USA > Iowa > History of the Thirtieth Iowa Infantry Volunteers : giving a complete record of the movements of the regiment from its organization until mustered out > Part 3
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he had to stop in order to hold his lines The development of Me- Pherson was so rapid that Stevenson before 12 m. had to take his right brigade, Barton's, entirely out of line, and move it rapidly to the left in the rear of Cummins and Lee to confront a part of Me- Pherson's corps, Logan's division, which had already turned Lee's left, and was virtually between Lee and the bridge. All this was going on between 10 a. m. and 12 m. About 12 m. the battle op ened with great fury, the divisions of Logan and Hovey falling with all their strength on Lee and Cummins brigades. Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division had already gained the woods on the spur running to Baker creek, and on Lee's left and between Lee and the bridge over Baker creek. It was here that Logan had Lee's brigade cut off if he had known it, but in withdrawing Stevenson's
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brigade to help Hovey, opened the way for Lee's retreat and he made good his escape.
The attitude of the two armies about 12 o'clock, when the battle opened with great fury on Pemberton's left and Grant's right. may be stated as follows: It is well to describe more minutely the attitude of the union army under Grant's right. It hasalready been stated that four divisions, Osterhans. Carr, A. J. Smith and Blair's under General Metlernand. which composed the center and left of Grant's army took scarcely any part in the battle until it was de. eided. Osterhaus and Carrarrived on the field about 3:30 p. m. and on their arrival, finally, with the concentrated fire of Hovey's and MePherson's artillery, caused Bowen's divisions to fall back. These two divisions, under Grant's orders, took up the pursuit. but the arrival of two of Loring's brigades about three or four o'clock, between the Edwards and Bolton roads and Baker's creek, held them in check for a short time and gave the defeated confederates a chance to cross the creek at the ford on the lower Raymond road. General Loring moved his three brigades around on the south Ray- mond road and united his forces a few days later with General .J. S. Johnson at or near Jackson, Miss. He did not go into Vicksburg with Pemberton's army after the battle. It was different, bow: ever, with Hovey and MePherson on Grant's right. Hovey be- ing in front. As soon as he saw the confederates he at once formed in line of battle and begun to push out his skirmishers, and Me- Pherson, who was early in the front, hurried up his two divisions. Logan's and Crocker's, and began placing them in an open field near the railroad to the right of Hovey. A request was sent back to Grant at Clinton to hurry to the front, and that officer, by f a. m. was moving rapidly toward Champion Hill. The road was cleared of all trains so the troops could move rapidly to the front.
About 10:30 MePherson ordered Hovey's division to move direct- ly against the high points of the hill, while Logan's division, three brigades, Leggett, Smith and Stevenson's, was in the open field in two lines of battle, ahnost at right angles to Hovey's and facing the sonth. Roger's battery was between Smith and Stevenson toward the right. Hovey formed his divisionon both sides of the road near Champion House. Metinmis on the right with the eleventh. twenty fourth thirty-fourth and forty sixth Indiati regime its. and the twenty-ninth Wiscon an in two lines of battle with the eleventh Indiana south of the road. Black's brigade was formed to the left of MeGinnis and sonth of the Clinton and Ed- wards road, and the angle formed by this road and the middle Ray.
