USA > Iowa > History of the Thirtieth Iowa Infantry Volunteers : giving a complete record of the movements of the regiment from its organization until mustered out > Part 2
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In arranging for the crossing of his army. General Grant was most ably supported by admiral Porter, who, on the night of April
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16th, ran by the batteries of Vicksburg with eight gunboats, three transports and two barges.
The transports and barges were filled with coal and provisions. Singularly enough, only one of the transports was sunk in running by the batteries. The Henry Clay was set on fire and sunk, making as fine a war picture as we witnessed while in the service. All of the vessels were more or less damaged but were soon repaired.
Early in the morning of February 2nd, 1863, the Queen of the West, a river transport, ran the blockade and safely passed the rebel batteries. She was the first boat of any kind to run the bat- teries.
On the night of April 23rd five transports, a gun boat and twelve barges ran the batteries again. Only one transport, the Tigress, and one barge were sunk. The Tigress sank near shore and was raised, repaired and soon ready for service again in helping to ferry the troops over the river at Grand Gulf, Miss.
These two bold efforts demonstrated that the batteries of Vicks- burg did not stop the passage of boats down the river. General Grant now had enough boats to cross his army and begin his bold and aggressive campaign to the south of Vicksburg. He, on April 30th, 1863, crossed the two corps, the 13th and 17th. numbering in all about 30,244 men present for duty. On the same day General Sherman, with the first division of the 15th corps, went up the Yazoo river twelve miles north of Vicksburg. Sherman was sev- eral days making this demonstration. General Grant also on April 17th, to further mislead General Pemberton, had caused General Grierson to make his raid through Mississippi from La Grange, Tenn., to Baton Rouge, La., breaking the railroads in Mississippi. which was so successfully done.
You will see that General Grant had this campaign thorough- ly in his mind, just as a map is to our eyes. It called for troops to meet these several raids in the northern part of General Pember- ton's department and this before General Grant crossed the river on the 30th day of April, 1863:
It would be well now to re-examine the relative resources and number of troops with General Grant and General Pemberton at this critical period in the beginning of this great campaign. so ste- cessful to the union army and so disasterous to the confederate arms and cause.
General Grant had with him three army corps, the 13th. 15th and 17th. There was present for duty in the three corps, about
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH JOWA INFANTRY.
53,000 men, and co-operating with General Grant's army was the Mississippi flotilla, commanded by Rear Admiral David D. Porter. It was composed of gunboats, iron clads. rams, prizes, tin elads and various vessels under the head of Union Vessels in the Vicksburg Campaign, carrying about 270 gums. The Hartford Al- batross was one of Farragut's fleet which. during all the time of General Grant's campaign. was above Fort Gibson. General Grant put a high estimate on Porter's fleet in the ferrying of the men and the service done, with their guns, although they never silenced a single battery on the bluffs of Vicksburg. He also says that without its assistance, the campaign could not have been made successfully. It could not have been made at all, in the way that it was, with any number of men, without such assistance.
The same official returns show that General Pemberton had at his disposal. in the four months. Jannary to April 30th, an average of 15.763 men. His March returns showed present for duty. 45. 829 men and not 18,000 as he said. for he surrendered 31.000 on July 1. 1 863.
As soon as General Grant crossed the Mississippi river April 30th, General Pemberton realized what it meant. Ho re called the troops he had sent to assist General Bragg in Tennessee in April. They all canie back, but were included in his March report. He. how- ever. called for reinforcements and some were sent but never reach- ed him but were received by General Joseph E. Johnson on ae- vont of the quick movement of Grant in placing his army between those of Generals Pemberton and Johnson. Johnson's army consisted of about 31.226 men present for duty. This move- ment by Grant showed his great military skill. of which all the world's great generals have spoken of in the highest military terms. General Hood says in his memoirs that it was the grandest move ever made by a general.
As stated before. General Grant crossed the Mississippi river during the day and night of April 30th, 1863, with the corps of Med'lernand and MePherson, at once pressed his army to the bluffs and on the road toward Port Gibson, twelve miles distant. Ho en- countered the confederates four miles from that town. General Bowen had been sent by General Pemberton to that place some time previous to construct some batteries and mount some guns at Grand Gulf at the mouth of Big Black River. twenty-eight miles from Vicksburg, in case Grant's canal proved a success opposite Vicksburg, on the Louisiana side of the Mississippi river.
