USA > Kentucky > History of the 3d, 7th, 8th and l2th Kentucky C.S.A > Part 12
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General Buford, who commanded the division which did nearly all the fighting, said: "During the night of the 13th I received orders to bring up my division to the cross-roads by daylight next morning, about a mile and a half from Harrisburg; the troops were then formed for the attack, Mabry's brigade on the left of the road from Pontotoc to Tupelo, the Kentucky brigade on the right, and Bell's brigade im- mediately in the rear of Mabry's brigade as a support. Roddey's division was formed on the right of the Kentucky brigade; Chalmers' division and Lyon's division as reserves."
Colonel Crossland, who commanded the Kentuckians, said : "About 7 o'clock my brigade was formed in line on the right of the road, Mabry's brigade being on my left and Roddey's division on my right. I was ordered to move forward to the attack."
Colonel A. R. Shacklett, who commanded the Eighth Kentucky, said: "When we had moved within eight hundred yards of the enemy's works we were ordered to charge through an open field."
Major Thomas S. Tate, who commanded the Twelfth Kentucky after Colonel Faulkner fell, after giving the preliminaries of the bat- tle, said: "We then moved forward with the brigade; very soon our advanced skirmishers became warmly engaged, and the whole brigade moved forward at a double-quick. Colonel Faulkner ordered his bugler to sound the charge."
Captain J. T. Cochran, who commanded the Seventh Kentucky after Colonel Sherrell and Major Hale fell, in reporting the prepara- tions for the attack, said: "After passing through several fields and skirts of woods the enemy was discovered in position behind breast- works, upon seeing which the ardor of the men was such that they could not be restrained ; they raised a yell and charged them,"
Captain Ridgeway, who commanded the Third Kentucky a por- tion of the time, said: "On the morning of the 14th the regiment
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
moved forward with the brigade and attacked the enemy at Harris- burg, making a charge across an open field of half a mile in width."
Colonel Hinchie M. Mabry, who commanded the brigade on the left of the Kentuckians, said: "On the 14th my command was placed on the left of General Buford's division and formed part of the first line of attack. In his (the enemy's) front were large open fields, the ground was gentle and undulating, affording no protection for our troops on any part of the line. A most terrific fire of small arms opened upon me when we were within about three hundred yards of the works, and I immediately ordered a charge."
General Bell, who commanded a brigade in Buford's division, said : My brigade marched out before the enemy just in the rear of Mabry's, which was temporarily attached to the second (Buford's) division, and which, after fighting for some time in front of the enemy's fortifica- tions returned, leaving my brigade to take its place."
General James R. Chalmers, who commanded one of the divisions, held in reserve, said: "I was ordered to move up my division, dis- mounted, and did so, marching my men about two miles. The men were placed in reserve, and soon after we had obtained our position, the line in front advanced to the attack, and while moving received three different orders-from General Forrest to support Roddey ; from General Lee to support Mabry, and from General Buford to support his center. General Forrest being my immediate commander, I obeyed him and moved to the right."
I presume it will never be known why General Chalmers was ordered from the rear of the Kentucky Brigade, at a time when it was being slaughtered, to support a division that never fired a gun in the battle. From the foregoing it can be readily perceived that when the front line moved forward the attack in a straight line extended from north to south, the Kentuckians in the center; that they would strike the apex or the front of the circle of the Federal position, and would, therefore, necessarily come in range of the Federal fire first, and when they marched out of the woods into the open space in front of the Federal position they attracted their fire first; and it must be borne in mind that there was no time indicated when the battle should begin, nor were there any arrangements for a signal to commence marching. The lines were simply moved forward, and everybody understood that it was for the purpose of engaging the enemy in battle ; therefore, when the Kentuckians were marched under fire of the enemy, it was natural for these veterans to suppose the general in charge had everything ready for an immediate engagement. They could not afford to halt or retire, and it had been the custom of the brigade to always advance, under fire, double-quick; and at this point Major Tate says that Colonel Faulkner, the gallant commander of the Twelfth, ordered his buglers to sound the charge. Whether it was that bugle or a general impulse, the whole brigade started forward in their charge to death to so many.
