USA > Indiana > Allen County > History of Allen County, Indiana, with illustrations and biographical sketches of some of its prominent men and pioneers > Part 11
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From Fort Washington the route pursued by the army of Gen. Harmar was northward, bearing to the northeast. passing the Indian village of Chillicothe, on the Little Miami, on the 6th of October. From there it moved in a northerly direction, crossing the Pickaway Fork of the Grent Miami on the following day. From that point the course was toward the northwest, crossing the main branch of the Great Miami on the 10th, afterward bearing more to the westward. On the 14th, when about thirty miles from the Miami towns, Col. Hardin, with one company of regulars and six hundred militia, was detached from the main army and sent forward to the Indian village, at the confluence of the river St. Joseph's with the St. Mary's, forming the Maumee. This detachment reached the village on the afternoon of the 15th, and took possession of it, the Indians having vacated a short time previously. In the mean time, the main army, having pur- sued its line of' march, was in the immediate vicinity, and on the morning of the 17tb crossed the Maumee to the village immediately above, on the St. Joseph's, when the work of destruction comuneneed. By the 21st, the chief town, five other villages, and uearly twenty thousand bushels of corn in ear, had been destroyed.
Upon the arrival of the main body of the army. when it had been ascer- tained that there were no Indians, it was contemplated for a time by Gen. Hammar to press forward and attack the Indian settlements on the Wea, and at other points in the vicinity of the Wabash, but the project was abandoned, and Gen. Trotter, with three hundred Kentuckians, was sent forward to reconnoiter and scour the woods adjacent in search of the Indians who had so recently vacated their towns. This reconnaisance, which took place on the 18th. was without any effectual result ;
and, as a consequence, unsatisfactory to the general in chief, who, on the following day, placed Col. Hardin in command of the detachment, with additional instructions. As on the previous day, the force placed at his disposal, consisting of about. three hundred men. included thirty regulars, forty light horse, and two hundred and thirty active riflemen. Leaving camp on the morning of the 19th, the line of march taken was along an Indian trail, bearing to the northwestward, in the direction of the Kickapoo towns. When about five miles from the head of the Maumce, the detachment was halted, and divisions of it placed in eligible posi- tions in readiness for an attack, should one be made. Subsequently, no enemy appearing, it moved forward about three miles, when two Indians were discovered. on foot, who, owing to the thick underbrush surrounding, escaped unhurt. " Some time after," says Capt. Armstrong. who closely observed the details of passing events, " a gun had been fired in our front, which might be considered as an alarm gun, and I saw where a horse had come down and returned again ; but the Colonel still moved on, giving no orders nor making any arrangements for an attack.
" Some time after, I discovered the enemy's fires at a distance, and informed the Colonel, who replied that they would not fight, and rode in front of the advance, until fired on from hehind the fires, when he, the Colonel, retreated, and with him all the militia except pinc, who continued with me, and were instantly killed, with twenty-four of the Federal troops. Seeing my last man fall, and, being surrounded by the savages. I threw myself into a thicket, and remained tbere three hours in daylight. During that time, I had an oppor- tunity of seeing the enemy pass and repass, and conceived their numbers did not amount to one hundred men. Some were mounted, others armed with rifles, and the advance with tomahawks only."
Speaking of the operations on the preceding day, Capt. Armstrong further says: " I am of opinion that had Col. Trotter proceeded on the 18th, agreeably to his orders, having killed the enemy's sentinels, he would have surprised their camp and, with ease, defeated them ; or, had Col. Hardin arranged his troops or made any military disposition on the 19th, that he would have gained a vietory. Our defeat I therefore aseribed to two causes ; the unofficer-like conduct of C'ol. Hardin ( who, I believe. was a brave man), and the cowardly behavior of the militia-many of them threw down their arms, loaded -- and I believe that none, except the party under wy command, fired a gun." Resuming his narrative, he continued :
" On the 19tb, Col. IFardin commanded in lieu of Col. Trotter. Attacked abont one hundred Indians about fifteen miles west of the Miami village, and,
from the dastardly conduct of the militia. the troops were obliged to retreat. I lost one sergeant and twenty-one out of thirty men of my command. The Indians, on this occasion, gained a complete victory, having killed. in the whole, near one hundred men, which was about their nminher. Many of the militia threw away their arms without. firing a shot, ran through the federal troops and throw them in disorder. Many of the Indians must have been killed, as I saw my men bayonet many of them. They fought. and died hard."