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mond road. Also in two lines of battle, the forty-seventh Indiana, fifty-sixth Ohio, and the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth Iowa regiments. Leggett's brigade of Logan's division was immediately to the right of MeGummis. MePherson's second division, Crocker's. was coming np rapidly, as the formation of Hovey and Logan was about completed and ready to attack. The confederate skirmish- ers under Lee were driven in by 10:15 a. m. on the Bolton road and also from the open field. General Cummins had no skirmishers in his front. He had moved so rapidly to the left that his skirmish ors could not follow his movements .. The umion line of battle was complete from left to right and at 11:30 a. m. the two divisions of Hovey and Logan advanced to attack. By 12 o'clock the battle was at its height. The road from the Champion House, as already stated, ran sonthward half a mile to the high point of the hill and thence" due south half a mile to the middle Raymond road, so that Hovey's division swung the right brigade to the left and the left brigade to the right, forming in crescent shape, as it approached the confed- erate lines of battle, which made a right angle at the high point. Melimis' brigade, as it advanced gradually, came in line with Lo- gan's division facing sonth. His brigade crowded nearer the angle on the north side and gradually occupied the ravines and ridges close to the confederate position. The brigade being in double line of battle, made a rush on the west side of the angle held by the thirty ninth and thirty-fourth Georgia and after a very short and desperate struggle, drove back these two regiments, capturing quite a number of prisoners and four pieces of artillery. Having captured this portion of the lines, the eleventh Indiana attacking on the east side and also Black's brigade, it enfiladed the lines of the thirty sixth Georgia on the Clinton road after it had entered - the Raymond road and resumed its western direction towards Ed. ward's depot about four miles distant. The union troops, after penetrating some short distance into the woods. also enfiladed the right of S. D. Lee's brigade, causing the two right regiments, the twentieth and thirty-first Alabama, to fall back to a ridge some 400 yards in the rear of the 56th and 57th Georgia regiments at the in- tersection of the middle Raymond and Clinton roads. Also had to change front so as to face north to protect Waddell's battery con sisting of six guns, in the south angle made by the two roads. Lee, after arriving with two regiments on the right, thought he had repulsed the attack of Leggett and Smith in his front. He had to withdraw his entire brigade to save them, placing it on a ridge between his first line, facing the open field. and the Edwards and
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Clinton road one half mile in his rear, as Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division had turned his left flank. This line was a contin- nation of the line on which the 20th and 21st Alabama regiments had been carried, which had been occupied by Cummins' Georgia brigade. The carrying of the high point of the hill by MeGinnis' brigade of Hovey's division and the foreed change of position on the right and left of the angle by Cummins and Lee's brigades took some time, probably from one to one and a half hours, and was marked by the most desperate fighting on both sides, ground being taken and retaken several times. Waddell's battery was at the cross roads doing splendid service. At 1:30 p. m. the 30th Iowa of Thayer's brigade captured Waddell's battery at the cross roads. Stevenson repulsed Barton's attack and cut him off from the confederate troops on his right, Barton moving to his left and crossing the bridge towards Edwards. Stevenson, after gaining the road in the rear of the confederate line of battle. saw part of Cummins' troops reforming and those of Bowen's division coming up in the distance. During all this time desperate fighting had been going on. MeGinis had called for help and two regiments of Sanford's brigade, Crocker's division, had reinforced him and the other two regiments of Sanford's brigade had reinforced Leggett and Smith. Hovey, seeing the desperate condition in his front by the approach of Bowen's division, had called hastily for help. Grant, as Crocker was not then fully up, ordered Logan to move his division to the left to help Hovey. Stevenson, of Logan's di- vision, who had captured and crossed the read in the rear of Lec, was recalled, but had he been left where he was he would have captured Lee's entire brigade, but ho was hurried to the rear of Smith and Leggett to be ready to aid in turning the union disaster, then appearing iminent, by the driving back of Hovey and Crock- er's brigades before Bowen. The union troops made a desperate stand on the slope of the hill toward the Champion House. Six- teen guns of the Ist Missouri battery, Schofield's Ohio battery and Dillon's Wisconsin battery were placed on the ridge in an open field, so as to infilade the entire line of Bowen's division. The fir- ing of the two lines of battle could be distinctly seen, and this terrible artillery fire showered shot and shell on the entire line of the confederates. About four p. m. the troops of Osterhaus and Carr were approaching the middle Raymond road in formidable line of battle with their skirmishers in front. Bowen called for help. but Loring had not come with reinforcements. A few confederate guus were opened on the approaching line, and the 12th .Louisiana
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was sent to check them, but they came steadily along, and the confederates had to fall back to prevent being cut off by this form- idable new line of Osterhaus and Carr approaching at right angles. The two brigades, in falling back, moved directly toward the low- er end on the south Raymond road. Beaufort's brigade of Loring's division appeared in the rear of the Clinton and Edwards road, about the time Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division had returned to its former position. After crossing the Edwards road in the rear of Lee a little after 12 m., it had now returned and had again crossed in the rear of Lee, who was fighting to the left of Bowen. . The day had been lost to the confederates. Stevenson had orders from Pemberton to retreat before Loring's arrival. Bowen moved directly toward the lower ford, passing to the south of Loring's two brigades. Lee, of Stevenson's division, was still fighting after the withdrawal of Bowen on the right and north of the Edwards road. Seeing Stevenson of Logan's division had again gotten to his rear, Lee withdrew one-half mile to the Edwards road and formed the left of Featherstone's brigade, and reported to General Loring, the senior officer on the field.
