridge, and at half past seven, struck Forrest's cavalry at Jay's Mill and at once become hotly engaged. Thus opened the battle of Chick- amauga. Thomas had become the left, Crittenden the right, and MeCook the center of the Union army. This maneuver completely changed the order of battle as planned by General Bragg.
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Johnson's division, upon reaching Rosecrans' headquarters at the Widow Glenn's, was immediately sent to Thomas.
128
Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
where it arrived at noon, and was ordered eastwardly into the woods, just south of the Kelly farm, to the relief of Baird's division. Johnson had gone only about four hundred . yards, when he was met by stragglers from the line in front. They were soon recognized as stragglers from Starkweather's brigade, of Baird's division, whose entire brigade had broken up and scattered in all directions. They were running to the l'ear as fast as they could go. Johnson pushed forward, met -. the enemy, opened fire, and then charged them back at least a mile. Then, having gone too far beyond the line of the troops on his left, Johnson halted, having driven the enemy from his front. During this charge the formation from right to left of the brigade was Twenty-ninth Indiana, Seventy-sev- enth Pennsylvania, Seventy-ninth Illinois and the Thirtieth Indiana.
This position, near the Winfrey House, one mile east of the La Fayette road, the most advanced on the Union line, was held by Johnson, the Second brigade was here again formed , into two lines, with the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania and the Seventy-ninth Illinois in the front line. All was now quiet for a brief time.
Baird was sent forward to support Johnson, a part of his division was formed in extension of Johnson's left, the rest of Baird's command was placed in reserve.
Cheatham's lines were formed just behind the rising ground to the southeast, from which position, after three o'clock P. M. they kept up a continuous artillery fire on Johnson's line.
Late in the afternoon Cleburne was sent from east of the Chickamauga to attack from the direction of Jay's Saw Mill. he marched his men directly across the river with the water up to their armpits, and reached Jay's Saw Mill at about six P. M., where he immediately formed and pushed forward. striking Johnson's line a little before seven P. M., then en- sued a battle in the darkness, such as very rarely occurs. it was almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe, each side being largely guided by the flashes from their opponents' guns. .
The two right brigades of Cheatham's division joined Cle- burne in this night attack, the second brigade, 1,130 strong,
129
The Battle of Chickamauga.
was attacked by General Deshler's Texas brigade (1,783 strong), of Cleburne's division, and by General Preston Smith's Tennessee brigade of Cheatham's division. Smith had fully as many men here as Deshler. The second brigade was posted thus: the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania on the right, with the Seventy-ninth Illinois on their left. To them the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Indiana were in reserve. The whole force of this overwhelming onset on the brigade fell upon the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania and the Seventy-ninth Illinois, who were in the front line, the two reserve regiments were not brought into action during this night engagement.
On the right of the Seventy-seventh there was a large gap. A detail under Lieutenant Colonel Pyfer was sent into the woods, to the right, before dark, and ascertained that the nearest Union troops in that direction were three-quarters of a mile away. Through this gap, in the darkness Deshler marched his brigade. Having gotten far to the rear of the Union lines, he returned, passing unexpectedly through the Seventy-seventh from their rear. Some of Deshler's men were captured here but could not be held long, as at the same time Smith's brigade came up immediately in front of the Seventy-seventh, and it became a hand to hand fight.
General Smith, with his staff, rode through the Pennsylva- nia line. In doing so he was killed by Sergeant John W. Bryson, of Company A, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, just in the rear of the line. Almost at the same time, two mem- bers of Smith's staff, Captains Donaldson and King,. were killed. Bryson killed General Smith with a Confederate gun, made in Mississippi, which he had picked up on a previons bat- tlefield. (It was the same gun with which Colonel, then Cap- tain, Rose shot the sharpshooter at Stone River).
