USA > Iowa > History of the Thirtieth Iowa Infantry Volunteers : giving a complete record of the movements of the regiment from its organization until mustered out > Part 4
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
Far better would it be for me to die at the head of my army, even in vain, to face the enemy's lines, than to surrender it and leave, and meet the abuse that will be heapel upon me. But my duty is to sacrifice myself to save the army which has nobly done its duty in defending Vicksburg. I therefore concur with you and shall offer to surrender the army on the 4th day of July." There were objections to this date but General Pemberton said: "I am a north- ern man and know my people. I know their peculiar weakness, and their national vanity. I know we can get better terms on the Fourth of July than any other day of the year. We must sacrifice our pride to these considerations."
The following is Pemberton's note asking terms:
HEADQUARTERS, VICKSBURG, MISS., July 3rd, 1863. MAJOR GENERAL U. S. GRANT, COMMANDING U. S. FORCES:
(GENERAL :--- I have the honor to propose to you an armistice of several hours, with the view of arranging terms for the capitu- lation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you. I will ap- point three commissioners to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such a place and hour today as you may find conven- ient. I make this proposition to save further effusion of blood, which umst otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling my- self fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed to you under a flag of truce, by Major General J. S. Bowen.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant General.
General Bowen came out in front of General A. J. Smith, to whom he delivered the letter, and asked to see General Grant. This request was refused as the commander of the union army could treat with no less a personage than the commander of the opposing force. Bowen, being a regular army officer, realized the force of this, and suggested a meeting between Pemberton and Grant. To this Grant acceded, sending a verbal message to the effect that if Pemberton desired, he would meet him in front of MePherson's corps, at three o'clock in the afternoon. Grant also sent the fol- lowing written reply:
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
IN THE FIELD NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., July 3rd, 1863. LIEUTENANT GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON,
COMMANDING CONFEDERATE FORCES:
GENERAL :- Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armstice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH JOWA INFANTRY.
of capitulation, through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you choose by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the re- spect of any adversary, and I can assure you they will be treated with all respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the propo- sition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation because I have no terms other than those indicated above. I am, General, Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Major General.
After the interview between Pemberton and Grant ended, the latter agreed to send a letter giving final terms by that night. The morning of July 4th was a fine morning. After 8 o'clock the John- nies came out and laid around on their works. We talked with them as friends, until about 10 o'clock. Then they fell in line and marched outside the works and stacked their arms and placed their flags on a stack of guns. There were two sets of colors left in our front. It was a great sight to see. When they were stacking arms one could hardly help feeling sorry for them, to see the hu- miliation they had to go through. They were all with spare faces, lean and haggard, and showed their overwork, being in the ditches for forty-seven days and nights.
Their surrender was a great thing to the union army. There were surrendered 32,000 prisoners, 173 cannons and 60,000 small arms. This was a hard blow on the confederacy; it and the victory at Gettysburg the same day, ought to have ended the war. But there was lots of hard fighting and marching after that.
This was one of the greatest campaigns ever made. We had marched over two hundred miles, fought six successful battles, waded swamps and bayous, and lived five days on one day's rations.
The union loss was 10,142. The confederate loss 9,091. Iowa had the second most troops of any other state, a total of thirty regiments. Illinois alone had more, having fifty-five.
Without opportunity to see the captured city, the regiment was hastily marched toward Jackson, and at Brandon had a sharp lit- tle fight, and destroyed five miles of railroad track. We returned to Black River bridge where we went into camp.
We lay in camp at Black River, Mississippi, doing pieket duty. The health of the regiment was poor, fever and diarrhoea being prevelent. On tbe 22nd of September the first division of the 15th corps, to which we belonged, General Osterhaus being in command,
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY .. 35
and Colonel Williams of.the 4th Iowa being in command of the bri- gade, we broke camp about 4 o'clock and marched for Vicksburg. On the next day we embarked on transports for Memphis, Tenn., arriving there about the 28th of September. We marched to Mer- cer on the Southern railroad; thence to Grand Junction; thenco to Milltown, then on the 8th of October we arrived at Corinth, Miss., thence to Barnesville, thence to Iuka on the 10th, fighting at Dol- ton station on the 20th and at Cherokee station on the 21st, where we had quite a hard fight. The regiment lost 29 men killed and wounded. Among the killed was our beloved Colonel Torrence.
