USA > Indiana > Hamilton County > History of Hamilton County, Indiana : with illustrations and biographical sketches of some of its prominent men and pioneers > Part 5
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HISTORY OF HAMILTON COUNTY, INDIANA.
strongholds had passed from French possession, and new alliances became a necessity, then it was that the Indians began to manifest opposition to English rule. This widespread disaffection rapidly assumed form and the demand for a empetent leader berame imminent. The emergency was met in the choice of Pontiac. Mighty in his influence among the people of his race, powerful in person, commanding in presence. resolute to an extraordinary degree, possessed of a rare gift of chopence, sagacious and subtle as a beast of prey-he right- fully claimed the office of chief over many tribes, and became the minister of vengeance for his rare De was a principal chief of the Ottawas and a warrior of great renown. As a participant in the battle upon the Heights of Abra- ham, in the vicinity of Quebee, he was the ally of the French, and, now that they had been subjugated, he manifested an aunwillingness to surrender that allegiance to the computerors, preferring to maintain, by forre of arms if wved be, his fidelity to the early friends of his people.
Had the English, at this juncture, adopted a course of policy toward the Indians similar to that of the French, mich effusion of blood might have been spared, and much of the myparalleled suffering of victims averted. "But then, as since, Great Britain acted les from the dictates of a broad humanity than from the impulse of commercial gain. In fixing the degree of rogami- bility for what followed, we should. in order to be just, weigh well the causes which impelled the savages to the war-path. I' Great Britain could have appeased the tigers of the American forests panting for blood, she should have done it , that she not only offered no conciliation, but scorned and mal- treated the untamed creatures, is to make her at least partially accountable for the conspiracy and its sad results,'
"The mutterings of the impending storm were heard early in the summer of 1761, when Maj. Campbell, commanding at Detroit, was fully informed of a conspiracy among the tribes along the lakes and in the Ohio Valley, to rise simultaneously against all the forts, to massacre the garrison and then to combine und fall upon all settlements advanced over the eastern rider of the Alleghanies, Expresses were at once dispatched to all the points menaced. This Intrayal of their plot sofieed to postpone the attack for that season. Sir Jeffrey Anderst commanded extreme caution to be used at all ports, while the Indians store treated with a severity and suspicion which only served to strengthen their bit- terness of forling toward their fue." +
While this postponement gave the English an opportunity to strengthen their posts and guard against attack, it enabled the Indians, also, to perfect their plans and better concentrate their efforts when the proper time arrived for their onward movement. Pontiac made good use of the delay in sending mnbassarlors to all the adjacent Indian tribes, urging an alliance. These move- ments of the wily chief wore kept, however, profoundly secret, and, had it not bren for the confidential disclosures, in the way of warnings to special friends, the result would have been most disastrous tu the white settlements within the limits of the prescribed territory.
Among the means of diplomatie interemise between the different tribes in that day, the transmission of belts, having an accepted significance, was, per- lage, the most conspicuous, and was generally accompanied with a speech or "talk," calculated to emphasize the symbology of the belt. A white belt was emblematic of prace, while black or red belts were suggestive of war, and were always transmitted by special messengers. The practiced observer understood well their pirport, and prepared accordingly.
The chiefs, says Parkman, have the power "to declare war and to make peare; but when war was declared, they had no power to carry the declaration into offert. The warriors fight. if they chose to do so; but if, on the enn- trary, they preferred to remain quiet, no man could force them to lift the hatchet. The war chief, whose part it was to lead them to battle, was a mere partisan, whom his bravery and exploits had led to distinction. If he thought proper, he sang his war-song and danced his war-dauer, and, as many of the young men ax were disposed to follow him gathered around and enlisted them- srlves nuder him. Over these volunteers he had no legal authority, and they could desert him at any moment with no other penalty than disgrace."