I presume no one who pretends to believe that the Kentuckians permitted their ardor to get away with their judgment, and there-
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BATTLE FIELD OF HARRISBURG, MISS., JULY 14, 1864.
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BATTLE OF HARRISBURG, MISS.
fore brought this terrible disaster upon themselves, will pretend to set up a contention that the Kentuckians did not have a right to suppose that the whole line was advancing with the center, where the Ken- tuckians were. Is it natural that they could have thought for a moment that the commanding generals were not in readiness to bring on the general engagement at that moment? There are no contentions that there was any sort of understanding that the line was to march to a certain point and halt for re-alignment, but, on the contrary, every- thing indicated that the arrangements were all made to make the at- tack; Colonel Faulkner certainly thought so when he had his bugles to sound the charge. As well aligned and in as good order as trained veterans ever made a running charge, the Kentuckians dashed across an open space of perhaps five hundred yards and up to within sixty or eighty yards of the Federal works; then they halted and opened fire on the Federals, and on that position the whole Federal army con- centrated their fire. From that advanced position we could look across an open field to our right and rear and see Roddey's command stand- ing, making no effort to advance. There was a ridge running at right angles to the left of our line which cut off our view of Mabry's brigade. Both Chalmers' cavalry and Lyon's infantry divisions were held in reserve, but we could see no indications of their coming to the assist- ance of the Kentuckians; yet Crossland's men were unwilling to give up the unequal contest. They arose from their place and made another dash against the Federal works, but to be hurled back by such a withering fire as no human being could withstand; and then they were finally ordered to retire by Colonel Crossland. They left forty-five per cent of their numbers on the field, and, strange to contemplate, no assistance was sent to them while retiring from that field of carnage. And when the Federals moved out of their works to pursue the shat- tered Kentuckians they had to turn and meet the enemy again them- selves. In the meantime, Chalmers was marching and counter-marching his division awaiting orders.
With my knowledge of the battle as an eye witness and the light that has been thrown upon it by officers in charge, I am forced to the conclusion that the movement of the Confederates was a medley of blunders from the first move in the morning of the 14th to the last move on the evening of the 15th. In the first place, it was perfectly ridiculous to permit an invading army to select their own battleground and fight him in his works with such inferior numbers, and making the attack in front, just where the enemy desired it should be, when he had two vulnerable flanks.
General Buford, the grand old man who contributed so much to the fame of Forrest's command, and whom writers of history have treated with so little consideration, advised a flank attack. It was demonstrated during the battle and by subsequent events, that Buford had a clearer conception of the situation than any of them.
That there were wretched mistakes made in the handling of the Confederate forces in that battle, all agree, and of late years efforts have been made to shift the responsibility from one shoulder to an-
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
other. The often-repeated assertion that the Kentuckians brought this slaughter upon themselves by their own fool-hardiness can be easily refuted, and if it were a fact that the Kentuckians permitted their ardor to rush their part of the line in advance of the other, that would have furnished no reason why the other part of the line should be brought to a standstill, and thereby permit the fire of the whole Fed- eral army to concentrate on them; nor is it any excuse for permitting the reserve to remain inactive while the Kentuckians were cut down, and after they were disabled, or rather swept from the field, the medley of mistakes was kept up by continuing the fight by brigades, one at a time, till they had been moved over the same ground, first Mabry, then Bell, who was followed by Rucker, and later by parts of Chalmers' command, seemingly without any concert of action, and while all this bloody work was going on on the left of the Confederate line, Roddey's division remained inactive on the right, and Lyon's infantry was never moved to the front and did not fire a shot. I have never heard it said that those other brigades, who suffered so severely, went in on their own accord, one at a time. I have very high regard for General Stephen D. Lee, and know that he rendered brilliant services to the Confederacy, and I know General Forrest was one of the greatest geniuses developed during our war; but the fact still remains-there was a blunder made at Harrisburg, Miss.
OLD TOWN CREEK.
