USA > Kentucky > History of the 3d, 7th, 8th and l2th Kentucky C.S.A > Part 6
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48
HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
his army was in position at three points on the railroad converging there; Sherman at Memphis with six thousand five hundred men ; Ord at Jackson and Bolivar with eighteen thousand, and Rosecrans at Cor- inth with twenty-three thousand, including stray outposts at Rienzi, Russellville, Jacinto and Iuka. General Van Dorn estimated that Grant's total strength was about forty-two thousand, and his own com- bined force at twenty-two thousand. So the outlook was not very encouraging for the Confederates to carry out their plans to march through West Tennessee into Kentucky in the face of an army of Federals nearly twice the size of their own, but, notwithstanding the disparity in numbers, General Van Dorn decided to move forward at once. While preparation was being made for the forward movement the Kentuckians were camped at Davis' Mills, on the Mississippi Cen- tral railroad, a few miles south of the Tennessee line, and not far south of Grand Junction. On September 26th a Federal command came out near that place; on the following night or just before day the next morning the Confederate brigade commanded by General Rust, to which the Third and Seventh Kentucky belonged, left their encamp- ment, and by forced marches attempted to get in the rear of the Fed- erals and cut them off from their army located at Boliver, Tenn., and, if possible, to effect their capture. The command marched by paths and through woods and fields in order to reach the public highway be- hind the enemy and thus cut them off from Bolivar, but on reaching this highway they met the rear of the Federal command, making their way in haste back to their base, having learned that the Confederates were making an attempt to cut them off. The Confederates struck their rear and pushed them back vigorously to within a short distance of Bolivar. This was one of the hardest forced marches the Ken- tuckians engaged in during the war, and a great many were forced to fall out of the ranks, utterly exhausted. Water was very scarce along the byways over which the Confederates were pushing the Fed- erals, and numbers of men almost famished for water.
A very laughable circumstance occurred while on that march. General Rust, the brigade commander, had just taken charge of the brigade before the march commenced, and the men had never had an opportunity of seeing him until they saw him that day. He was wear- ing citizens clothes and had very much the appearance of a country planter. There was a well at a farm house from which a number of the famished men were attempting to get water, when General Rust came up and ordered them to move on. They, taking him to be the owner of the premises, commenced to abuse him with all the epi- thets they had in their vocabulary, and it was said that they seemed abundantly supplied on that occasion; and it was a long while before the general could succeed in convincing them that he was their com- mander, and in the meantime he was in danger of bodily harm from the enraged men.
After pressing the Federals to within gun-shot distance of the fortifications around Bolivar, the Confederates returned to their camps at Davis' Mills and remained there until about October Ist, when they broke camp to march in the direction of Corinth, Miss., where they
49
BATTLE OF CORINTH.
engaged in the battle at that point on the 4th and 5th of that month. On September 19th General Price had engaged the Federals in battle at Iuka, Miss., which resulted in a drawn engagement, the Federals falling back to Corinth and Price to Baldwin.
The following letter from General Van Dorn to General Price clearly indicated for what purpose the army of Van Dorn and Price was to be united and merged into one command :
"HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI,
"Jackson, Miss., Sept. 8, 1862.
"Major-General Sterling Price, Commanding Army of the West.
"General: Your letter of September 5th has been received. I have requested Major Wright to go and confer with you in regard to the matter now claiming our attention.
"If Rosecrans has crossed the Tennessee River and got beyond our reach, do you think it would be better for us to join forces at Jack- son, Tenn., clear Western Tennessee of the enemy, and then push on together into Kentucky, along the Ohio River? We together would have a force to oppose anyone there .. If Rosecrans is much ahead of you, he could join Buell and meet Bragg before you could aid him. On the other hand, Bragg could form a junction with Smith and Mar- shall, southwest of Lexington, and defeat Buell and Rosecrans com- bined. You would not be in the contest. We, joined on the Ohio, would be between Buell's army and the forces from the west and prevent junction, or by crossing eastward from the Ohio behind, Buell could join Bragg and aid him in case of need. This is suggested in the event Rosecrans is over the river and out of reach. If he is still on this side and standing, I will join you from Holly Springs and attack him with you, push him hard with our left and force him back on the river, and prevent junction with Sherman and McClernand, who would then retire on and up the Mississippi. Rosecrans would then be disposed of. I presume, however, that he is gone.
