USA > Indiana > Greene County > Vicksburg > Indiana. Vicksburg National Military Park Commission. Indiana at Vicksburg > Part 10
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While my forces were opening one end of the pass, the enemy was diligently closing the other end, and in this way succeeding in gaining time to strongly fortify Greenwood, below the junction of the Tallahatchee and Yalabusha. The advance of the expedition, consisting of one division of MeClernand's Corps, from Helena, commanded by Brig. Gen. L. F. Ross, and the Twelfth and Seven- teenth Regiments Missouri Infantry, from Sherman's Corps, as
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sharpshooters on the gunboats, succeeded in reaching Coldwater March 2, after much difficulty and the partial disabling of most of the boats. From the entrance into Coldwater to Fort Pemberton, at Greenwood, Mississippi, no great difficulty of navigation was experienced, nor any interruption of magnitude from the enemy. Fort Pemberton extends from the Tallahatchee to the Yazoo at Greenwood. Here the two rivers come within a few hundred yards of each other. The land around the fort is low, and at the time of the attack was entirely overflowed. Owing to this fact, no move- ment could be made by the army to reduce it, but all depended upon the ability of the gunboats to silence the guns of the enemy and enable the transports to run down and land troops immediately on the fort itself.
After an engagement of several hours, the gunboats drew off, being unable to silence the batteries. Brig. Gen. I. F. Quinby, commanding a division of McPherson's Corps, met the expedition under Ross with his division on its return near Fort Pemberton, on March 21, and, being the senior, assumed command of the entire expedition, and returned to the position Ross had occupied.
On March 23, I sent orders for the withdrawal of all the forces operating in that direction, for the purpose of concentrating my army at Milliken's Bend.
On March 14, Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding the Missis- sippi Squadron, informed me that he had made a reconnaissance up Steele's Bayou, and partially through Black Bayou toward Deer Creek, and, so far as explored, these water courses were reported. navigable for the smaller iron-clads.
Information, given mostly, I believe, by the negroes of the coun- try, was to the effect that Deer Creek could be navigated to Rolling Fork, and that from there through the Sunflower to the Yazoo River there was no question about the navigation.
On the following morning I accompanied Admiral Porter in the ram Price, several iron-clads preceding us, up through Steele's Bayou to near Black Bayou.
At this time our forces were at a deadlock at Greenwood, and I looked upon the success of this enterprise as of vast importance. It would, if successful, leave Greenwod between two forces of ours, and would necessarily cause the immediate abandonment of that stronghold. About thirty steamers of the enemy would have been destroyed or fallen into our hands.
Seeing that the great obstacles of navigation, so far as I had gone, was from overhanging trees, I left Admiral Porter near Black [10]
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Bayou, and pushed back to Young's Point, for the purpose of send- ing forward a pioneer corps to remove these difficulties. Soon after my return to Young's Point, Admiral Porter sent back to me for a co-operating military force. Sherman was promptly sent with one division of his corps. The number of steamers suitable for the navigation of these bayous being limited, most of the force was sent up the Mississippi River to Eagle Bend, a point where the river nuns within one mile of Steele's Bayou, thus saving an important part of this difficult navigation.
The expedition failed, probably more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any im- practicability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of re- moving them. This gave the enemy time to move forces to effect- nally checkmate further progress, and the expedition was with- drawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open naviga- tion to the Yazoo.
All this may have been providential in driving us ultimately to a line of operations which has proven eminently successful.
For further particulars on the Steele's Bayou expedition, see report of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, forwarded on April 12.
As soon as I decided to open water communication from a point on the Mississippi, near Milliken's Bend, to New Carthage, I de- termined to occupy the latter place, it being the first point below Vicksburg that could be reached by land at the stage of water then existing, and the occupancy of which, while it secured to us a point on the Mississippi River, would also protect the main line of com- munication by water. Accordingly, the 13th Army Corps, Maj. Gen. J. A. MeClernand, commanding, was directed to take up its line of mareh on March 29 for New Carthage, the 15th and 17th Army Corps to follow, moving no faster than supplies and ammu- nition could be transported to them.
