USA > Tennessee > Knox County > Knox County in the World War, 1917-1919 > Part 12
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82
THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT
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THE BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL
Salient is the military term for the very common words "pocket" and "wedge." The St. Mihiel salient, the elimination of which was the first big, concerted, of- fensive operation of our forces in large number in France, was a deep pocket driven into the French lines in the fall of 1914 by the German armies in their attempt to outflank Verdun, whose forts held the key to the defense of Eastern France. The right edge of this wedge, as a glance at the map will show, was just above Pont-a-Mousson, while the left edge was at Les Eparges, a few miles southeast of Verdun.
This pocket, always the deepest and sharpest on the western front, was some 18 miles across from base to base, and slightly over 13 miles in depth. Yet meas- uring around its perimeter, it was no less than 40 miles in extent. To pinch off or close the salient meant shortening the line about 22 miles.
There were other considerations than the decrease in battle front which caused General Pershing to select this as the sector of attack of the First American Army. For four years this pocket had been a threat to Verdun, about which the Germans had closed on the northern and eastern side. If the left side of the wedge above St. Mihiel was driven still farther westward, Verdun would be virtually cut off and the French forces therein surrounded and captured. Fur- thermore, the German advance at the deepest point of the pocket barely cut the main railroad from Paris to Verdun, Toul, Epinal and Belfort, a double-track line that linked up the great fortresses of Eastern France. This had been a great loss, for it interfered with the speedy movements of troops from one sector to another of the southern battle front. It had been necessary for four years to transport troops by a single track line farther south, much longer and burdened with all traffic to Toul and Nancy.
As an offensive stroke, the closing of the St. Mihiel salient was fraught with equally great possibilities. It meant the restoration of about 150 miles of French territory, which was under the yoke of its German oppressors; the reversal from a threat to surround Verdun to a very decided menace of an allied attack upon Metz, the left hinge and base of the German battle line; the establishment of a straight base line from which attacks could be launched toward Conflans at the coal and iron fields of Briey and Longwy, the German mineral basins, and at the great railroad arteries through Sedan, Montmedy and Metz.
Several desperate attempts had been made by the French earlier in the war to straighten out their lines and relieve the pressure on Verdun. In the spring of 1915, they struck a hard blow with large numbers at Les Eparges on the western flank. The attack was continued several weeks and both sides left thousands of dead on the field of battle. The Germans were estimated to have lost 30,000 killed in this series of operations, while the French casualties were even heavier. Outside of local gains, the attack was unsuccessful. The French resumed their drive in the summer on the other side of the pocket at Apremont, attempting to crush in that flank. The fighting was bitter and the French made some headway, but all was lost in a counter-offensive of the Germans in the fall of 1915. After that nothing was done on either side for three years, as the tide of active operations shifted to other sectors. Both sides improved their defensive fortifications, but neither assumed the offensive. The lines were held by divisions that needed rest and recuperation from operations elsewhere.
The military strategy employed by General Pershing in the reduction of this salient is explained very well by a homely illustration. Pont-a-Mousson and Les Eparges, the hases of the pocket, were the hinges of two great doors which opened outward in the direction of St. Mihiel. If the doors were swung together on these hinges, they would meet just north of Vigneulles and form a straight line. To accomplish this, it was necessary for the divisions on the left flank to
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work eastward, while those on the right side made their way northwesterly to join them. The attacks had to be so timed that the flanks would arrive at the junction point at the same time. It was necessary also that the maneuver be accomplished quickly to cut off the German forces at the bottom of the pocket and prevent their escape.
For the successful execution of this operation, General Pershing withdrew from the Marne salient the eight divisions, which were engaged there in the hot fighting of June and July, 1918; brought from other quiet sectors several divisions which were receiving their training in trench warfare; and transported clear across France from their training camps still other divisions which had had no actual battle experience. The organization of the First American Army and the commencement of assembly of all the units that were to take part in the attack began August 10. The plans of the general staff provided for the con- centration of about 600,000 troops of all arms and branches, together with their weapons and material, for the operation. As it was planned as a surprise, all movements were conducted by night. No troops or signs of unusual activity were visible on the roads by day. But with the fall of night, all highways were jammed with trucks, guns, ammunition, tanks, and wagons, going forward in position for the drive. The front line trenches were held lightly so that the enemy might not suspect the blow that was being aimed at him. Complete suc- cess depended upon overwhelming him before he could adequately man with his reserves the powerful defensive fortifications he had built.