General Pemberton, after the disaster at Champion Hill, with- drew his army across Black river, the union troops following leis- urely in pursuit, crossing Baker creek both on the lower Raymond and Clinton road and the Clinton and Jackson road.
On the 17th Pemberton tried to hold the "Tete de pont" at Big Black with Vanghan's brigade of fresh troops and Bowen's division. This also resulted in a disaster and the loss of additional guns and many prisoners. The confederates were very much demoralized and soon broke in their efforts to cross the bridge. The confeder- ate troops on the west bank covered the disorderly flight, enabling ' most of the troops on the east side of the river to get over. Pem- berton then directed Stevenson to withdraw all the troops within the trench line of the city of Vicksburg. It must be considered however, that the campaign of Grant, from the time he conceived it, was masterly and has no equal in this or any other war. It is true he had great resources, but he used them as only a great gen- eral coukl. This was a hard fought battle in which the confeder. ates lost very heavily.
The bridge at Big Black River was burned by the rebels. Our pontoon train was brought up and at once put in place, being fin ished by night. We began to cross about 7 or 8 o'clock. Fires were made of pine knots, which made it about as light as day. It was picturesque to see the bridges swing to and fro in the light of
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the torches, as the soldiers crossed over them. About 10 o'clock p. m. we reached the Benton ville road. Here we halted and were given about two hours to close the columns and then we resumed our march toward Vicksburg. The following day we skirmished some and drove the "Johnnies" into the outer works, abont two miles from the main works. Here the road forks, the left branch being the main Jackson road and the right branch was called the Cemetery Road, entering the city near the cemetery. Our division, the first of the 15th Corps, commanded by General Steele, in per- son, was ordered to take the right hand road and work our way down the bluff to make connection with the fleet on the Missis- sippi river, aboveand to the right of our army. This was about 4 o'clock on the 18th of May. A rail fence was thrown open to let the soldiers pass through and while we were passing through the fence, we saw Generals Graut and Sherman standing by one of the corners, and a ball from the rebels killed one of Gen- eral Grant's orderlies. General Graut was smoking a cigar, as he usually was. We drove the Johnnies to the main line and had quite a fight that evening Had three killed and eight wounded. This was our first loss after the city was surrounded. The 15th corps was on the extreme right of the army. The first division, under connand of General Steele, was on the right, and the third brigade was on the extreme right of the Army of the Tennessee.
On the 19th General Grant ordered an assault. Our troops reached the rebel works but could not cross over, as the ranks were so thin. We lost oue man killed and eight wounded. The 20th and 21st were spent strengthening our breast works and on the 22nd. we made a memorable bayonet charge resulting in a loss in not to execel 15 minutes time of 78 killed and wounded. Our brave Colonel Abbott and our beloved Major Milligan were among those killed.
