USA > Tennessee > History of the Twentieth Tennessee regiment volunteer infantry, C.S.A > Part 28
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42
"After Brown had reached the position indicated to him and had formed a line of battle, he sent to inform me that it would be certain disaster for him to attack, as the enemy's line ex- tended beyond his right several hundred yards. I sent word to him to throw back his right brigade and make the attack. I had already sent couriers after General Bate to bring him back and direct him to join Cleburne's left. Going to the right of my line I found Generals Brown and Cleburne, and the latter re-
Digitized by Google
332
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH TENNESSEE REGIMENT
ported that he had reformed his division. I then gave orders to Brown and Cleburne that as soon as they could connect their lines they should attack the enemy, who were then in sight ; in- forming them at the same time that General Hood had just told me that Stewart's column was close at hand, and that General Stewart had been ordered to go to my right and place his com- mand across the pike. I furthermore said to them that I would go myself and see that Bate was placed in position to connect with them, and immediately rode to the left of my line for that purpose.
"During all this time I had met and talked with General Hood repeatedly, our field headquarters being not over one hundred yards apart. After Cleburne's repulse I had been along my line and had seen that Brown's right was outflanked several hundred yards. I had urged General Hood to hurry up Stewart and place him on my right, and had received from him assurance that this would be done; and this assurance, as before stated, I had communicated to Generals Brown and Cleburne.
"When I returned from my left, where I had been to get Bate in position, and was on my way to the right of my line, it was dark ; but I intended to move forward with Cleburne and Brown and make the attack, knowing that Bate would be in position to support them. Stewart's column had already passed by on the way toward the turnpike, and I presumed that he would be in position on my right.
"On reaching the road where General Hood's field quarters had been established, I found a courier with a message from General Hood requesting me to come to him at Captain Thompson's house, about one and a fourth miles back on the road to Ruther- ford's Creek. Here I found Generals Stewart and Hood. The Commanding General there informed me that he had concluded to wait till morning, and directed me to hold my command in readiness to attack at daylight.
"I was never more astonished than when General Hood in- formed me that he had concluded to postpone the attack until daylight. The road was still open - orders to remain quiet until morning - and nothing to prevent the enemy from march- ing to Franklin."
Digitized by Google
333
REGIMENTAL HISTORY
The following communication, written by Governor (after- ward Senator) Harris of Tennessee, then acting as aide to General Hood, is a valuable contribution to the history of this campaign. It is copied from Drake's "Annals of the Army of Tennessee," for May, 1877. A copy was furnished to General Hood.
Gov. JAMES D. PORTER : -
Dear Sir: In answer to yours of the 12th inst., I have to say that on the night that the army of Tennessee, under command of Gen. J. B. Hood, halted at Spring Hill on its march from Columbia to Nashville, General Hood, his adjutant-general Major Mason, and myself occupied the same room at the residence of Captain Thompson, near the village. Late at night we were aroused by a private soldier, who reported to General Hood that on reaching the camp near Spring Hill, he found him self within the Federal lines; that the troops were in great confusion, a part of them were marching in the direction of Franklin, others had turned toward Columbia, and that the road was blocked with baggage-wagons and gun-carriages, rendering it impossible to move in order in either direction. Upon the re- ceipt of this report, General Hood directed Major Mason to order General Cheatham to move down on the road immediately and attack the enemy. General Hood and myself remained in bed. I went to sleep, and I supposed that General Hood did the same. At daylight on the following morning we learned that the Federal army had left Spring Hill and was being con- centrated at Franklin.
On the march to Franklin, General Hood spoke to me, in the presence of Major Mason, of the failure of General Cheatham to make the night attack at Spring Hill, and censured him in severe terms for his disobedience of orders. Soon after this, being alone with Major Mason, the latter remarked that "General Cheatham was not to blame about the matter last night. I did not send him the order." I asked if he had com- municated the fact to General Hood. He answered that he had not. I replied that it is due to General Cheatham that this ex- planation should be made. Thereupon Major Mason joined
Digitized by Google
334
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH TENNESSEE REGIMENT
General Hood and gave him the information. Afterwards General Hood said to me that he had done injustice to General Cheatham, and requested me to inform him that he held him blameless for the failure at Spring Hill. And, on the day fol- lowing the battle of Franklin, I was informed by General Hood that he had addressed a note to General Cheatham, assuring him that he did not censure or charge him with the failure to make the attack.