"At all events, general, I will be in a short distance of Grand Junction in a few days, and we will confer by couriers. I will join you if needed. If you go off at once after Rosecrans, can I not take your five thousand returned prisoners with me? There will be no necessity for them behind you. With them I can put an army into the field to cope with the western troops of the enemy, and will push on and upward with the great line of advance with the same colors that wave over you and the brave troops of the Army of the West.
"However all this may turn out, I shall always be happy to be found associated with you in this noble struggle, and I pray God you may be victorious wherever you may be.
"Very truly and sincerely, general, your friend and obedient servant,
EARL VAN DORN. "Major-General."
The plan for the movement north was to attack and crush the Federal army at Corinth and then move north through West Tennessee, forcing the Federals back to the Ohio River, as indicated in General
50
HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
Van Dorn's letter to General Price. On September 25th, Price in- formed General Van Dorn that he was then ready to join his forces and make an attack on Corinth, as has been previously discussed. The consolidated armies met at Ripley and marched from there to Poca- hontas, reaching there October Ist. The attack on Corinth was to be made from the west and northwest. General Van Dorn, writing of the condition of his troops at this time, says : "No army every marched to battle with prouder steps, more hopeful countenances or with more courage than marched the army of West Tennessee out of Ripley on its way to Corinth."
On the evening of October 2d the army reached Chewalla, about ten miles from Corinth and bivouacked there for the night. Early on the morning of the 3d the army resumed its march in the direction of Corinth, Lovell's division, under whom the Kentuckians were acting, moving in front, and on the south side of Memphis and Charleston Railroad. When within about five miles of Corinth, Price's com- mand turned to the left and crossed to the north side of the above- mentioned railroad. Out about three miles from Corinth, Lovell's command struck another line of intrenchments. The division was soon formed in line of battle, fronting the intrenchments. A belt of fallen timber extended along nearly the whole line of intrenchments; this must be crossed before the Federals could be reached by a charge. The attack was commenced by Lovell's division, which was on the right of the army. General Rust's brigade was on the extreme right, and the Third Kentucky on the right of the brigade, which put them on the extreme right of the army. The Seventh Kentucky, under Colonel Crossland, was held in reserve. Colonel Thompson's regiment was not only on the extreme right, but was disconnected from the main army by a space of several hundred yards. That regiment was started forward first and commenced to attack, and was confronted by at least two regiments of Federals. The engagement soon became fierce.
In addition to the small arms, the Federals opened up a battery, firing grape and canister. Thompson pressed forward under a wither- ing fire. General Rust, seeing the unequal contest the Third was wag- ing, ordered Crossland to take the Seventh to support the Third. He says : "Officers and men seemed impatient for the order, and rushed impetuously forward, but only reached the scene of the conflict to wit- ness the flight of the enemy."
In a short time the Federal lines were broken and forced back from their outer works to the fort around the town. Late in the afternoon the Confederate line moved forward, bivouacked in line of battle in the midst of the forts and camps of the enemy and inside of an abatis which extended entirely around their exterior line of defense. On the morning of the 4th the whole division advanced in line of battle toward the fortifications of the enemy in the forts on College Hill, General Villepigue on the left, General Bowman on the right in front, and Rust, with the Kentuckians, following close in the rear as a reserve, ready to support the front line at any point where they were needed. The advance was made in this order to within a few hundred yards of several well constructed forts, which could be easily
MAJ .- GEN. MANSFIELD LOVELL.
