USA > West Virginia > Hampshire County > History of Hampshire County, West Virginia : from its earliest settlement to the present > Part 13
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Colonel Kelley left Grafton in the morning. It was gen- erally supposed he was on his way to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Dumont's column left Grafton after dark on the evening of June 2. The march that night was through rain and in pitch darkness. This delayed Dumont's divi- sion, and it seemed that it would not be able to reach Philippi by the appointed time; but the men marched the last five miles in an hour and a quarter, and so well was everything managed that Kelley's and Dumont's forces arrived before Philippi within fifteen minutes of each other. The confederates had not learned of the ad- vance and were off their guard. The pickets fired a few
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shots and fled. The union artillery opened on the camp and the utmost confusion prevailed. Colonel Porterfield ordered a retreat, and succeeded in saving the most of his men, but lost a considerable portion of the small supply of arms he had. He abandoned his camp and stores. This action was called the "Philippi Races," because of the haste with which the confederates fled and the union forces pursued. Colonel Kelley while leading the pursuit was shot through the breast and was supposed to be mortally wounded, but he subsequently recovered and took an ac- tive part in the war until near its close, when he and Gen- eral Crook were surprised and taken prisoner at Cumber- land, Maryland. General McClellan, who had not yet crossed the Ohio, was much encouraged by this victory, small as it appears in comparison with the momentous events later in the war. The loyal people of West Virginia were also much encouraged, and the southern sympath- izers were correspondingly depressed.
Colonel Porterfield's cup of disappointment was full when, five days after his retreat from Philippi, he learned that he had been superseded by General Robert S. Gar- nett, who was on his way from Richmond to assume com- mand of the confederate forces in West Virginia. Colonel Porterfield had retreated to Huttonville, in Randolph county, above Beverly, and there turned his command over to his successor. A court of inquiry was held to examine Colonel Porterfield's conduct. He was censured by the Richmond people who had sent him into West Virginia, had neglected him. had failed to supply him with arms or the adequate means of defense, and when he suffered de- feat, they threw the blame on him when the most of it be- longed to themselves. Little more than one month elapsed from that time before the confederate authorities had oc- casion to understand more fully the situation beyond the Alleghanies; and the general who took Coloncl Porterfield's place, with seven or eight times his force of men and arms,
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HISTORY OF HAMPSHIRE.
conducted a far more disastrous retreat, and was killed while bringing off his broken troops from a lost battle.
Previous to General McClellan's coming into West Vir- ginia, he issued a proclamation to the people, in which he stated the purpose of his coming, and why troops were about to be sent across the Ohio river. This proclamation was written in Cincinnati, May 26, 1861, and sent by tele- graph to Wheeling and Parkersburg, there to be printed and circulated. The people were told that the army was about to cross the Ohio as friends to all who were loyal to the government of the United States; to prevent the de- struction of property by the rebels; to preserve order; to cooperate with loyal Virginians in their efforts to free the · state from the confederates; and to punish all attempts at insurrection among slaves, should they rise against their masters. This last statement was no doubt meant to allay the fears of many that as soon as a union army was upon the soil, there would be a slave insurrection, which, of all things, was most dreaded by those who lived among slaves. On the same day General McClellan issued an address to his soldiers, informing them that they were about to cross the Ohio, and acquainting them with the duties to be per- formed. He told them they were to act in concert with the loyal Virginians in putting down the rebellion. He enjoined the strictest discipline and warned them against interfering with the rights or property of the loyal Vir- ginians. He called on them to show mercy to those cap- tured in arms, for many of them were misguided. He stated that, when the confederates had been driven from northwestern Virginia, the loyal people of that part of the state would be able to organize and arm, and would be com- petent to take care of themselves; and then the services of the troops from Ohio and Indiana would be no longer needed, and they could return to their homes. He little understood what the next four years would bring forth.