Almost simultaneously with the appearance of General Smith, riding through the lines, the Seventeenth and eigh- teenth Texas, of Deshler's brigade, filed across the right Hank of the Seventy-seventh and opened a terrific enfilading fire. The regiment was hemmed in on all sides. Under cover of the darkness some got away, but seventy-three of the rank and file were here taken prisoners. Among those captured were all the field officers, four captains, two lieutenants, and
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130
Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
sixty-four enlisted men. The regimental flag also fell into the hands of the Texans.
On the morning of the twentieth the remnant of the second brigade, including what was left of the Seventy-seventli, less than one hundred men, was posted on the left of Baird's divi- sion, north of the Kelly Farm. There it maintained that po- sition, against every atack of the enemy, until it was with- drawn, along with the army, to Rossville toward nightfall. The regiment remained at Rossville until the night of the twenty-first, when it was moved to Chattanooga, having been so reduced in numbers that but eighty-four were left to answer roll calls. As the Seventy-seventh took less than two hundred men into this battle, its loss here was over fifty per cent .. Owing to the capture of all their field officers, no regi- mental report on the battle of Chickamauga was made. Col- onel Dodge's report, which follows, gives consequently, the only official account of the doings of the Seventy-seventh there.
Colonel Dodge's Report.
Headq'rs Second Brig., Second Div., 20th Army Corps, Chattanooga, September 27, 1863.
Sir: In compliance with your circular of the 25th instant, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part that this brigade took in the recent battles near this place:
After a tedious and laborious march we reached a point about four miles from Crawfish Spring, in the direction of Stevens' Gap, on the 1Sth instant, where my brigade was placed on picket and staid all night.
On the morning of the 19th I marched, at about 7 o'clock, with the rest of the division, and passed Crawfish Spring, in the direction of Chattanooga, about three miles, when we filed off the road to the right. My brigade, being on the left of the division, was, agreeably to your order, here deployed into column; the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Col. Thomas E. Rose com- manding, and the Seventy-ninth Illinois, Col. Allen Buckner commanding, in the first line; the Twenty-ninth Indiana. Lient. Col. D. M. Duun com- manding, and the Thirtieth Indiana, Lient. Col. O. D. Hurd commanding. in the second line, in rear of the First and Third brigades, and ordered to govern myself by their movements, and to support them. After moving in this manner a short distance, I received an order to move to the right, until I reached General Hazen's brigade of General Palmer's division, and relieve him, as his men were getting short of ammunition. I accordingly moved my whole command by the right flank about 400 yards, when I found a very brisk engagement going on, and the enemy's line formed in an oblique direction to the one I was in. I immediately changed front with my first line, and seeing that the enemy were well sheltered, while my
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131
The Battle of Chickamauga.
command was badly exposed to their fire, and my men being comparatively fresh, I ordered a charge. The whole column had previously deployed into line, that having been necessary in order to keep from making too wide an opening between my left and the right of General Willich's brigade.
The order was most gallantly obeyed by both officers and men, and the enemy gave way in utter rout and confusion. In this charge the Twenty- ninth Indiana was on the right, the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania next, the Seventy-ninth Illinois next, and the Thirtieth Indiana on the left. We drove them, in this manner, nearly or quite one mile (some officers think farther), when, finding that my line was getting broken, in consequence of losses in killed and wounded, and that I had no support on either flank, I ordered a halt. On this charge my command passed some 30 or 40 yards to the right of a battery, belonging to the enemy, which was nearly deserted by them, and a part of which was captured by one of the other brigades to my left (General Willich's, I believe). I then formed my 'command in its original order, and moved about 400 yards to my left and rear, and formed a connection with the right of Willich's brigade, refusing my right slightly, so as to protect my flank as much as possible, and threw out a heavy line of skirmishers in my front and on my flank. There was no force (of ours) on my right in sight, and I was fearful that the enemy would attack us on that flank.