Following this engagement the investment of Vicksburg was be- gun and the work of the siege was carried on until the surrender of Pemberton on July 4th, 1863. Thirty-two lowa regiments were present at the siege of Vicksburg. The same troops that bad marched two hundred miles in a little over a fortnight. and won six battles in as many days, was now ready to take Vicksburg by siege or storm. The attempt to take the city and thus free the waters of the Mississippi river, had already cost the union army ten thousand killed and wounded, and other lives were ready for the sacrifice and the army of the Tennessee urged General Grant
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to assault the lines at once. The morning of May 19th saw the union army forming a semi-circle line outside the fortifications of Vicksburg. Sherman held the right, McPherson the center and McClernand the left. The investment was not quite complete. There was a gap on the left for a few days, but later, when that was closed, the union line was nearly eight miles long. In front of it were fortifications, pronounced by General Sherman to be stronger than the works of Savastopol. The soldiers defending them were veterans and on their own soil. Outside the lines of their entrenchments, the rebels, under General Joseph E. Johnson, were rapi lly collecting a second army along Black river to attack General Grant's rear. It was a boast in the south that Grant, placing himself between the armies, was lost. In fact the gather- ing of the second army in Grant's rear was a pertinent factor in determining him to assault the seemingly impregnable works. The main redoubts were ten feet, with ditches in front seven or eight feet deep, making the top of the parapet about fifteen feet high and were about twenty-five to twenty-eight feet thick. The entrenchments on the whole line were ten feet thick and five feet high, with trenches in front about four feet deep. There were 128 cannons, not including those facing the river, defending this strong position.
The country about was all hills, cane-breaks and deep ravines. Nature aided the rebels in making Vicksburg the most impregnable position on the continent. It was pronounced by Pemberton the most important point to the confederacy. The failure on the 19th did not cool the ardor of oither the soldiers or commanders. The position of Johnson's army in the rear was becoming a terrible menance. If Vicksburg could be taken by assault, the union army could suddenly turn on Johnson and destroy them. At 2 o'clock on the morning of May 22nd was set as the time for the second at- tempt to storm the works. From daylight of that morning until the moment for assault every cannon of the besinging line poured its thunders of shot and shell into the forts in front. Then the union line advanced from behind the hills where they were lying and began a long and desperate assault on the forts and lines now ablaze with rebel musketry. Colonel Charles H. Abbott was killed in this assault while gallantly leading his 30th Iowa through the storm of bullets.
This assault of the 22nd of May, despite the heroism of the army. was a failure. The works were too strong to be taken by storm and in the darkness the lines were withdrawn and the siege by
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sappers and miners began. In the second assault General Grant lost more than four thousand men, killed and wounded. Now commenced the kind of a conflict unequaled in the history of war- fare. Every man in the investing line became an army engineer day and night. The soldiers worked at digging narrow, zigzag ap- proaches to the rebel works. Entrenchments, rifle pits and dirt caves were made in every conceivable direction. When entrench- ments were safe and finished. still others, yet farther in advance, were made, as if by magic, in a single night. Other zigzag under- ground saps and mines were made for explosion under forts. Every day the regiments foot by foot, yard by yard, approached nearer the strongly armed rebel works. The soldiers got so they bored like gophers and beavers, with a spade in one hand and a gun in the other. The pickets were not squads of soldiers, but the whole regiment filled the extremely advanced trenches all the time, being relieved only in the night. The regiments poured a constant fire of musketry into the embrazures and over the parapets of the forts. Day and night was heard the ceaseless firing of roaring mus- ketry, while batteries of artillery often joined in the midnight. chorus, and the shells from the gunboats and mortars rose into the air like burning comets and fell into the devastated city. It was a wonderful spectacle at night to see the fase from the shells -- and you could see them plainly the comet or star-like streams of fire and then hear them coming down into the doomed city. We used to watch them while on picket at night. The rifle pits of the two armies were now so close that the pickets talked with each other and traded tobacco for coffee. It was a trick of our boys to put their hats on the ramrods of their guns and hold them up just above the headlogs and see how quickly some Johnnie would fire at them; and they would nearly always hit it if above the log. Our boys would be watching for them and if they saw a rebel put his head up above their works to see if he had hit some Yank, as he supposed it was, they would pull on him, and we were toll after the surrender that they often hit them.
Before we got so close to their works, the rebel batteries would shell us quite often at night and I think all of the boys in the regi- ment will never forget old "Whistling Dick" that threw those long, sharp pointed shells into our camp, and sometimes clear over into Walnut Hill. After we got so close to their works the sharpshoot- ers kept them from firing very often.