5I
BATTLE OF CORINTH.
seen, behind which were long heavy lines of infantry, visible to the whole command. While from the forts the enemy opened a most rapid fire from their artillery, which General Rust said his command stood with the most gratifying steadiness, not an officer or man leaving his position or exhibiting, so far as he could perceive, the least discom- posure. Just at this point, the writer remembers, one of the regiments in the front lines became panic-stricken and made a dash from the field and could not be checked until they ran upon the line of the Kentuckians of Rust's brigade. I refrain from calling the name of that regiment, because after that on many hard-fought fields they demonstrated as much courage as any troops in the Confederate serv- ice, and left behind them more than half their number, whose bones are bleached upon fields of glory, their gallant commander falling on the breastworks at Franklin in the midst of the heroes of his regiment. In a short time Rust's, brigade was marched to the front and put into position on the front line, still in full view of the Federal's forts. The artillery of the forts ceased firing altogether, although the Con- federate line was only a short distance away and in full view and in easy range of their guns, and in this position the brigade remained for hours, while that position of the army commanded by General Price was engaging the enemy in and around the town, in one of the most desperate battles of the war, considering the number of men engaged.
While the Kentuckians could not see the engagement from where they were, they could distinctly hear the rattle of the deadly small arms, and the almost constant roar of the artillery. They could hear the victorious yell of Price's gallant followers as he pushed the Fed- erals back from position to position, and when the Federals were re- inforced and Price was compelled to yield the ground he had gained by such heroic fighting, they could tell that he was gradually being pushed back by overwhelming numbers, contesting every inch of ground with the tenacity that Confederates could so well exhibit. Why Lovell's division remained inactive all day while Price's command was making such desperate efforts against overwhelming odds, is something I have never heard explained. It was true that the forts in their front, with abatis in front of the works, seemed to be very formidable, but if it was not the intention of the commanding officers to make an attack on them there is no good reason why that division should not have been moved to the assistance of General Price's command, or to some other point from which they could have been moved to the attack.
General Mansfield Lovell says in his report of the engagement : "In the night I was notified by the commanding general that early in the morning Price would open with a large battery of artillery and then attack, in force, with his left, and while thus engaged my division should press forward and attack with vigor on our right. Accordingly, at daylight the division was moved forward in line along the side of a hill for a mile and a half, with some very heavy firing of infantry on Villepigue's left and artillery on Bowman's right. Rust, hitherto in reserve, moved up and occupied the center, the line advancing until within a few hundred yards of two strong works of nine guns each,
T
52
HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
protected by heavy infantry forces. While reconnoitering their posi- tion with a view to the assault, I received an order from the com- manding general to detach my strongest brigade to the support of Price's center, which was being overpowered by large re-inforcements of the enemy. This order was obeyed, and I was about to remove the remaining brigade to the left to close the gap made by dataching Villepigue, when the further order was received to retire, covering the retreat of the army. The division was withdrawn from under the very guns of the enemy's works without the slightest confusion and in the most excellent order."
From the foregoing the reader will observe that General Lovell says he was devoting those hours while his division was remaining in- active to reconnoitering the position with a view to attack. The gen- eral does not inform us where he spent his hours reconnoitering; it was certainly not in front of the troops, for there was the enemy's works in plain view where every soldier in his command could plainly see them and take in the situation in a few moments, and if General Lovell intended to make the attack he certainly should have done it while General Price was doing such desperate fighting on the left.
General Price says in his report of this battle: "It was after 9 o'clock when my line became generally and furiously engaged with the enemy in his innermost and formidable works, from which his infantry and artillery could jointly operate against my troops. My men pressed forward upon the enemy and with heavy loss succeeded in getting into the works, having driven him from them. Capturing more than forty pieces of artillery and forcing him to take refuge in the houses of the town and every place that would afford protection from our galling guns, he was followed and driven from the houses with great slaughter."
