USA > Indiana > Greene County > Vicksburg > Indiana. Vicksburg National Military Park Commission. Indiana at Vicksburg > Part 11
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Passing to the front, I found Hovey's Division, of the 13th Army Corps, at a halt, with our skirmishers and the enemy's pickets near each other. Hovey was bringing his troops into line ready for battle, and could have brought on an engagement at any moment. The enemy had taken up a very strong position on a narrow ridge, his left resting on a height where the road makes a sharp turn to the left, approaching Vicksburg. The top of the ridge and the precip- itous hillside to the left of the road are covered by a dense forest and undergrowth. To the right of the road the timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope and into a valley, extending for a considerable distance. On the road and into the wooded ravine and hillside, Hovey's Di- vision was disposed for the attack. McPherson's two divisions-all of his corps with him on the march from Milliken's Bend, until Ran- som's Brigade arrived that day after the battle-were thrown to the right of the road (properly speaking, the enemy's rear), but I would not permit an attack to be commenced by our troops until I could hear from MeClernand, who was advancing with four divi- sions, two of them on a road intersecting the Jackson road, about one mile from where the troops above described were placed, and
Major General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, Fifteenth Corps.
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REPORT OF GENERAL GRANT.
about the center of the enemy's line; the other two divisions on a road still north, and nearly the same distance off.
I soon heard from McClernand through members of his staff and my own, whom I had sent to him early in the morning. and found that, by the nearest practicable route of communication, he was two and one-half miles distant. I sent several successive mes- sages to him to push forward with all rapidity. There had been continuous firing between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel ad- vanee, which by 11 o'clock grew into a battle. For some time this division bore the brunt of the conflict; but, finding the enemy too strong for them, at the instance of Hovey, I directed first one and then a second brigade from Crocker's Division to reinforce him. All this time Logan's Division was working upon the enemy's left and rear, and weakened his front attack most wonderfully. The troops here opposing us evidently far outnumbered ours. Expeet- ing McClernand momentarily with four divisions, including Blair's, I never felt a doubt of the result. He did not arrive, however, until the enemy had been driven from the field. after a terrible contest of hours, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded and prisoners, and a number of pieces of artillery.
It was found afterward that the Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about one mile, and to where it intersected one of the Raymond roads, turns almost to the west, down the hill and across the valley in which Logan was operating on the rear of the enemy. One brigade of Logan's Division had, un- conscious of this important fact, penetrated nearly to this road, an 1 compelled the enemy to retreat to prevent eapture. As it was, much of his artillery and Loring's Division of his army were eut off, be- sides the prisoners captured.
On the call of Hovey for more reinforcements just before the rout of the enemy commeneed, I ordered MePherson to move what troops he could by a left flank around to the enemy's front. Logan rode up at this time, and told me that if Hovey could make another dash at the enemy, he could come up from where he then was and capture the greater part of their force. I immediately rode forward and found the troops that had been so gallantly engaged for so many hours withdrawn from their advanced position, and were filling their cartridge-boxes. I direeted them to use all dispatch, and push forward as soon as possible, explaining to them the position of I ogan's Division. Proceeding still farther forward, expecting every moment to see the enemy, and reaching what had been his line, I found he was retreating.
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INDIANA AT VICKSBURG.
Arriving at the Raymond road, I saw to my left and on the next ridge, a column of troops, which proved to be Carr's Division, and McClernand with it in person; and to the left of Carr, Osterhaus' Division soon afterward appeared, with his skirmishers well in ad- vance. I sent word to Osterhaus that the enemy was in full retreat. and to push up with all haste. The situation was soon explained, after which I ordered Carr to pursue with all speed to Black River, and across it if he could, and to Osterhaus to follow. Some of Mc- Pherson's troops had already got into the road in advance; but having marched and engaged the enemy all day, they were fatigued and gave the road to Carr, who continued the pursuit until after dark, capturing a train of cars loaded with commissary and ord- nance stores and other property.
The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with Me- Clernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover his numbers. As it was, the battle of Champion's Hill, or Baker's Creek, was fought mainly by Hovey's Division, of McClernand's Corps, and Logan's and Quinby's Divisions (the latter commanded by Brig. Gen. M. M. Crocker), of MePherson's Corps.
