An illustrated history of Klickitat, Yakima and Kittitas counties; with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington, Part 22

Author: Interstate publishing co., Chicago, pub
Publication date: 1904
Publisher: [Chicago] Interstate publishing company
Number of Pages: 1146

USA > Washington > Kittitas County > An illustrated history of Klickitat, Yakima and Kittitas counties; with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington > Part 22
USA > Washington > Yakima County > An illustrated history of Klickitat, Yakima and Kittitas counties; with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington > Part 22
USA > Washington > Klickitat County > An illustrated history of Klickitat, Yakima and Kittitas counties; with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington > Part 22

Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).

Acting upon Governor Stevens' instructions to "spare no exertion to reduce to unconditional submission any hostiles within reach," Colonel Shaw determined to attack a force of the enemy whom he ascertained to be encamped in the Grand Ronde valley. Pushing rapidly over the mountains, he encountered the hostiles July 17th, and in a decisive battle drove them as fugitives in every direction. The story of this fight is vividly told by the Colonel himself in the follow- ing language :

We arrived in the Grande Ronde valley on the even- ing of the 16th and camped on a branch of the Grande Ronde river in the timber, sending spies in advance, who returned and reported no fresh signs. On the morning of the 17th, leaving Major Blankenship, of the central, and Captain Miller, of the southern battalion, assisted by Cap- tain DeLacy, to take up the line of march for the main valley, I proceeded ahead to reconnoiter, accompanied by Major Maxon, Michael Marchmean, Captain John and Doctor Burns. After proceeding about five miles we ascended a knoll in the valley, from which we discovered dust rising along the timber of the river. I immediately sent Major Maxon and Captain John forward to recon-

THE YAKIMA WAR.

noiter and returned to hurry up the command, which was not far distant. The command was instantly formed in order; Captain Miller's company in advance, supported by Maxon's, Henness' and Powell's companies, leaving the pack train in charge of the guard under Lieutenant Good- man, with a detachment ot Goff's company, under Lieu- tenant Wait, and Lieutenant Williams' company in reserve with orders to follow on after the command.

The whole command moved on quietly in this order until within one-half mile of the Indian village, when we discovered that the pack train had moved to the left, down the Grande Ronde river. At this moment a large body of warriors came forward singing and whooping, and one of them waving a white man's scalp on a pole. One of them signified a desire to speak, whereupon I sent Cap- tain John to meet him, and formed the command in line of battle. When Captain John came up to the Indians they cried out to one another to shoot him, whereupon he retreated to the command and I ordered the four compa- nies to charge.

The design of the enemy evidently was to draw us into the brush along the river, where from our exposed position they would have the advantage, they no doubt having placed an ambush there. To avoid this I charged down the river toward the pack train. The warriors then split, part going across the river and part down toward the pack train. These were soon overtaken and engaged. The charge was vigorous and so well sustained that they were broken, dispersed and slain before us. After a short time I sent Captain Miller to the left and Major Maxon to the right; the latter to cross the stream and to cut them off from a point near which a large body of warriors had col- lected, apparently to fight, while I moved forward with the commands of Captain Henness and Lieutenant Powell to attack them in front. The major could not cross the river, and on our moving forward the enemy fled after firing a few guns, part taking to the left and part continuing for- ward.

Those who took to the left fell in with Captain Miller's company, who killed five on the spot, and the rest were not less successful in the pursuit, which was continued to the crossing of the river, where the enemy had taken a stand to defend the ford. Being here rejoined by Captain Miller and by Lieutenant Curtis, with part of Maxon's com- pany, we fired a volley and I ordered a charge across the river, which was gallantly executed. In doing this Pri- vate Shirley, ensign of Henness' company, who was in front, was wounded in the face. Several of the enemy were killed at this point. We continued the pursuit until the enemy had reached the rocky canyons leading toward the Powder river, and commenced scattering in every direction, when, finding that I had but five men with me and the rest of the command scattered in the rear, most of the horses being completely exhausted, I called a halt and fell back, calculating to remount the men on the captured horses and continue the pursuit after night.

I found the pack train, guard and reserve encamped on a small creek not far from the crossing, as I had previously ordered, and learned that a body of the enemy had fol- lowed them up all day and annoyed them but had inflicted no damage beyond capturing many of the animals which we had taken in charge and left behind.