The last report of Colonel Torrence was at Iuka, and is as follows: HEADQUARTERS, 30TH REGIMENT IOWA VOLUNTEERS, IUKA, MISS., October 13th, 1863. N. B. BAKER, Adjutant General of Iowa:
Accompanying this you will receive two flags worn out in the service. They were carried by the 30th Iowa during their marches, a distance of 5, 700 miles between October 26, 1862, and October 10, 1863. They were carried in the following named bat- tles to-wit: Chicakasaw Bayou, December 26 and 28, 1862; Arkan- sas Post, January 10 and 11, 1863; Jackson, Miss., May 14, 1863; the siege of Vicksburg from May 18 to July 4, 1863; Clinton, Miss., July 11, 1863; Jackson Hill, July 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1863; Brandon Hill, July 18, 1863. It is the wishes of the regiment that you forward them to the State Historical Society, there to be subject to the or- ders of the commanding officer of the regiment.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. N. G. TORRENCE, Colonel Commanding. The death of Colonel Torrence occurred in the following manner: Wheeler and Lee's divisions of cavalry, who were opposing us, had our uniforms on and were thus able to get close in before diseov- ered. Our pickets opened fire on them but were driven in pell mell, a few being taken prisoners. Colonel Torrence was in his saddle at once, sounding the alarm, "To arms! To arms!" A heavy line of skirmishers was at once sent out. The regiment was moved rapidly by the left flank in colunms of fours, a short dis- tance. We had out-traveled the skirmishers who had to advance through brush and timber. The regiment was halted, front faced, and some began firing. Colonel Torrence discovered blue uniforms and at once commanded, "Cease firing! you are killing our own men." Geo. Anderson, of Co. C, who was just ready to fire, called to the Colonel, saying: "Don't you see their wooden canteens?" That instant the Colonel fell dead from his horse. The surprise
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
somewhat confused the regiment, which fell back, but at once re- formed and drove them from the field, and retook the Colonel's body. His watch, pocket book and papers were afterwards found in a dead rebel's haversack. His faithful horse was sent home, to Keokuk, with the Colonel's body, in,care of George Zion, who was the Colonel's orderly.
Lieutenant Colonel Roberts, who succeeded in command, had charge of our regiment during the remainder of the war. Major R. D. Creamer was major, through the rest of the war. They were good and faithful officers.
The report made by Colonel Roberts was as follows:
OPERATIONS IN ALABAMA.
Regiment left Corinth, Miss., October 8th for Inka. Arrived at Iuka October 10, 1863. Distance traveled 25 miles. Left Inka Oc- tober 18 for Cherokee, Alabama. Arrived at Cherokee October 20th .. October 21 skirmished with the enemy and lost 29 men killed, wounded and missing. The enemy driven back. October 26th left Cherokee station Alabama, for Tuscombia: skinmished all day with the enemy. At night camped within three and one-half miles of Tuscombia. October 27th drove the enemy back and took possession of Tuscombia. October 28th left Tuscombia for Chero- kee station. Arrived at Cherokee at 5 p. m. October 28th. Octo- ber 29th, attacked by the enemy; routed them and returned to camp without a casuality. October 30th left Cherokee for Chick- asaw, Alabama, arriving at Chickasaw October 31.
AURELIUS ROBERTS,
Lieutenant Colonel commanding 30th Iowa Infantry.
CHAPTER III.
CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.