On April 28th Admiral Porter attacked the batteries at Grand
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Gulf with eight gunboats, but failed to silence them. During that night he ran by the batteries and down the river. Bowen at once made arrangements to resist the landing of Grant's forces below Grand Gulf. Leaving a part of his command to protect the batter- ies, he moved his troops to cover the two roads leading from Bruinsburg. These troops numbered about 7,500 men and thir- teen pieces of artillery. Grant's advances met them about four miles from Port Gibson on the morning of May Ist before daylight. Bowen was also reinforced by a brigade of General Tracy of Stevenson's division and Baldwin's brigade of Smith's division. They lost 787 men and four pieces of artillery. He resisted two lines of battle during the day and was forced back by Grant's men. The confederate troops engaged were a part of Green's Missouri brigade with the 6th Mississippi and a section of Hudson's battery, 775 men; Tracy's brigade and Joseph W. Anderson's Virginia bat- tery, 1516 men; Baldwin's brigade, 1614. and part of Cockrell's brigade. Bowen retreated with main force northward and across bayou Pierre. Baldwin's brigade went through Port Gibson and across both forks of bayou Pierre and joined Bowen between the north fork and Big Black river. Bowen, during the night of May 2nd evacuated Grand Gulf and with General Loring, who came up in advance of his troops, crossed over the Big Black to the Vicks- burg side of the river, the union men following the confederate troops to the river.
General Grant, having successfully crossed the Mississippi river and driven the forces under General Bowen north of the Big Black, he established bis base of supplies at Grand Gulf at the mouth of the Big Black river. He remained inactive near Hankinson's Ferry mitil about May 8th. 1863, excepting that he pressed his troops toward the railroad from Vicksburg to Jackson, threatening a crossing at all the ferrys. He also hurried up the 15th corps under General Sherman, which arrived in time to join the 13th and 17th corps in the movement toward Jackson, Miss.
These were active days for both Grant and Pemberton, the one intently and hastily preparing for a bold and aggressive campaign and the other awakening to his great danger and seeing the imme- diate necessity for concentration of his troops to meet a compact army of al out 41.367 men immediately in his vicinity.
The confederates were at all times pressed by Grant's army. For Pemberton to draw reinforcements from any other army was a difficult problem at all times, as each threatened point or army ap- peared always to be the one of most urgency.
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
General Pemberton, it seems, never fully comprehended General Grant's campaign until General Bowen was defeated at Port Gibson. Then he began actively to concentrate his army for the defense of Vicksburg and to organize his moveable army to meet Grant. The latter had carefully arranged his campaign and was ready to move forward with the compact army of his command before his antag- onists could concentrate an army to oppose him. We see Pember- ton was unfortunately situated as he received conflicting telegrams from President Jefferson Davis and General J. E. Johnson, neither conciding with his own views. Davis' idea was to hold Vicksburg at all hazards and telegraphed him to that effect, and if besieged he would be relieved. Johnson's idea was to get reinforcements and to concentrate and beat Grant. Pemberton's idea, as given by Johnson May 12th, was to await attack near Edward's Depot on the railroad, and not get so far from the city as to make it possible for Grant's army to get between him and the city. He believed at first, also, that Grant would cross the Big Black river and at once invest the city. Here is where Grant out-generated all three of them- Davis, Jolson and Pemberton.
General Pemberton concentrated his entire moveable. army first on the west side of Big Black river and later, when he saw Grant's plans develop, he moved it to Edward's depot some twenty miles from Vicksburg, toward Jackson, where it remained till noon of May 15th. He received General Johnson's first dispatch, written May 14th, to move toward Clinton and attack Grant's rear. Ho said he would do so, but arriving at Edwards he held that he was too weak to go toward Clinton. He called a council of general officers, a majority of whom advised that he should obey Johnson. He however decided that instead of moving east toward Clinton, as ordered, he would move south from Edwards and attack a body of federal troops, said to be at Dillon on Grant's supposed lines of communication with the Mississippi river. General Grant, hav- ing been reinforced at Hankinson's Ferry by General Sherman with two divisions of the 15th corps, the first and second, decided that instead of crossing Big Black river and moving directly on Vieks- burg, he would only threaten to make this movement but would in fact move directly toward Jackson, Miss., and disperse any rein- forcements that might be coming to Pemberton's relief. He exe- cuted this plan in a masterly manner. moving his three corps, 41,369 men, on parallel roads about eight miles south of the road, with his right reaching to Raymond. McPherson's corps, the 17th, and MeClernand's, the 13th, still threatened Big Black and the rail-
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
road and Sherman's, the 15th corps, moved between MeClernand's and MePherson's. He then, as the movement advanced, adroitly drew MeClernand's corps from the Big Black and the railroad and from Pemberton's front in the direction of Raymond.