Very respectfully, ISHAM G. HARRIS.
Memphis, Tenn., May 20, 1877.
Maj .- Gen. John C. Brown, commanding Cheatham's division, gave the following account of the same affair : -
"My division comprised four brigades of infantry, commanded respectively by Gen. S. R. Gist, of South Carolina, Generals O. F. Strahl, G. W. Gordon, and John C. Carter, of Tennessee. On the morning of Nov. 29, 1864, when I left my bivouac on the Mooresville turnpike in front of Columbia, Tenn., the whole command numbered not exceeding 2,750 effective men. Gist's brigade was the largest, and Strahl's was next in numerical strength ; those of Gordon and Carter being about equal in the number of effective men. We started on the march about sun- rise, and after traversing cedar brakes and pathless woods, crossed Duck River by a pontoon previously laid, about four miles above Columbia, at or near what was known as Davis' ferry or Davis' ford. Conforming to the daily alterations, my division was the rear of your [Cheatham's] corps. After cross- ing Duck River, as I now recollect, at or near Bear Creek, the commanding general, apprehending an attack on our left flank, ordered your corps, on its march from that point, to move in two parallel columns, so that it could come instantly into action in two lines of battle if attacked on the flank. Accordingly, my division was ordered to form the supporting column, and for that purpose to leave the road by which the main body was moving, and so conform its movements to that of the other two divisions (Cleburne's and Bate's), that in coming into action to meet an attack on our left flank, it would occupy a place in rear of and
Digitized by Google
335
REGIMENTAL HISTORY
about four hundred yards distant from the front line of battle. The march thence to Rutherford's Creek was made pursuant to these orders, and the whole distance thus traversed (five or six miles) was through fields and woods and over rough ground, adding greatly to the fatigues of the day. About the commence- ment of this movement, or soon afterwards, by the order of the commanding general in person, the whole of Gist's and about one-half of Strahl's brigade were detached for picket duty, to be relieved by the orders of the commanding general, thus leaving me with about one-half of my division.
"When near Rutherford's Creek, learning that a crossing was not practicable east of the road, I changed the direction of the march to the left into the road, and found Bate's division pre- paring to cross the stream. After reaching the north bank of the stream, I was ordered to pursue the road leading in the direction of the Caldwell place, while Cleburne's and Bate's divisions moved at an angle to the left ; but before reaching the Dr. Caldwell house, I was ordered to change the direction of my column to the left, and we reached the "Lewisburg," or " Rally Hill " pike, near the toll-gate, a distance of one and a half miles from Spring Hill.
"This was within an hour or an hour and a half of sunset. I could distinctly see the enemy in force, both infantry and artillery, at Spring Hill, but did not, and perhaps could not at that point, see either troops or wagons moving on the Columbia pike. Forrest's cavalry were on higher ground northeast of my position.
"I was ordered to form a line of battle and 'take' Spring Hill. Gist's brigade and the detachment from Strahl had not reported. I formed my line as speedily as worn out troops could be moved, and after throwing forward a skirmish line, advanced four hundred or five hundred yards, when I discovered a line of the enemy thrown out of Spring Hill, across and threatening my right flank, and I then discovered. for the first time that General Forrest's cavalry, which I had been assured would protect my right, had been ordered to another part of the field, leaving me without any protection on my right flank or support in rear. I had neither artillery nor cavalry, and was left in a position
Digitized by Google
336
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH TENNESSEE REGIMENT
where I must meet with inevitable disaster, if I advanced on Spring Hill.
"A hasty consultation with my brigade commanders resulted in a determination to suspend the advance, and confer with the corps commander. I need not remind you that in a very few minutes you were upon the field, and fully approved of what had been done, as did also General Hood a little later, when he directed that the attack be delayed until the arrival of Generals Stewart and Gist, and in the meanwhile, that the whole command should be held under orders to advance at a moment's notice. General Gist's brigade reported a little after nightfall, and was immedi- ately placed in position on my right. General Stewart's corps came up later, and went into bivouac on the stream in the rear of my right, where it remained until the following morning. I received no further orders that evening or during the night to advance or change my position. After daylight on the morning of the 30th I took up the line of march for Franklin, the enemy in the meantime having preceded, under circumstances of which you are fully advised.