The roads, though level, were intolerably bad, and the move- ment was therefore necessarily slow. Arriving at Smith's planta- tion, two miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal was broken in several places. thus leaving New Car- thage an island.
All the boats that could be were collected from the different bayous in the vicinity and others were built, but the transportation of an army in this way was found exceedingly tedious. Another
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route had to be found. This was done by making a further march around Vidal to Perkins' plantation, a distance of twelve miles more, making the whole distance to be marched from Milliken's Bend to reach water communication on the opposite side of the point thirty-five miles. Over this distance, with bad roads to con- tend against, supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to be hauled by wagons with which to eommenee the campaign on the opposite side of the river. At the same time that I ordered the cecupation of New Carthage, preparations were made for running transports by the Vicksburg batteries with Admiral Porter's gun- boat fleet.
On the night of April 16, Admiral Porter's fleet and the trans- ports Silver Wave, Forest Queen and Henry Clay ran the Vicksburg batteries. The boilers of the transports were protected as well as possible with hay and cotton. More or less commissary stores were put on each. All three of these boats were struck more or less frequently while passing the enemy's batteries, and the Henry Clay, by the explosion of a shell or by some other means, was set on fire and entirely consumed. The other two boats were somewhat in- jured, but not seriously disabled. No one on board of either was hurt.
As these boats sueeeeded in getting by so well, I ordered six more to be prepared in like manner for running the batteries. These latter, viz., Tigress, Anglo-Saxon, Cheeseman, Empire City, Horizon and Moderator, left Milliken's Bend on the night of April 22, and five of them got by, but in a somewhat damaged condition. The Tigress received a shot in her hull below the water line, and sunk on the Louisiana shore soon after passing the last of the bat- teries. The crews of these steamers, with the exception of that of the Forest Queen, Capt. C. D. Conway, and the Silver Wave, Cap- tain McMillan, were composed of volunteers from the army. Upon the call for volunteers for this dangerous enterprise, officers and men presented themselves by the hundreds, anxious to undertake the trip. The names of those whose services were accepted will be given in a separate report.
It is a striking feature, so far as my observation goes, of the present volunteer army of the United States, that there is nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or professional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for the duty required in almost every regiment.
The transports injured in running the bloekade were repaired by order of Admiral Porter, who was supplied with the material for
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such repairs as they required, and who was and is ever ready to afford all the assistance in his power for the furtherance of the success of our arms. In a very short time five of the transports were in running order, and the remainder were in a condition to be used as barges in the moving of troops. Twelve barges loaded with forage and rations were sent in tow of the last six boats that run the blockade. One-half of them got through in a condition to be used.
Owing to the limited number of transports below Vicksburg, it was found necessary to extend our line of land travel to Hard Times, Louisiana, which, by the circuitous route it was necessary to take, increased the distance to about seventy miles from Milli- ken's Bend, our starting point.
The 13th Army Corps being all through to the Mississippi, and the 17th Army Corps well on the way, so much of the 13th as could be got on board of the transports and barges were put aboard, and moved to the front of Grand Gulf on April 29. The plan here was that the navy should silence the guns of the enemy, and the troops landed under the cover of the gunboats, and carry the place by storm.
At 8 a. m. the navy made the attack, and kept it up for more than five hours in the most gallant manner. From a tug out in the stream I witnessed the whole engagement. Many times it seemed to me the gunboats were within pistol-shot of the enemy's batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were too ele- vated and their fortifications too strong to be taken from the water side. The whole range of hills on that side were known to be lined with rifle-pits; besides, the field artillery could be moved to any position where it could be made useful in case of an attempt at landing. This determined me again to run the enemy's batteries, turn his position by effecting a landing at Rodney, or at Bruins- burg, between Grand Gulf and Rodney. Accordingly, orders were immediately given for the troops to debark at Hard Times, Louis- iana, and march across to the point immediately below Grand Gulf.