When the battle of Harrisburg was over the Kentucky regiments fell back on the Pontotoc road about one mile and remained in line all the afternoon, expecting an attack. A little after dark they were ordered to mount and move to the right, taking a position south of Harrisburg and Tupelo on the Verona road. While taking position across the highway heavy firing was going on in their front; they learned afterward that it was Rucker's brigade engaging the enemy. From the position the commanding officer was placing his troops, he certainly was expecting the Federals would attempt to continue his movement south. The command remained in this position until the following morning ; at an early hour an advance was ordered and was soon engaged with the enemy, pressing them back slowly. Just at this point, General Smith says, in his report: "On the morning of the 15th it became a matter of necessity to return. I directed Colonel Moore, commanding the Third division, to withdraw his line and take the advance and proceed on the Ellistown road, moving very slowly, the train to follow with the sick and wounded. General Mower and the remainder of the cavalry covering the withdrawal. On reaching Old Town creek we encamped for the night."
At about 2 on the evening of the 15th it was learned that the Federals were retreating from Harrisburg. General Buford mounted his division and commenced a rapid and vigorous pursuit, coming upon a heavy force of Smith's army at Old Town creek about five miles north of Tupelo. Buford's division was mounted and advancing on a narrow road with thick woods on either side and the underbush was
COL. H. S. HALE.
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BATTLE OF HARRISBURG, MISS.
so dense it was impossible to ride through them; it fact it was diffi- cult for a man on foot to make his way. The men were dismounted and as best they could formed lines in those dense woods and under a withering fire from a well posted line of the enemy's infantry. As soon as dismounted and formed into line, the Confederates advanced on the enemy's position and soon became engaged in one of the fiercest engagements any of Forrest's command was in during the war. Not more than seven hundred men, under Buford, was contending against four thousand of the enemy, in a well selected position. Here Cross- land, the Kentucky brigade commander, received another serious wound. Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. Sherrill, of the Seventh Kentucky, lost his life; Major H. S. Hale, of the same regiment, received a wound that was thought to be fatal at the time, though he did finally recover after hovering between life and death for a long while. To- gether with the officers mentioned a number of other Kentuckians fell on the ill-fated field. The writer received a wound in the knee in this engagement, which is a constant reminder of what occurred there. General Forrest received a painful wound in this engagement. The following morning the enemy continued to make their way back toward Memphis, pursued by a portion of Forrest's command.
In his report Forrest says: "Three of my brigade commanders, Rucker, McCulloch and Crossland, were severely wounded, and all the colonels were either killed or wounded."
Crossland says in his report: "The action of the 14th was the most severe and destructive ever encountered by the troops of this brigade, who were veterans in the service. Their loss was unprece- dented. Nobly every man did his duty; not one failed to respond. There were no laggards or cowards." Crossland further reported that he lost forty-six per cent of his men, either killed or wounded. "The loss in Crossland's brigade was not often surpassed during the war, and then only in those long continuous engagements which occupied one or more days; but in no battle of the war, which lasted no longer than an hour and a half (the time the troops were engaged at Harris- burg) was there such great loss." (Life of General N. B. Forrest.)
General Buford's report of those engagements cover the main points well, a large part of which is as follows:
Report of Brigadier-General Abraham Buford, C. S. Army, com- manding Second Division.
"HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, FORREST'S CAVALRY,
"Egypt, Miss., July 22, 1864.
"I have the honor to sumbit the following report of the operations of my division during the late engagement in and around Tupelo :
"My division was composed of Lyon's brigade, comprising the Third, Seventh, Eighth and Faulkner's Kentucky Regiments, nine hundred strong; Bell's brigade, comprising the Second, Fifteenth and Sixteenth and Newsom's Tennessee Regiments, one thousand three hundred strong; and Mabry's brigade, temporarily attached to the divi-
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
sion, comprising the Sixth and Thirty-eighth Mississippi, Fourth Mississippi and Fourteenth Confederate Regiments, one thousand strong ; in all, three thousand two hundred effective men.
"On the 7th of July I was ordered to send Bell's brigade to Ellis- town. He accordingly moved at 5 o'clock the morning of the 8th for that point, and guarded the approach from Ripley via Ellistown to Tupelo.