Three weeks had not elapsed after Colonel Porterfield
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retreated from Philippi before General McClellan saw that something more was necessary before Western Virginia would be pacified. The confederates had been largely reinforced at Huttonville, and had advanced northward within twelve miles of Philippi and had fortified their camp. Philippi was at that time occupied by General Morris, and a collision between his forces and those of the confederates was likely to occur at any time. General Mc- Clellan thought it advisable to be nearer the scene of operations, and on June 22, 1861, he crossed the Ohio with his staff and proceeded to Grafton where he established his headquarters. He had at this time about twenty thousand soldiers in West Virginia, stationed from Wheel- ing to Grafton, from Parkersburg to the same place, and in the country round about.
CHAPTER XIV.
-«O»-
GENERAL GARNETT'S RETREAT.
Colonel Porterfield was relieved of his command by General Garnett. June 14, 1861, and the military affairs of northwestern Virginia were looked after by Garnett in person. The Richmond government and the Southern Confederacy had no intention of abandoning the country beyond the Alleghanies. On the contrary, it was resolved to hold it at all hazzards; but subsequent events showed that the confederates either greatly underestimated the strength of Mcclellan's army, or greatly overestimated. the strength of their own forces sent against him. Other- wise, Garnett, with a force of only eight thousand, would not have been pushed forward against the lines of an army of twenty thousand; and that, too, in a position so remote that Garnett was practically isolated from all as- sistance from the south and east. Reinforcements numbering about two thousand men were on the way from Staunton to Beverly, at the time of Garnett's defeat: but had these troops reached him in time to be of service, he would still have had only half as large a force as that of McClellan opposed to him. Military men have severely criticised General Lee for what they regard as a blunder in thus sending an army to almost certain destruction, with little hope of performing any service to the confederacy.
Had the confederates been able to hold the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, the disaster attending General Garnett's campaign would probably not have occurred. With that road in their hands, they could have thrown soldiers and supplies into Grafton and Clarksburg within ten hours
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from Harper's Ferry. They would thus have had quick communication with their base of supplies, and an open way to fall back when compelled to do so. But they did not hold the Baltimore and Ohio road, and their only prac- ticable route into western Virginia, north of the Kanawha was by wagon roads across the Alleghanies, by way of the Valley of Virginia. This was a long and difficult route by which to transport supplies for an army; and in case that army was compelled to retreat, the line of retreat was liable to be cut by the enemy, as it actually was in the case of Garnett.
On July 1, 1861. General Garnett had about four thousand five hundred men. The most of them were from eastern Virginia and the states further south. A considerable part of them were Georgians who had recently been sta- tioned at Pensacola, Florida. Reinforcements were con- stantly arriving over the Alleghanies, and by July 10, he had eight thousand men. He moved northward and west- ward from Beverly and fortified two points on Laurel hill, one named Camp Rich Mountain, five miles west of Beverly, the other fifteen miles north by west, near Belington, in Barbour county. These positions were naturally strong, and their strength was increased by fortifications of logs and stones. They were only a few miles from the out- posts of Mcclellan's army. Had the confederate positions been attacked from the front, it is probable that they could have held out a considerable time. But, there was little in the way of flank movements, and when Mcclellan madehis attack, it was by flanking. General Garnett was not a novice in the field. He had seen service in the Mexican war; had taken part in many of the hardest battles; had fought Indians three years on the Pacific coast, and at the outbreak of the civil war he was traveling in Europe. He hastened home; resigned his position in the United States army, and joined the confederate army, and was almost immediately sent into West Virginia to be sacrificed.
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HISTORY OF HAMPSHIRE.