On the 25th of April, 1763, a council was summoned to meet on the River Eurorces. " In accordance with the summons, they came issuing from their cabins-the tall, unked figures of the wild Ojibwas, with quivers shing at their backs, and light war-clubs resting in the hollow of their arms ; Ottawas, wrapped close in their gaudy blankets; Wyandots, fluttering in painted shirts, their heads adorned with feathers, and their leggins garnished with bells. All we're soon sented in n wiele circle upon the grass, row within row-a grave and -
silent assembly. Each savage countenance seemed carved in word, and notre could have detected the deep and Gery passions hidden beneath that unmoved exterior. Pipes, with ornamented stoms, were lighted and passed from hand to hand." Before this grand council, Pontiac delivered his war sprech, ingenions in its method and thrilling in its efforts upon his silent, statur-like auditors. " Every sentence was rounded with a ferer ejaculation ; and, as the - impetuous erator proceeded, his auditory grew restless to spring at once into the bloody arena of battle and bury the scalping-knife and tomahawk in the body of the enemy." With this kind of enthused excitement at fever heat, the conspirators were ready for immediate action. Detroit was the objective point, but the plot was discovered in time to prevent its execution. Notwith- standing the failure to capture Detroit, mmmmeros other justs-Sandusky, Presque Isle. Michilimackinac. Ouiatenon fill into the hands of conspirators. Soon the capture of the post at the junction of St. Joseph's and St. Mary's Rivers followed.
Meanwhile, though these apparent snecesses of the conspirators had a tend- ency to enentrage them, the results were not equal to their anticipations, in view of the fact that the strongholds of the English had m a measure become impregnable, and, the question of the ultimate success of the conspiracy no longer a doubtful one, its failure was found to be inevitable. This fart. to the mind of Pontiac, wasstrikingly manifest, and, though still sollen and intrartable. he, and such of bis followers as continued their allegiance to him. in the fall of 170%, left Detroit and took their abode for the time being on the Manner, a few miles below the present site of Fort Wayne. Finally, in the spring of 170. Pontiac left his encampment on the Maumee, " accompanied by his chiefs, and by an Englishman named Crawford, a man of vigor and resolution, who had been appointed by the Superintendents to the trouble-me office of attending the Indian deputations and supplying their wants "-for the purjuse of meeting in council the English Governor at O-wego. Reaching the point of his destination, where the great council was held, be made his great perare sprech, and " sealed his submission to the English " by acknowledging allegiance to them forever. This was the end of his warlike career.
CHAPTER IV.
E.rpedition of Gru. Harmar mminst the Miamis-His Difrut and its Consr- quevers-St. Chef's Expedition and Defout-Disasters Attending Wayne's Expedition and Victory-Indians Demoratized-Treat for Porre.
FROM the date of the failure of D'untiae's conspiracy until the commence- ment and during the progress of the American Revolution, but little more than local protection was afforded the frontier settlements against the depredations of Western Indians. Indeed, it was a part of the policy of the British Gov- ernment to maintain an alliance with belligerent tribes, for the purpose of ming them, when opportunity offered, in its offensive warfare against the colonists. It was not until the close of the Revolution. the success of the colonial arms and the establishment of a permanent government by the people of the I'nited States, that any formidable movement was inaugurated against them, notwith- standing frequent and startling incidents of merciless Indian warfare were com- mon. When, however, the machinery of government was put into operation, and the power to meet force with force, if' need be, was adequately established. I'resident Washington called the attention of Congress to the necessity of effective measures in the premises. At first a pacibe policy was adopted, and all reasonable means to establish and maintain the same applied, but without satisfactory results, Hence, Washington, in his message of' the Sth of Jan- mary, 1790, directed the attention of Congress to the matter, using this lan- guage : " There was reason to hope that the pacific measures adopted with regard to certain hostile tribes of Indians, would have relieved the inhabitants of our Southern and Western frontiers from their depredations ; but you will perevive, from the information contained in the papers which I shall direct to be laid before you fcomprehending a communication from the Commonwealth of Virginia], that we ought to be prepared to afford protection to those parts of the Union, and, if necessary, to punish the aggressors." Again, in his second enoual message, on the 8th of December, in the same year, he sub- mitted the following :
" It has been heretofure known to Congress that frequent incursions have been made on our frontier settlements by certain banditti of Indians from the northwest side of the Ohio. These, with some of the tribes dwelling on and near the Wabash, have of late been particularly activo in their depredations,
. American Cunspir., P. 35.
