USA > Louisiana > A history of Louisiana, Volume II > Part 19
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In the Senate of the United States there were animated discussions about Louisiana in February, 1803, and James Ross, of Pennsylvania, delivered a vehement ad- dress on the subject, February 14. He said, among other things:
To the free navigation of the Mississippi we had an undoubted right from nature, and from the position of our western country. This right and the right of deposit in the island of New Orleans had been acknowledged and fixed by treaty in 1795. That treaty had been in actual operation and execution for many years ; and now, without any pretense of abuse or violation on our part, the officers of the Spanish government deny that right, refuse the place of deposit, and add the most offensive of all insults by forbidding us from landing on any part of their territory and shutting us out as a common nuisance.
He maintained that the command of the navigation of the river ought to be in the hands of the Americans, and added:
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THOMAS JEFFERSON 1743-1826
Third President of the United States, who acquired Loui- siana from France in 1803. From a painting by Rem- brandt Peale, executed in 1803 (the year of the transfer), and now in the possession of the New York Historical Society.
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Why not seize, then, what is so essential to us as a nation? Why not expel the wrong-doers ?- wrong-doers by their own con- fession, to whom by seizure we are doing no injury. Paper con- tracts, or treaties, have proved too feeble. Plant yourselves on the river, fortify the banks, invite those who have an interest at stake to defend it; do justice to yourselves when your adver- saries deny it; and leave the event to Him who controls the fate of nations.
On February 15 a confidential message was received by the Senate from the House, transmitting a bill passed by that body, by which two million dollars were placed at the disposal of the President for the purchase of the island of Orleans and the provinces of East and West Florida. On February 16 Mr. Ross introduced in the Senate a series of resolutions, very warlike in tone, which authorized the President to take immediate possession of the island of Orleans or the adjacent territories, and to call into active service the militia of South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, or the Mississippi Territory. .
On February 22 Samuel White, of Delaware, sup- ported the resolutions of Mr. Ross and read a paper signed by Carlos de Grandpré, which declared that he had received orders from the intendant not to allow any commerce between the citizens of the United States and the subjects of the King of Spain. Among the opponents of the resolutions was James Jackson, of Georgia, who was in favor of trying every possible method of obtaining redress before going to war. He spoke of Bonaparte in this interesting and curious manner:
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Sir, we have been told much by the gentleman from Delaware of Bonaparte; that he is the hero of France, the conqueror of Italy, and the tyrant of Germany, and that his legions are in- vincible. We have been told that we must hasten to take pos- session of New Orleans whilst in the hands of the sluggish Spaniards, and not wait until it is in the iron grasp of the Cæsar of modern times. But much as I respect the fame and the ex- ploits of that extraordinary man, I believe we should have little more to fear from him, should it be necessary in the end to con- tend with him for the possession of New Orleans, than from the sluggish Spaniards. Bonaparte, sir, in our Southern country, would be lost, with all his martial talents ; his hollow squares and horse artillery would be of little service to him in the midst of our morasses and woods, where he would meet, not with the cham- paign country of Italy, with the little rivulets commanded by his cannon, which he could pass at leisure, not with fortified cities which command surrounding districts, but with rivers miles wide, and swamps, mortal or impenetrable to Europeans. With a body of only ten thousand of our expert riflemen around him, his laurels would be torn from his brow, and he would heartily wish himself once more on the plains of Italy.
Gouverneur Morris, of New York, was in favor of vio- lent measures, but his colleague, Mr. Clinton, spoke in favor of peace. His words seem strange to us who have witnessed the events of 1898. "Of all characters," said he, " I think that of a conquering nation least becomes - the 'American people. What, sir! shall America go forth, like another Don Quixote, to relieve distressed nations, and to rescue from the fangs of tyranny the powerful states of Britain, Spain, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands? Shall she, like another Phaeton, madly ascend the chariot of Empire, and spread desolation and
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horror over the world? Let us, sir, never carry our arms into the territory of other nations, unless we are compelled to take them up in self-defense. A pacific character is of all others most important for us to establish and main- tain."
On February 25 the resolutions of Mr. Ross were re- jected, and milder ones were adopted. They had been prepared by Mr. Breckenridge, of Kentucky.
In spite of the excitement in Congress and in the West, Jefferson acted with moderation and wisdom and had great confidence in Monroe's mission to France. He had foreseen the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and under- stood the influence which this event would have on the destiny of Louisiana. James Monroe sailed from New York on March 8, 1803.
