USA > Kentucky > History of the 3d, 7th, 8th and l2th Kentucky C.S.A > Part 16
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
General Armstrong, coming to the assistance of the Kentuckians, the Federals were put to flight. Colonel Crossland, who had not en- tirely recovered from a wound received at Harrisburg, or rather at Old Town creek, received another painful wound here, and the brig- ade was, therefore deprived of his valuable services during the cam- paign. Colonel Faulkner, of the Twelfth Kentucky, being the next ranking officer, assumed command of the brigade, moving on through Lawrenceburg toward Pulaski. At Campbellsville they encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry, which was driven back after a vigorous engagement. Nearly all of Forrest's command on the 24th reached Columbia, which was occupied by a considerable Federal army. Gen- eral Forrest proceeded to invest it, and held them in that position until General Hood's main body arrived, which was on the 27th; they at once relieved the cavalry.
General Forrest then threw his force across Duck River, some crossing at Carr's Mill, others at Holland's Ford, and still others at Owen's Ford. This movement was made to gain the rear of the Federal army, which was falling back from Columbia. After getting his command together on the north side of Duck River, General Forrest moved rapidly toward Spring Hill. Two miles from town the enemy's pickets were encountered. The Kentucky brigade, together with some other troops, were formed, and a charge was made on horseback, but the enemy was found so strongly posted upon the crest of a hill that the troopers could not move them. The entire command was dismounted and moved upon their lines. It was then discovered that the Confederates were confronting the advance of the Federal army, falling back from Columbia. General Forrest says : "About this time I received orders from General Hood to hold my posi- tion at all hazards, as the advance of his infantry column was only two miles distant and rapidly advancing."
General Buford's division again charged the enemy and drove them back. General Jackson's division was formed across the pike and succeeded in holding the enemy in check nearly all night. A large part of General Hood's infantry was marched up to within sight of the pike on which the Federals had to fall back. Hood's army halted and remained there all night, without making any effort to assist Forrest in obstructing the enemy's retreat. There have been charges and counter-charges between Confederate officers as to whom was responsible for that vital blunder. This was the opportune moment to crown the campaign with any show of success. General Hood, who was on the ground and should have known perfectly the condition of things, had sent a message to Forrest, who was across the enemy's path fighting desperately to hold him back until Hood could get there with his army which, he said, at sundown, was only two miles away. That infantry did come up to almost within rifle-shot of the pike over which the Federals must travel, and remained there all night, per- mitting the Federal army to march past them and put themselves in the strongly constructed works at Franklin.
On the morning of the 30th Forrest put his men in motion after
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HOOD'S CAMPAIGN TO NASHVILLE.
the enemy on their way to Franklin. Buford and Jackson were ordered to move on the Franklin pike and press the enemy. On Winstead's Hill, some two miles south of Franklin, they found the enemy well posted. General Stewart's corps arriving on the ground, General Forrest moved with Buford's and Jackson's divisions to the right, their right extending to Harpeth River. General Chalmers was ordered to take a position with his division, on the left of the infantry; General Jackson was ordered to cross the Harpeth River with his division and dislodge the enemy from a commanding position from which they were firing with effect upon Forrest's command. In his report General Forrest says: "I ordered Brigadier-General Buford to dismount his command and take position in line of battle on the right of Stewart's corps, covering the ground from Lewisburg pike to Harpeth River." At this point, the writer remembers, a heavy line of skirmishers was thrown out in front of the Kentuckians, who engaged the enemy in a brisk skirmish for quite a while, at the same time moving obliquely to the right, giving room for the infantry to form on their left. Finally, when they did take a position on the right of the infantry, it so hap- pened that the Kentuckians were on the immediate line with the brig- ade of Scotts', who, as colonel of the Twelfth Louisiana, had brigaded with the Kentuckians before they were mounted, and the Twelfth Louisiana was now formed, touching the Kentuckians. Each having confidence in the other, it had a tendency to inspire confidence in suc- cess.