In order to be certain, about 4 P. M. I sent out a detachment under Lieu- tenant Colonel Pyfer, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, to examine the position of the enemy, if possible, and to ascertain the position of the nearest troops on our own line. He reported a heavy picket force of the enemy about 500 yards to my front and right, and that it was about three-fourths of a mile from my right to the left of General Turchin's brigade, and that his were the nearest of our troops on that flank. I strengthened my line of pickets, and made all the preparations possible to resist an attack from that quarter. Just before dark the enemy made an attack some distance to my left, and gradually swept around to my front, when I was informed that a heavy column was moving directly against my flank. It was now quite dark, so that it was impossible to distinguish any person a few feet off. I immediately withdrew my battery to the rear, just in time to save it, as this column swept around on my right and rear, delivering at the same time a very heavy fire, and capturing nearly the whole of the Seventy- seventh Pennsylvania, and about one-half of the Seventy-ninth Illinois. A large portion of the men succeeded, in the confusion and darkness in making their escape, but Colonel Rose, Lieutenant Colonel Pyfer and Major Phillips, all of the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, and Major Fitzsimmons, of the Thirtieth Indiana, who had previously been wounded, but was near the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, together with quite a number of line officers, were captured, or wounded so that they were unable to get away.
My second line returned their fire and held their position. I was, as yet, not aware of the extent of the loss of my brigade, owing to the dark- ness, and, while endeavoring to move my left more to the front, got into the enemy's lines and was taken prisoner, but succeeded in making my escape, and on my return found that my brigade, with the rest of the
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132
Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
division, was being withdrawn from its perilous position, as it was almost entirely surrounded by a force largely its superior in numbers. We bivouacked that night about 300 yards to the right of the Chattanooga road.
Early in the morning of the 20th instant, by your orders, I took a position with the remnant of my brigade, in rear of the Third brigade, forming the second line.
Shortly afterward, I received an order to move to the left, where I found that I was detached from the division-General Baird's division, of the Fourteenth Army Corp, being between the right of ury line and the left of the rest of the division, and one brigade on my left, forming the extreme left of our line. About 9 o'clock the enemy made an attack on our front, which was repulsed after a severe fight. From that time until 5 P. M. we were under a constant fire, at times one of great intensity, but every attack was repulsed, and some of them were attended with great slaughter to the enemy.
At about 5 o'clock, during a very severe attack, and which we were . repulsing with our usual success, I received. an order from General Johnson, in person to withdraw my command, fighting the best way I could, as our whole line was to do the same. I immediately moved my command by the left flank, in rear of the brigade that bad been ou my left, toward the Chattanooga road, and then across the hills in the direction of Rossville. Some little confusion took place in this movement, owing to the terrific fire we received from the infantry and artillery on our flank and rear while crossing a cornfield; but, with the assistance of Colonel Buckner, of the Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers, I succeeded in getting into good order again, and retiring, in that manner to near Rossville, where we bivouacked for the night. During this terrible engagement I am proud to say that all, men and officers alike, behaved in such a manuer as to make distinction between them invidious.
*
* * *
# The loss of my brigade is shown by the following table .* It will be
*Omitted In Rebellion Records, embodied in revised statement, as follows:
Killed.
Wounded.
Captured or · missing.
Command.
Officers.
Enlisted men.
Officers.
Enlisted men.
Officers.
Enlisted men.
Aggregate.
Staff,
.
1
1
2
5
9
Seventy-ninth Illinois,
1
20
6
91
121
Twenty-ninth Indiana,
0
5
S7
7
62
172
Thirtieth Indiana.
S
5
50
4
57
126
Seventy-seventh Pennsylvanla.
3
4
21
9
64
104
Ohlo Light Artillery, Twentieth
Battery,
2
2
4
Total Second Brigade,
4
23
16
1S4
25
251
526
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133
The Battle of Chickamauga.
seen that, out of an aggregate of 1,130 who went into the engagement, there remained but 308 men.