I learned also that Major Maxon had crossed the river with a small party and was engaged with the enemy and wanted assistance. I immediately despatched a detach- ment under Lieutenants Williams and Wait, sending the man who brought the information back with them as a guide. They returned after dark without finding the major, but brought in one of his men whom they found in the brush and who stated that one of the major's men was killed and that the last he saw of them they were fighting with the Indians. At daylight I sent out Captain Miller with seventy men, who scouted around the whole valley without finding him, but who unfortunately had one man killed and another wounded whilst pursuing some Indians. I resolved to remove camp the next day to the head of the valley, where the emigrant trail crosses it, and continue

the search until we became certain of their fate. The same evening I took sixty men, under Captain Henness, and struck upon the mountains and crossed the heads of the canyons to see if I could not strike his trail. Finding no sign, I returned to the place where the major had last been seen, and there made search in different directions and finally found the body of one of his men (Tooley) and where the major had encamped in the brush, From other signs it became evident to me that the major had returned to this post by the same trail by which we first entered the valley.

Being nearly out of provisions, and unable to follow the Indians from this delay, I concluded to return to camp, recruit for another expedition in conjunction with Captain Goff, who had, I presumed, returned from his expedition to the John Day's river.

I should have mentioned previously that in the charge the command captured and afterward destroyed about one hundred and fifty horse loads of lacamas, dried beef, tents, some flour, coffee, sugar and about one hundred pounds of ammunition and a great quantity of tools and kitchen fur- niture. We took also about two hundred horses, most of which were shot, there being about one hundred servicea- ble animals.

There was present on the ground from what I saw, and from information received from two squaws taken prisoner, about three hundred warriors of the Cayuse, Walla Walla, Umatilla, Tyh, John Day and Des Chutes tribes, commanded by the following chiefs: Stock Whitley and Simmistastas, Des Chutes and Tyh: Chickiah, Plyon, Wicecai, Watahstuartih, Winmiswot, Cayuses; Tahkin, Cayuse, the son of Peopeomoxmox; Walla Walla and other chiefs of less note.

The whole command, officers and men, behaved well. The enemy was run on the gallop fifteen miles, and most of those who fell were shot with a revolver. It is impossi- ble to state how many of the enemy were killed. Twenty- seven bodies were counted by one individual, and many others were known to have fallen and been left, but were so scattered about that it was impossible to get count of them. When to these we add those killed by Major Maxon's command on the other side of the river we may safely conclude that at least forty of the enemy were slain and many went off wounded. When we left the valley there was not an Indian in it and all signs went to show that they had gone a great distance from it.

On the 21st instant we left the valley by the emigrant road and commenced our return to camp. During the night Lieutenant Hunter, of the Washington territorv volunteers, came into camp with an express from Captain Goff. I learned to my surprise that the captain and Major Layton had seen Indians on John Day's river, had followed them over to Burnt river and had a fight with them, in which Lieutenant Eustus and one private were killed, and some seven Indians. They were shaping their course for the Grande Ronde valley, and had sent for provisions and fresh horses. I immediately sent Lieuten- ant Williams back with all my spare provisions and horses and continued my march. On Wild Horse creek I came across Mr. Fites, a pack master who had been left in camp, who informed me, to my extreme satisfaction, that Major Maxon and his command had arrived safe in camp and were then near us with provisions and ammunition. These I sent on immediately to Captain Goff. I learned that Major Maxon had been attacked in the valley by a large force of Indians on the day of the fight; had gained the brush and killed many of them; that at night he tried to find our camp. and hearing a noise like a child crying, probably one of the captured squaws, had concluded that my command had gone on to Powder river and that the Indians had returned to the valley by another canyon. He moved his position that night and the next day saw the scout looking for him, but in the distance thought that it was a band of Indians hunting his trail. Conceiving him- self cut off from the command, he thought it best to return to this camp, thinking that we would be on our way back to Grande Ronde with provisions and ammunition.

CENTRAL WASHINGTON.

Meanwhile Governor Stevens was making every effort to sustain the friendly faction of the Nez Perces under Lawyer, and in this he was receiving the hearty co-operation of William Craig, a white man who had been adopted into the tribe. In Governor Stevens' opinion an important incident in preserving the friendship of the Nez Perces was the holding of the Walla Walla valley. He seems to have determined to follow up the moral advantage gained by Shaw's victory by holding a council with all the Indians, friendly, neutral and hostile, whom he could induce to meet him in the Walla Walla country. Wishing to present a solid front against the Indians he endeavored strenuously to secure the hearty co-operation of the regulars. He accord- ingly held a conference with Wright at Vancou- ver, at which he learned that the colonel could not be present in person at the council but would send Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe with four com- panies to reach the scene in time. Everything seemed propitious for a friendly co-operation. The regular officers were, however, acting with duplicity, for they had received orders from Gen- eral Wool such as would prevent any real co-oper- ation with Stevens.