McPherson first met resistance five miles from Raymond, when he encountered Gregg's brigade of about 2,000 men. He engaged him at once with General Logan's division. Logan defeated him, causing a loss of 514 men. Gregg retreated to Raymond and dur- ing the night of May 12th, toward Jackson. Grant determined then to move directly on Jackson, with MePherson's corps, via Clinton to the north of Raymond on the railroad, leaving Sherman to follow Gregg through Raymond, toward Jackson, the two corps arriving before Jackson on May 14th, one from the west and an- other from the south. General Joseph E. Johnson, arriving in Jackson about dark, on the evening of May 13, the evening before the arrival of Sherman's and MePherson's corps. found every- thing in confusion. He learned that Gregg had been defeat- ed at Raymond the day before and that several divisions of federal troops were at Clinton between Jackson and Pemberton's army. Two brigades of South Carolina troops, Generals Walker and Col- quett's, which with Gregg's brigade, numbered about 10,000 at his disposal. As soon as he learned the situation, he sent the follow- ing dispatch to General Pemberton, then west of the Big Black at Bovina, while his army was at Edward's depot: "I have lately ar- rived and find that Major General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to establish commica- tions that you may be reinforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat a detachment, would be of great value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all important."
This dispatch was sent in triplicate by different messengers. One of the messengers was one of Grant's spies who put it in Grant's hands the next day, May 14th. On that day the corps of Sherman and McPherson, arrived in front of Jackson and had a sharp little fight; Sherman being on the right near Pearl river. General John- son saw at once that he could not hold the place, and gave orders for the evacuation of Jackson. He moved north toward Canton about six miles and sont messengers to Pemberton, advising him of the evacuation of Jackson, and of his own location; and still im- pressing upon Pemberton the importance of having his reinforce- ments. This dispatch did not reach Pemberton until after his de- feat at Champion Hill.
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
On the morning of May 15th, Johnson received Pemberton's dis- patch dated 5:40 p. m. at Edwards, May 14th, to the effect that Pemberton had changed his plans and would not go, as he had pre- viously state 1, toward Clinton, but would on May 15th, move with hisentire army to Dillon on the main road from Raymond, and Port Gibson, seven and one-half miles below Raymond, and nine and one-half miles from Edward's depot, to cut General Grant's communications, and force Grant to attack him, as he felt he was too weak to attack Grant or eut his way through to Jackson. General Johnson at once sent word to Pemberton in substance that he was leaving Jackson, an I going to march, to obey his, John- son's, orders and that he would move from Edwards in direct line of Brownville, leaving Bolton on his right. Grant, having posses- sion of Jackson May 14th, at once had Sherman begin the destruc- tion of all publie property.
So soon as he had Johnson's first dispatch on May 14th, and or- dered Pemberton to move so as to effect a junction north of the railroad. Pemberton, receiving this dispatch at 6:30 a. m. on the 16th, the day of battle, replied, telling Johnson where he was, and that he had issued orders to reverse his northward course, rend ving his movement for a junction by way of Raymond, im- practicable. on account of the order of the 13th to Pemberton, in Grant - pression, through a spy. It gave Grant the key to the confederate plan of campaign, and he at once with great skill, began to concentrate his army to meet probable movements of Pemberton to comply with his superior's orders, supposing that he would obey it. Heknew that Pemberton could not execute the order with success owing to the location of his own troops. With this great kay in his possession, he had a great advantage over . Pemberton, and his army was in admirable position to concentrate, and counterast any movement of Pemberton. He ordered Mc- Pherson to retrare his steps rapidly toward Bolton, it being the nearest point that Johnson could reach Pemberton if he obeyed the order from his position on the Canton road. He also ordered Met 'lernand to move his corps toward Bolton. Gen. Blair, of Sher- man's corps, was also ordered to move toward Bolton so on the af- ternoon of May 15th, two divisions of MePherson's corps, four di- visions of MeC lernand's corps, and one division of Sherman's corps were marching almost in line of battle to concentrate at Bolton. Their movements were afterwards changed so that MeClernand had one division moving on the main Clinton and Edwards road in front of MePhersons two divisions; the divisions of Osterhaus and
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH JOWA INFANTRY.