Ransom's Brigade, of MePherson's Corps, came on to the field where the main battle had been fought immediately after the enemy had begun his retreat.
Word was sent to Sherman, at Bolton, of the result of the day's engagement, with directions to turn his corps toward Bridgeport, and to Blair to join him at this latter place.
At daylight on the 17th, the pursuit was renewed, with McCler- nand's Corps in the advance. The enemy was found strongly posted on both sides of Black River. At this point on Black River the bluffs extend to the water's edge on the west bank. On the east side is an open, cultivated bottom of nearly one mile in width, sur- rounded by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to three feet in depth and from ten to twenty feet in width, from the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the inside line of this bayou, the enemy had constructed rifle-pits, with the bayou to serve as a ditch on the outside and immediately in front of them. Carr's Division occupied the right in investing this place, and Lawler's Brigade the right of his division. After a few hours' skirmishing, Lawler discovered that by moving a portion of his brigade under cover of the river bank he could get a position from which that
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REPORT OF GENERAL GRANT.
place could be successfully assaulted, and ordered a charge accord- ingly. Notwithstanding the level ground over which a portion of his troops had to pass without cover, and the great obstacle of the ditch in front of the enemy's works, the charge was gallantly and successfully made, and in a few minutes the entire garrison, with seventeen pieces of artillery, were the trophies of this brilliant and daring movement. The enemy on the west bank of the river imme- diately set fire to the railroad bridge and retreated, thus cutting off all chance of escape for any portion of his forces remaining on the east bank.
Sherman by this time had reached Bridgeport, on Black River, above. The only pontoon train with the expedition was with him. By the morning of the 18th, he had crossed the river, and was ready to march on Walnut Hills. McClernand and McPherson built float- ing bridges during the night, and had them ready for crossing their commands by 8 a. m. of the 18th.
The march was commenced by Sherman at an early hour by the Bridgeport and Vicksburg road, turning to the right when within three and one-half miles of Vicksburg, to get possession of Walnut Hills and the Yazoo River. This was successfully accomplished be- fore the night of the 18th. McPherson crossed Big Black River above the Jackson road and came into the same road with Sherman, but to his rear. He arrived after nightfall with his advance to where Sherman turned to the right. McClernand moved by the Jackson and Vicksburg road to Mount Albans, and there turned to the left, to get into Baldwin's Ferry road. By this disposition the three army corps covered all the ground their strength would admit of, and by the morning of the 19th the investment of Vicksburg was made as complete as could be by the forces at my command.
During the day there was continuous skirmishing, and I was not without hope of carrying the enemy's works. Relying upon the demoralization of the enemy, in consequence of repeated defeats outside of Vicksburg, I ordered a general assault at 2 p. m. on this day. The 15th Army Corps, from having arrived in front of the enemy's works in time on the 18th to get a good position, were enabled to make a vigorous assault. The 13th and 17th Army Corps succeeded no farther than to gain advanced positions covered from the fire of the enemy.
The 20th and 21st were spent in perfecting communications with our supplies. Most of the troops had been marching and fighting battles for twenty days, on an average of about five days' rations
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INDIANA AT VICKSBURG.
drawn from the commissary department. Though they had not suf- fered from short rations up to this time, the want of bread to aeeom- pany the other rations was beginning to be much felt.
On the 21st, my arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being complete, I determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg by assault. There were many reasons to determine me to adopt this course. I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, reinforced by other troops from the East, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I then had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the siege.
Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and pos- sessed myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tom- bigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for cam- paigning in this latitude. I would have saved the Government sending large reinforcements, much needed elsewhere; and, finally. the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's works.
Accordingly, on the 21st, orders were issued for a general assault on the whole line, to commence at 10 a. m. on the 22d. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated the three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commeneed the assault. I had taken a commanding position near MePherson's front, and from which I could see all the ad- vancing columns from his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions, and maintained them there until night.
Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie. The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially. to be taken in that way.
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REPORT OF GENERAL GRANT.
At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works would cover.
The assault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded, but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability to ultimately succeed.