At the close of his pow-wow campaign in the Yakima country, Wright, having failed to find any enemy to oppose, had reported to General Wool that the war was at an end. The latter had, on the 2d of August, issued an order to Wright in which he said:

"The general congratulates you on your suc- cessful termination of the war with the Yakimas and Klickitats. * * * With the least possible delay you will conduct an expedition into the Walla Walla country. No emigrants or other whites, except the Hudson's Bay Company, or persons having ceded rights from the Indians, will be permitted to settle or remain in the Indian country, or on land not ceded by treaty, confirmed by the senate and approved by the president of the United States, excepting the miners at the Colville mines. Those will be notified, however, that, if they interfere with the Indians, or their squaws, they will be punished and sent out of the country. It appears that Colonel Shaw, from Puget sound, with his volun- teers, has gone to the Walla Walla country. Colonel Wright will order them out of the country by way of Fort Dalles. If they do not go immediately, they will be arrested, disarmed and sent out."

Had Stevens known of this order, he would not have relied on the regulars for assistance. But being ignorant of it, he proceeded into the heart of the Indian country without hesitation. Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe left The Dalles with four companies August 20th, and on the 5th of the following month he established a camp five miles below the council ground. Stevens had made arrangements for "sending home the volun-

teers, to be mustered out of the service on the arrival in the valley of the regular troops," and thus unconsciously saved Steptoe one task enjoined upon him by Wool's order.

On the evening of September 10th, Governor Stevens, now ready for the council, requested two of Steptoe's companies of troops and some mountain howitzers. Steptoe refused on the ground that he could not do so in consistency with the directions of his superior, and Stevens retained Captain Goff's company of volunteers as guards. The council opened on the 11th. I was decidedly stormy from the beginning, and by the 13th conditions became so alarming that Governor Stevens again addressed Steptoe, advising him that half the Nez Perces were hostile, as were practically all the other tribes, and stating that he deemed a company of regu- lars essential to his safety. Steptoe again refused and advised the governor to adjourn council to his (Steptoe's) camp. This under the circum- stances Stevens could not help but do. While en route he met Kamiakin, who, he thought, would surely have attacked him had he known in time of his intended march. "Kamiakin," wrote he to the secretary of war, "had unques- tionably an understanding, as subsequent events showed, with all the Indians except the friendly Nez Perces (about one-half the nation) and a small number of friendly Indians of other tribes, to make an attack that day or evening upon my camp. He found me on the road, to his great surprise, and had no time to perfect his arrange- ments. I had learned in the night that Kami- akin had camped on the Touchet the night before, and that he would be in this day. The council opened on the roth. All the Indians were camped near. Kamiakin and his band were only separated from the council grounds by a narrow skirt of woods in the bottom of Mill creek."

For several days more Governor Stevens labored in vain to get the Indians to accept his terms of peace, namely, that they must throw aside their guns and submit to the justice and mercy of the government, surrendering all mur- derers for trial. The Indians would conclude no peace on other terms than that they should be left in possession of their territory as before the treaties. On the 19th Governor Stevens directed his march westward. His battle with the Indians on that date and the incidents of his return were thus summarized in his official report :

"So satisfied was I that the Indians would carry into effect their determination, avowed in the councils in their own camps for several nights previously, to attack me, that, in starting, I formed my whole party and moved in order of battle. I moved on under fire one mile to water, when, forming a corral of the wagons and hold- ing the adjacent hills and the brush on . the stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to

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THE YAKIMA WAR.

defend my position and fight the Indians. Our position in a low open basin five or six hundred yards across [he was attacked on what is known as Charles Russell's ranch ] was good, and with the aid of our corral, we could defend ourselves against a vastly superior force of the enemy.

