USA > West Virginia > Barbour County > The history of Barbour County, West Virginia, from its earliest exploration and settlement to the present time > Part 17
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* " Loyal West Virginia," by T. F. Lang.
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between Fairmont and Mannington, hoping thereby to delay the arrival of the Wheeling troops.
At daybreak on May 27 Colonel Kelley's troops left Wheeling on board the cars for Grafton. When they reached Mannington they stopped long enough to rebuild the burnt bridges, which delayed them only a short time. While there Kelley received a telegram from Mcclellan informing him that troops from Ohio and Indiana were on their way to his assistance. When the Wheeling troops reached Grafton the town had been deserted by the Confederates, who had retreated to Philippi, about twenty-five miles south of Grafton. Colonel Kelley at once planned pursuit. On June 1 a consid- erable number of soldiers from Ohio and Indiana had arrived. Colonel R. H. Milroy, Colonel Irvine and General Thomas A. Morris were in command of the troops from beyond the Ohio. They were the van of General McClel- lan's advance into West Virginia. When General Morris arrived at Grafton he assumed command of all the forces in that vicinity. Colonel Kelley's plan of pursuit of Colonel Porterfield was laid before General Morris and was approved by him, and preparations were immediately commenced for carrying it into execution. It appears that Colonel Porterfield did not ex- pect pursuit. He had established his camp at Philippi and was waiting for
reinforcements and supplies, which failed to arrive. Since assuming com- mand of the Confederate forces in West Virginia he had met one diappoint- ment after another. His force at Philippi was stated at the time to number two thousand, but it was little more than half so large. General Morris and Colonel Kelley prepared to attack him with three thousand men, ad- vancing at night by two routes to fall upon him by surprise.
Colonel Kelley was to march about six miles east from Grafton on the morning of June 2, and from that point march across the mountains during the afternoon and night, and so regulate his movements as to reach Philippi at four o'clock the next morning. Colonel Dumont, who had charge of the other column, was ordered to repair to Webster, a small town on the Park- ersburg branch of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, four miles west from Grafton, and to march from that point toward Philippi, to appear before the town exactly at four o'clock on the morning of June 3. Colonel Kelley's task was the more difficult, for he followed roads that were very poor. Gen- eral Morris suspected that spies in and about Grafton would discover the movement and would carry the news to Colonel Porterfield at Philippi, and that he would hurriedly retreat, either toward Beverly or eastward to St. George, on Cheat River. Colonel Kelley was therefore ordered, in case he received positive intelligence that Porterfield had retreated eastward, to follow as fast as possible and endeavor to intercept him; at the same time he was to notify Colonel Dumont of the retreat and of the movement to in- tercept the Confederates.
Colonel Kelley left Grafton in the early morning. It was generally supposed he was on his way to Harper's Ferry. Colonel Dumont's column left Grafton after dark on the evening of June 2. The march that night was through rain and in pitch darkness. This delayed Dumont's division, and it seemed that it would not be able to reach Philippi by the appointed time, but the men marched the last five miles in an hour and a quarter, and so well was everything managed that Kelley's and Dumont's forces arrived before Philippi within fifteen minutes of each other. The Confederates had not learned of the advance and were off their guard. The pickets fired a few shots and fled. The Union artillery opened on the camp and the utmost
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confusion prevailed. Colonel Porterfield ordered a retreat, and succeeded in saving the most of his men, but lost a considerable portion of the small supply of arms he had. He abandoned his camp and stores. This action was called the "Philippi Races," because of the haste with which the Con- federates fled and, the Union forces pursued. Colonel Kelley, while leading the pursuit, was shot through the breast and was supposed to be mortally wounded, but he subsequently recovered and took an active part in the war until its close.
General Mcclellan, who had not yet crossed the Ohio, was much encouraged by this victory, small as it appears in comparison with the mo- mentous events later in the war. The Union people of West Virginia were also much encouraged, and the Confederates were correspondingly depressed.