The result of the movement against the Indians on the 18th and 19th was as unexpected as it was unsatisfactory. It was a reasonable presumption, at least, that officers of the known courage and experience of Col. Trotter and Capt. Hardin, charged with the execution of an enterprise involving interests of such vast moment, would not fail to maintain the integrity of their reputations and accomplish all within the range of possibility, with the surroundings present. It will be remembered by the careful reader that, in the organization of the army and preparation for the expedition, elements of discord were so strongly mani- fested as to give room for grave doubts whether those elements could be made to coalesce with such unity of purpose as to warrant successful co-operation. The numerical force consisted in a great measure. of undisciplined militia, many of them brought into the service involuntarily and illy provided with the implements of war, entertaining feelings of jealousy amounting almost to antagonisin against the smaller proportion of regular troops, officered by men of experience and dis- cipline, and completely armed. It has been stated by a historian of high repute that " At this time, probably, the jealousy between the regulars and militia, which had been anticipated, and which had threatened trouble at Fort Washing- ton, began effectually to work mischief; the regular troops disliked to be com- manded by Trotter and Hardin ; the army olheers despised the militia, and the militia, hating them, were impatient under the control of Harmar and his staff. Again, the rivalry between Trotter and Hardin was calculated to make the ele- ments of discord and disobedience yet mare widespread, so that all true confidence between officers and men was destroyed, and with it, of necessity, all true strength.
" But though the troops had been disappointed and defeated, the houses and crops had been burned and wasted; and upon the 21st of October, the army com- menced its homeward march. But. Hardin was not easy under his defeat, and the night of the 21st. heing favorable, he proposed to Harmar to send back a detachment to the site of the village just destroyed, supposing the savages would have already returned thither. The General was not very willing to try further experiments, but Hardin urged him, and at last obtained an order for three hun- dred and forty militia, of which forty were mounted, and sixty regular troops ; the former under Hardin, the latter under Maj. Wyllys. How they fared shall be told by Capt. Ashton, an actor in the affray.
" " The detachment marched in three columns, the federal troops in the een- ter. at the head of which I was posted, with Maj. Wyllys and Col. Hardin in my front ; the militia formed the columns to the right and left. From delays occasioned by the militia's halting, we did not reach the hanks of the Omee ( Maumee ) till some time after sunrise. The spies then discovered the enemy and reported to Maj. Wyllys, who halted the f deral troops and moved the militia on some distance in front, where he gave his orders and plan of attack to the several commanding officers of the corps. Those orders were not communicated to me. Maj. Wyllys reserved the command of the federal troops to himself.
": Maj. Hall. with his battahon, was directed to take a cirenitous route around the bend of the Omee River, cross the Pickaway Forks (or St. Mary's), which brought him directly in the rear of the enemy, and there wait until the attack should commence with Maj. McMullen's battalion, Maj. Fontaine's cavalry and Maj. Wyllys with the federal troops, who all crossed the Omee, at or near the common fording-place. After the attack commenced, the troops were by ho means to separate, but were to embody, or the battalions to support each other, as circumstances required.
" From this disposition, it appeared evident that it was the intention of Maj. Wyllys to surround the enemy, and that if Col. Hall, who had gained his ground undiscovered, had not wantonly disobeyed his orders by firing on a single Indian, the surprise must have been complete. The Indians then fled with precipitation, the battalions of militia pursuing in different directions.
"' Maj. Fontaine made a charge upon a small party of savages ; he fell at the first fire, and the troops dispersed. The Federal troops, who were left unsnp- ported, hecame an easy sacrifice to much the largest party of the Indians that had been seen that day. It was my opinion that the misfortunes of that day were owing to the separation of the troops and disobedience of orders.
"' After the Federal troops were defeated, and the firing in all quarters nearly ceased, Col. Hall and Maj. MeMollen, with their battalions, met in the town, and after discharging and fresh loading their arms, which took up abont half an hour, proceded to join the army, unmolested. I am convinced that the detachment, if it had been kept embodied, was sufficient to have an-wered the fullest expectations of the General, and needed no support ; but I was informed a battalion, under Maj. Ray, was ordered out for that purpose.'"