The fight continued till late in the night. Two charges were made to disperse the Indians the last led by Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw in per- son, with twenty-four men; but, whilst driving before him some hundred and fifty Indians, an equal number pushed into his rear, and he was compelled to cut his way through them towards the camp, when, drawing up his men, and aided by the teamsters and pickets who gallantly sprang forward, he drove the Indians back in full charge upon the corral. Just before the charge the friendly Nez Perces, fifty in number, who had been assigned to hold the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by the enemy they came not to fight the Nez Perces but the whites. 'Go to your camp,' said they, 'or we will wipe it out.' Their camp, with the women and children, was on a stream about a mile dis- tant, and I directed them to retire, as I did not require their assistance and was fearful that my men might not be able to distinguish them from hostiles, and thus friendly Indians be killed.

"Towards night I notified Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe that I was fighting the Indians, that I should move the next morning and expressed the opinion that a company of his troops would be of service. In his reply he stated that the Indians had burned up his grass and suggested that I should return to his camp and place at his disposal my wagons in order that he might move his whole command and his supplies to the Umatilla or some other point, where sustenance could be found for his animals. To this arrange- ment I assented and Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe sent to my camp Lieutenant Davidson, with detachments from the companies of dragoons and artillery with a mounted howitzer. They reached my camp about two o'clock in the morning, everything in good order and most of the men at the corral asleep. A picket had been driven in by the enemy an hour and a half before, that on the hill south of the corral, but the enemy was immediately dislodged, and ground pits being dug, all points were held. The howitzer having been fired on the way out, it was believed noth- ing would be gained by waiting until morning and the whole force immediately returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe's camp.

"Soon after sunrise the enemy attacked the camp but was soon dislodged by the howitzer and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe's com- mand. On my arrival at the camp, I urged Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe to build a blockhouse immediately, to leave one company to defend it with all his supplies, then to march below and return with an additional force and additional

supplies, and by a vigorous winter campaign to whip the Indians into submission. I placed at his disposal for the building, my teams and Indian employes. The blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than ten days. My Indian storeroom was rebuilt at one corner of the stockade.

"On the 23d day of September we started for The Dalles, which were reached on the 2d of October. Nothing of interest occurred on the road.

"In the action of the 19th my whole force consisted of Goff's company of sixty-nine, rank and file, the teamsters, herders, and Indian employes numbering about fifty men. Our train consisted of about five hundred animals, not one of which was captured by the enemy. We fought four hundred and fifty Indians and had one man mortally, one dangerously and two slightly wounded. We killed and wounded thirteen Indians. One-half of the Nez Perces, one hundred and twenty warriors; all of the Yakimas and Palouses, two hundred warriors; the great bulk of the Cayuses and Umatillas, and an unknown number of the Walla Wallas and Indians from other bands were in the fight. The principal war chiefs were the son of Owhi, Isle de Pere and Chief Quoltonee; the latter of whom had two horses shot under hiin, and showed me a letter from Colonel Wright acknowl- edging luis valuable services in bringing about the peace of the Yakimas.

"I have failed, therefore, in making the desired arrangements with the Indians in the Walla Walla, and the failure, to be attributed in part to the want of co-operation with me, as superintendent of Indian affairs, on the part of the regular troops, has its causes also in the whole plan of operations of the troops since Colonel Wright assumed command.

"The Nez Perces, entirely friendly last December and January, became first disaffected in consequence of the then chief of the Cayuses, Ume-howlish, and the friendly Cayuses going into the Nez Perce country contrary to my posi- tive orders. I refused to allow them to go there in December last, saying to thein, 'I have ordered the Nez Perces to keep hostiles out of the country. If you go there your friends in the war party will come; they can not be kept out. Through them disaffection will spread among a portion of the Nez Perces.' Ume-howlish, my prisoner, was sent into the Nez Perce country by Colonel Wright, and from the time of his arrival there all the efforts made by Agent Craig to pre- vent the spread of disaffection were aborted. What I apprehended and predicted had already come to pass. Looking Glass, the prominent man of the lower Nez Perces, endeavored to betray me on the Spokane as I was coming in from the Blackfoot council, and I was satisfied from that time that he was only awaiting a

CENTRAL WASHINGTON.

favorable moment to join bands with Kamiakin in a war upon the whites, and Colonel Wright's management of affairs in the Yakima furnished the opportunity.