Certainly all students of military affairs and soldiers of the Civil War would come to the conclusion in a moment that at this time it would have been the imperative duty of General Lovell to have made an attack. It was the only thing that could have been done to insure a victory. But the battle was fought and lost without the assistance of Lovell's division-I mean on the day the main engagement took place. The retreat was ordered back over the road on which the Con- federates marched to Corinth. The Federals were marched out from Bolivar to the Hatchie River, for the purpose of cutting off the re- treat of the Confederates. Price, with a portion of his command, at- tempted to force a passage, but the enemy was found in such force that Price could not dislodge them. Van Dorn's army, themselves hemmed in between two Federal armies, either of which was as large as his own, and the Hatchie to be crossed in order to get out south, for several hours the Confederates appeared to be in a desperate condition, and every soldier realized that fact. The writer remembers that at the time when things looked the most precarious, Colonel Crossland, of the Seventh Kentucky, rode to the center of his regiment and made them a short speech, in which he told them of the conditions in which they were and admonished them to keep their organization intact and determine to do their whole duty, to extricate themselves, and told them
5.3
BATTLE OF CORINTH.
that if they would all determine to do that, there was not enough Yankees south of the Ohio river to whip or capture them.
Finally an old bridge was found at Crum's Mill, which was soon repaired so the army could cross, which was accomplished during the following night. General Van Dorn moved his command back to Coldwater in the vicinity of Holly Springs. General Bowman pre- ferred charges against General Van Dorn in regard to the manage- ment of the campaign of Corinth, and a court of inquiry was held, which exonerated the general from all blame.
CHAPTER VII.
Movement in Front of Grant ; Holly Springs, Grenada and Tallahatchie Back to Vicksburg; Big Black and to the Battle of Baker's Creek.
On October Ist, Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton had been assigned to the command of the department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, and he assumed his duties October 12th, Van Dorn remain- ing at the head of the forces in the field. About the Ist of November General Grant began a movement on Grand Junction with his forces from Corinth and Bolivar, with the intention of moving on Holly Springs and Grenada. About the Ioth of October General Pemberton ordered Van Dorn, Price and Lovell back to the south bank of the Tallahatchie, where the men were put to work throwing up fortifica- tions. Some fifteen or twenty days later Grant moved his army south to Holly Springs, repairing the railroad as he advanced. On the 24th of November General Joseph E. Johnston was assigned to the com- mand of the regions embracing Western North Carolina, Tennessee, Northern Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana, Gen- eral Pemberton remaining in command in Mississippi, with Van Dorn in command of the army of West Tennessee, which, at that time, con- sisted of Lovell's division. The Ist of December the Confederates fell back from Tallahatchie to Grenada and the Yallabusha was made the new line of defense. Grant moved south and established his head- quarters at Oxford. Some of his troops went as far south as Coffee- ville, where, on December 5th, they were defeated by the Confederates under General Lloyd Tilghman. The Kentucky brigade did the prin- cipal part of the fighting driving the enemy from the field with con- siderable loss.
On the 19th General Forrest, then a brigadier-general, drove a Federal command from Jackson, Tenn., and then made a clean sweep of the Federals north of that place, destroying the stores and rail- road, drawing quite an army of Federals after him from Grant's army. On December 20th, General Van Dorn, in command of what cavalry could be gotten together, made a raid on Holly Springs, surprised and captured the garrison, and burned a large amount of supplies, said to be worth a million and a half dollars, and fifteen hundred Federals were taken prisoners. Grant at once fell back to Holly Springs.
At Grenada the Kentuckians prepared fairly good winter quar- ters and spent a while resting and recruiting quite comfortably, and while there the army was visited and reviewed by President Davis, the only time the men of that army had an opportunity to see him during the war.
General Grant did not attempt to advance south any further on the Mississippi Central, but transferred his army to the Mississippi River, for the purpose of moving on Vicksburg. Van Dorn's army was known no more as an army. Part of Price's command was moved across the river to the trans-Mississippi. The remainder was moved to different points, the larger part of them going to assist in the de- fense of Vicksburg. The Kentuckians went to Jackson and to Big Black, and from there they were sent to Port Hudson, and were there
55
BATTLE OF BAKER'S CREEK.
on the night of March 14, 1863, when the Federal fleet under Farra- gut made an attack on the batteries of the water defense. On the above date General Banks, who was in command of the Federal army at Baton Rouge, about twenty miles below Port Hudson, planned to make a strong demonstration with his land forces, while Farragut made an attack by water. The Confederates anticipated a land attack, as well as by the fleet, and therefore had the larger portion of their forces at their places in the rifle-pits around the place, and some located just at the point where the gunners from the fleet directed their shots.