At Fayetteville, Sherman found orders from General Grant di- recting him to divide his troops into several different columns marching by several different roads, so as to subsist them more easily and hasten their advance. Therefore, Sherman started one of his divisions from Decherd, over the Anderson and Stephenson road, with another moving on Bridgeport by the way of University. General Blair was marching on the other road, by way of New Market, Larkinsville and Belmont, which route would take the troops over a part of the country where a considerable amount of supplies might be found.
Sherman reached Bridgeport on November 13th, and as he did not expect his troops until the 17th, he took the steamer to Kelley's Ferry, whence he rode across the peninsula to Chattanooga, Tenn., to meet his old friend and captain, and have a face to face talk with him, as to the situation and what was necessary to be done. The first glance that Sherman gave to the scene around him, was very depressing. He saw everywhere, on commanding positions, strong bodies of confederates with their flags flying and their can- nons thundering at intervals. Everywhere was the manifestation of Bragg's power and his decided advantage over the union army in Chattanooga. It seemed to Sherman that all the crests were in the hands of the enemy, and his first remark was of decided un- easiness: "You are then truly besieged." It took some explana- tion from General Grant to make him understand that although the confederate flag still floated from the commanding heights of Lookout Mountain, that the possession sf that great wall was no longer of importance to Bragg, since the union troops held all of
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the country as far as the mouth of Lookout creek, and that the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge and the hills in front were much more alarming in appearance than dangerous in fact. With the opening of the "eracker line," the real dangers of the sitnation had passed. Bragg had lost his opportunity and it was folly for him to maintain longer a show of investment and siege. Even af- ter the detachment of Longstreet, Bragg had still in his lines, 43,000 infantry with 112 pieces of artillery and 12,000 cavalry sup- porting his flanks. These troops were all in the best condition, since they had the pick of the abundant supplies of Georgia and northern Alabama. They had done almost nothing in the way of actual labor since the battle of Chicamaugua, and the bracing air of that splendid mountain region had brought back to the flag thousands of invalids from the hospitals. Why Bragg remained with his superb army which, while not large enough to assail Chat- tanooga, yet could have been effectively used in another direction, is a curious problem. It has been said that he was fascinated by the sight of Chattanooga, and he could not make up his mind to break away from it, even though his good sense must have told him that every day he remained increased the probability of disas- ter to him.
General Grant was entirely willing that Bragg and his army should be amused by this pretense of a siege, for it served to keep them quiet while he matured his plans for offensive operations, and until Sherman could come up with a force sufficient to make decisive the result of an aggressive movement.
The most anxiety that Grant had was as to the fate of Burnside, which gave he and the president so much anxiety throughout the battle of Chattanooga and Lookout Mountain in the latter part of 1863, and he ordered a movement threatening Bragg, in order to compel the return of Longstreet. It was thought impossible at this tine to execute the movement, since there were no horses for the artillery and but few for any purpose. Gen. Grant was so in earnest however, that he ordered the horses taken away from the mounted officers for the batteries. A careful examination of the men finally convinced him that even if he had made his batteries available, he could not have more than 18,000 effective infantry for the contemplated attack or menace up on the north end of Bragg's line. The rest of the men were so weak from the pro- longed deprivation that it was as much as they could do to man the works, therefore, Grant countermanded the order until a full sup- ply of rations would bring the troops to a better condition. Gen-
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eral Sherman's arrival would bring from 30,000 to 40,000 more mouths, men and beasts, to feed, and immensely complicated mat- ters in regard to the question of supplies. Also it was evident that Burnside's army, 25,000 men, in eastern Tennessee would have to be fed from Chattanooga. Burnside had been hauling all his rations and forage, with the exception of that which he could get from oft gleaned Tennessee, from Lexington, Ky., 180 miles away over those great ranges . of mountains and the worst possible roads. Even during the pleasant months of autumn, this had been a work of the utmost difficulty. Dead mules were so plentiful along the roads as to be spoken of as "quarter-master's mile posts" by the soldiers, and full rations were an unheard of thing for the men. As the fall rains set in, the roads would become next to impassable and unless Burnside could get supplies in another direction, his army would starve, as in faet, it came near doing.