At dark the gunboats again engaged the batteries, and all the transports run by, receiving but two or three shots in the passage, and these without injury. I had some time previously ordered a reconnaissance to a point opposite Bruinsburg, to ascertain, if pos- sible. from persons in the neighborhood the character of the road leading to the highlands back of Bruinsburg. During the night I learned from a negro man that there was a good road from Bruins- burg to Port Gibson, which determined me to land there.
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The work of ferrying the troops to Bruinsburg was commenced at daylight in the morning, the gunboats as well as transports being used for the purpose.
As soon as the 13th Army Corps was landed, and could draw three days' rations to put in haversacks (no wagons were allowed to cross until the troops were all over), they were started on the road to Port Gibson. I deemed it a matter of vast importance that the highlands should be reached without resistance. The 17th Corps followed as rapidly as it could be put across the river.
About 2 o'clock, May 1, the advance of the enemy was met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the road to Port Gibson. Ile was forced to fall back, but, as it was dark, he was not pursued far until day- light.
Early on the morning of the 1st, I went out, accompanied by members of my staff, and found McClernand with his corps en- gaging the enemy about four miles from Port Gibson. At this point the roads branched in exactly opposite directions, both, how- ever, leading to Port Gibson. The enemy had taken position on both branches, thus dividing, as he fell back, the pursuing forces. The nature of the ground in that part of the country is such that a very small force could retard the progress of a much larger one for many hours. The roads usually run on narrow, elevated ridges, with deep and impenetrable ravines on either side. On the right were the divisions of Hovey. Carr and (A. J.) Smith, and on the left the division of Osterhaus, of McClernand's Corps. The three former succeeded in driving the enemy from position to position back toward Port Gibson steadily all day.
Osterhaus did not, however, move the enemy from the position occupied by him on our left until Logan's Division, of MePherson's Corps, arrived. M.Clernand, who was with the right in person, sent repeated messages to me before the arrival of Logan to send Logan's and Quinby's Divisions, of MePherson's Corps, to him.
I had been on that as well as all other parts of the field, and could not see how they could be used there to advantage. How- ever, as soon as the advance of MePherson's Corps (Logan's Di- vision) arrived, I sent one brigade to MeClernand on the right, and sent one briagde. Brig. Gen. J. E. Smith commanding, to the left. to the assistance of Osterhaus.
By the judicious disposition made of this brigade, under the im- mediate supervision of MePherson and Logan, a position was soon obtained. giving us an advantage which soon drove the enemy from
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that part of the field, to make no further stand south of Bayou Pierre.
The enemy was here repulsed with a heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. The repulse of the enemy on our left took place late in the afternoon. IIe was pursued toward Port Gibson, but night closing in, and the enemy making the appearance of an- other stand, the troops slept upon their arms until daylight.
In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated across Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, and a brigade of Logan's Division was sent to divert his attention, while a floating bridge was being built across Bayou Pierre immediately at Port Gibson. This bridge was completed, eight miles marehed by MePherson's Corps to the North Fork of Bayou Pierre, that stream bridged, and the advance of this corps commenced passing over it at 5 o'clock the following morning.
On the 3d, the enemy was pursued to Hankinson's Ferry, with slight skirmishing all day, during which we took quite a number of prisoners, mostly stragglers, from the enemy.
Finding that Grand Gulf had been evacuated, and that the ad- vance of my forces was already fifteen miles out from there, and on the road, too, they would have to take to reach either Vicksburg, Jackson, or any intermediate point on the railroad between the two places, I determined not to march them back; but taking a small escort of cavalry, some fifteen or twenty men, I went to the Gulf myself, and made the necessary arrangements for changing my base of supplies from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf.
In moving from Milliken's Bend, the 15th Army Corps, Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman commanding, was left to be the last to start. To prevent heavy reinforcements going from Vicksburg to the assistance of the Grand Gulf forces, I directed Sherman to make a demonstration on Haynes' Bluff, and to make all the show possible. From information since received from prisoners captured, this ruse succeeded admirably.