While the confederates were fortifying their positions in Randolph and Barbour counties, the union forces were not . idle. On June 22 General McClellan crossed the Ohio river at Parkersburg. The next day at Grafton he issued two proclamations, one to the citizens of West Virginia, the other to his soldiers. To the citizens he gave assur- ance again that he came as a friend, to uphold the laws, to protect the lawabiding, and to punish those in rebellion against the government. In the proclamation to his sol- diers he told them that he had entered West Virginia to bring peace to the peaceable and the sword to the rebel- lious who were in arms; but mercy to disarmed rebels. He soon began to concentrate his forces for an attack on Garnett. He moved his headquarters to Buckhannon on July 2, to be near the center of operations. Clarksburg was his base of supplies, and he constructed a telegraph line as he advanced, one of the first, if not the very first military telegraph line in America. From Buckhannon he could move in any desired direction by good roads. He had fortified posts at Webster, Clarksburg, Parkersburg and Grafton. Eight days later he had moved his head- quarters to Middle Fork, between Buckhannon and Bev- erly, and in the meantime his forces had made a general advance. He was now within sight of the confederate fortifications on Rich mountain. General Morris, who was leading the advance against Laurel Hill, was also within sight of the confederates. There had already been some skirmishing, and all believed that the time was near when a battle would be fought. Lieutenant John Pegram, with thirteen hundred confederates, was in command at Rich Mountain; and at Laurel Hill General Garnett, with be- tween four thousand and five thousand men, was in com- mand. There were about two thousand more confederates at various points within a few miles. 1
After examining the ground McClellan decided to make the first attack on the Rich Mountain works, but in order 14
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GENERAL GARNETT'S RETREAT.
to divert attention from his real purpose, he ordered Gen- eral Morris, who was in front of General Garnett's posi- tion, to bombard the confederates at Laurel Hill. Accord- ingly shells were thrown in the direction of the confeder- ate works, some of which exploded within the lines, but doing little damage. On the afternoon of July 10 General McClellan prepared to attack Pegram at Rich Mountain, but upon examination of the approaches he saw that an at- tack in front would probably be unsuccessful. General Rosecrans, who was in charge of one wing of the forces in front of the confederate position, met a young man named Hart, whose father lived two miles in the rear of the rebel fortifications, and he said he could pilot a force, by an ob- scure road, round the southern end of the confederate lines and reach his father's farm, from which an attack on Pegram in the rear could be made. The young man was taken to General McClellan and consented to act as a guide. Thereupon General Mcclellan changed his plan from at- tacking in front to an attack in the rear. He moved a por- tion of his forces to the western face of Rich Mountain, ready to support the attack when made, and he then dis- patched General Rosecrans, under the guidance of young Hart, by the circuitous route, to the rear of the confeder- ates. General Rosecrans reached his destination and sent a messenger to inform General Mcclellan of the fact, and that all was in readiness for the attack. This messenger was captured by the confederates, and Pegram learned of the new danger which threatened him, while Mcclellan was left in doubt whether his troops had been able to reach the point for which they had started. Had it not been for this perhaps the fighting the next day would have resulted in the capture of the confederates.
Colonel Pegram, finding that he was to be attacked from the rear, sent three hundred and fifty men to the point of danger, and built the best breastworks possible in the short time at his disposal. When Rosecrans advanced to
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HISTORY OF HAMPSHIRE.
the attack he was stubbornly resisted, and the fight con- tinued two or three hours, and neither side could gain any advantage. Pegram was sending down reinforcements from the mountain when the union forces made a charge, and swept the confederates from the field. Colonel Peg- ram went up the mountain and collected several compa- nies and prepared to renew the attack. It was now late in the afternoon of July 11. The men were panic stricken, but they moved forward, and were led around the moun- tain within musket range of the union forces that had re- mained on the battle ground. But the confederates be- came alarmed and fled without making an attack. Their forces were scattered all over the mountain, and night was coming on. Colonel Pegram saw that all was lost, and de- termined to make his way to Garnett's army, if possible, about fifteen miles distant, through the woods. He com- menced collecting his men and sending them forward. It was after midnight when he left the camp on the summit of Rich mountain, and set forward with the last remnants of his men in an effort to reach the confederate forces on Laurel Hill. The loss of the confederates in the battle had been about forty-five killed and about twenty wounded. All their baggage and artillery fell into the hands of the union army. Sixty-three confederates were captured. Rosecrans lost twelve killed and forty-nine wounded.