In Europe hostilities between France and England were again imminent, and Bonaparte knew that, in case of war, Louisiana would be at the mercy of the English. He knew that France would lose the province, and he resolved to prevent that loss from being to the advantage of the English. He wished, however, to be enlightened on the subject, and he consulted two of his ministers who had resided in the United States-Barbé-Marbois and Decrès. The latter had served in the French army dur- ing the war of the American Revolution, and the former had served in a diplomatic capacity in the United States. Barbé-Marbois had married an American wife. We quote freely from his account of these important events:
On April 10, 1803, Easter Sunday, after attending to the solemnity of the day and the exigencies of the ceremonial, he
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called those two counselors, and spoke to them with that vehe- mence and that passion which he exhibited especially in political affairs. "I know all the value of Louisiana," said he, " and I have wished to repair the error of the French negotiator who abandoned it in 1763. A few lines of a treaty have given it back to me, and hardly have I recovered it when I must expect to lose it. But if I lose it, it will be dearer one day to those who compel me to abandon it than to those to whom I wish to deliver it. The English have successively taken away from France- Canada, Cape Breton, Newfoundland, Acadia, the richest parts of Asia. They are agitating Santo Domingo. They shall not have the Mississippi, which they covet. Louisiana is nothing in com- parison with their aggrandizements all over the globe, and yet the jealousy which they feel at the return of that colony under French domination announces to me that they wish to take pos- session of it, and it is thus that they will begin the war. They have twenty vessels in the Gulf of Mexico, they sail over those seas as sovereigns, while our affairs at Santo Domingo have grown worse every day since the death of Leclerc. The conquest of Louisiana would be easy if they merely took the trouble to land there. I have not a moment to lose if I wish to place it out of their reach. I do not know that they are not there already. It is their custom, and as for me, if I were in their place, I should not have waited. I wish, if it is still time, to take away from them even the thought of ever possessing that colony. I am thinking of ceding it to the United States. Hardly shall I be able even to say that I am ceding it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If I leave any time to our enemies, I shall trans- mit only a vain title to those republicans whose friendship I seek. They ask me only for one city of Louisiana; but I con- sider already the entire colony as lost, and it seems to me that in the hands of this growing power it will be more useful to the policy, and even to the commerce, of France, than if I attempted to keep it. Give me both of you your opinion."
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Barbé-Marbois agreed entirely with Bonaparte, but 'Admiral Decrès was of a different opinion. The First Consul did not make known his intentions, and dismissed his counselors late at night. The next morning, at day- break, he sent for the minister who had advised him to cede Louisiana and showed him despatches from London announcing great preparations for war on land or on sea.
The English [said Bonaparte] ask of me Lampedusa, which does not belong to me, and at the same time they wish to keep Malta for ten years. That island, where military genius has brought the resources of defense to a perfection that one can- not perceive if one has not seen it, would be for them another Gibraltar. To leave it to them would be to deliver to them the commerce of the Levant, and despoil my southern provinces. They wish to keep that possession, and that I should evacuate Holland. Uncertainties and deliberation are no longer seasonable. I re- nounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I wish to cede, it is the whole colony, without reserving anything of it. I know the value of what I abandon, and I have proved sufficiently the importance that I attach to that province, since my first diplomatic act with Spain was for the object of its recovery. I renounce it, therefore, with great regret. To insist upon its preservation would be madness. I direct you to negotiate this affair with envoys of Congress. Do not even wait for the arrival of Mr. Monroe; have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston. But I have need of a great deal of money for this war, and I should not like to begin it with new contributions. For a hundred years France and Spain have been incurring ex- penses for improvements in Louisiana, whose trade never has indemnified them. Large sums have been lent to companies, and to agriculturists, and they will never be reimbursed to the treasury. The price of all these things is justly due to us. If I were to
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regulate my terms on what these vast territories will be worth to the United States, the indemnities would have no limits. I shall be moderate, in consideration of the necessity to sell in which I am. But remember this well: I want fifty millions, and for less than this amount I shall not treat. I would rather make a desperate attempt to keep these beautiful countries. To-morrow you will have full powers.
Barbé-Marbois says he made a few general observa- tions on the cession of the rights of sovereignty and on the abandonment of what the Germans call souls, as if they could be the object of a contract of sale or of ex- change. The First Consul answered him:
That is, indeed, in all its perfection the ideology of the right of nature and of nations. But I must have money to make war against the nation that has the most money. Send your doctrine to London; I am sure it will be the subject of great admiration, and yet no great attention is paid to it when it is a ques- tion of taking possession of the finest countries in Asia. Per- haps, also, it will be objected that the Americans may be found too powerful for Europe in two or three centuries; but my fore- sight does not embrace those remote fears. Besides, one may expect in the future rivalries within the Union itself. The con- federations that are called perpetual last only as long as one of the contracting parties does not find it to its advantage to break them, and it is the present dangers to which we are exposed by the colossal power of England that I wish to remedy.