No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the 21st (22d) Iowa Volun- teers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these none returned, except the sergeant and possibly one man. The work en- tered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same tinie.
About 12 m. I received a dispatch from MeClernand that he was hard pressed at several points, in reply to which I directed him to reinforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had that were not engaged. I then rode around to Sherman and had just reached there when I received a second dispatch from MeClernand, stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of, and still held, two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag then waved over them, and asking me to have Sherman and McPher- son make a diversion in his favor. This dispatch I showed Sher- man, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on his front. I also sent an answer to MeClernand, directing him to order up Me- Arthur to his assistance, and started immediately to the position I had just left on MePherson's line, to convey to him the information from McClernand by this last dispatch, that he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching MePherson, I met a messen- ger with a third dispatch from MeClernand, of which the following is a copy :
HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS.
IN THE FIELD, NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., May 22, 1863. Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant.
GENERAL: We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur to re- enforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command at this point?
JOHN A. MOCLERNAND. Major-General. Commanding.
P. S .- I have received your dispatch. My troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to re-enforce others.
The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on
[11]
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INDIANA AT VICKSBURG.
in front of the 13th Army Corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for reinforcements, as represented in his dispatches, up to the time I left it, which was between 12 m. and 1 p. m., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubts the facts subse- quently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements. for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's Di- vision, which was all of MePherson's Corps then present but four brigades. to report to MeClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his dispatches to MePherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and resulted in the increase of our mortality list fully 50 per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.
About 3:50 p. m. I received MeClernand's fourth dispatch, as follows :
HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS May 22, 1863.
Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant.
Department of the Tennessee :
GENERAL: I have received your dispatch in regard to General Quin- by's divisioon and General McArthur's division. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed. and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by riffe-pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment. I am hard pressed.
JOHN A. MCCLERNAND. Major-General, Commanding.
The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining; no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization.
After the failure of the 22d. I determined upon a regular siege. The troops being now fully awake to the necessity of this, worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satis- factorily until July 3, when all was about ready for a final assault.
There was a great scarcity of engineer officers in the beginning. but under the skilled superintendence of Capt. F. E. Prime, of the
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REPORT OF GENERAL GRANT.
Engineer Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, of my staff, and Capt. C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer Corps, who joined this command during the siege, such practical experience was gained as would en- able any division of this army hereafter to conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular engineer officers.
On the afternoon of July 3, a letter was received from Lieuten- ant General Pemberton, commanding the Confederate forces at Vieksburg, proposing an armistice and the appointment of commis- sioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place. The cor- respondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted, resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburg at 10 a. m .. July 4, 1863, on the following terms :
The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each ; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores sufficient to last them be- yond our lines ; the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food, and thirty wagens to transport such articles as could not well be carried.
These terms I regarded more favorable to the Government than an unconditional surrender. It saved us the transportation of them North, which at that time would have been very difficult, owing to the limited amount of river transportation on hand. and the expense of subsisting them. It left our army free to operate against Johns- ton, who was threatening us from the direction of Jackson, and our river transportation to be used for the movement of troops to any point the exigency of the service might require.
I deem it proper to state here, in order that the correspondence may be fully understood, that after my answer to General Pember- ton's letter of the morning of the 3d, we had a personal interview on the subject of the capitulation.
The particulars and incidents of the siege will be contained in the reports of division and corps commanders, which will be for- warded as soon as received.
I brought forward during the siege, in addition to Lauman's Division and four regiments previously ordered from Memphis, (W. S.) Smith's and Kimball's Divisions, of the 16th Army Corps. and assigned Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn to command of the same.
164
INDIANA AT VICKSBURG.