Carr, moving on what was known as the middle Raymond road, so on the afternoon of May 16th the seven divisions were moving toward Edwards depot instead of toward Bolton. General Sher- man was left with the first division of the 15th corps in Jackson to tear np the railroads and destroy other public property and then to follow later. These seven divisions now rapidly concentrating for battle, and on converging roads, mbered as by latest reports, April 30, 1863, 33,551 men, leaving out the losses at Port Gibson, Raymond and Jack on, amounting to about 1, 617 men.
Pemberton, about noon on May 15th, moved his army of 35.500 men in three divisions, from the line of battle in front of Edward's depot, facing east, on the main Edwards and Clinton road. He could not move on the direct road to Dillon, as a heavy rain had fallen on the night of May 11th and had caused Baker's creek to riso and wash away the bridge on that road. This caused delay and forced his army to be put in motion after midday.
The confederate army movel on the Edwards and Clinton road in an easterly direction to a point abont a mile from the Champion Honse, where the road to Clinton and Bolton turned abruptly to the north for about a mile before again resuming an easterly di- rection near the Champion House. This is a very important point in the description of the battle as it is where the middle Raymond road comes into the Clinton and Edwards road on which the divis- ions of Osterhans and Carr were moving toward Edwards and were encamped on the night of May 15th. It is also the point where a country road continues almost due south and in prolongation of the Clinton road in its southerly direction before turning west again. This country road ran from one to one and a half miles south before entering the south Raymond road, upon which the divisions of A. J. Smith and F. P. Blair were moving from Raymond to Edwards. At the intersection of these roads, via Clinton and middle Raymond, one mile from the Champion House, is where Pemberton's army left the Edwards and Clinton road, as also the middle Raymond road, moving to the south to get on the south Edwards and Ray- mond road, the one Pemberton intended to move his army on from Edwards. His army marched until after midnight. The front di- vision, Loring's, passed out of the cross road and turned east on the Raymond road and went towards Raymond, about a mile and a half from Mrs. Ellison's house. The rear divisions, Bowen's and Stevenson's, found themselves on this country road when they went into bivouac after midnight. All three divisions were strung out on this country road and on the south Raymond and Edwards road.
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
The rear of Pemberton's army was at the intersection of these three roads. The condition of affairs were very singular on the night of May 15th, when the two armies were in bivouac. Grant knew what Pemberton's move would probably be. The three columns were moving, as already stated, almost in line of battle in support- ing distance on three converging roads towards Edwards and with a fixed purpose to give battle and forestall any movement of Pom- berton.
The union army eneamped on each road about three miles from the confederate army, with orders to make an early start on the morning of May 16th. Grant was displaying quickness, decision . and thorough knowledge of grand tacties in the handling of his troops and based on what his enemy would probably do, founded on the delivery of the dispatch by the spy. As stated, the morning of May 16th found the confederates strung out for about two and one-half miles on two roads. As the army had marched nearly all night: Pemberton decided to await some information before he began his march again. He sent out scouts on all the roads. The first information was received from south Raymond road on which Smith and Blair were moving. Skirmishing began about 7:30 a. Comonading began on this road soon afterward and it was "ou apparent that Grant's army was on each road and in force. V httleadersnurie Pemberton received an order from Johnson to moir korth of the railroad so that he could form a junction with lam. He informed him his move southward would not do as he haddevaraated Jackson and moved north and could not join him by the way of Raymond. Pemberton at once gave orders to reverse his or jer of march to get across Baker's creek and to Edwards so that he could be in a position to form a junction with Johnson. . The roadway was cleared by 9 o'clock, but by that time it was evi- dent that General Grant's army was close at hand and advancing and was bent on battle. He had surprised Pemberton, who then decided to form a line of battle on the cross roads connecting the two Raymond roads. It took some time to do this and Loring's division was drawn back from the south Raymond road and form- ed so as to cover this road and the military road leading southwest, and connect with Bowen's division to his left, and the latter with Stevenson's division to his left. This battle formation made the confederate line about one and a half miles long and put Steven- son's left at the intersection of the three roads, one mile from the Champion House.