When the rebels surrendered July 4th some of us went into their lines about 10 a. m. and saw how our bullets had scarred up the
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carriages of the heavy guns. The thought came, how did anyone live who got in front of the port holes. A gunner, when asked how they escaped death, said that it got so that if any one tried to fire either of the guns it was nearly sure death. When our soldiers would see the port hole darkened there were from five to ten ready to shoot into it. While we lay there fighting our men were given a better opportunity for becoming good marksmen than they would have had without such practice, and it helped our army ever after- wards, as shown at Lookout Mountain, Resaca and Atlanta, Ga. We suppose that no time in America was ever flour, meal, meat, molasses and other things to live on so high as they were at Vicks- burg in 1863 when we were besieging the city. Flour was said to be $1000 a barrel, meal $140 per bushel, molasses $12 a gallon, beef $2.50 per pound; muilo meat $1 a pound and said by the rebel sold- iers to be scarce at that.
We now often think of the hard times we had in the service and during the siege of Vicksburg. Of course we had plenty to cat, while our brother Johnnies did not. While we were out in the trenches at night we used to talk to each other, after fighting all day. In the evening when everything had stopped for the day, some of our men or some of the Johnnies would yell, "hello Johnnie" or "hello Yank," "how did you enjoy the day?" The oth- er would say "Fme;" then some one would say, "Johnnie, how do you like mule meat?" and they answer "Fine;" then "How do you like beef dried on the bone?" to which they would reply "Not so well; it is too close to the bone to be good." Then some one would say, "Come over and we will give you some 'sow . belly' to fry it in." They would reply, "We can't eat meat alone;" then the reply was, "We will give you some hardtack." Then they would reply, "The tack you sent over today was so hard we could not chew it." So you see how soon those on both sides forgot their troubles when night came, but in the morning about daylight, when the business of the day was about to open, we would say, "Watch out Johnnie, and hunt your hole," and things were on in earnest for the day. When night came again probably the John- nies would say, "Yanks, when are you going into Vicksburg?" and we would always say, "On the 4th of July we will dine in your city." We thought we would but were mistaken in this, that we had to go in pursuit of Joseph E. Johnson, but a part of the army, General Logan's division, entered Vicksburg on the 4th of July. The rest of the army was after Johnson, out about Jackson. A few days before he concluded to surrender, General Pemberton had his
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last communication with Johnson relative to a joint operation, in which Johnson was to attack Grant's army at Haines' Bluff and Pemberton was to take advantage of this to escape with his army to the south and southeast by the way of Hankinson's and Bald- win's ferry roads.
Johnson moved down toward Haines' Bluff to carry out his part of the program, though it was hopeless from the first, since fully one-half of Grant's army was stationed there behind strong works. When Pemberton felt the pulse of his own army, with reference to the project, he found them so unanimously against it that he knew it was doomed to failure from the outset. His commanding officers from Major down to Colonel, all reported that their men were fam- ished and worn out by long labor and tense excitement so they were physically unfit for any other duty than to simply stand in their trenches and fire. The result was the calling of a conneil of war at Pemberton's headquarters on the night of July 2nd, 1863. The council, every one of those present, reported that their works had been terribly battered, many of their guns had been dismounted and that the immediate troops in front of them had securely plant- ed themselves where they could reach their works in at least a minutes time after the charge began, so that it was hopeless to ex- peet to stop them. The place was at the mercy of the federals whenever they decided that it was worth the expenditure of life. There was no doubt that the federals had mines ready to spring, which would make effective breaches at several places. After hearing all these reports, which were all of one character, General Pemberton said that he had lost all hope of being relieved by Gen- oral Johnson and had considered every possible plan and other ways to his mind, but there were but two alternatives, either to surrender while they had ammunition enough left to give the right to demand terms or to sell their lives as dearly as possible, in what all knew to be a hopeless effort to cut their way through the mion lines. He therefore said that he would ask each officer to give his vote on the question, surrender or not. When this vote was taken beginning with the junior officers present, all voted to surrender except two, Major General Baldwin and Brigadier General S. D. Lee, who gave no reason for their negative vote. After the vote General Pemberton said. "Well, gentleman. I have heard your wife and I agree with your almost unanimous decision, though my own preference would be to put myself at the head of my troops and make a desperate effort to eut our way through the enemy. This is my only hope of saving myself from the shame and disgrace.
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