Colonel Porterfield's cup of disappointment was full when, five days after his retreat from Philippi, he learned that he had been superseded by General Robert S. Garnett, who was on his way from Richmond to assume command of the Confederate forces in West Virginia. Colonel Porterfield had retreated to Huttonsville, in Randolph County, above Beverly, and there turned his command over to his successor. A court of inquiry was held to examine Colonel Porterfield's conduct. He was censured by the Richmond people who had sent him into West Virginia, had neglected him, had failed to supply him with arms or the adequate means of defense, and when he suffered defeat, they threw the blame on him when the most of it belonged to themselves. Little more than one month elapsed from that time before the Confederate authorities had occasion to understand more fully the situation beyond the Alleghanies; and the general who took Colo- nel Porterfields place, with seven or eight times his force of men and arms, conducted a far more disastrous retreat, and was killed while bringing off his broken troops from a lost battle.
Previous to General McClellan's coming into West Virginia he issued a proclamation to the people, in which he stated the purpose of his coming, and why troops were about to be sent across the Ohio river. This procla- mation was written in Cincinnati, May 26, 1861, and sent by telegraph to Wheeling and Parkersburg, there to be printed and circulated. The people were told that the army was about to cross the Ohio as friends to all who were loyal to the Government of the United States; to prevent the destruc- tion of property by the rebels; to preserve order, to co-operate with loyal Virginians in their efforts to free the State from the Confederates, and to punish all attempts at insurrection among slaves, should they rise against their masters. This last statement was no doubt meant to allay the fears of many that as soon as a Union army was upon the soil there would be a slave insurrection, which, of all things, was most dreaded by those who lived among slaves. On the same day General Mcclellan issued an address to his soldiers, informing them that they were about to cross the Ohio, and acquainting them with the duties to be performed. He told them they were to act in concert with the loyal Virginians in putting down the rebellion. He enjoined the strictest discipline and warned them against interfering with the rights or property of the loyal Virginians. He called on them to show mercy to those captured in arms, for many of them were misguided. He stated that, when the Confederates had been driven from northwestern Virginia, the loyal people of that part of the State would be able to organize and arm, and would be competent to take care of themselves, and then the + Cafe H.W. Herhar UNA, ald To Beur Mom's who frees all about this affect, write There Troops marched all night in violent radies. an , luet Henny werly at day light, at either end of the bridge at the most of the village of the Permi
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services of the troops from Ohio and Indiana would be no longer needed, and they could return to their homes. He little understood what the next four years would bring forth.
Three weeks had not elapsed after Colonel Porterfield retreated from Philippi before General McClellan saw that something more was necessary before Western Virginia would be pacified. The Confederates had been largely reinforced at Huttonsville, and had advanced northward within twelve miles of Philippi and had fortified their camp. Philippi was at that time occupied by General Morris, and a collision between his forces and those of the Confederates was likely to occur at any time. General McClellan thought it advisable to be nearer the scene of operations, and on June 22, 1861, he crossed the Ohio with his staff and proceeded to Graf- ton, where he established his headquarters. He had at this time about twenty thousand soldiers in West Virginia, stationed from Wheeling to Grafton, from Parkersburg to the same place, and in the country round about.
Colonel Porterfield was relieved of his command by General Garnett, June 14, 1861, and the military affairs of northwestern Virginia were looked after by Garnett in person. The Richmond Government and the Southern Confederacy had no intention of abandoning the country beyond the Alle- ghanies. On the contrary, it was resolved to hold it at all hazards; but subsequent events showed that the Confederates either greatly underesti- mated the strength of Mcclellan's army or greatly overestimated the strength of their own forces sent against him. Otherwise Garnett, with a force of only six thousand, would not have been pushed forward against the lines of an army of twenty thousand, and that, too, in a position so remote that Garnett was practically isolated from all assistance. Rein- forcements numbering about two thousand men were on the way from Staunton to Beverly at the time of Garnett's defeat, but had these troops reached him in time to be of service, he would still have had not half as large a force as that of McClellan opposed to him. Military men have severely criticised General Lee for what they regard as a blunder in thus sending an army to almost certain destruction, with little hope of perform- ing any service to the Confederacy.
Had the Confederates been able to hold the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- road, the disaster attending General Garnett's campaign would probably not have occurred. With that road in their hands, they could have thrown soldiers and supplies into Grafton and Clarksburg within ten hours from Harper's Ferry. They would thus have had quick communication with their base of supplies and an open way to fall back when compelled to do so. But they did not hold the Baltimore and Ohio Road, and their only practicable route into Western Virginia, north of the Kanawha, was by wagon roads across the Alleghanies, by way of the Valley of Virginia. This was a long and difficult route by which to transport supplies for an army; and in case that army was compelled to retreat, the line of retreat was lia- ble to be cut by the enemy, as it actually was in the case of Garnett.