It had been my intention, up to the time of crossing the Missis- sippi River, to collect all my forces at Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores before moving, and in the meantime to detach an army corps to co-operate with General Banks on Port Hudson, and effect a junction of our forces.
About this time I received a letter from General Banks, giving his position west of the Mississippi River, and stating that he could return to Baton Rouge by May 10; that by the reduction of Port Hudson he could join me with 12,000 men.
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I learned about the same time that troops were expected at Jack- son from the Southern cities, with General Beauregard in command. To delay until May 10, and for the reduction of Port Hudson after that, the accession of 12,000 men would not leave me relatively so strong as to move promptly with what I had. Information received from day to day of the movements of the enemy also impelled me to the course pursued.
While lying at Hankinson's Ferry waiting for wagons, supplies and Sherman's Corps, which had come forward in the meantime, demonstrations were made, successfully, I believe, to induce the enemy to think that route and the one by Hall's Ferry, above, were objects of much solicitude to me. Reconnaissances were made to the west side of the Big Black to within six miles of Warrenton.
On May 7, an advance was ordered, MePherson's Corps keeping the road nearest Big Black River, to Rocky Springs, McClernand's Corps keeping the ridge road from Willow Springs, and Sherman following, with his corps divided on the two roads. All the ferries were closely guarded until our troops were well advanced. It was my intention here to hug the Big Black River as closely as possible with MeClernand's and Sherman's Corps, and get them to the rail- road at some place between Edwards Station and Bolton. MePher- son was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, and from there into Jackson, destroying the railroad, telegraph, public stores, etc., and push west to rejoin the main force. Orders were given to MePher- son accordingly. Sherman was moved forward on the Edwards Station road, crossing Fourteen-Mile Creek at Dillon's plantation ; McClernand was moved across the same creek, farther west, sending one division of his corps by the Baldwin's Ferry road as far as the river. At the crossings of Fourteen-Mile Creek both MeClernand and Sherman had considerable skirmishing with the enemy to get possession of the crossings.
McPherson met the enemy near Raymond, two brigades strong. under Gregg and Walker, on the same day ; engaged him, and, after several hours' hard fighting, drove him, with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners. Many threw down their arms and de- serted. My position at this time was with Sherman's Corps, some seven miles west of Raymond, and about the center of the army.
On the night of May 12. after orders had been given for the corps of McClernand and Sherman to march toward the railroad by parallel roads, the former in the direction of Edwards Station and the latter to a point on the railroad between Edwards Station and Bolton, the order was changed, and both were directed to move
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toward Raymond. This was in consequence of the enemy having retreated toward Jackson after his defeat at Raymond, and of in- formation that reinforcements were daily arriving at Jackson, and that Gen. Joe Johnston was hourly expected there to take command in person. I therefore determined to make sure of that place and leave no enemy in my rear.
McPherson moved on the 13th to Clinton, destroyed the railroad and telegraph, and captured some important dispatches from Gen- eral Pemberton to General Gregg, who had commanded the day before in the battle of Raymond. Sherman moved to a parallel position on the Mississippi Springs and Jackson road. McClernand moved to a point near Raymond.
The next day Sherman and McPherson moved their entire force toward Jackson. The rain fell in torrents all the night before and continued until about noon of that day, making the roads at first slippery, and then miry. Notwithstanding, the troops marched in excellent order, without straggling and in the best of spirits, about fourteen miles. and engaged the enemy about 12 m. near Jackson. McClernand occupied Clinton with one division, Mississippi Springs with another, Raymond with a third, and had his fourth division and Blair's Division, of Sherman's Corps, with a wagon train, still in the rear near New Auburn, while McArthur, with one brigade of his division, of McPherson's Corps, was moving toward Raymond on the Utica road. It was not the intention to move these forces any nearer Jackson, but to have them in a position where they would be in supporting distance if the resistance at Jackson should prove more obstinate than there seemed reason to expect.