"On the march to Franklin, General Cleburne, with whom I had long enjoyed very close personal relations, sent a message to the head of my column requesting an interview. Allowing my column to pass on, I awaited his arrival. When he came up, we rode apart from the column through the fields, and he told me with much feeling that he had heard that the commanding general was endeavoring to place upon him the responsibility for allowing the enemy to pass our position on the night previous. I replied to him that I had heard nothing on that subject, and that I hoped he was mistaken. He said, 'No, I think not; my information comes through a very reliable channel.' He said that he could not afford to rest under such an imputation, and should certainly have the matter investigated to the fullest extent, as soon as we were away from the immediate presence of the enemy. General Cleburne was quite angry, and evidently was deeply hurt, believing that the commander-in-chief had censured him. I asked General Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemy during the afternoon and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criti-
Digitized by Google
1
.
337
REGIMENTAL HISTORY
cisms of a command occupying a position on his left, and con- cluded by saying that of course the responsibility rested with the commander-in-chief, as he was upon the field during the afternoon, and was fully advised during the night of the move- ment of the enemy.
"The conversation at this point was abruptly terminated by the arrival of orders for yourself from the commanding general. As he left he said. 'We will resume this conversation at the first convenient moment,' but in less than three hours after that time this gallant soldier was a corpse upon the bloody field of Franklin."
Major-General Bate, referring to an interview with General Hood between the hours of 10 and 12 of the night of the 29th of November, at which General Bate mentioned a conflict in the orders of the general commanding, and the corps commanders touching the movement of his division, relates that General Hood said : "It makes no difference now, or it is all right, anyhow, for General Forrest, as you see, has just left, and informed me that he holds the turnpike with a portion of his forces north of Spring Hill, and will stop the enemy if he tries to pass toward Franklin, and so in the morning we will have a surrender with- out a fight." He further said in a congratulatory manner, "We can sleep quietly to-night."
General Forrest reported that after the arrival of Cleburne's division at Spring Hill, "I ordered Brig .- Gen. W. H. Jackson to move with his division in the direction of Thompson's Station and there intercept the enemy. He struck the road at Fitzgerald's, four miles from Spring Hill, at II P. M., just as the front of the enemy's column had passed. This attack was a com- plete surprise, producing much panic and confusion. Brigadier- General Jackson had possession of the pike, and fought the enemy until daylight, but receiving no support he was compelled to retire.
Two small brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals Arm- strong and Ross, constituted Jackson's division. If an adequate force had been sent forward to take advantage of the panic and confusion created by Jackson's attack, a second golden oppor- tunity would not have been lost.
Digitized by Google
338
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH TENNESSEE REGIMENT
The first intimation of dissatisfaction on the part of the com- manding general at the management of the affair at Spring Hill was suggested by the receipt of the following note, written in front of Nashville and dated December 3, 1864 : -
"MY DEAR GENERAL : I do not censure you for the failure at Spring Hill. I am satisfied that you are not responsible for it. I witnessed the splendid manner in which you delivered battle at Franklin on the 30th ult., and I now have a higher estimate of you as a soldier than I ever had.
"Yours very truly,
"J. B. HOOD, General. "Major-General B. F. Cheatham."
"On the morning of the 4th of December," says General Cheatham, " I went to the headquarters of General Hood, and referring to his note and criticism that had evidently been made by some one, I said to him, 'A great opportunity was lost at Spring Hill, but you know that I obeyed your orders there, as everywhere, literally and promptly.' General Hood not only did not dissent from what I said, but exhibited the most cordial manner, coupled with confidence and friendship."
After the failure of the Confederates on the night of November 29 to cut off the Yankee army at Spring Hill, Hood put his army in motion the next morning and arrived in front of Franklin, II miles north of Spring Hill, about 2 P. M. Here he found General Schofield with the fourth and twenty-third army corps under General Stanley and Cox respectively, numbering 23,734 infantry and artillery, and 5,500 cavalry, entrenched behind two lines of earthworks.