"On the morning of the 9th, by order of Major-General Forrest, I moved from Tupelo to Ellistown with the Kentucky brigade, Briga- dier-General Lyon commanding. At this point I was joined by Colonel H. P. Mabry with this brigade of Mississipians, who had moved from Saltillo. Learning from scouts that the enemy were not advancing on Ripley and Ellistown road, but on the road from Ripley via New Albany to Pontotoc, I moved my division to the latter place, marching all night, halting about daylight two miles from Pontotoc. I received during the day several orders directing me to develop the enemy's strength, not to bring on a general engagement, but keep in the enemy's front and on his flanks and gradually fall back to Okolona. I accord- ingly made dispositions to carry out these orders. I sent a regiment of Mabry's brigade, Colonel Isham Harrison commanding, accom- panied by a staff officer, toward Plentytude, on the Plentytude and Chesterville road. I ordered Colonel Bell to send the Second Ten- nessee, Colonel Barteau commanding, in the direction of New Albany. I had hardly made these dispositions, and was preparing to make others, when, at 7:30 in the morning on the 10th of July, I received an order from Major-General Forrest to get on the Chesterville road if I could, and join the command at Okolona, and to send a squadron of one hundred good men in rear of the enemy to cut off his communica- tions, and so forth. I immediately detached one hundred picked men, under Captain Tyler, Company A, Faulkner's (Kentucky) regiment, to proceed to the rear of the enemy, and carry out the instructions I had received. For the operation of this squadron I refer to the report of Captain Tyler, herewith forwarded. About 9 in the morning I was joined at Pontotoc by McCulloch's brigade, of Chalmers' division.
"I left Pontotoc about I a.m. Sunday, 10th of July, and marched to a strong position on a creek five or six miles from the town, leav- ing McCulloch's brigade at Pontotoc and Barteau's regiment (Second Tennessee) on the Pontotoc and New Albany road to skirmish with the enemy and gradually fall back. During the day I received orders to report to Brigadier-General Chalmers, who had been fully instructed by the major-general commanding, and to co-operate with him. I did so.
"The enemy made his appearance Monday morning, 11th instant, in Pontotoc. His force consisted of thirteen thousand infantry (in- cluding one brigade of negroes), two thousand five hundred cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of artillery, under command of Major-General A. J. Smith. This force was admirably equipped, commanded by an officer of experience and skill, and moved with great caution, always prepared. Colonel McCulloch's brigade and Colonel Barteau's regi-
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BATTLE OF HARRISBURG, MISS.
ment were gradually driven, and fell back three miles on the Pontotoc and Okolona road. Dispositions were made to hold the enemy in check. "On Tuesday morning the enemy advanced and Lyon's brigade met them. The enemy's cavalry dismounted and moved against the position taken in the road by this brigade, but were handsomely re- pulsed. Tuesday night Generals Lee and Forrest arrived on the field, bringing with them the entire force of infantry and dismounted cav- alry. I reported to them all the information in my knowledge and the fact that up to that time I had discovered no evidence of the demoral- ized condition of the enemy, but had found him ever ready for action.
"On Wednesday it was discovered that the enemy had left Ponto- toc that morning and was marching on Tupelo. I was immediately ordered to move on his flank on the Pontotoc and Carmargo Ferry road, known as the Chauappa Valley road, leading via Doctor Cal- houn's house to Verona. I did so, moving on his right flank, Colonel Bell's brigade in advance. General Lyon was relieved from his brigade and ordered to take command of the division of infantry. The com- mand of the Kentucky brigade then developed on Colonel Crossland, Seventh Kentucky Regiment. General Forrest, with Mabry's brigade, followed immediately in the rear of the enemy. About 5 o'clock Wed- nesday evening (13th) under the order of Lieutenant-General Lee, with Bell's brigade and a section of artillery from Morton's battery, I attacked the enemy on his right flank during the march. At no time had I found the enemy unprepared. He marched with his column well closed up, his wagon train well protected, and his flanks covered in an admirable manner, evincing at all times a readiness to meet any attack, and showing careful generalship. After fighting him about an hour, suffering considerable loss, the enemy , was heavily reinforced and I was compelled to withdraw the brigade from action. They fell back and re-formed across a creek. The Kentucky brigade having by this time arrived at the scene of action, I formed the two brigades to repel any attack that might be made, but the enemy being pushed in the rear, moved on to Harrisburg. I followed him to within two miles of that place, when I joined General Forrest at the intersection of the Harrisburg and Verona and the Pontotoc and Tupelo roads. The enemy formed his line at Harrisburg, where he had a strong, natural position, and during the night threw up a line of fortifications and awaited an attack from us. I camped for the night, throwing the Ken- tucky brigade forward on picket.