"The war was commenced in the Yakima on our part in consequence of the attempt, first, to seize the murderers of the agent, Bolon, and miners who had passed through their country; and, second, to punish the tribe for making com- mon cause witlı them and driving Major Haller out of the country. It is greatly to be deplored that Colonel Wright had not first severely chastised the Indians, and insisted not only upon the rendition of the murderers, but upon the absolute and unconditional submission of the whole tribe. to the justice and mercy of the government. The long delays which occurred in the Yakima, the talking and not fighting, this attempt to pacify the Indians and not reducing them to submission, thus giving safe conduct to murderers and assassins, and not seizing them for summary and exemplary punishment, gave to Kamiakin the whole field of the interior, and by threats, lies and promises he has brought into the combination one-half of the Nez Perce nation and the least thing may cause the Spo- kanes, Coeur d'Alenes, Colvilles and Okanogans to join them.

"I state boldly that the cause of the Nez Perces becoming disaffected and finally going into war, is the operations of Colonel Wright east of the Cascades-operations so feeble, so procras- tinating, so entirely unequal to the emergency, that not only has a severe blow been struck at the credit of the government and the prosperity and character of this remote section of the country, but the impression has been made upon the Indians that the people and the soldiers were a different people. I repeat to you officially that when the Indians attacked me they expected Colonel Steptoe would not assist me, and when they awoke from their delusion Kamiakin said, 'I will now let these people know who Kamiakin is.' One of the good effects of the fight is that the Indians have learned that we are one people, a fact which had not been previously made apparent to them by the operations of the regular troops.

"Is, sir, the army sent here to protect our people and punish Indian tribes who. without cause and in cold blood and in spite of solemn treaties, murder our people, burn our houses and wipe out entire settlements? Is it the duty of General Wool and his officers to refuse to co- operate with me in my appropriate duties as superintendent of Indian affairs, and thus prac- tically assume those duties themselves? Is it the duty of General Wool, in his schemes of pacify- ing the Indians, to trample down the laws of congress; to issue edicts prohibiting settlers returning to their claims and thus for at least one county, the Walla Walla, make himself dictator over the country?"

From the refusal of the Indians to treat with Stevens, and their attack upon the party return- ing from the council, it would naturally seem that the end of the war was still far in the future. Not so, however. Colonel Wright proved more successful, and yet not more successful, in the efforts he soon after inaugurated to pacify the Indians than had Stevens. The man who pursues the policy of conceding to the adverse party all he can ask can hardly fail to be successful in negotiations.

October 19th Wright was instructed by General Wool to proceed in person at the earliest possible date to the Walla Walla country and to attend to the establishing of a post there. In the order Wool used the following significant language:

"It is also of the highest importance that you, the senior officer (the chief man), should see and talk with all the tribes in that region in order to ascertain their wants, feelings and disposition towards the whites. Warned by what has occurred, the general trusts you will be on your guard against the whites and adopt the most prompt and vigorous measures to crush the enemy before they have time to combine for resistance, also check the war and prevent further trouble by keeping the whites out of the Indian coun- try."

As to the post above referred to, the site selected for it was a point on the bank of Mill creek, six miles above its junction with the Walla Walla river. The rest of the order was duly complied with. A council was called and forty Indians condescended to attend, practically all of whom denounced the treaty of 1855 and Chief Lawyer, of the Nez Perces, as the one by whom, mainly, the Indians were induced to sign it. Wright seemed more than willing to condone the perfidious wretches who signed the treaty as a deliberate act of treachery, and then when they had lulled the whites into a feeling of security. began assiduously the work of disseminating hos- tile feeling and of organizing a general war, for the purpose of exterminating or expelling the white race. His assurance to the Indians was: "The bloody cloth should be washed, and not a spot should be left upon it. The Great Spirit, who created both the whites and the red men, commanded us to love one another. All past dif- ferences must be thrown behind us. The hatchet must be buried and for the future perpetual friendship must exist between us. The good talk we have this day listened to should be planted and grow up in our hearts and drive away all bad feelings and preserve peace and friendship between us forever. Put what I say in your hearts and when you return to your homes, re- peat it to all your friends." In his letter to General Wool reporting the proceedings of his council, Wright laid all the blame of the war upon the Walla Walla treaties. "Give them back

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An illustrated history of Klickitat, Yakima and Kittitas counties; with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington, Part 22

Author: Interstate publishing co., Chicago, pub Publication date: 1904 Publisher: [Chicago] Interstate publishing company Number of Pages: 1146

Author: Interstate publishing co., Chicago, pub
Publication date: 1904
Publisher: [Chicago] Interstate publishing company
Number of Pages: 1146