The moral and psychological value of the operation's success was almost as great as the military advantages to be obtained. While the American divisions had fought splendidly when brigaded with the British and French, they had con- ducted no offensive on their own initiative and under their own leadership. The elimination of the salient would be the acid test of their offensive ability, while the successful execution of a task at which the French had failed for four years would not only inspire respect and courage in our allies as well as strike terror in the hearts of the Germans, but the American people would be aroused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by an action in which our fresh, vigouous troops were pitted successfully against their much vaunted German foes.
The plans of the attack were worked out to the minutest detail by the army staff. The hour and minute at which the barrages were to be laid down, the rate of advance of the infantry behind them, the sector of attack of each division, the objectives of each day's fighting were mapped out carefully in advance, and all commanders, from division down to platoon leaders, were rehearsed on the parts assigned to each. Special stress was laid upon the effective cooperation of all arms, infantry, artillery, aviation, tanks, machine guns, engineers and supply trains. The French were of very great assistance, for in addition to loaning us much artillery, many of their best bombing and scout planes, and all of the tanks that were used in the attack, they contributed three divisions for the very delicate operations against the German troops at the nose of the salient.
The infantry of nine American divisions was assigned to make the attack on the two flanks of the pocket, crush them in by frontal assaults, close to the center, and capture the garrison of several thousand men at its bottom. On the right flank, strung from Pont-a-Mousson as a pivot, was the First Corps, commanded by General Liggett, and composed of the 82nd, 90th, 5th and 2nd divisions. Gen- eral Dickman commanded the Fourth Corps, made up of the 89th, 42nd and 1st divisions, which were stationed in the center of attack and upon the left of the First Corps. Upon the left of the Fourth Corps, and strung lightly around the tip of the salient from Xivray to Mouilly, was the Second French Corps, while the western base of the wedge was held by the Fifth American Corps, under General Cameron, made up of the 26th and 4th American divisions and a French division. In reserve for the three American Corps were the 3rd, 35th, 78th and 91st divisions, while the 33rd and 80th were available in case of need.
128
The artillery concentration for the attack was one of the greatest of the en- tire war. Guns were so numerous that they seemed placed behind every par- ticle of cover available. They were greatly out of proportion to the amount of infantry used. Their number was about 2,000, while their calibers ranged from the famous French 75's up to three huge American naval guns, which had a range of about 20 miles and which bombarded the German lines of communication far in the rear of the battle lines. All calibers were supplied lavishly with ammu- nition to batter down the strong natural and artificial defenses, which the enemy had erected in front of him in the four years of his occupation of this sector.
Of the 600,000 men assembled for the drive, ahout 250,000, twice the size of any American army ever engaged in one battle, were employed actively in the operations. The rest were kept in reserve or used in the service of supply to the combat troops. Against them were opposed seven German divisions in the line and four in reserve. However, though they were considerably inferior in numbers as compared with the attacking forces, a much smaller force was neces- sary to defend the salient than to attack it. They were powerfully supplied with the most potent weapons of defense, an abundance of all calibers of artillery and of light and heavy machine guns.
The Germans, in spite of the secrecy that was maintained in the preparations for the attack, seem to have had some inkling of its coming. Their plans, ac- cording to documents captured from prisoners, appear to have vacillated. Some of the heavy artillery was withdrawn to the second line of defense, known as the Michel position, and all work on fortifications was stopped a few days before the blow fell. No extra reserve divisions were brought into the sector for a more powerful defense. This was due probably to the fact that they were needed worse at other parts of the front to stem the French and English drives which were in progress. However, it has been established very clearly that the Ger- mans did not evacuate the salient "according to previous plans", as the German war office announced after the battle to soften the bitterness of the losses in men. guns, and ground.
The attack started with a tremendous artillery preparation at 1 o'clock on the morning of September 12. The chorus of two thousand guns, majestic in their roar, lighting up the pitch black darkness of a rainy night with splotches like rays of lightning, and fairly shaking heaven and earth with their tremendous power, played for four hours upon the towns, shelters, and strong points of the enemy in the rear of their front lines and made the night for them a veritable inferno. At five o'clock sharp, all firing ceased and an unearthly calm pervaded everything for a half hour. Then all burst forth again in a mighty roar as a barrage of high explosive shell was laid down upon the front lines of the Ger- mans. Our infantry, jumping out of their trenches in the fog and mist of the early morning, leaped forward through the tangle of barbed wire to the attack. They found the Germans huddled in groups in their dugouts or torn and mangled by the hurricane of shell and shrapnel. Some put up a sturdy resistance, others, bewildered and nerveless, gave themselves up with little fighting. The American troops, inspired by the success they attained in the first few hours of the fight- ing, pressed forward vigorously on the flanks of the pocket, while the French, with great skill, engaged the enemy at the bottom of the salient and prevented his retreat. The advance continued throughout the day and night of September 12, and early on the morning of September 13, the advance guards of the 1st and 26th Divisions met, as had been planned, just north of Vigneulles, where the doors of the wedge were to be closed.