The enemy marched out the bulk of his force on the Clinton road, and engaged McPherson's Corps, about two and one-half miles from the city. A small force of artillery and infantry took a strong position in front of Sherman, about the same distance out. By a determined advance of our skirmishers, these latter were soon driven within their rifle-pits, just outside the city. It was impossible to ascertain the strength of the enemy at this part of the line in time to justify an immediate assault; consequently McPherson's two divisions engaged the main bulk of the rebel garrison at Jackson without further aid than the moral support given them by the knowl- edge the enemy had of a force to the south side of the city and the few infantry and artillery of the enemy posted there to impede Sherman's progress. Sherman soon discovered the weakness of the enemy by sending a reconnoitering party to his right, which also had the effect of causing the enemy to retreat from this part of his
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line. A few of the artillerists, however, remained in their places, firing upon Sherman's troops until the last moment, evidently in- structed to do so, with the expectation of being captured in the end.
On entering the city it was found that the main body of the enemy had retreated north after a heavy engagement of more than two hours with McPherson's Corps, in which he (the enemy) was badly beaten. He was pursued until near night, but without fur- ther damage to him.
During that evening I learned that General Johnston, as soon as he had satisfied himself that Jackson was to be attacked, had ordered Pemberton peremptorily to march out from the direction of Vicks- burg and attack our rear. Availing myself of this information, I immediately issued orders to McClernand, and Blair of Sherman's Corps, to face their troops toward Bolton, with a view to reaching Edwards Station, marching on different roads converging near Bolton. These troops were admirably located for such a move. McPherson was ordered to retrace his steps early in the morning of the 15th on the Clinton road. Sherman was left in Jackson to de- stroy the railroads, bridges, factories, workshops, arsenals, and everything valuable for the support of the enemy. This was accom- plished in the most effectual manner.
On the afternoon of the 15th, I proceeded as far west as Clinton, through which place MePherson's Corps passed to within support- ing distance of Hovey's Division, of McClernand's Corps, which had moved that day on the same road to within one and one-half miles of Bolton.
On reaching Clinton, at 4:45 p. m., I ordered McClernand to move his command early the next morning toward Edwards Depot, marching so as to feel the enemy if he encountered him, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident he was able to defeat him: and also to order Blair to move with him.
About 5 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two men, employes on the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad, who had passed through Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to my headquar- ters. They stated Pemberton's force to consist of about eighty regiments, with ten batteries of artillery, and that the whole force was estimated by the enemy at about 25,000 men. From them I also learned the positions being taken by the enemy, and his intention of attacking our rear. I had determined to leave one division of Sher- man's Corps one day longer in Jackson, but this information deter- mined me to bring his entire command up at once, and I accordingly dispatched him, at 5:30 a. m., to move with all possible speed until
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he came up with the main force at Bolton. My dispatch reached him at 7:10 a. m., and his advance division was in motion in one hour from that time. A dispatch was sent to Blair at the same time to push forward his division in the direction of Edwards Station with all possible dispatch. McClernand was directed to establish communication between Blair and Osterhaus, of his corps, and keep it up, moving the former to the support of the latter. McPherson was ordered forward, at 5:45 a. m., to join McClernand, and Lieu- tenant Colonel Wilson, of my staff, was sent forward to communi- cate the information received, and with verbal instructions to Me- Clernand as to the disposition of his forces.
At an early hour I left for the advance, and, on arriving at the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad with the road from Raymond to Bolton, I found McPherson's advance and his pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge on the former road, that had been destroyed by the cavalry of Osterhaus' Division, that had gone into Bolton the night before. The train of Hovey's Division was at a halt, and blocked up the road from farther advance on the Vicksburg road. I ordered all quartermasters and wagonmasters to draw their teams to one side and make room for the passage of troops. McPherson was brought up by this road.
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