In a little while after the line commenced moving forward a line of the enemy was developed in front of Buford's command. A charge was ordered and the enemy was driven across the river after a hot contest. The infantry of the Federal army had now taken position in their strong works in front of Franklin, and General Hood at once commenced making arrangements to assault them. When Forrest ascertained the intentions of General Hood, Colonel D. C. Kelley says that he (Forrest) proposed to Hood that if he would give him one strong division of infantry, with his cavalry he would agree to flank the Federals from their works within two hours. This was the only sensible thing to be done, and this was another of the lost opportuni- ties that presented themselves to Hood, of which he did not avail him- self, that would have given him some chance of success. If Hood had marched around Thomas at Franklin, there was nothing to prevent his marching into Nashville; or if Thomas had marched out of his works at Franklin as soon as he learned that he was being flanked, which in all probability he would have done, in that event the two armies would have been upon an equality in an open field. If Thomas chose to fight, Hood would have had the advantage, and an equal chance of reaching Nashville ahead of Thomas ; but Hood did not have the sagac- ity to embrace the opportunity that was so patent to every military man of his command.
Between 3 and 4 o'clock of the fateful afternoon of the 30th day of November, 1864, General Hood moved his army to the assault; from then until after dark one of the bloodiest battles of the war was
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
fought out on the banks of the Harpeth. Perhaps in no other battle on Southern soil, or since civilization dawned, was there more heroism displayed. We have failed to find in the pages of history an account of an engagement where officers led their men more courageously or the rank and file fought more determinedly. General Hood says in his report : "Our loss in killed, wounded and prisoners was forty-five hundred. Among the killed were Major-General P. R. Clayburn, Brigadier-Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl and Cranbury. Major- General Brown, Brigadier-Generals Carter, Manigualt, Quarles, Cock- rell and Scott were wounded and Brigadier-General Gordon captured."
Cleburn and Adams fell on the enemy's breastworks; the dash- ing Gordon dashed over the works and was captured while engaging the enemy in a hand-to-hand fight. The ditch in front of the Federal works was filled with the hundreds who bravely offered up their lives on that useless field of carnage. The Confederates succeeded in effect- ing an entrance at some points and held their position until a late hour in the morning, at which time the Federals withdrew.
Here fell four thousand heroes, whose unexcelled bravery at Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta and numerous other places made their names immortal. In some instances whole regi- ments were almost eliminated in that slaughter. The army that Gen- eral Hood crossed the Tennessee River with, worn and reduced in num- bers as it was from long service and many hard-fought battles, would have been, well handled, extremely dangerous to the Federals in that section; but the ill-advised Franklin engagement rendered it power- less for good to the Confederacy or hurtful to the Federals.
Early in the morning of December Ist, Forrest moved across the Harpeth River, and General Buford, with the Kentuckians, advanced on the Wilson pike and struck a strong force of the enemy at Owen's Cross-Roads. Morton's battery was put into position and opened up on them. Buford ordered the Kentucky brigade to charge; the enemy was dislodged and driven back. The command continued in the direc- tion of Nashville, driving everything before them, and went into camp for the night on the Nashville pike.
On the morning of the 2d we moved again in the direction of Nashville, and took a position in the outskirts of the city; moved from there to the right and took a position on the Murfreesboro pike. As soon as the infantry came up and took the place of the cavalry around Nashville, the Kentuckians were put in operation against some block- houses. Blockhouse No. 2 refused to surrender, and Morton's bat- tery was put in action on it at short range and which did considerable execution. This was late in the afternoon and during the night some of the Federals made their escape from it, as General Buford thought, through the carelessness of Colonel Faulkner, who was in command of the brigade. Faulkner was ordered under arrest and Colonel Shacklett, of the Eighth Kentucky, assumed command of the brigade. Several blockhouses were captured on the 4th and 5th. General Forrest, with Buford's and Jackson's divisions and Major-General Bates' division of infantry, was directed to move against Murfreesboro. Forrest's re-
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HOOD'S CAMPAIGN TO NASHVILLE.
port says : "I ordered Brigadier-General Jackson to send a brigade across to Wilkinson pike and, moving on both pikes, the enemy was driven into his works at Murfreesboro. After ordering General Bu- ford to picket from Nashville and Murfreesboro to the Lebanon pike on the left and Jackson to picket on the right to the Salem pike, I encamped for the night."