Every objective of the commander-in-chief was attained and, during the course of the next two days, the line was straightened from Les Eparges to Pont-a- Mousson. The prisoners taken in the engagement numbered about 16,000, while the guns counted 443. These figures do not include a large number of machine guns and a great mass of materials and stores, which the Germans were forced to abandon in their haste to escape.
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THE MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE
Of all the battles and engagements in which Knox Countians took part during the world war, more men and officers of them were engaged perhaps, first and last, in the 47-day struggle of the American army against the vital German posi- tions in the Argonne Forest northward as far as Sedan than in any other large conflict or large operation in France. As has been pointed out in a previous chapter, these Knox Countians were not grouped into one combat unit, but were scattered through many organizations. They were to be found in the Fifty-fifth Field Artillery Brigade, the Second Corps Artillery Park, the Forty-second Di- vision, the Eighty-first and Eighty-second Divisions, the marines, the five regular divisions and many of the other army, corps, and divisional units that participated in this long campaign.
The Meuse-Argonne offensive should be regarded as a campaign, a series of battles, rather than a single engagement. It was a prolonged struggle of al- most seven weeks between two great armies, engaged in a death grapple at the most vital part of a battle line more than 400 miles long. No better illustration of the extreme importance, with which the German high command regarded the Argonne sector, can be found than in the manner in which its armies were dis- posed in the crucial months of October and November, 1918. Before the British and French troops the German armies were withdrawn as swiftly as possible and only rear-guard actions took place. Against the American forces, however, they resisted to the last inch with the best troops they had, knowing that if General Pershing reached his objective at Sedan, their whole line of communication on the Western Front would be pierced and the divisions against the French and English would be in danger of being flanked and cut off.
The plans for the attack were laid some weeks before it actually began. Toward the latter part of July or the first of August, 1918, when the success of the allied counter-offensive was assured and the offensive was definitely wrested from the German high command, Marshal Foch and General Pershing agreed upon the plan of action that the American armies should pursue on the eastern end of the battle front. First, the St. Mihiel salient was to be reduced; second, the German positions in the Argonne Forest and along the Meuse River were to be taken by frontal assault; third, the American and French armies were then to outflank and capture Metz, seizing the coal and iron fields of Longwy and Briey. If these operations were successful, the only tenable position for the enemy would be the east bank of the Rhine on German soil.
The first step was a complete success, although, if certain well authenticated rumors are correct, it was made against the wishes of Marshal Foch, who toward the latter part of August came to the opinion that this pocket could not be wiped out in time for the American divisions to reach the Argonne Forest and make adequate preparation within two weeks for such a great attack. The will of General Pershing prevailed, however, and his knowledge of the capabilities of his divisions was more than justified by events.
The German defenses from the Meuse to the Argonne were the most formid- able on the western front. They were both natural and artificial. The natural defenses were a long series of heights and ridges, wooded and covered with brush, bushes, and strong points. Upon these the Germans had built successive lines of artificial defenses, the Hindenburg Line, the Hagen Stellung, the Volker Stellung, the Kriemhilde Stellung, and the Freya Stellung, Concrete machine gun and artillery emplacements, several closely woven barbed wire systems, mines and booby traps, and an intricate system of interlocking trenches added
131
further strength to these natural fortifications, which guarded the great railroad system in their rear, the coal mines of Northern France and Belgium, and the iron mines of Lorraine.