Upon the return of Col. Hardin to the camp, being dissatisfied with the issue of this last action, and desiring to recover advantages lost by precipitation and disobedience of orders, requested of Gen. Harmar to return with his, the entire force, to the village, and thus make the enterprise a success. The Gen- cral, being short of supplies and the means of transportation, declined compliance with the request, and, on the morning of the 23d of October, putting his army in motion, tank up the line of march back to Fort Washington, the expedition having proved, essentially, a failure in the attainment of its purpose. The loss was 183 killed and 31 wounded, the death list including Maj. Wyllys and Lieut. Frothingham, of the regulars, and Maj. Fontaine, Capts Thorpe, MeMurty and Scott, Lieuts. Clark and Rogers, and Ensigns Bridges, Sweet, Higgins and Thielkeld, of the militia. The loss of the Indians was estimated as nearly equal
HISTORY OF ALLEN COUNTY. INDIANA.
to that of the whites. Notwithstanding this estimate, the Indian account differs greatly from it, fixing their loss at a far less number. Their account was as fol- lows :
" There have been two engagements about the Miami towns between the Amerieans and the Indians, in which, it is said, the former had about five hun- dred men killed, and that the rest' have retreated. The loss was only fifteen or twenty on the side of the Indians. The Shawannes, Miamis and Pottawato- mies were, I understand, the principal tribes that were engaged ; but I do not learn that any of the nations have refused their alliance or assistance, and it is confidently reported that they are now marching against the frontiers on the Ohio."
This aeeount, also, while it may contain many of the elements of truth, the reference to numbers killed of the whites, is, no doubt, as largely overstated as their own loss is below the truth.
The following account of the expedition of Gen. Harmar, written in 1791, and published in the Philadelphia Daily Advertiser of that date, gives some items of information eoneerning that disaster, perhaps nowhere else to be found :
" There were, at that time, seven towns on the three rivers in the vicinity of the confluenee of the St. Joseph's and St. Mary's. The principal Miami village was called Omee Town, among the inhabitants of which were a considerable number of French traders. It stood upon the east bank of the St. Joseph's, or north side of the Maumee, directly opposite the mouth of the St. Mary's River, and had been burnt before Col. Hardin's arrival. Another Miami village of thirty houses stood on the bank opposite the Omee town. The Delawares had three villages ; two upon the St. Mary's, about three miles from its mouth, with forty- five houses in all ; and the other on the cast bank of the St. Joseph's, two or three miles from its mouth, with thirty-six houses. The Shawanoes had two villages, about three miles down the Maumee, and one called Chillicothe, on the north bank, with fifty-eight houses, and the other on the opposite side of the river with sixteen houses. The army burned all the houses at the different villages and destroyed about twenty thousand bushels of eorn which they discov- ered in various places, where it had been hidden by the Indians, and, also, considerable property belonging to the French traders."
One of the principal elements of value in this statement is that whieb gives the relative loentions of the Indian towns in this vieinity, and fixes the exaet situation of the several Omee towns-the large one on the bottom between the Maumee and the St. Joseph's, at the junction, and the other over on what was afterward called the " Wells' Pre-emption," between Spy Run and the St. Joseph's. Again, it renders certain the location of Chillicothe, on the north hank of the Maumce, three miles down, the point from which Gen. Harmar issued his orders on the 20th of October, 1790, before taking up the line of march on his return to Fort Washington. It is probable that the Delaware towns referred to in the account as being Inented on the St. Mary's River, are the " Pickaway " towns of history, because the upper St. Mary's was long known as the Piekaway fork of the Maumee .*
Some other interesting details of the proceedings on the 19th of October are given in an aeeount somewhat amplified from that given by Col. Armstrong, which has been eited above.
Col. Hardin, on the morning of that day, having pursned the same route as that taken by Col. Trotter on the day preceding, in pursuit of the savages, " finding himself in their neighborhood, he detached Capt. Faulkner, of the Pennsylvania militia, to form on his left, which he did at sueb a distance as to render his company of no serviee in the approaching engagement. Hardin's command moved forward to what they discovered to be the encampment of the enemy, which was flanked by a morass on each side, as well as by one in front, which was crossed with great promptness by the troops, now reduced to less than two hundred, who, before they had time 10 forni, received a galling and unex- pected fire from a large body of savages. The militia immediately broke and fled, nor could all the exertions of the officers rally them ; fifty-two of those dispersing being killed in a few minutes.
" The enemy pursued until Maj. Fontaine, who had been sent to hunt up Faulkner and his company, returned with them, compelled them to retire, and the survivors of. the detachment arrived safe in eamp.