.
Hood, on his arrival in front of the town, formed his three corps thus : Cheatham, who was in command of Hardee's old corps, composed of the divisions of Bate, Brown (Cheatham's old division), and Cleburne, was on the left of Hood's line ; Bate, being on the extreme left of the Confederate infantry, moved down by the Carter's Creek pike and the widow Bostick house. General John C. Brown, who commanded Cheatham's old division, was on Bate's right, with the right of his division resting on the Columbia pike. Cleburne was on the right of
Digitized by Google
i
339
REGIMENTAL HISTORY
Brown, with his left on the pike, the pike being the guide between these two gallant divisions. General A. P. Stewart, who had in his corps the divisions of Loring, French, and Walthall, was on the right of Cleburne, and moved to the assault across the open fields that lay between the Columbia and Lewis- burg pikes. The corps of General Stephen D. Lee, composed of the divisions of Generals Ed. Johnson, Clayton, and Stevenson, did not arrive on the field until about 4 P. M., just as Hood was moving to the assault with Cheatham's and Stewart's corps. Johnson's division of Lee's corps was ordered to support Cheatham. They were carried into the battle about dark, and most gloriously and effectively did they do their work. They were mostly from Mississippi and Alabama. The two other divisions of Lee's corps, viz., Clayton's and Stevenson's, were not engaged.
Maj .- Gen. J. D. Cox of the Federal army, in his history of the Battle of Franklin, said that "General Hood moved his troops to the assault with less men than Schofield had behind his works," which were well constructed and the position admi- rably chosen, and was defended by nearly 24,000 Veterans, well drilled and superbly armed, taking one line of works and a portion of the second and lining up in the outer ditch of the second works. They contended with a force one third larger than their own, across the second works, with bayonets and butts of guns for two long hours,-a fight the like of which has never been surpassed on this continent,-and finally forced the Yankees to retreat from their own trenches, which was as grand a feat as the French performed when they assaulted and captured the Malakoff in the Crimean War. Oh, but what a sacrifice !
It was here that the noblest, the bravest, the grandest lot of men, for the number, that ever assaulted an enemy, enriched Franklin's fields with the cream of Southern blood. How could a just God look down from pure skies and witness this horrible tragedy (that was brought about by mistake), and not by some hidden hand stop it before it culminated in this horrible slaughter ?
It was to the right of the Columbia pike, in front of the old gin house, that that gallant son of the Emerald Isle, that superb
Digitized by Google
340
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH TENNESSEE REGIMENT
soldier, that Bernadotte of the Western army, gave up his life for our Southern land. On this spot we ought to erect a monument to Patrick Ranayne Cleburne, and carve on its sides, the sham- rock, the magnolia, and the cross of St. Andrew, and dig deep into the sides of this monument in letters of gold : "None braver, none truer, duty fully done."
It must be remembered that the three corps of Cheatham, Stewart, and Lee, when they crossed the Tennessee River, numbered about 26,000 men, and a greater number of them, not having seen their families for two years, went home. Two divisions of Lee's corps were not engaged, which reduced these three corps that made the assault at Franklin to 16,000 men.
In this engagement the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment fought in Tyler's brigade of Bate's division, commanded by Col. T. B. Smith, which was on the left of the infantry line, and was not as desperately engaged as were the men to our right, although Bate lost out of his three little brigades 47 killed and 253 wounded. Captain Todd Carter, who was on the staff of General Tom Benton Smith, and who was raised here at Franklin and went to the war as a member of Company H, Twentieth Tennessee Regi- ment, was killed here right at the enemy's works, almost at his father's door. The right of Bate's division took the breast works in their front, and held them until next morning. This was the first engagement during the entire war, that the Twen- tieth Tennessee Regiment was engaged in, that they failed to get into the hottest part of the battle, and the boys thought they were in luck.
To show how gallantly this little assaulting army of 16,000 men were led across a plain one and a half miles in open view of an army 24,000 strong, magnificently armed and protected by two lines of works, we will state that this heroic little band lost one major-general killed and one wounded, four brigadier- generals killed and five wounded, six colonels killed and fifteen wounded, two lieutenant-colonels killed and nine wounded, three majors killed and five wounded. No men were more gallantly led by superior courage and skill than was this assaulting column.