The retreat from Rich mountain was disastrous. The confederates were eighteen hours in groping their way twelve miles through the woods in the direction of Gar- nett's camp. Near sunset on July 12, they reached the Tygart river, three miles from the Laurel Hill camp, and there learned from the citizens that Garnett had already retreated and that the union forces were in hot pursuit. There seemed only one possible avenue of escape open for Pegram's force. Thatwas a miserable road leading across the mountains into Pendleton county. Few persons lived near the road, and the outlook was that the men would
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GENERAL GARNETT'S RETREAT.
starve to death if they attempted to make their way through. They were already starving. Accordingly, Colonel Pegram that night sent a flag of truce to Beverly, offering to surrender, and at the same time stating that his men were starving. Early the next morning General McClellan sent several wagon loads of bread to them, and met them on their way to Beverly. The number of pris- oners surrendered was thirty officers and five hundred and twenty-five men. The remainder of the force at Rich Mountain had been killed, wounded, captured and scat- tered.
It now remains to be told how General Garnett fared. The fact that he had posted the greater part of his army on Laurel Hill is proof that he expected the principal at- tack to be made on that place. He was for a time deceived by the bombardment directed against him, but he was un- deceived by the sound of cannon at Rich Mountain, and later he learned that Colonel Pegram had been defeated, and that General McClellan had thrown troops across Rich Mountain and had successfully turned the flank of the con- federate position. All that was left for Garnett was to withdraw his army while there was yet time. His line of retreat was the pike from Beverly to Staunton, and the union forces were pushing forward to occupy that and to cut him off in that direction. On the afternoon of July 12, 1861, Garnett retreated, hastening to reach Beverly in ad- vance of the union forces. On the way he met fugitives from Pegram's army and was told by them that Mcclellan had already reached Beverly, and that the road in that direction was closed. Thereupon Garnett turned eastward into Tucker county, over a very rough road. It is now be- lieved that the union forces had not reached Beverly at that time, and that Colonel Pegram's fugitives had mistaken retreating confederate cavalry for union troops. In Cap- tain A. J. Smith's history of the 31st Virginia (confeder- ate) regiment, it is stated that the reason why Garnett
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HISTORY OF HAMPSHIRE.
turned eastward was because confederate cavalry had blockaded the Beverly pike. Whether this was the case or whether McClellan had reached Beverly, retreat in that direction had been cut off. General Morris pursued the retreating confederates over the mountain to Cheat river, skirmishing on the way. General Garnett remained in the rear directing his skirmishers; and on July 14, at Corrick's Ford, where Parsons, the county seat of Tucker county, has since been located, he found that he could no longer avoid giving battle. With a few hundred men he opened fire on the advance of the pursuing army and checked the pursuit. But in bringing off his skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood, Garnett was killed and his men were seized with panic and fled, leaving his body on the field, with a score or more of dead.
Up to this point the retreat had been orderly, but it soon became a rout. The roads were narrow and rough, and the excessive rains had rendered them almost impassible. Wagons and stores were abandoned, and when Horse Shoe run, a long and narrow defile leading to the Red House, in Maryland, was reached information was received that union troops from Rowlesburg and Oakland were at the Red House, cutting off retreat in that direction. The artil- lery was sent to the front. A portion of the cavalry was piloted by a mountaineer along a narrow path across the Backbone and Alleghany mountains. The main body con- tinued its retreat to the Red House. A union force had reached that point, but retreated as the confederate front came within hearing about two o'clock on the morning of July 15. The army pursued its way unmolested across the Alleghanies and proceeded to Monterey. Two regi- ments marching in haste to reinforce Garnett at Laurel Hill, had reached Monterey when news of Garnett's retreat was received. The regiments halted there, and as Gar- nett's stragglers came in they were reorganized.
The union army made no pursuit beyond Corrick's Ford,
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GENERAL GARNETT'S RETREAT.
except that detachments followed to the Red House to pick up the stores abandoned by the confederates. Garnett's body fell into the hands of the union forces and was pre- pared for burial and sent to Richmond. It was carried in a canoe to Rowlesburg, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad thirty miles below, on Cheat river, in charge of Whitelaw Reid, who had taken part in the battle at Corrick's Ford. Reid was acting in the double capacity of correspondent for the Cincinnati Gazette and an aid on the staff of Gen- eral Morris. When Rowlesburg was reached Garnett's body was sent by express to Governor Letcher, at Rich- mond.