Just before this the rain had turned into a snow and the weather was extremely cold. Numbers of the infantry were barefooted and clad in old tattered clothing; their sufferings must have been terrible. The writer remembers that he was clad in good clothing, including overcoat and boots, and he suffered no little on the march and camp- ing out in the snow. The infantry of Hood's army must have pos- sessed the highest order of patriotism, or they would not have under- gone the hardships and suffering they did that winter.
The infantry joined Forrest on the 6th, and they were put into position about three miles north of Murfreesboro, where they re- mained during the night. I quote again from Forrest's report: "On the morning of the 7th I discovered, from the position occupied by Colonel Palmer, the enemy moving out in strong force on the Salem pike, with infantry, cavalry and artillery. Being fully satisfied that his object was to make battle, I withdrew my forces to the Wilkinson pike and formed a new line in a more favorable position. The enemy moved boldly forward, driving in my pickets, when the infantry, with the exception of Smith's brigade, from some cause which I cannot explain, made a shameful retreat, losing two pieces of artillery."
While the foregoing was taking place in front General Buford moved his division around to the left and succeeded in pushing his command into town, expecting the infantry to assist him by pushing the enemy in front, but when they gave way in such a shameful man- ner, the whole forces of the enemy turned on Buford and forced him back. On the IIth, General Buford was ordered to move his command to the Hermitage and throw pickets out to the Cumberland River and protect the right flank of Hood's army. The infantry destroyed the railroad from Murfreesboro to near Nashville. The Kentuckians re- mained in camp near the Hermitage until in the night of the 16th, when they were informed of the disaster of Hood's army in an engagement around Nashville. It is not the writers intention to go into details of that most unfortunate engagement. The reader will remember that General Hood took a position with his army circling the city on the south, on the 4th and 5th of December, and remained there long enough for Thomas to collect an overwhelming army and make all arrange- ments to drive Hood from the State. At the time Hood should have known that Thomas was ready to attack him, he sent Forrest, his strong right arm, with the major part of his command, together with Bates' infantry, away to Murfreesboro, outside of striking distance, when the crisis came. Those half-clad, weather-worn, battle-scarred veterans, under Hood, put up a manful fight against overwhelming numbers of a well-equipped adversary, and if Forrest, Buford and Bates had been there it is a question whether or not Hood's lines could
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
have been broken by the force then engaging them. As it was, the disaster was complete, and the wonder is that a remnant of the old Army of the Tennessee was saved from total destruction.
Some time in the early part of the night of the 16th the Ken- tuckians commenced moving rapidly in the direction of the Nashville and Franklin pike for the purpose of throwing themselves in front of the Federals, then pressing Hood's fleeing army, striking that pike just north of Franklin, and just in time to prevent an onslaught of the enemy on the rear of Hood's command. When the head of the column of the Kentucky brigade struck the pike they turned in the direction of Franklin. They had only gone a short distance when they came to a body of Confederate infantry formed in line on a ridge on the side of the pike on which the Kentuckians were march- ing. In a few moments firing was heard in the rear. They moved past the infantry and commenced forming on the left of the road, on line with what we then learned was a portion of Stephen D. Lee's com- mand. When the Federals came in range the infantry opened on them a brisk fire, which drove the enemy back. The infantry then withdrew, moving back toward Franklin. The Kentucky brigade re- mained in position for a short time, when a column of Federal cavalry made a dash at them. A hand-to-hand conflict ensued. The Federals were driven back and the Kentuckians withdrew, crossing Harpeth River and passing through Franklin. Some two or three miles south of Franklin, on the Columbia pike, the Confederates formed again, and the Federals attacked vigorously; the engagement continued into the night. Resting part of the latter portion of the night, the following morning (18th) the command fell back to the south side of Rutherford creek, which was a small stream and ordinarily would not be any impediment to travel, but owing to recent heavy rains it was bank full and could not therefore be easily crossed.
The Federals were held in check at this point at least twenty-four hours, giving the Confederates time to cross to the south side of Duck River.