"During the night I received orders to bring up my division to the cross-roads by daylight next morning, about a mile and a half from Harrisburg. The troops were there formed for the attack, Mabry's brigade on the left of the road from Pontotoc to Tupelo, the Kentucky brigade on the right, and Bell's brigade immediately in rear of Mabry's brigade as a support. Brigadier-General Roddey's division was formed on the right of the Kentucky brigade. Chalmers' division of cavalry and Lyon's division of infantry were held as reserves. About 7 p.m. I was ordered to move forward to the attack, when I modestly ex- pressed the opinion that the attack should not be a direct one, but the
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
majority of the forces should be thrown on the Verona and Tupelo road, and a vigorous assault made on his left flank ; that a direct charge was what the enemy most desired, and for which he was strongly posted both by nature and art. The ground moved over was open timber intersected by hills and ravines. In moving forward the Ken- tucky brigade obliqued to the right, in order to connect with Roddey's division, Mabry's brigade obliqued to the left. Observing these in- tervals, I reported the fact to General Lee, who immediately ordered Colonel Bell to move forward and form between Mabry's and Cross- land's brigades. The accompanying plan will show the disposition of my division for the attack. Immediately in front of the enemy's position, which was on elevated ground commanding the entire ap- proach, the country was open, there being no timber in front for a distance of one hundred or two hundred yards at different points of his line. The enemy's skirmishers were driven in. When the Kentucky brigade arrived at the edge of the timber, discovering the enemy's posi- tions, raising a shout, they charged his line of works. The enemy re- served his fire until our men were in close range, and poured upon them a galling fire. They continued, however, to advance. The en- emy's artillery was fired with great rapidity, charged with canister, upon our advancing columns. Perceiving that the force on our ex- treme right (Roddey's) did not advance, the enemy turned the fire of his batteries posted on an elevation in Roddey's front, on the ad- vancing Kentuckians, and they, under a galling fire of musketry and artillery both in front and obliquely from the enemy in Roddey's front, were compelled to fall back. They had advanced, however, to the enemy's intrenchments. Some fell and were taken prisoners within his lines, and several within thirty steps of his breastworks. Colonel Faulkner's horse was killed within sixty steps under him. The loss was very severe in this charge, and it was only under a fire that dealt death on every side and decimated their ranks fully one-third that they were forced to fall back. Mabrey's and Bell's brigade advanced to within close musket range and engaged the enemy. Approaching grad- ually they poured a very destructive fire upon his line. Arriving at the open space and having to cross a cornfield, they slowly ad- vanced, but so deadly was the concentrated fire that, after penetrating some fifty steps, they retired to the cover of timber, where they kept up a heavy and continual fire upon the enemy for three hours, deal- ing destruction in his ranks. General Chalmers' division was ordered forward to relieve my command, and I was directed to fall back and hold my command immediately in rear of the position where the first line of batttle was formed. During the night I was ordered to mount Bell's brigade and station it at Doctor Calhoun's house, to be in readi- ness to oppose the enemy if an advance was made toward Verona, and the Kentucky brigade to be thrown between the enemy and Doctor Calhoun's house. I was further ordered to send a mounted regiment from Mabry's brigade through Harrisburg, to ascertain what the en- emy was doing, while the remainder of that brigade was left in its original position. I made the dispositions required by these orders,
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