On July 1, 1861, General Garnett had about four thousand five hundred men. The most of them were from Eastern Virginia and the States further south. A considerable part of them were Georgians who had recently- been stationed at Pensacola, Florida. Reinforcements were constantly arriving over the Alleghanies, and by July 10 he had six thousand men. He moved northward and westward from Beverly and fortified two points his city I brought has trodpy in at The ufo The village, the wh de force must have been Le ander reported That our seur hoch, where quealle disorganized Ti fear of a schum attack!
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on Laurel Hill, one named Camp Rich Mountain, six miles west of Beverly, the other fifteen miles north by west, near Belington, in Barbour County. These positions were naturally strong, and their strength was increased by fortifications of logs and stones. They were only a few miles from the out- posts of Mcclellan's army. Had the Confederate positions been attacked only from the front it is probably that they could have held out a con- siderable time. But there was little in the way of flank movements, and when Mcclellan made his attack, it was by flanking. General Garnett was not a novice in the field. He had seen service in the Mexican War; had taken part in many of the hardest battles; had fought Indians three years on the Pacific Coast, and at the outbreak of the Civil War he was traveling in Europe. He hastened home; resigned his position in the United States Army and joined the Confederate Army, and was almost immediately sent into West Virginia to be sacrificed.
While the Confederates were fortifying their positions in Randolph and Barbour Counties, the Union forces were not idle. On June 22 General McClellan crossed the Ohio River at Parkersburg. The next day at Graf- ton he issued two proclamations, one to the citizens of West Virginia, the other to his soldiers. To the citizens he gave assurance again that he came as a friend, to uphold the laws, to protect the law-abiding, and to punish those in rebellion against the Government. In the proclamation to his soldiers he told them that he had entered West Virginia to bring peace to the peaceable and the sword to the rebellious who were in arms, but mercy to disarmed rebels. He began to concentrate his forces for an attack on Garnett. He moved his headquarters to Buckhannon on July 2, to be near the center of operations. Clarksburg was his base of supplies, and he con- structed a telegraph line as he advanced, one of the first, if not the very first, military telegraph lines in America. From Buckhannon he could move He had fortified posts at Webster, in any desired direction by good roads.
Clarksburg, Parkersburg and Grafton. Eight days later he had moved his headquarters to Middle Fork, between Buckhannon and Beverly, and in the meantime his forces had made a general advance. He was now within sight of the Confederate fortifications on Rich Mountain. General Morris, who was leading the advance against Laurel Hill, was also within sight of the Confederates. There had already been some skirmishing, and all believed that the time was near when a battle would be fought. Colonel John Pegram, with thirteen hundred Confederates, was in command at Rich Mountain; and at Laurel Hill General Garnett, with between four thousand and five thousand men, was in command. There were about six hundred more Confederates at various points within a few miles.
After examining the ground McClellan decided to make the first attack on the Rich Mountain works, but in order to divert attention from his real purpose, he ordered General Morris, who was in front of General Garnett's position, to bombard the Confederates at Laurel Hill. Accordingly shells were thrown in the direction of the Confederate works, some of which ex- ploded within the lines, but doing little damage. On the afternoon of July 10 General McClellan prepared to attack Pegram at Rich Mountain, but upon examination of the approaches he saw that an attack in front would probably be unsuccessful. The Confederate works were located one and a half miles west of the summit of Rich Mountain, where the Staunton and Parkersburg pike crosses. When the Union forces reached the open coun- try at Roaring Creek, a short distance west of the Confederate position,
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Colonel Pegram planned an attack upon them, but upon mature reflection, abondoned it. There was a path leading from Roaring Creek across Rich Mountain to Beverly, north of the Confederate position, and Colonel Pegram guarded this path with troops under Colonel Scott, but he did not know that another path led across the mountain south of his position, by which McClellan could flank him. This path was left unguarded, and it was in- strumental in Pegram's defeat. General Rosecrans, who was in charge of one wing of the forces in front of the Confederate position, met a young man named David Hart, whose father lived one and a half miles in the rear of the Confederate fortifications, and he said he could pilot a force, by an obscure road, round the southern end of the Confederate lines and reach his father's farm, on the summit of the mountain, from which an attack on Colonel Pegram in the rear could be made. The young man was taken to General Mcclellan and consented to act as a guide. Thereupon General McClellan changed his plan from attacking in front to an attack in the rear. He moved a portion of his forces to the western base of Rich Mountain, ready to support the attack when made, and he then dispatched General Rosecrans, under the guidance of young Hart, by the circuitous route, to the rear of the Confederates. Rosecrans reached his destination and sent a messenger to inform General Mcclellan of the fact, and that all was in readiness for the attack. This messenger was captured by the Confeder- ates, and Pegram learned of the new danger which threatened him, while McClellan was left in doubt whether his troops had been able to reach the point for which they had started. Had it not been for this perhaps the fighting would have resulted in the capture of the Confederates.