" The regulars, under Armstrong, bore the brunt of this affair, one Sergeant and twenty-one privates being killed on the battle-gronnd, and. while endeavoring to maintain their position, were thrown in disorder by the militia running through their lines, flinging away their arms without even firing a shot. The Indians killed in this affair nearly one hundred men."*
The site of this sanguinary affair was, from the best information now attain- able, by observation, and deductions from the observation of others. in the south- western part of Eel River Township, not far distant from where Eel River erosses the county line. Indeed, there are numerous points within an area of less than three miles along Eel River, which bear unmistakable evidences of a terrible con- ffiet at arms.
In the engagement that took place on the morning of the 22d, there are some details in the account before us not found in the more general yet mainly official narrative, from which we have before liberally quoted, but which, it is thought, contains soule faets of interest not contained in the other.
The detachinent sent out under Col. Hardin, being formed in three divisions, with militia on the right and left and regulars in the center, the left, under Maj. Hall, was ordered to pass round the bond and cross the St. Mary's in rear of the Indian towns on the St. Joseph's, and remain there until the battalion of Maj. MeMullen, ocenpying the right, should eross the Maumee lower down, and commence the action by attacking the Indians on the east side of the St. Joseph's. This latter movement was to be the signal for the regulars, under Hardin and Wyllys, who occupied the eenter, with Major Fontaine's cavalry, to eross the
Maumee at the old ford and attaek the enemy in front, and thus surround the Indian camp. Contrary to orders, bowever, Maj. Hall, instead of waiting for the signal, permitted some of his men to fire upon a straggling Indian, which, alarming the Indians in the town, they attacked the troops on the left. The eon- sequence of this was the discovery by the Indians of Hardin's men, on the oppo- site side of the Manmee, who immediately began to eross over, Major Fontaine being in advance. Before this division had crossed, it was attacked in front, on the north bank and in the river, the cavalry having, in the mean time, gained a footing in the borders of the town. The fight. soon became general, the Indians having the whites at a disadvantage. The contest was terrific, the savages heing wrought up to a piteh of desperation seldom equaled, perhaps never exeelled. Owing to the premature engagement on the left., the whole plan was so much dis- arranged that no two divisions could execute orders in concert ; thus divided, defeat was inevitable. Though the regulars and cavalry bore the brunt of hattle with the most heroic fortitude, they were finally overcome by superior force.
CHAPTER 1I.
St. Clair's Expedition.
Notwithstanding the three successive expeditions of Gens. Harmar, Seott and Wilkinson against the Wabash Indians during the year 1790, and the first part of the year 1791, had, as a whole, resulted somewhat disastrously to the warlike elements directing the movements of these savage hordes, there still remained a disposition among those near the head-waters of the Wabash and Upper Eel Rivers to pursue the advantages gained by them in the actions of the 18th and 19th of October, 1790, with the forees under Gen. Harmar, in the vieinity of the Miami towns on the Maumee and St. Joseph. As a consequence, therefore. aets of hostility were not unfrequent, and a spirit akin to defiance aetnatedl the leaders in their warlike demonstrations whenever opportunity offered. Hence, the Gov- ermmment of the United States, in order to teach these hostiles an important lesson in the attitude maintained toward the white people and to protect the frontier settlements against their murderous attacks, continued to send forward expedi- ·tions into the Indian country.
In the meantime, the Miamis, under Little Turtle, and the Shawanoe band of Blue Jacket, with Buck-ong-a-he-las, of the Delawares, all occupying territory adjacent to Maumee and the Inkes, had formed an alliance with detached bands of the Wyandots, Kickapoos, Pottawatomies, Ottawas, Chippewas, and kindred tribes, for more extensive operations against the military power of the United States, and to organize a confederaey of these tribes sufficiently formidable to counteract efforts of the Government to maintain its authority in the territory northwest of the Ohio River. In these movements, they were aided by the counsel of Simon Girty, a white savage, and influential agents, emissaries of the British Government, from whom, also, they received ammunition and supplies.