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HISTORY OF HAMILTON COUNTY, INDIANA.
and, bring emboldened by the impunity of their crimes, and aided by such parts of the neighboring tribes as could be seduced to join in their hostilities or afford them a retreat for their prisoners and plunder, have, instead of listen- ing to the liumane invitations and overtures made on the part of the United States, renewed their violences with fresh alarrity and greater effect."
" These aggravated provocations rendered it essential to the safety of the Western settlements, that the aggressore should be made sensible that the fios- crament of the Union is not less capable of punishing their crimes than it is disposed to respect their rights, and reward their attachments. As this object could not be offerted by defensive measures, it became necessary to put in force the art which empowers the President to call out the militia for the protee- tion of the frontier. I have, accordingly, authorized an expedition in which the regular troops in that quarter are combined with such draughts of militia ax were dermed sufficient."
Pursuant to the authority above referred to, Gen. Harmar, having been placed in chief command of the expedition, left Fort Washington on the Ith of October, 1790, at the head of the army, the route bring to the northward, hearing to the northeast, passing the Indian village of Chillicothe, on the Little Miami, on the 6th. From there, the route lay to the northward and west- ward, in the direction of the Miami towns at the head of the Maumee. On the 14th of October, when about thirty miles from the objective point, Col. Hardin, with our company of regulars and 600 militia, was detached from the main army and gut forward to reconnaiter the position of the Indians, their munber and apparent intentions. On the afternoon of the following day, this detachment reached the village and took possession of it, the Indians having vacated it a short time previously. In the meantime, however, the main body of the army, having pursued the regular line of march, arrived on the morning of the 17th, and crossed the Maumee to the village above, at the junction of the St. Joseph's with this stream. Then the destruction of the village com- menred, and before the 21st the destruction was complete, the chief town and five subordinate villages, with nearly twenty thousand bushels of corn found in the vicinity, had been reduced to ashes.
A general reconnaissance of the surrounding neighborhood having been determined upon to ascertain the whereabouts of the absconded savages, Gen. Trutter, with 300 Kentuckians, was sent out for that purpose on the morning of the 18th, after the destruction of the principal village. This reconnaissance was not rewarded with any beneficial results, and was, as a consequence, unsat- isfactory to the General-in-Chief. On the morning of the following day, Grn. Trotter's command was transferred to Col. Hardin, with instructions as on the preceding day, and the detachment took up its line of march along the Indian trail, bearing to the northwestwand, in the direction of the Kickapoo village. A halt was called, when about five miles from the head of the Maumee, and positions assigned to different divisions, anticipating an attack, but, none being made, the detachment moved forward about three miles, when two Indians were discovered on foot. These escaped unhurt, owing to the thick underbrush surrounding, though a gun had been fired at them. A little further on, a more formidable body of Indians were discovered with camp-fires in front of them. A fire was at once opened by these Indians upon Col. Hardin's detachment, which, withont waiting to return the fire, hastily retreated with great loss, the regulars alone remaining to continue the fight against. fear- ful tulis. The result was most disastrous,
Col. Hardin was greatly chagrined at the apparently uunecessary defeat of his expedition, and, on the night of the 21st, after Gen. Harmar had taken up his line of march back in the direction of Fort Washington, after much per- suasion, induced the commaruling firneral to give him another opportunity to vindicate himself, by sending him back to the site of the village just destroyed. Accordingly, though Gen. Harma was unwilling to try further experiments, having alrendy suffered greatly, he received an order for a special detachment of 310 militia, of which forty were mounted, and sixty regular troops, the former to be commanded by himself, and the latter by Maj. Wyllys, The detachment marched immediately, forming in three columns, the regulars in the center, commanded by Capt. Asheton, with Maj. Wyllys and Col. Hardin in front, the militia forming the right and left. The Maumee was reached about sunrise on the morning of the 22d, when the spies, discovering the cacmy on the opposite side of the river, reported to Maj. Wyllys, who halted the regulary, and gave his orders und plan of attack to the militia in front, with the com. manding officers of the several divisions. These orders, however, were not generally communicated, leaving those uninformed officers in doubt. Divisions were sent to the left with instructions to cross the St. Mary's in rear of the vil- Inge, and to the right, crossing the Maumee at the old ford io advance of the
regulars, to cut off the retreat of the Indians below the village, while the center was to move forward, cross the Maumee near the same point, and attack the enemy in front. Premature firing from the division sent to the rear of the village disarranged the order of attack, and the lilians, being apprised of the situation, attacked the entire body almost simultaneously, and forced the center by a concentrated movement, with fatal effect. The right and left, being held by an inferior force, were unable to afford any assistance in repelling the principal attacking force of the enemy. The engagement was short, sharp and derisive, the slaughter terrible. The loss to the whites was 183 killed and 31 wounded. The Indian loss was not so great.