On June 11, Maj. Gen. F. J. Herron's Division, from the Depart- ment of the Missouri arrived, and on the 14th two divisions of the 9th Army Corps, Maj. Gen. J. G. Parke, commanding, arrived. This increase in my force enabled me to make the investment most complete, and at the same time left me a large reserve to watch the movements of Johnston. Herron's Division was put into position on the extreme left, south of the city, and Lauman's Division was placed between Herron and McClernand. Smith's and Kimball's Divisions and Parke's Corps were sent to Haynes' Bluff. This place I had fortified on the land side, and every preparation made to resist a heavy force. Johnston erossed Big Black River with a portion of his force, and everything indicated that he would make an attack about June 25. Our position in front of Vicksburg hav- ing been made as strong against a sortie from the enemy as his works were against assault, I placed Major General Sherman in command of all the troops designated to look after Johnston. The force intended to operate against Johnston, in addition to that at Haynes' Bluff, was one division from each of the 13th, 15th and 17th Army Corps and Lauman's Division. Johnston, however, not at- tacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions, ready to move upon receipt of orders, if the assault should prove a success. His prep- arations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the 4th-two days earlier than I had fixed for the attack-Sher- man was found ready, and moved at onee with a force increased by the remainder of both the 13th and 15th Army Corps, and is at present investing Jackson, where Johnston has made a stand.
In the march from Bruinsburg to Vieksburg, covering a period of twenty days, before supplies could be obtained from Government stores, only five days' rations were issued, and three days' of these were taken in haversaeks at the start, and were soon exhausted. All other subsistence was obtained from the country through which we passed. The march was commeneed without wagons, except such as could be picked up through the country. The country was abun- dantly supplied with corn, bacon, beef and mutton. The troops enjoyed excellent health, and no army ever appeared in better spirits or felt more confident of success.
In accordance with previous instructions, Maj. Gen. S. A. Hurl- but started Col. (now Brig. Gen.) B. H. Grierson with a cavalry
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REPORT OF GENERAL GRANT,
force from La Grange, Tenn., to make a raid through the central portion of the State of Mississippi, to destroy railroads and other public property, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of the army moving to the attack on Vicksburg.
On April 17, this expedition started, and arrived at Baton Rouge on May 2, having successfully traversed the whole State of Mississippi. This expedition was skillfully conducted, and reflects great credit on Colonel Grierson and all of his command. The no- tice given this raid by the Southern press confirms our estimate of its importance. It has been one of the most brilliant cavalry ex- ploits of the war, and will be handed down in history as an example to be imitated. Colonel Grierson's report is herewith transmitted.
I cannot close this report without an expression of thankfulness for my good fortune in being placed in co-operation with an officer of the navy who accords to every move that seems for the interest and suecess of our arms his hearty and energetic support. Admiral Porter and the very efficient officers under him have ever shown the greatest readiness in their co-operation, no matter what was to be done or what risk to be taken, either by their men or their vessels. Without this prompt and cordial support, my movements would have been much embarrassed, if not wholly defeated.
Capt. J. W. Shirk, commanding the Tuscumbia, was especially active, and deserving of the highest commendation for his personal attention to the repairing of the damage done our transports by the Vicksburg batteries.
The result of this campaign has been the defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburg and its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, among whom were fifteen general officers; at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilgh- man and Green, and hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of strag- glers, who can never be collected and reorganized. Arms and muni- tions of war for an army of 60,000 men have fallen into our hands, besides a large amount of other public property, consisting of rail- roads, locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, etc., and much was de- stroved to prevent our capturing it.
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INDIANA AT VICKSBURG.
. Our loss in the series of battles may be summed up as follows :
Killed. 130
718
5
Port Gibson
Fourteen-Mile Creek (skirmish )
69
341
32
Raymond
40
240
6
Jackson
426
1,842
189
Champion's Hill
29
242
2
Vicksburg
545
3,688
303
Note: See general summary, page 172.
Of the wounded, many were but slightly wounded and continued on duty ; many more required but a few days or weeks for their recovery. Not more than one-half of the wounded were perma- nently disabled.
My personal staff and chiefs of departments have in all cases rendered prompt and efficient service.
In all former reports I have failed to make mention of Company A, Fourth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Cavalry, Capt. E. D. Os- band commanding. This company has been on duty with me as an escort company sinee November, 1861, and in every engagement I have been in since that time rendered valuable service, attracting general attention for their exemplary conduct, soldierly bearing and promptness. It would not be overstating the merits of this company to say that many of them would fill with credit any posi- tion in a cavalry regiment.
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