Lee's skirmishers were out on the middle Raymond road a mile
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
away and were also at the Champion House. Lee, instead of fol- lowing the reverse of the confederate army back to Edwards, as was intended, had been compelled to form a line of battle at 8 a. m. and was engaged with Logan's division of the 17th corps. They were aggressive and cansed Lee to gradually fall back. He notified the troops on his right of the necessity of this move, at the same time reporting to General Stevenson, his division commander. The confederate line of battle facing east, confronted the two divisions of Osterhaus and Carr on the middle Raymond road and the divis- ions of A. J. Smith and Blair on the south Raymond road. The massing of troops to the left of the confederate army, facing east, as reported by S. D. Lee and the beginning of his movement to his left to counteract it, soon developed the fact that the battle was not to be fought as had been expected, but that a formidable attack was being precipitated on a new line at right angles to the first line of battle and by three divisions, to-wit: Hovey, of the 13th corps, Logan's and Crocker's of the 17th, numbering about 16, 663 men. Pemberton did not realize his condition until too late, and as the skirmishing had begun on the two sonth roads first, he felt that the main attack would be delivered there, but General Grant had them hold the Confederates in their immediate front until it was too late to move these confederate troops in time to prevent the disaster and until the more vigorous attack was made on Pom- berton's left flank by the wide awake and skillful MePherson, and later by Grant himself. Stevenson, commanding Pemberton's left division, soon saw the magnitude of the flank move of Grant and began forming a new line of battle. Though he was constantly and hotly engaged between 9:30 and 11 a. m., he could not impress the immediate danger on Pemberton. It is now necessary at this point to give the topography of the new battlefield that was to be, facing north, instead of the one Pemberton expected with his army facing east on the cross roads and confronting the four divisions then in his front, and in the morning, nearer to him than the troops marching to Clinton towards Edwards.
As already stated there were two roads leading to Edwards, the south road, and the other branching off to the west from the road leading almost due north to Bolton on the railroad and nearly half way. The Clinton and Edwards road ran a half mile south of the railroad and in a westerly direction until near the Champion House, half way between Bolton and Edwards. Baker creek, near the Champion House, runs north of the railroad in a westerly direction for a little over a mile when it turns almost due south. The change
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
of direction in the creek caused the country, beginning at the Champion House, to become rougher and more undulating, more hilly and broken, with deep ravines. What is known as Champion Hills begins near the house and the highest point of the hills. is one half mile northwest of the house. This point too is on a line almost at right angles with the hills, spurs running off to the west toward the creek and Edwards depot. A main spur also runs al- most due south and crosses both the middle and south Raymond roads. There are spurs running north from the main spur running toward Edwards, west in the woods. To get over this hill, at the Champion House, the Clinton and Edwards road turned northwest half a mile, and when it reaches the highest point it runs due south half a mile, when it drops to the middle Raymond road, turns westerly again toward the creek and Edl- wards and the two roads become one and the same road. This road now runs one and one-half miles down a gentle slope almost west to the bridge over Baker creek, and is from a half to a quar- tor of a mile from the top of the ridge of hill; where the battle was fought and decided. Between this ridge and the road for about a mile or more, are minor ridges and ravines. It should be stated also that when the Clinton and Edwards road, after going a mile from the Champion House, turns westerly toward Edwards, that a country road continues in a southerly direction to the south Bay- mond road. and it was on this cross road that Pemberton's first line of battl . was formed. MePherson's troops then forming on an open field pushing forward with his own skirmishers, and with H way's division foreing Lee back to the hills and woods. He was forced back over a mile and a half from his first position in the morning and until about 11 a. m. when the battle opened so heavily
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