ST. CLAIR'S EXPEDITION.
The failure of the expedition of Gen. Harmar against the Wabash Indians naturally induced a continuance of the hostile spirit manifested by the savages of that locality, and, indeed, of the whole territory northwest of the Ohio. The leaders of these hostile bands, whenever opportunity offered. never failed to exercise their warlike propensity. Hence, the Government of the United States found it weerssary to adopt other measures for the relief of the frontier set- dements, AAccordingly, Gov. St. Clair was directed to prepare for such defense with all possible dispatch. Hener, on the 28th of March, 1791, he left Phil- adelphia and proeveded thenre to Pittsburgh, arriving there on the Hith of April following. From Pittsburgh he repaired to Lexington, Ky., where he remained a few days and departed for Fort Washington, arriving there on the 15th of May. The garrison at the latter point consisted then of seventy-nine commissioned officers and privates fit for doty. At Fort Harmar, " the garrison consisted of forty-five, rank and file ; at Fort Steuben, there were sixty-one regulars; and at Fort Knox eighty-three." On the 15th of July following, the whole of the First Regiment of I'nited States Infantry, " amount- ing to 299 non commissioned officers and privates, arrived at Fort Washing- ton, under orders from Gov. St. Clair, Commander-in-Chief." This force was subsequently increased under art of Congress to raise the number of regulars to complete the quota, drawn principally from New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.
Early in September, the army took up its line of march in the direction of the Miami towns at the head of the Mammee, halting on the site where Fort Rreuvery was afterward erected. On the 3d of November, the army, con-ist- ing of about fourteen hundred effective men, encamped on the head-waters of the Wabash, among a number of small ereeks. The right flank lay in front of a ereck about twelve yards wide, and constituted the first line, while the left wing formed the second line. Between these two lines there was a spare uf nbont seventy yards, which was all the sitoation would allow. The right flank was supposed to be protected by the creek, while the left was covered by a steep bank, a corps of cavalry and some pickets. The militia passed over the creek and encamped in two lines about one quarter of a mile in advance of the main army. Snow was on the ground, and two rows of fires were made between Butler's and Darhe's lines, with two rows also between the lines of the militia.
At the sune time, and while the army was thus encamped, Little Turtle and Buckongahelas, with other chiefs of less distinction, with about twelve hundred warriors, were lying only a few miles distant, awaiting a favorable opportunity to commence the attack. This opportunity was presented about 4 o'clock on the morning of the next day, and the attack was made accord- ingly, with a suddenness and effect seklom equaled, just as the army had been dismissed from parade in a state bordering on disorganization. The result was a most sanguinary and disastrous defeat to the white people, the details of which were almost incredible in the degree of barbarous atrocity. The loss was stated to have been thirty-nine officers killed, and 593 men killed and missing. The wounded, twenty-two officers and 240 men. The loss of the Indians did not exceed 150 killed and wounded.
The Government, then, in view of the situation, seeing that a larger, better- provided and better-disciplined army was ureessary to give confidence to the settlers along the frontiers and put a quietus on the movements of the Indians, took immediate steps toward fitting out an expedition free from all the ele- ments of weakness that characterized the two former.
WAYNE'S EXPEDITION.
When the outlines of a re-organization had been fully matured, Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne, a native of Chester County, Penn., was placed in chief command, Gen. St. Clair having resigned. Gen. Wayne at once proceeded to arrange preliminaries ie sach manner as to insure the most auspicious results.
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HISTORY OF HAMILTON COUNTY, INDIANA.