General Grant instantly saw that the single track from Nashville to Bridgeport would at once become overtaxed. In the midst of his preparations for striking Bragg, he evolved a plan for greatly in- creasing the capacity of the line, and sent an order to General Sherman to halt General Dodge, with his division of 8,000 men, at Decatur, Alabama, to rebuild the road from that place to Nashville. It will be remembered that Dodge was the engineer who attained world-wide fame by his astonishing achievements in building the Union Pacific railroad during the years immediately following the civil war.
The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a country of great roughness, cut every little while . by streams which have eroded deep gulches, and involving high bridges for the railroad. The rebels had most effectually wrecked this part of the road, burning the bridges, blowing up the culverts, twisting the rails, and ruining all of the rolling stock they could. To rebuild the road however, would give an additional road from Nashville to Decatur and Stevenson. From these points steamboats could carry sup- plies up the Tennessee river to Chattanooga.
General Grant tells us with deep appreciation, how well Gener- al Dodge performed his task. Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers, such as axes, picks and spades, and with these he was able to entrench his men, and pro- teet them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to be considered after the protecting of
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his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the surround- ing country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all that they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as they could find. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the lines of the army. When these were not near enough the troops for protection, they were taken down and moved up the line of the road.
Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel in them, were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Men were put to work getting out timbers for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road was completed, carbuilders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars, and thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with and supplying the workmen with food, was going on all at the same time and without the aid of mechanies and laborers except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we had, running to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use.
To supply these deficiencies, eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg were ordered sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. All the troops in west Tennessee were ordered to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charles- ton road, and the cars, locomotives and rails from all the roads, except the Memphis and Charleston, were ordered to Nashville. The military manager of roads was also directed to furnish more rolling stock, and as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him all finished within forty days after receiving the orders. The number of bridges rebuilt was 182, many of them being over deep and wide chasms, and the length of the road repaired was 102 miles.
With that swift grasp of all the possibilities, in which Grant was unsurpassed by any General in history, he formulated a plan of operations so skillfully, that it defies criticism even in the fuller knowledge of today. In other words he instinctively adopted the very best course that could be suggested even now. With General Hooker in Look Out valley, about all the value of Look Out moun- tain was lost to Bragg, yet for some reason not easy to understand he retained one whole division under General Stevenson on the top of the mountain and another on the north and west side below the palisade. The only possible advantage that the men on the lower
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HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
slope of the mountain could have, was to maintain the control of the river between Brown's ferry and Chattanooga, an unimportant matter, however, since the distance from Kelly's Ferry to Chatta- nooga, by the way of Brown's ferry, was so short and the road so easy, that it was possibly nearly as well to haul the rations over in wagons, as to bring them up by steam boats over the long circuit of boistrous rapids. Stevenson's division on the top of the moun- tain was of no use at all since it could not help the troops below, and twenty-five men could have guarded the erest of the palisades as well as a whole division.
Grant's first plan was to leave enough of General Hooker's men in Look Out valley to keep Bragg's force there and bring the rest of Hooker's men over in position on the right flank of the Army of the Cumberland where they would be in good shape to attack Bragg's thin left flank through the line across Look Out mountain, and turn Bragg's left flank at Rossville, while he was being at- tacked in front and on the right flank. The army of the Cum- berland was to move directly out of its fortifications against Bragg's center. Sherman was to bring up his men from Bridgeport in such a way as to first menace Look Out mountan and the troops there, then mingling with the other troops they were to make their way across the river to a concealed camp back of Moccasin Point. From this they were to make a night rush across the Tennessee river again, above Chattanooga and below the month of the Chicamaugua, to gain the end of Missionary Ridge, to turn Bragg's right flank, and strike for the depot at Chica- maugua station. This plan would have several objects; if not too far gone Longstreet might be recalled and thus save Burnside. ,Bragg would be prevented from sending any more troops to Long- street, and from doing what was a possibility- dropping Chatta- nooga and rushing off with his whole army to join Longstreet and crush Burnside. By menacing or capturing Chicamaugua station, Bragg would be thrown back, in any event, beyond where he had begun the Chicamangua campaign. Osterhaus was to add to the problem of disturbing Bragg's mind by turning off with his divi- sion the first of the fifteenth army corps, army of the Tennessee, from Wanhatchie toward Trenton. This being in full view of the rebel signal station on Look Out mountain, would lead Bragg to think that a movement was intended like that of Thomas in Sep tember, to cross Look Out mountain and strike at his rear.