General Forrest was ordered by General Hood to take charge of the rear guard and cover Hood's retreat to his best ability to the Ten- nessee River. Some infantry commands were turned over to him to assist the cavalry. In the report of General Thomas, the commander of the Federal army, we find this: "Forrest and his cavalry and such other detachments as had been sent off from his main army, joined Hood at Columbia. He had formed a powerful rear guard, number- ing about four thousand infantry and all his available cavalry. With the exception of this rear guard his (Hood's) army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause, to put an end to their sufferings. The rear guard, however, was un- daunted and firm and did its work bravely to the end."
As soon as Forrest could throw his command in front of the vic- torious pressing Federals, he taught them to respect him. In his report General Forrest says : "On the 20th, Hood, on leaving Colum-
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HOOD'S CAMPAIGN TO NASHVILLE.
bia, gave me orders to hold the town as long as possible, and when compelled to retire to move in the direction of Florence, Ala., via Pulaski, protecting and guarding his rear. To aid me in this object he ordered Major-General Walthall to report to me with about nine- teen hundred infantry, four hundred of whom were unserviceable for want of shoes. The enemy appeared in front of Columbia on the even- ing of the twentieth and commenced a furious shelling upon the town. Under a flag of truce I proceeded to the river and asked an interview with General Hatch, whom I informed by verbal communication, across the river, that there were no Confederate troops in town and that his shelling would only result in injury to the women and children and his own wounded, after which interview the shelling was discon- tinued."
On the morning of the 22d the Federals succeeded in crossing Duck River, and the Confederates fell back in the direction of Pulaski. The Kentuckians brought up the rear. Some four or five miles out from Columbia the enemy dashed up on our rear and there was a sharp engagement. On the 23d the command went into camp in line, near Loganville. On the morning of the 24th the command advanced a short distance until they met the enemy. A considerable engagement ensued, which lasted about an hour; then the Confederates fell back to Richland creek, the Kentuckians taking position on the left. In a little while the enemy advanced upon that position and brought on an engagement which lasted for two or three hours. General Buford received a painful wound in this last engagement and was compelled to quit the field. It was such dogged, determined fighting as this that caused General Thomas to say, that "Hood's rear guard did its work bravely to the last."
On the 25th, seven miles south of Pulaski, the command was thrown into line again, and when the enemy advanced they were driven back with considerable loss; nor did they attempt to attack any more during the day. The rear guard camped Christmas night on the banks of Sugar creek. During the night the infantry threw up temporary breastworks. Early the following morning the enemy ad- vanced, and owing to a dense fog which hovered over them, they did not discover the Confederates until they were in forty or fifty yards of them. At short range the Confederates opened fire upon the enemy, which threw them back in wildest confusion. A charge was ordered, which caused a complete rout of the enemy. In his report Forrest says: "In this engagement he (the enemy) sustained a loss of about one hundred and fifty killed and wounded and about four hundred horses killed." The enemy made no further attempt at per- suit. On the evening of the 27th of December Forrest crossed his rear guard to the south bank of the Tennessee.
Forrest says in his report: "From the day I left Florence, on the 2Ist of November, to the 27th of December, my cavalry was engaged every day with the enemy. My loss in killed and wounded has been heavy."
During all the campaign the Kentucky brigade was always in the
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
forefront and was relied upon, and did do its duty under all trying circumstances. At this time all thinking people knew there was but the least hope that the Confederacy could finally succeed, but that fact made no sort of difference with the conduct of that gallant band of Kentuckians ; they were determined to do their duty to the last, if it cost them their lives.
CHAPTER XV. From Montevallo to Selma.
After crossing the Tennessee River subsequent to the Hood cam- paign, Forrest moved his command to the vicinity of Corinth, where he could get provender for his stock, the railroad having been re- paired up to that point. From the 12th of November to the 27th of December Forrest's men had been constantly marching and fighting, a large part of the time without food for themselves or feed for their horses ; the men were exhausted and the horses so jaded that they were useless. It was plain that the men and horses must have some rest before they would be in any sort of condition for service. It was therefore determined to furlough the men for twenty days, in order to give them a chance to return to their homes, get another supply of clothing and, if possible, fresh mounts. As soon as they were set at liberty the Kentucky brigade struck out for their homes in Western Kentucky, where they remained for about two weeks, basking in the smiles of their relations and friends. At the same time there were some detachments who remained in camp at various places as a lookout for those who were at home. They made some demonstra- tion in small force for the purpose of holding the Federals close to their bases, so they would not interfere with those enjoying their vacation.