Colonel Pegram, finding that he was to be attacked from the rear, sent three hundred and fifty men to the point of danger, at the top of the moun- tain, and built the best breastworks possible in the short time at his disposal. When Rosecrans advanced to the attack he was stubbornly resisted, and the fight continued two or three hours, and neither side could gain any ad- vantage. Pegram was sending up reinforcements to the mountain when the Union forces made a charge and swept the Confederates from the field. Colonel Pegram collected several companies and prepared to renew the fight. It was now late in the afternoon of July 11. The men were panic- stricken, but they moved forward, and were led around the mountain with- in musket range of the Union forces that had remained on the battle ground. But the Confederates became alarmed and fled without making an attack. Their forces were scattered over the mountain, and night was coming on. Colonel Pegram saw that all was lost, and determined to make his way to Garnett's army, if possible, about fifteen miles distant, through the woods. He commenced collecting his men and sending them forward. It was after midnight when he left the camp and set forward with the last remnants of his men in an effort to reach the Confederate forces on Laurel Hill. The loss of the Confederates in the battle had been about forty-five killed and about twenty wounded. All their baggage and artillery fell into the hands of the Union army. Sixty-three Confederates were captured. Rosecrans lost twelve killed and forty-nine wounded.
The retreat from Rich Mountain was disastrous. The Confederates were eighteen hours in groping their way twelve miles through the woods in the direction of Garnett's camp. Near sunset on July 12 they reached the Tygart River, three miles from the Laurel Hill camp, and there learned from the citizens that Garnett had already retreated and that the Union
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forces were in pursuit. There seemed only one possible avenue of escape open for Pegram's force. That was a miserable road leading across the mountains into Pendleton County, Few persons lived near the road, and the outlook was that the men would starve to death if they attempted to make their way through. They were already starving. Accordingly, Col- onel Pegram that night sent a flag of truce to Beverly, offering to surren- der, and at the same time stating that his men were starving. Early the next morning General McClellan sent several wagon loads of bread to them, and met them on their way to Beverly. The number of prisoners surren- dered was thirty officers and five hundred and twenty-five men. The remainder of the force at Rich Mountain had been killed, wounded, cap- tured and scattered. Colonel Scott, who had been holding the path leading over the mountain north of the Confederate position, learned of the defeat of Pegram and he made good his retreat over the Alleghanies by way of Huttonsville.
It now remains to be told how General Garnett fared. The fact that he had posted the greater part of his army on Laurel Hill is proof that he expected the principal attack to be made on that place. He was for a time deceived by the bombardment directed against him, but he was undeceived when he learned that Colonel Pegram had been defeated, and that General McClellan had thrown troops across Rich Mountain and had successfully turned the flank of the Confederate position. All that was left for Garnett was to withdraw his army while there was yet time. His line of retreat was the pike from Beverly to Staunton, and the Union forces were pushing forward to occupy that and to cut him off in that direction. On the after- noon of July 12, 1861, Garnett retreated, hastening to reach Beverly in ad- vance of the Union forces. On the way he met fugitives from Pegram's army and was told by them that Mcclellan had already reached Beverly, and that the road in that direction was closed. Thereupon Garnett turned eastward into Tucker County, over a very rough road. General Morris pursued the retreating Confederates over the mountain to Cheat River, skirmishing on the way. General Garnett remained in the rear directing
his skirmishers, and on July 14, at Corrick's Ford, where Parsons, the county seat of Tucker County, has since been located, he found that he could no longer avoid giving battle. With a few hundred men he opened fire on the advance of the pursuing army and checked the pursuit. But in bringing off his skirmishers from behind a pile of driftwood, Garnett was killed and his men were seized with panic and fled, leaving his body on the field, with a score or more of dead.