While he was taking these preliminary steps, the Government of the United States was making efforts to establish treaties of peace and alliance with the hostile Indians of the Northwest. To do this, and to acquire the information pertinent to a knowledge of the movements and designs uf these hostiles, mes- sengers with " talk"," delegated with authority to that end, with Commission- ers empowered to make treaties with them, were appointed for different local- ities. It was especially oujoined upon these Commissioners and mesengers, to assure the Indians that it was not the purpose of the Government to take their lands without a satisfactory consideration therefor, nor without their entire con- sent, the failure to observe which had before been the orcasion of so much bluewished. Conformably with this idea. Gen. Wayne was instructed, in April. 1792, to ise a proclamation informing the people along the frontier of the measures in contemplation, and that it was their duty to refrain from any arts calculated to occasion distrust on the part of the Indians to be treated with.
" On the 28th of July. 1794, the troops under his command having Inen joined, two days previously, by Maj. Gen. Scott, with about sixteen hundred mummted volunteers frion Kentucky, Gen. Wayne, with this united force, com- mened his march for the Indians on the Maunice River. At a point on the St. Mary's River, about twenty-four miles to the northward of Fort Recovery, he created and garrisoned another post, which he called Fort Adams. Mor- ing bence, on the Ith of August. he arrived at the junction of the Manmire and Auglaize, on the eth. The capture of the post at this point is best theseribed in the language of Gen. Wayne's rejust to the Secretary of War, dated August 11. 1794. He says: ' I have the honor to inform you that the army under my command took possession of this very important post on the morning of the Sth inst .- the vuemy, on the preceding evening. having aban- doned all their settlements, towns, and villages, with such apparent marks of surprise and precipitation, as to amount to a positive proof that our approach was not discovered by them until the arrival of a Mr. Newman, of the Quar- termaster General's Department, who deserted from the army near the St. Mary's. * * I had made such demonstrations for a longth of time previous to taking up our line of march, as to induce the savage- In expert our advance by the route of the Miami villages, to the left, or toward Roche de Boot. by the right-which forints appear to have produced the desired effect, by drawing the attention of the enemy to these points, and gave an opening for the army to approach undiscovered by a devions (t. e. ), in a central, dirce- tin. Thus, sir, we have gained possession of the grand emporium of the hostile Indians of the West, without loss of blood.'"
After the capture of the post at the month of the Auglaize, Gen. Wayne completed a strong stockade fort at that point, which, from the character of the structure and his purpose in erecting it, he called Fort Defiance. Then, desir- ing still to spare the effusion of blood and carry out literally the instructions received from the hands of President Washington, he made overtures for peace with Indians, sending messengers with conciliatory talks. These efforts, how- ever, were unavailing ; the Indians, from their former successes, anticipating an easy vietury, determined for war, notwithstanding Little Turtle and some other of the principal chiefs, in council, advised otherwise. In the mean time, how- over, while these efforts were in progress, tien. Wayne, watching with sleepless vigilance every movement of the savages, was netive in his preparations for offensive or defensive measures, as ciremostances might require, Having con- vineed himself of the intentions of the Indians, " at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 20th [of' August, 1791], the army again advanced in cummins, accord- ing to the standing order of march-the Legion on the right, its flank covered by the Maumee; one brigade of mounted volunteers on the left, under Brig- ulier General Todd, and the other in the rear, ouder Brigadier General Barbe, A select battalion of mounted volunteers moved in front of the legion, com- manded by Major Price, who was directed to keep sufficiently advanced, so as to give timely notice for the troops to form in case of action, it being yet nude- termined whether the Indians would determine for peace or war. Alter advancing about five miles, Major Price's corps received no severe a fire from the enemy, who were serreted in the wewels and high grass, as to compel them to retreat. The Legion was immediately formed in two lines, principally in a close, thick wood, which extended for miles on our left, and for a considerable distance in front, the ground loving covered with old fallen timber, probably prensioned by n tornado, which rendered it impracticable for the cavalry to net. with effect, and afforded the enemy the most favorable covert for their wiele of warfare. The savages were formed in three lines, within supporting distance of each other, and extending for wear two miles nt right ungles with the river. I soon discovered, from the weight of the fire and extent of their lines, that
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