At the appointed time to return to their duty, the several com- mands assembled at various designated points-Clinton, Dukedom, Dresden and other places. Finally the brigade was gotten together and ready to return, without any serious mishaps except one unfortu- nate, as well as sad, incident. Colonel W. W. Faulkner, commander of the Twelfth Kentucky, was with his men at Dresden, preparing to move south. With other recruits who had joined his command there were two McDougal brothers, one of whom had been at the head of an independent company operating in Western Kentucky, better known as guerrillas. It was said that the colonel had promised them that if they would attach themselves to his regiment they would not be put under arrest or otherwise molested for any misdoings that might have been charged against them. The regiment was drawn up in line preparatory to marching, when the colonel rode up to the Mc- Dougals and demanded the surrender of their arms. In place of giv- ing them up they drew them and commenced firing on the colonel, and did not stop until he was dead. There seems to have been no effort on the part of Faulkner's men to protect him, owing to the alleged fact that the McDougals had more friends in the regiment than had the colonel. Colonel Faulkner was a courageous, dashing soldier, but for some reason did not seem to be popular with his men.
At this time General Sherman, who at all times seems to have had a lively dread of Forrest and was constantly watching him, dis- patched to Thomas: "I suppose Forrest is again scattered to get
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HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
horses and men and to divert attention. I would like to have Forrest hunted down and killed, but doubt if we can do that as yet." Sherman seemed to have understood Forrest pretty well, but up to that time was powerless to have him handled.
At the appointed time the Kentucky brigade reported back to their chief. In the meantime Forrest had been assigned to the com- mand of a department, or district, composed of Mississippi, East Louisiana and West Tennessee. He had learned that a large cavalry force was being mobilized at Waterloo, on the Tennessee River, and it was plain that the purpose for which this command was being fitted out was to move south. While awaiting developments Forrest was busy reorganizing his troops. Decimated regiments were consolidated in order to give them something like the number of men they should have. The writer is not in possession of the roster of the consolidated Kentucky regiments, and is not, therefore, prepared to give it cor- rectly ; he remembers, however, that Colonel Ed. Crossland was made colonel; H. S. Hale, lieutenant-colonel, and Horne major of one of them. And Crossland was put in command of the brigade, and con- tinued to command it until they fired their last shot in battle.
On March 22d the Federal General Wilson, with his formidable cavalry force of fourteen thousand, commenced moving south in the direction of Selma, Ala. This was perhaps the best armed and all- around best equipped force sent out by the Federal government dur- ing the war. Owing to the fact that Forrest's territory was threatened with invasion from several points, he did not have his troops well in hand to meet Wilson's formidable force; but those he had in hand he commenced at once to put in motion to gain Wilson's front. The Ken- tuckians, under Crossland, were moved rapidly to Montevallo, in which direction Wilson's main column was headed. At about noon on March 3Ist the brigade arrived in the vicinity of Montevallo, where they found a strong force of the enemy, who had already destroyed several iron-works and other valuable property. Crossland at once threw his small command (about four hundred) in front of the enemy for the purpose of obstructing their movement south as much as possible, in order to give Forrest time to bring up his whole force
Wilson says in his report: "At I p.m., the enemy having made his appearance, Upton moved out and attacked, driving him in great confusion, taking nearly one hundred prisoners from Roddy's com- mand or Crossland's (Lyon's old) Kentucky brigade." Wilson was correct in saying that the Kentuckians were driven back, but not in confusion. For two days no small body of troops ever stood up more gamely in front of such overwhelming numbers. At no time did this gallant four hundred have less than five thousand of the enemy to con- tend with. Crossland would at times form his whole brigade, and at other times he would form by regiments. A few miles south of Waterloo he halted and threw his men in line across the road, checked the advance of the enemy, and with a portion of the command charged them, driving them back for several hundred yards. Further back, at a creek, Crossland formed his men on an elevation south of the stream
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