Barbé-Marbois did not reply, and the First Consul continued :
Mr. Monroe is on the point of arriving. This minister, going a thousand leagues from his constituents, must have received from
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the President, after the latter had defined the object of his mis- sion, secret instructions more extensive than the ostensible author- ization of Congress for the payment to be made. Neither that minister nor his colleague expects a resolution that surpasses in- finitely what they are going to ask of us. Begin without subter- fuge to make the overture to them. You will inform me, day by day, hour by hour, of the progress you make. The cabinet of Lon- don is informed of the resolutions taken at Washington, but it cannot suspect the one which I take. Observe the greatest secrecy, and recommend it to the American ministers ; they have no less interest in it than you. You will correspond with M. de Talleyrand, who alone knows my intentions. If I took his advice, France would limit its ambition to the left bank of the Rhine and would make war only to protect the weak, and not to be dismembered. But he admits also that the cession of Louisiana is not the dismemberment of France.
On April 10, 1803, Bonaparte had made up his mind to sell Louisiana to the United States, and, in his conver- sations on the subject with Barbé-Marbois, we see his wonderful judgment of men and of things and his promptness in arriving at a decision and at a fulfilment of his projects. At one glance he could see all sides of a question, just as he could discern all the movements of the enemy on the battle-field; and his extraordinary ca- pacity for action enabled him to accomplish in an incredi- bly short time the greatest deeds in statesmanship and in war. During his consulate Bonaparte appears to have been infallible in his judgments, except when he ordered the execution of the Duke d'Enghien. If Napoleon, the Emperor, committed mistakes, it was because his won- derful achievements had led him to believe that every-
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thing was possible to his genius. He considered that nei- ther nature nor man could be an obstacle to his projects, and he fell finally, overcome both by nature and by man. In 1803 Bonaparte was still First Consul, and in the cession of Louisiana to the United States he displayed keen foresight-we might say prophetic instinct-when he indicated the vast consequences of that act to the American Union.
When we see, in Barbe-Marbois's History of Loui- siana, that Bonaparte had fully decided upon the ces- sion of the province, it is curious to read Robert R. Livingston's despatches to his government, in which he speaks of his efforts to persuade the First Consul and his ministers to cede New Orleans and the Floridas to the United States. On April 11, 1803, Livingston wrote to Secretary Madison:
M. Talleyrand asked me this day, when pressing the subject, whether we wished to have the whole of Louisiana. I told him, no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Flor- idas; that the policy of France should dictate (as I had shown in an official note) to give us the country above the river Ar- kansas, in order to place a barrier between them and Canada. He said that if they gave New Orleans, the rest would be of little value; and that he would wish to know " what we would give for the whole." I told him it was a subject I had not thought of, but that I supposed we should not object to twenty millions, pro- vided our citizens were paid. He told me that this was too low an offer, and that he would be glad if I would reflect upon it and tell him to-morrow. I told him that, as Mr. Monroe would be in town in two days, I would delay my further offer until I had the pleasure of introducing him. He added that he did not
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speak from authority, but that the idea had struck him. I have reason, however, to think that this resolution was taken in council on Saturday.
We notice in this communication of Livingston the usual duplicity of Talleyrand, and the latter's extraordi- nary statement that, without New Orleans, the rest of the country would be of little value. That rest now com- prises several populous, wealthy, and progressive States.
James Monroe arrived in Paris on April 12, 1803, and on April 13 Livingston wrote that on that same day, while Monroe and several other gentlemen were at dinner with him, he observed Barbé-Marbois walking in his (Living- ston's) garden. On being invited to join the company, the French minister said he would return when they had dined. He came in while they were taking coffee, and had a free conversation with Livingston in a room next to that in which the company was assembled, and also that same evening at Barbé-Marbois's house. The latter said the First Consul had told him: " Well! you have charge of the treasury; let them give you one hundred millions of francs, and pay their own claims, and take the whole country." Livingston adds very judiciously: "I now plainly saw the whole business: first, the Consul was dis- posed to sell; next, he distrusted Talleyrand, on account of the business of the supposed intention to bribe, and meant to put the negotiation into the hands of Marbois, . whose character for integrity is established." Livingston then told Marbois that the United States would be per- fectly satisfied with New Orleans and the Floridas, and that they would be ready to purchase, provided the sum
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was reduced to reasonable limits. Barbé-Marbois finally said that "if we would name sixty millions of francs, and take upon us the American claims to the amount of twenty more, he would try how far this would be ac- cepted." Livingston replied that this was far beyond the means of his country, and he and Monroe, after a few days, offered forty millions, including the debts due the Americans, and afterward fifty millions. The French negotiator said, according to Livingston, that such an offer could not be accepted.