Such was the plan of attack which Grant explained at length to General's Sherman and Thomas. On November 16, 1863, with
HISTORY OF THE THIRTIETH IOWA INFANTRY.
characteristic thoroughness, he took them with him to personally examine the ground over which Sherman was to make his cross- ing of the river and deliver his blow on Bragg's right flank. After surveying the position for some time from the high hills of the north bank, these three dismounted from their horses and crept forward from tree to tree until they reached the very bank of the river, and were so close that they could hear the confederate pick- ets talk on the opposite bank. From this point they could plainly see the end of Missionary Ridge, where it abuts upon the Tennessee river like a great hay stack, only a great deal higher. From the first Grant had recognized this in looking for a key to the situation, and Sherman took it all in with one swift glance, appreciating fully the signification of the work out out for him. He started back to Bridgeport to hurry up his force, and, believing that he could make better time by floating down the swift current of the swollen Ten- nessee, he set out with his rowboat, laboring at the oars with his own hands much of the way.
Grant planned to deliver his hard stroke five days later. Novem- ber 21st. Sherman was to add to this spectacular event, another quite as dramatic. He had reached Hooker's headquarters. four miles from Chattanooga, during the heavy rain of Novem- ber 20th, where he received General Grant's orders to make his at- tack on the 21st. Only one division, that of General Jobn E. Smith, was in the position intended. General Ewing, with his di- vision, was at Trenton threatening Bragg with a crossing of Look- out mountain and an attack upon his rear. The other two wero struggling through the rain and mud to reach. Brown's Ferry. On the 21st Morgan G. Smith's and Ewing's divisions were gotten across the river at Brown's Ferry, but Osterhaus was separated from them by the breaking of the bridge. To replace this division General Grant gave him General Jeff C. Davis' division from the Army of the Cumberland. As before stated, Sherman put his di- vision out of sight of the signal stations on Lookout mountain, be- hind the hills of Moccasin Point. Meantime General " Baldy Smith," assisted by General James H. Wilson, had built north of the Chic-
amangua creek, 116 pontoons. They were painstakingly concealed from the enemy in bends of the creek, where they were completed to the last detail and carefully prepared for the voyage. The point selected for the crossing was two and a half miles below where north Chicamangua creek enters the Tennessee river from the west side and a little below the month of the Chicamaugua river. Gen- eral John M. Brennan, chief of the Artillery of the Army of the
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Cumberland, had secretly placed forty guns where they could sweep the ground across the river and cover a crossing in the event of re- sistance being offered. To General Jeff C. Davis was assigned the duty of supporting these guns. Everything was in perfect readi. ness by midnight of November 23rd and General Giles A. Smith's brigade of Morgan L. Smith's division entered the boats on Chica- maugua creek and floated quietly down that stream until they reached the river, over which they silently ferried, and returning up the bank, succeeded in capturing the picket post at that point. The pontoons were immediately sent back across the river and the rest of the division crossed below the mouth of the Chicamaugua river, Sherman being with it. The whole operation was full of anxiety, since it depended for its success upon surprise and it was only too likely that Bragg's suspicion had been aroused and that he had prepared a startling resistance for the first detachments that should cross. One of the rebel pickets had escaped capture and it was feared that he would carry the alarm to camp, but for- tunately all remained silent in front and the boats, handled with perfect order. soon brought over Morgan L. Smith's division and by daylight there were 8,000 men on that side of the stream and facing Missionary Ridge.
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