At the battle of Waterloo, when the tide of battle had been
Digitized by Google
:
-
341
REGIMENTAL HISTORY
ebbing and flowing for several hours, and Napoleon thought it was time to play his favorite tactics,- pierce the enemy's center, - he formed the old guard in a column, and put at their head the best and bravest marshall of all that fighting machine, Marshall Ney. This column was formed on a little eminence called La Belle Alliance, and swept down across a narrow valley, up the gentle slope of a ridge, against the right center of the allied armies, and here met the two brigades of Maitland and Adams, and were repulsed by an equal number; while at Franklin, the Confederates under Cheatham, Stewart, and Cle- burne crossed a plain three times as wide, assaulted the enemy one third stronger than they, behind two lines of works, and finally compelled him to retreat. The loss of the French at Waterloo was thirty per cent., and the Confederates about the same at Franklin.
General Cox, who commanded the Twenty-third Army Corps of Yankees, and witnessed the whole affair, said : "When the Confederates had formed and started forward, no more magnif- icent spectacle was ever witnessed." Hood's report showed that out of 16,000 that he put into the assault, he lost, killed, wounded, and captured, 4,500, which was a little over thirty per cent., while the divisions of Brown and Cleburne lost forty per cent.,
Brown's division, who were nearly all Tennesseeans, lost almost every field officer that went into the battle.
The gallant George W. Gordon, who commanded one of Brown's brigades, was wounded on the enemy's works. Color- bearer Drew, of the Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiment of Gordon's brigade, planted his colors on the enemy's works, and was killed. He fell inside of their works, and died on his colors. General Gist, another of Brown's brigade commanders, was killed in advance of his brigade, near the Yankee's works.
The gallant O. F. Strahl, who was born in the North on the banks of the Muskingum, and was one of Brown's most trusted brigadiers, was killed near where the Columbia Pike and the second line of works crossed, within a few feet of the Yankees' works. Your writer had a brother who was Sergeant-Major of the gallant Twenty-fourth Tennessee Regiment ; he was killed by the side of the noble Strahl. Brigadier-General Carter, who
Digitized by Google
342
HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH TENNESSEE REGIMENT
commanded Brown's left brigade, was killed, and Sergeant Brewer was the ranking officer left of the gallant Sixth Tennessee Regiment.
General John Adams, a Tennessean who commanded a brigade in Loring's division, was shot near the enemy's works, and his horse leaped on the enemy's works and fell dead. Quarles' brig- ade of Tennesseans, of Walthall's division, suffered severely, as did the divisions of French and Loring. The attack of the Con- federates was repeated on some parts of the line until nine o'clock at night, and at twelve o'clock the enemy began to withdraw in the direction of Nashville.
There were enough Tennesseans killed in this battle to throw the whole State into mourning.
The battle of Franklin was fought on the evening and night of November 30, 1864. December 1, was occupied with burying our gallant dead and caring for our wounded. On December 2, Hood marched his army north from Franklin to Nashville, a distance of eighteen miles, and formed in line two miles south of the city, with an army of 23,053 men facing an army under Gen. Geo. H. Thomas of about 30,000, which in a few days was rein- forced to 60,000, and were working like beavers, entrenching themselves for fear of an attack from Hood's little band.
On the morning of December 2, General Hood ordered Major- General Bate with his three little brigades under Generals T. B. Smith, Jackson, and Robert Bullock, with Slocumb's battery under Lieutenant Chalaron, and 150 cavalry under Col. B. J. Hill, in all 1,600 men, to proceed to Murfreesboro, and destroy the blockhouses and bridges from that place to Nashville. Gen- eral Bate at once started with his division by way of Triune, and then took the Nolensville Pike north seven miles to Nolens- ville, then east through the country, over very rough roads, to the terminus of the Wilkerson Pike, some seven miles from Murfreesboro. Here he learned that Murfreesboro had not been evacuated, as he was led to believe, but instead it was fortified and garrisoned with 8,000 or 10,000 troops under Major- General Rousseau, which fact General Bate reported to General Hood, whose headquarters were at the Overton House, six
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.