The list of missing, as will be seen, is quite large. A large majority of those reported in that manner, I am satisfied, were either killed or wounded, as much of the heaviest loss, I suppose, was during the attack of the night of the 19th, as we received a very heavy cross-fire from the enemy, there must have been a great many struck down by the enemy's bullets. Very . nearly all that were lost at that time are reported missing, and will have to stand that way until we receive more definite information.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. DODGE,
Colonel, Comdg. 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division, 20th Army Corps. Lieutenant A. S. Smith,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General Second Division.
The prisoners from the regiment were passed through the Confederate lines, taken to Atlanta, and from thence, by rail, to Richmond. Here the commissioned officers were put into Libby, and the enlisted men into other prisons. In Novem- . ber the men were taken to Danville, Virginia, and subse- quently to Andersonville, Georgia. Fifty-seven of these men died while in prisons principally at Andersonville, leaving only seven survivors out of the sixty-four. That fact alone speaks volumes as to the treatment received by the Union prisoners of war, during the Rebellion.
In the prisons too the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania had a unique distinction. Members of it were prominently en- gaged while confined in prisons in the three most successful tunnels that were dug out of military prisons, during the en- tire Rebellion. Colonel Thomas E. Rose was the head of the Libby Prison tunnel. Under very great difficulties it was dug from the building, under the street, ending under a shed which admirably screened the escaping prisoners. This excavation was about fifty feet in length. Through it es- caped one hundred and nine officers, Colonel Rose among them. IIe was re-captured, but was afterwards exchanged and reached his regiment in time to participate in the Atlanta campaign.
The second tunnel referred to, was dng from Prison No. 5. Danville, Virginia, in December, 1863. It was somewhat shorter than the Libby tunnel and ended in the open, outside of the guard line. It opened in plain view of the guards.
134
Serenty-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
The men depended entirely upon the darkness of the night to enable them to escape unobserved. About seventy es- caped through this burrow. Corporal Jacob Isenberger, of Company K, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, was one of the leaders, and a prominent worker in this enterprise.
The third tunnel was from the same No. 5 Prison, at Dan- ville. It was dug in January and February, 1864, requiring about six weeks work. Having learned, by previous exper- ience, that such enterprises if generally known among the prisoners, would almost infallibly come to the knowledge of the prison authorities, the men formed an oathbound league, numbering sixty members, to do this work. In the organiza- tion of this league, Sergeant John Obreiter, of Company K, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, was elected first assistant en- gineer, and John H. Shirk, of Company E, Seventy-ninth Penn- sylvania, second assistant. The chief engineer was a west- . ern man. He did not see the work until it was finished, when he went down and through it to liberty. The work therefore all fell to the assistants and their helpers without any assist- ance or advice from the chief engineer. It was done under the most trying circumstances. Owing to the former at- tempts to escape, guards were at this time, placed inside of the building in addition to the regular guard surrounding it on the outside. Yet, in spite of all difficulties, the work was secretly and successfully accomplished. The entire length of the excavation was one hundred and eighty feet. It ended under a small detached outbuilding, which was then used as the kitchen of a dwelling, which stood on ground adjoining the prison property built upon piers or posts about two and ene- half or three feet above the ground. The prisoners expected that it would screen them from the view of the guards while they passed into the streets of the town. Fully one hundred and sixty escaped through this tunnel. This was the largest number that escaped from any prison during the entire war. A lady, living nearby, saw the men coming from. under the kitchen and reported the fact to the guards. They promptly stopped the exodus. But for this, prisoners would have con- tinued going out until dawn, by which time the prison would have been almost emptied.
Number five prison was a large three storied brick structure
PENNSYLVANIA 77TH REGIMENT VETERAN INFANTRY 212 BRIC 212 DIV 20 ARMY CORPS ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND
PRINT: JULIUS BIEN & CO. NEW YORK
CHICKAMAUGA, FRONT VIEW.