Marbois tells us that when Monroe arrived in Paris, Livingston gave him little encouragement for the success of their negotiations, and told his colleague that the best thing to do was to take possession of New Orleans first and to negotiate afterward. It happened, however, that the three negotiators-Livingston, Monroe, and Barbé- Marbois-had known one another in the United States. Livingston, as Chancellor of New York, had adminis- tered the oath of office to Washington at his inauguration. He remained in Europe until 1805, and was highly es- teemed by Napoleon. Monroe had been governor of Virginia. Barbé-Marbois had occupied a diplomatic post in the United States during the War of the Revolution, and he says that the two American negotiators and he, on seeing one another, remembered that they had been associated in a design conceived for the happiness of men. They labored, therefore, in perfect harmony.
The negotiation had three subjects: first the cession, then the price, and finally the debts due from France to citizens of the United States. With regard to the
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cession it was evident that Livingston and Monroe were not authorized to purchase the whole province of Loui- siana, but it was impossible to obtain further instructions, as hostilities between France and England were on the point of breaking out, and delay in the negotiations would only have served to make of Louisiana a colony of England. For the same reason it was not possible to consult the inhabitants about their wish in the matter, a fact that was deeply regretted by the three negotiators. It was so clearly to the interest of the United States to acquire the whole province, instead of New Orleans and the Floridas alone, that Livingston and Monroe assumed the responsibility of treating for the whole, and the first article agreed upon was as follows:
Whereas, by article third of the treaty concluded at St. Ilde- fonso, the 9th Vendémiaire, year 9 (1st October, 1800), between the First Consul of the French Republic and His Catholic Majesty, it was agreed as follows: "His Catholic Majesty promises and engages, on his part, to retrocede to the French Republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations herein relative to His Royal Highness the Duke of Parma, the colony or province of Louisiana, with the same ex- tent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it; and such as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other States,-And, whereas, in pursuance of the treaty, and particularly of the third article, the French Republic has an incontestable title to the domain, and to the possession of the said territory : The First Consul of the French Republic, desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the said United States, in the name of the French Republic, forever and in full sovereignty, the said territory, with all its rights and
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appurtenances, as fully and in the same manner as they had been acquired by the French Republic in virtue of the above-men- tioned treaty concluded with His Catholic Majesty."
The limits of Louisiana, as established by article first of the treaty, were very uncertain with regard to the North and Northwest, and to Florida, and all parties to the negotiation were aware of that fact. When Barbé- Marbois called Bonaparte's attention to it, the Consul exelaimed: "If the obscurity was not there, it would, perhaps, be good policy to put it there."
Article third of the treaty was prepared by Bonaparte himself, and the Louisianians should be grateful to him for providing with so much foresight for their future happiness. The article is as follows:
The inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citi- zens of the United States ; and in the mean time they shall be main- tained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess.
The First Consul added, says Barbe-Marbois:
Let the Louisianians know that we part from them with regret ; that we stipulate in their favor everything that they can desire, and let them hereafter, happy in their independence, recollect that they have been Frenchmen, and that France, in ceding them, has secured for them advantages which they could not have ob- tained from a European power, however paternal it might have
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been. Let them retain for us sentiments of affection ; and may their common origin, descent, language, and customs perpetuate the friendship.
Bonaparte said also:
This accession of territory strengthens forever the power of the United States, and I have just given to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride.
The treaty of cession was signed in Paris on the 10th Floréal, eleventh year of the French Republic (April 30, 1803).2 On the same day two conventions were - signed and annexed to the treaty. The first convention referred to the price of the cession. Barbe-Marbois says it had not been included in the treaty because it had been felt embarrassing to express the fact that, at the same time, an abandonment of the sovereign domain was be- - ing made and a sale for money of that domain. The First Consul had said that he counted on fifty million francs. Barbé-Marbois, without any further explana- tion with Bonaparte, told the American ministers that the price stipulated was fixed at eighty millions, and that it would be useless to propose a reduction.3 Livingston and Monroe finally accepted the price proposed by the French minister, on condition that twenty millions should be deducted from the eighty in consideration of the debts due by France to the citizens of the United States, con- tracted before September 30, 1800. The question of the debts was considered in the second convention annexed to the treaty of April 30, 1803.
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The contracting parties would have wished to obtain the concurrence of Spain to the negotiation, as that power by the treaty of St. Ildefonso had reserved the right of preference in case of the cession of the province. But it was thought impossible to wait for the deliberations of the cabinet at Madrid, and the Spanish government refused to approve the treaty. It was only on February 10, 1804, that Don Pedro Cevallos wrote to Mr. Pinckney, the American minister that " the opposition of His Catholic Majesty to the alienation of Louisiana was withdrawn, in spite of the solid reasons on which it was founded, and His Majesty had wished in this circumstance to give a new proof of his good will and kindness for the United States."
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