The plan of battle called for the American army to attack from Vienne-le- Chateau, on the eastern border of the Argonne Forest, to the west bank of the Meuse River. A French army was to drive forward at the same time on the west side of the Argonne, thus creating two deep salients on both sides of the forest, which would cause the evacuation of its matted, tangled woods by the Germans therein. Nine infantry divisions-the 77th, 28th, 35th, 91st, 37th, 79th, 4th, 80th, and 33rd, arranged in order from left to right-were used by General Pershing to make the assault. They were supported by a tremendous concentration of American and French artillery of all calibers. The total number of guns em- ployed in the preliminary bombardment, which began at 2:30 o'clock on the morn- ing of September 26, was about 4,000. They fired more than 300,000 shells that day, a volume of shell and shrapnel and fire that no human force could resist on such a front. They withered and blasted all first line defenses in front of them, and made the early morning hours a living hell for the Germans, protected though they were by almost impregnable defenses.
In spite of this bombardment, the infantry, who leaped out of their trenches and went over the top at 5:30 a. m. behind a smoke and shell barrage, had great difficulties from the German machine gun fire. They were cut and slashed by the hostile gunners, hidden behind trenches, logs, up in trees, or behind any kind of protective cover. The advance was almost wholly through woods. Yet the progress on the first day was very satisfactory, for the German line was pene- trated at some places to a depth of six or seven miles. Montfaucon, the highest point in the sector, was entered and definitely captured the following day. Most of the divisions reached their objectives. The attack was followed up the next day, still further progress being made, but not so much as the day before. The Germans, who had withdrawn much of their artillery during the bombardment, had pulled it back into prepared positions and within twenty-four hours they began to mow down the advancing waves of our infantry.
During the next four or five days the American infantry suffered bitterly, as the enemy knew their location and used both machine guns and artillery to de- stroy them. The gains were piece by piece, a few hundred yards each day. Furthermore, they did not have the full support of our artillery behind them, as a heavy rain and the lack of roads delayed the bringing forward of both guns and ammunition. The losses were very heavy, and it was necessary to relieve several of the divisions for rest and replacements. The net result of this first phase of the campaign was that the first two lines of the enemy's fortifications were broken down, he had been forced to draw heavily upon his best divisions in reserve, a considerable wedge had been driven into his lines, and he had lost a good deal of his artillery.
The second phase) of the attack began with a heavy bombardment along all parts of the line. In spite of the fact that both light and heavy artillery had been brought forward into position, the assault met with strong resistance, as the enemy also had fortified his line with more troops and more machine guns and artillery. He saw the scope and aim of the drive, and therefore determined to stop it if possible. He was dug in behind the Kriemhilde Stellung, a strong line of defense along the heights north of Bantheville, Landres and St. Juvin. The fighting, under these circumstances, was tooth-and-toenail for the next three weeks. The American divisions made their progress almost by yards. Towns and villages were captured, then lost, and finally recaptured. Every hill or ridge was the scene of bloody fighting. Abundant aviation was brought into play to
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photograph every vital point and to bomb every concentration of troops. Many of the planes swooped down to the ground and sprayed the trenches with enfilad- ing machine gun fire. But by the close of October the American advance had proceeded north of a straight line from Grand Pre to Brieulles.
The third and final big drive of the campaign was launched on the morning of November 1. Sweeping gains were made that day and they were even more pronounced the day following. The divisions in the center drove a big salient into the heart of the enemy, capturing Buzancy, the German railhead in this region. The flanks also brought up their share of the advance. The enemy, it was apparent, had given up all hope of resistance and relied upon strong rear- guards to save his main body from capture by getting across the Meuse first. Learning that his resistance had been broken down, the American forces were driven full speed ahead night and day to intercept the enemy. Trucks were brought up to hasten the advance and wide gains were made daily. The left flank continued the chase northward, while the center and right were swung northeast and east to the Meuse. The first crossing was effected at Brieulles on November 3-4, while other divisions followed and pressed the retreat toward Montmedy to cut the railroad lines there. Meanwhile, the Forty-second Division, which was on the left flank, went forward toward Sedan by leaps and bounds, beating the French there by a day. They held back, however, and permitted the latter to enter first as a matter of sentiment. The main objective had been reached, however, and the German communique of November 8 admitted for the first time in the four years of war that "the German line had been pierced."
When the armistice put a stop to hostilities on November 11, the battle line was completely east of the Meuse, the great four-track railroad line through Sedan and Mezieres, which was the heart of the enemy's lines of communication, had been cut, and the American forces were ready to launch another attack with the First Army in the direction of Longwy and with the Second Army, which was southeast of Verdun, toward Briey and Conflans. These operations, which were sure of success, would have outflanked Metz, the last German stronghold in Lorraine, and made necessary the withdrawal of all the enemy forces across the Rhine into Germany.
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