Gov. St. Clair left Philadelphia on the 28th of March, 1791, proceeding thenee to Pittsburgh, where he arrived on the 16th of April following. Leaving Pittsburgh, he repaired to Lexington, Ky. He remained there a few days, and then departed, arriving at Fort Washington on the I5th of May. The garrison there, at that time, consisted of seventy nine commissioned officers and privates fit for duty. At Fort Harmar, " the garrison consisted of forty-five, rank and file; at Fort Steuben, there were sixty-one regulars, and at Fort Knox, eighty- three." On July 15. the whole of the First United States Regiment, amounting to 299 non-commissioned officers and privates, arrived at Fort Washington, under orders from Gov. St. Clair, Commander in Chief. About the same time, also, Gen. Richard Butler, second in command, under an net of Congress at the pre- vious session, began to raise the number of regular troops to fill the quota. The recruits for this purpose were principally drawn from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia. Early in September following, the main body of the army, under Gen. Butler, moved toward Fort Washington, halting for a time and erecting Fort Hamilton mennwhile. From there, marching in the direction of the Miami village, a distance of about forty-two miles, where he halted again, and, ereeting Fort Jefferson, some six miles to the southward of Greenville, in Darke County, Ohio. Subsequently, the army took up its line of march toward the site upon which Fort Recovery was afterward erected-the main army, at this time, November 3, consisting of about fourteen hundred effective men. " Here, on the head-waters of the Wabash River, among a number of small creeks, the army encamped. The right wing of the army. commanded by Maj. Gen. Butler, and composed of the battalions under Majs. Butler, Clarke and Patterson, lay in front of a creek about twelve yards wide, and formed the first line. The left wing, composed of the battalions under Bedinger and Geither, and the Second Regiment, under the command of Lieut. Col. William Darke, formued the second line. Between the two lines, there was a space of about seventy yards, which was all that the ground would allow. The right flank was supposed to be protected by the creek ; and the left was covered by a steep bank, a corps of cavalry, and some piquets. The militia inarelied over the creek and encamped in two lines, about one-quarter of a mile in advance of the muain army. There was snow on the ground ; and two rows of fires were made hetween Butler's and Darke's lines, and also two rows between the lines of the militia. While the militia were crossing the creek, a few Indians were seen hovering about the army, but they fled precipitately ns soon as they were discovered. At this time, the Little Turtle, Blue Jacket, Buek-ong-a-hr-las, and other Indian chiefs of less distinction, were lying a few miles distant frow St. Clair's army, with about twelve hundred warriors, awaiting a favorable moment to hegin an attack. Simon Girty and some other white men were with the Indians."
* Knapp's Ilist. Maumee Val., p. 67.
" Dawson's Notes.
32
HISTORY OF ALLEN COUNTY, INDIANA.
The following is the official account of the engagement which took place on the morning of November 4, 1791, and which resulted in a miost disastrous defeat, at the point above indicated, and contains, perhaps, the most brief, as well as the most lucid, account of the transaction. The report is dated on the 9th of Novem- ber, 1791, and is in these words :
" At this place, which I judged to be about fifteen miles from the Miami village, I determined to throw up a slight work, the plan of which was coneerted that evening with Maj. Ferguson, wherein to have deposited the men's knapsacks, and everything else that was not of absolute necessity, and to have moved on to attack the enemy as soon as the first regiment came up. But they did not per- mit me to execute either ; for, on the 4th, about half an hour hefore sunrise, and when the men had been just dismissed from parade (for it was a constant practice to have them all under armis a considerable time before daylight), an attack was made upon the militia. Those gave way in a very little time, and rushed into camp through Maj. Butler's battalion ( which, together with a part of Clarke's, they threw into disorder, and which, notwithstanding the exertions of both those officers, was never altogether remedicd ), the Indians following elose at their licels. The fire, however, of the front line checked them, but almost instantly a very heavy attack began upon that line, and in a very few minutes it was extended to the second likewise. Tbe great weight of it was directed against the center of each, where the artillery was placed, and from which the men were repeatedly driven with great slaughter. Finding no great effect from our fire, and confusion beginning to spread from the great number of men who were fall- ing in all quarters, it became necessary to try what could be done by the bayonet. Lieut. Col. Darke was, accordingly, ordered to make a charge with part of the sce- ond line, and to turn the left flank of the enemy. This was executed with great spirit. The Indians instantly gave way, and were driven baek three or four hun- dred yards : but, for want of a sufficient number of riflemen to pursue this advantage, they soon returned, and the troops were obliged to give back in their turn. At this moment they had entered our camp by the left flank, having pushed baek the troops that were posted there. Another charge was made here by the Second Regiment, Butler's and Clarke's battalions, with equal effeet, and it was repeated several times, and always with sueeess; but in all of them many men were lost, and particularly the officers, wbieh, with so raw troops, was a loss altogether irremediable. In that I just spoke of, made by the Second Regiment and Butler's battalion, Maj. Butler was dangerously wounded, and every officer of the Second Regiment fell except three, one of which, Mr. Greaton, was shot through the body.
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