When it was found that the Confederates were retreating eastward Federal troops from Grafton, Rowlesburg and other points on the Balti- more and Ohio Railroad were ordered to cut off the retreat at St. George, in Tucker County. But the troops could not be concentrated in time, and the concentration was made at Oakland, in Maryland, with the expectation of intercepting the retreating Confederates at Red House, eight miles west of Oakland.
Up to the time of the fight at Corrick's Ford the retreat had been orderly, but after that it became a rout. The roads were narrow and rough, and the excessive rains had rendered them almost impassible. Wagons and stores were abandoned, and when Horse Shoe Run, a long and narrow defile leading to the Red House, in Maryland, was reached inform- ation was received that Union troops from Rowlesburg and Oakland were
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at the Red House, cutting off retreat in that direction. The artillery was sent to the front. A portion of the cavalry was piloted by a mountaineer along a narrow path across the Backbone and Alleghany Mountains. The main body continued its retreat to the Red House, and pursued its way un- molested across the Alleghanies to Monterey. Two regiments marching in haste to reinforce Garnett at Laurel Hill had reached Monterey when news of Garnett's retreat was received. The regiments halted there, and as Garnett's stragglers came in they were re-organized.
The Union army made no pursuit beyond Corrick's Ford, except that detachments followed to the Red House to pick up the stores abandoned by the Confederates. Garnett's body fell into the hands of the Union forces and was prepared for burial and sent to Richmond. It was carried in a canoe to Rowlesburg, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, thirty miles be- low, on Cheat River, in charge of Whitelaw Reid, who had taken part in the battle at Corrick's Ford. Reid was acting in the double capacity of cor- respondent for the Cincinnati Gazette and an aid on the staff of General Mor- ris. When Rowlesburg was reached Garnett's body was sent by express to Governor Letcher, at Richmond.
This closed the campaign in that part of West Virginia for 1861. The Confederates had failed to hold the country. On July 22 General Mcclellan was transferred to Washington to take charge of military operations there. In comparison with the greater battles and more extensive campaign later in the war, the affairs in West Virginia were small. But they were of great importance at the time. Had the result been different, had the Confeder- ates held their ground at Grafton, Philippi, Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill, and had the Union forces been driven out of the State, across the Ohio, the outcome would have changed the history of the war, but probably not the result.
* Secc. Janete began his client about 8P. M. July 11th. He suit decided when he started, whether he would retreat through Bewerte, in lake The road to ST. George, He decided To take the Ration road, before he reached The foot of Laurel Hill + to ordered_ He had means of Knowing contante whether Meblethan was in Beverly or not but he concluded that if he was not already There, he would be there before his train could Get Through It !!
CHAPTER XVI.
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PROGRESS OF THE WAR.
After Garnett's retreat in July, 1861, there were few Confederates in West Virginia, west of the Alleghanies, except in the Kanawha Valley. But the Government at Richmond and the Confederate Government were not inclined to give up so easily the part of Virginia west of the mountains, and in a short time preparations were made to send an army from the east to re-conquer the territory beyond the Alleghanies. A large part of the army with which McClellan had defeated Garnett had been sent to other fields; the terms of enlistment of many of the soldiers had expired. When the Confederates re-crossed the mountains late in the summer of 1861 they were opposed by less than ten thousand Federals stationed in that moun- tainous part of West Virginia about the sources of the Greenbrier, the Tygart Valley River, Cheat, and near the source of the Potomac. In that It was not elevated and rugged region a remarkable campaign was made. remarkable because of hard fighting, for there was no pitched battle; but because in this campaign the Confederates were checked in their purpose of re-conquering the ground lost by Garnett and of extending their con- quest north and west. This campaign has also an historical interest because it was General Lee's first work in the field after he had been assigned the command of Virginia's land and sea forces. The outcome of the campaign was not what might be expected of a great and calculating general as Lee was. Although he had a larger army than his opponents in the field, and had at least as good ground, and although he was able to hold his own at every skirmish, yet, as the campaign progressed he constantly fell back. 'In September he fought at Elkwater and Cheat Mountain, in Randolph County; in October he fought at Greenbrier river, having fallen back from his first position. In December he had fallen back to the summit of the Alleghanies, and fought a battle there. It should be stated, however, that General Lee, although in command of the army, took part in person only in the skirmishing in Randolph County. The importance of this cam- paign entitles it to mention somewhat more in detail.
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