At about II o'clock a skyrocket was thrown into the air, a signal that the fleet was advancing. The Federal reports inform us that the fleet consisted of the "Hartford," the "Albatross," the "Monon- gahela," and the "Mississippi." When they came in reach of the Confederate batteries, they opened upon them a terrific fire, and the fire from the ships responded vigorously, the bomb-shells bursting overhead in the ranks of the Kentuckians almost fast enough to make a constant light. The two first vessels succeeded in running the gauntlet of the Confederate batteries. The "Monongahela" was dis- abled and withdrew back down the river. The "Mississippi," a powerful war steamer, was not so successful; when she arrived at a point just above the center batteries she went aground, and for more than half an hour the Confederate gunners pounded her unmercifully. She was finally set on fire and abandoned. "On the bridge of the 'Mississippi,' by the side of his commander, stood the executive officer of the ship, a man who has risen, since March, 1863, from the bridge of the 'Mississippi' to the rank of Admiral of the United States Navy, and is known to the world as George Dewey." General Banks, from some cause, failed to make a land attack at the same time the fleet was engaged.
The Kentuckians remained at Port Hudson as part of its de- fense until April 13th, and during that time there were no more attacks made on the place either by land or water, and nothing else of special interest transpired while there, except that General Buford was assigned to the command of the brigade, an officer who was destined to lead the Kentuckians, either as brigade or division commander, until near the close of the war. On the 13th of April the brigade was ordered to Tullahoma to reinforce Bragg's army. They marched east to the Mississippi Central over the same road they marched be- fore, twice. They were loaded on to freight cars and transported via Jackson, Meridian and Mobile, ferried across the bay, and took cars again on the east side with the intention of going through Montgomery and on to Tullahoma. But, owing to the fact that Grant's forces were making such headway about Vicksburg, the Kentuckians were ordered to turn back to the assistance of General Pemberton.
On the 18th General Pemberton informed President Davis that a large number of the enemy's vessels had passed down the river by the batteries at Vicksburg. On the same day S. Cooper telegraphed Pemberton : "Under the altered conditions of your command, and the
56
HISTORY OF THE 3D, 7TH, 8TH AND 12TH KENTUCKY.
state of things in your department, your views are concurred in in respect to recalling the troops you may have sent to General Johnston." That meant Buford's brigade. On the same day, 18th of April, Gen- eral Pemberton sent from Jackson the following dispatch: "Briga- dier-General Buford, Montgomery, Ala. By authority of General Johnston, you will return with your entire brigade to this place." The brigade was soon aboard of the cars, making their way back over the same route they traveled over when going. They were stopped at Meridian for the purpose of attempting to intercept a Federal force of cavalry under Grierson, headed in that direction, destroying prop- erty as they advanced. The brigade was run back and fourth, above and below Meridian, in order to prevent the Federals from striking the railroad and destroying property.
In the meantime the Eighth Kentucky and part of the Third had been mounted and was acting as cavalry. All attempts to prevent Grierson from going south proved futile; despite the combined efforts he succeeded in striking several points on the Mobile & Ohio road, and then, turning west and crossing over the Mississippi Central, suc- ceeded in tearing up the track in several places and destroying the property, and finally succeeded in joining the Federal army at Baton Rouge.
This was one of the most brilliant raids any Federal cavalry offi- cer accomplished during the war. On May Ist, General Pemberton directed General Buford to leave a small regiment at Meridian and move with the rest of the command to Jackson. On the 4th, Buford was ordered to take his brigade to Edwards' Depot, and on the 13th he was ordered to move forward at once along the railroad, and take his position so as to guard General Bowman's right. And this brings us up to the battle of Baker's Creek, or Champion Hill.
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