This closed the campaign in that part of West Virginia for 1861. The confederates had failed to hold the country. On July 22 General Mcclellan was transferred to Wash- ington to take charge of military operations there. In com- parison with the greater battles and more extensive cam- paign later in the war, the affairs in West Virginia were small. But they were of great importance at the time. Had the result been different, had the rebels held their ground at Grafton, Philippi, Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, and had the union forces been driven out of the state, across the Ohio, the outcome would have changed the his- tory of the war, but probably not the result.
CHAPTER XV.
GENERAL LEE'S WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.
[' After Garnett's retreat in July, 1861, there were few confederates in West Virginia, west of the Alleghanies, except in the Kanawha valley. But the government at Richmond, and the confederate government, were not in- clined to give up so easily the part of Virginia west of the mountains; and, in a short time, preparations were made to send an army from the east to reconquer the territory beyond the Alleghanies. A large part of the army with which McClellan had defeated Garnett had been sent to other fields; the terms of enlistment of many of the soldiers had expired. When the confederates crossed the moun- tains late in the summer of 1861 they were opposed by less than ten thousand federals stationed in that mountainous part of West Virginia about the sources of the Greenbrier, the Tygart Valley river, Cheat, and near the source of the Potomac. In that elevated and rugged region a remarka- ble campaign was made. It was not remarkable because of hard fighting, for there was no pitched battle; but because in this campaign the confederates were checked in their purpose of reconquering the ground lost by Garnett and of extending their conquest at least as far north and west as Clarksburg and Grafton. This campaign has also an historical interest because it was General Lee's first work in the field after he had been assigned the command of Virginia's land and sea forces. The outcome of the cam- paign was not what might be expected of a great and calcu- lating general as Lee undoubtedly was. Although he had a larger army than his opponents in the field, and had at
GEN. LEE'S CAMPAIGN IN WEST VIRGINIA. 183
least as good ground, and although he was able to hold his own at every skirmish, yet, as the campaign progressed he constantly fell back. In September he fought at Elk- water and Cheat Mountain, in Randolph county; in October he fought at Greenbrier river, having fallen back from his first position. In December he had fallen back to the summit of the Alleghanies, and fought a battle there. It may be stated, however, that General Lee, although in command of the army, took part in person only in the skirmishing in Randolph county. The importance of this campaign entitles it to mention somewhat more in detail.
General Reynolds succeeded General Mcclellan in com- mand of this part of West Virginia. He advanced from Beverly to Huttonsville, a few miles above, and remained in peaceful possession of the country two months after Garnett's retreat, except that his scouting parties were constantly annoyed . by confederate irregulars, or guer- rillas, usually called bushwhackers. Their mode of attack was, to lie concealed on the summits of cliffs, over- hanging the roads, or in thickets on the hillsides, and fire upon the union soldiers passing below. They were justly dreaded by the union troops. These bushwhackers were usually citizens of that district who had taken to the woods after their well-known southern sympathies had rendered it unsafe or unpleasant to remain at home while the country was occupied by the union armies. They were excellent worksmen, minutely acquainted with all the ins and outs of the mountains and woods; and, from their manner of attack and flight, it was seldom that they were captured or killed. They hid about the outposts of the union armies; picked off sentinels; waylaid scouts; am- bushed small detachments, and fled to their mountain fastnesses where pursuit was out of the question. A war is considered severe in loss of life in which each soldier, taken as an average, kills one soldier on the other side, even though the war is prolonged for years. Yet, these
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HISTORY OF HAMPSHIRE.
bushwhackers often killed a dozen or more each, before being themselves killed; and, a case is recorded, in Pendle- ton county, in which a bushwhacker, named William Har- per, was captured and shot after he had killed thirty-five union soldiers. It can be readily understood why small detachments dreaded bushwhackers more than confeder- ate troops in pitched battle. Nor, did the bushwhackers confine their attacks to small parties. They often fired into the ranks of armies on the march with deadly effect. While in the mountains of West Virginia General Averell's cavalry often suffered severely from these hidden guerrillas who fired and vanished.
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