..... ₦
----
----
PRINT: JULIUS BIEN & CO. NEW YORK
CHICKAMAUGA, BACK VIEW,
SHOWING SHELL MONUMENT WHERE GEN. SMITH FELL, ALSO THE LARGE PINE TREE ON THE RIGHT WHERE THE 77 ™ FLAG WAS CAPTURED.
135
In Confederate Prison.
of very substantial construction, and was used, prior to the Rebellion, as a plug tobacco factory, but during the war, it was turned into a military prison, which, at the time when the tunnels were dug out from it, contained about 1,000 prisoners who were captured at the battle of Chickamauga.
To commemorate the services of the regiment in the battle of Chickamauga, an appropriate monument of granite and bronze has been erected on that field by the State of Penn- sylvania.
This monument stands on the ground where, on September nineteenth, during the night attack on Johnson's Division, so large a number of the Seventy-seventh, officers and men, were taken prisoners.
136
· Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regiment.
CHAPTER VII.
Chattanooga-Short Rations-Rosecrans plans to open communications, plan approved by Grant, successful-Rosecrans relieved, Thomas placed . in Command-Grant takes Supreme Command-Skirmish at Lookout · Creek-Whiteside-77th Re-enlistments-Home on Veteran Furlough.
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C HATTANOOG.\, the objective point of this campaign, had been successfully gained by Rosecrans, but at a fear- ful cost. As the Union army entered the town, it was closely followed by the enemy with the evident intention of forcing them out of it, and driving them to the north side of the river. By great exertion and very hard labor, all of which was cheerfully put forth by the men, the entire southern front of Rosecrans' position was quickly protected by a strong line of breastworks. These presented an almost insurmountable obstacle to an assaulting column. Bragg took up a position in front of the fortifications, extending his lines from the river, east of Chattanooga, to the river below Lookout Moun- tain, on the west of Chattanooga. His main force was on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, with lines of forti- fications at their bases, in Chattanooga valley as far south as Chattanooga creek. From the creek their works followed a ridge running across Orchard Knob, and from thence to the river. In Lookout Valley Bragg posted a brigade in a strongly intrenched position. His pickets extended down along the river, through Whiteside and Shellmound, nearly to Bridgeport. Alabama. Thus he held the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, thereby cutting the Federal army off from its base of supplies.
Rosecrans was compelled to bring all his supplies on wagon trains from Stevenson, Alabama, through the Sequatchie Val- ley, over roads which had been made almost impassable by incessant rains, and across the. Cumberland mountains. Under those conditions the Quartermaster's department could
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137
Chattanooga.
uot furnish the army with quarter rations. The overworked horses and mules died by hundreds, from starvation. Wagon trains were often twenty days in making the trip from Stev- enson. Usually they reached Chattanooga entirely empty, as all the supplies, with which they had been loaded, would nec- essarily be consumed on the way by the accompanying train guards and animals. By November first all the remaining animals had been so reduced by starvation, that they could no longer draw the wagons.
The men, too, suffered very severely. Day by day they con- sumed the pittance furnished, which was never enough to stay their hunger. Hard bread, mouldy and almost rotten from exposure in transit, which had been condemned as un- safe for use, was seized by the famishing men and greedily de- voured. But, in spite of all this privation and misery, the men tried to be cheerful. They did not indulge in murmuring or fault-finding, for they knew that all that was possible was being done for them. Accordingly they suffered, without complaining, in the hope of better times soon to come.
Rosecrans perfected a plan for restoring communications by opening the Tennessee river from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry, near Chattanooga. He had issued the necessary orders to carry it into effect, when on October nineteenth he received an order relieving him and putting General Thomas in com- mand. The same night, General Thomas directed General Hooker, at Bridgeport, to be ready to obey the order given him, in the morning, by General Rosecrans, but Hooker's train did not reach him until the twenty-sixth. On the next morn- ing he crossed the river to the south side, and moved towards Chattanooga, in execution of his part of the plan for opening the river.
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