USA > Louisiana > A history of Louisiana, Volume II > Part 7
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A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA [1781
risons of Louisiana and Mobile, and from these, if a fa- vorable opportunity presented itself, to attack Pensacola or to preserve more securely the recent conquests. The council of generals approved this idea, and ordered that thirteen hundred and fifteen men be given to Galvez, and that sufficient transports be furnished him. The convoy was to be protected by the man-of-war San Ramon, commanded by Don Joseph Calbo de Irazabal, two frigates, a chambequin, and a packet-boat, all under the command of Galvez. The instructions given to Don Joseph Calbo were, that he should execute the orders given to him by Don Bernardo de Galvez relative to the conquest of Pensacola.
The young general embarked on February 13, 1781, although he was not in good health; the troops on the 14th, and the convoy sailed from Havana on February 28. Galvez sent Captain Maximiliano Maxent in a schooner to New Orleans, to order the troops which had been left in the Mississippi by Don Joseph Rada, and those which had sought shelter from the storm, to meet the fleet, which was on the way to Pensacola. On March 1, Don Miguel de Herrera was sent to Mobile with letters for Don Joseph Ezpeleta, informing him that the fleet was to touch the eastern coast of the island of St. Rosa, and ordering Ezpeleta to advance by land to join his troops to those of Galvez.
On March 4 the general called together the officers of the war-ships, and told them that his plan was to land his troops on the island of St. Rosa and to attack the battery that the enemy had on Point Sigüenza, in order
MAP OF LOUISIANA
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ST. ROSA
1781]
to facilitate the entrance of the ships into the port, with- out their running the risk of passing between cross fires, and to await there the reinforcements from Louisiana and from Mobile. All the naval officers approved the plan, and some were even anxious to obtain the glory of being the first to enter the channel. On March 5, at six o'clock in the evening, the brig Galveztown, which had sailed from Havana on March 2, joined the squadron. She was commanded, says Martin, by Rousseau, and had lately arrived from New Orleans. It is a strange fact that in his Diary Galvez does not mention Rousseau, who, with his brig Galveztown, played such an important part in the conquest of Pensacola.
On March 9, at six o'clock in the morning, land was seen, and it was soon found to be the island of St. Rosa; at eight o'clock the firing of cannon from Pensacola was licard. At two o'clock the general ordered that the troops be held in readiness to debark at night, and that each soldier take three days' rations, the grenadiers and caza- dores being, of course, the first to debark. They were to enter barges when two lanterns should be placed on the stern of the San Ramon. The convoy was at anchor a cannon-shot from land, and three leagues to windward from the mouth of the port. At eight o'clock at night the signal was given for the barges; and, with the general at their head, the grenadiers and cazadores landed with their colonel, Don Francisco Longoria. Galvez after- ward returned on board the San Ramon to see to the land- ing of the remainder of the troops, and at three o'clock in the morning of March 10, all the troops were marching
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[1781
A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA
in a column on the shore of the island of St. Rosa facing the sea.12
At half-past five in the morning the grenadiers and cazadores reached Point Sigüenza, but found no fort, only three dismounted guns and a battery of fascines half destroyed, which the enemy, with little knowledge of its use, had abandoned. At that time two barges, containing seven men, were captured by the cazadores, and the pris- oners declared that the town was well supplied with men and provisions, and that reinforcements from Jamaica were expected from day to day. Fort Barrancas, oppo- site Point Sigüenza and distant about five hundred toises, and two English frigates began to fire briskly on the troops, but without doing them any harm, as they were protected by several hillocks. Earthworks, however, were erected for more security.
On March 10, at eleven o'clock in the morning, the convoy changed anchorage to a point near the port, and in the evening the general examined the coast of the island facing the town, for the purpose of erecting a battery that would defend his troops from the English frigates, drive the latter away, and protect the entrance of the convoy. He ordered, accordingly, that four guns and one hundred and fifty tents be landed. On March 11, before daybreak, the commander of the fleet sent men to sound the bar in the channel, and on the same day a battery of two twenty-four-pounders was erected in front of Fort Barrancas. It began firing at one of the English frigates at half-past three in the afternoon. At the same hour the fleet sailed to enter the port, and the general,
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THE BAR
1781]
. perceiving this, embarked immediately on the San Ra- mon to be present at this action and share the risk of the men. Commodore Joseph Calbo, however, insisted so strenuously that Galvez should return to land, that the latter consented to leave the ship. Shortly afterward the general perceived that the San Ramon was turning round and returning with the other ships to the place where they had anchored last. This retrograde movement was due to the fact that, on endeavoring to cross the bar, the commodore's ship had run aground. Don Joseph Calbo spent the whole night in lightening the San Ramon to prepare her to enter the channel, although the weather was not propitious for such an undertaking.
On the twelfth the weather continued unfavorable, and Galvez feared that if there was a storm the ships could not be kept in a place where there was no haven, and that if they departed there would be no provisions for the camp. He resolved, therefore, to do everything possible to pre- vent such an accident. At eight o'clock in the morning he went to inspect some works which he had ordered to be erected at the extremity of Point Sigüenza, and at two he went on board the San Ramon to order that the frigates cross the bar at the head of the convoy, and that the men- of-war should follow, so that if the San Ramon ran aground the other ships should not be detained as they had been the evening before. But perceiving some reluc- tance on the part of the naval officers to follow his plan, the general returned to land. He wrote then to Don Joseph Calbo that it was absolutely necessary that the fleet should enter the port, as in case of a storm, which was
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A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA [1781
a frequent thing on this coast, the ships would be forced to disperse and to abandon the army. He added that the commodore could count already on a battery of six twenty-four-pounders which he had erected at a point opposite the enemy's battery.
On the thirteenth the landing of provisions and am- munition continued; and on the same day the general re- ceived the reply of the commander of the fleet, who said that, after hearing the opinion of the naval officers, he found it very unwise to risk his ships, when he lacked the necessary knowledge as to the depth and direction of the channel, had no pilots, and understood that the enemy could attack the ships in front and rear without their being able to reply effectively. At three o'clock in the afternoon the general sent his aide-de-camp, Don Este- van Mirò, to Mobile, with orders for Colonel Joseph Ezpeleta with regard to the junetion of the latter's troops with those of Galvez. On the fourteenth the general or- dered the captain of the brig Galvestoren to sound, in the night, the interior of the port and ascertain its depth. On the fifteenth provisions were landed with great difficulty on account of the rough sea, and two eight-pounders were placed in position.
On the sixteenth Lieutenant Don Juan Riano arrived in a schooner from Mobile, with letters from Colonel Ez- peleta, who said he was about to march with nine hun- dred men to the Perdido River, five miles from Pensa- cola, and that he would need barges to cross the river. Commodore Calbo wrote to Galvez that he had ordered armed barges to go to the Perdido River with ten days'
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1781]
THE GALVEZTOWN
provisions, and that he would send the Pio, which was the lightest ship, to go as near the shore as possible, to protect Ezpeleta and provide him with guns and provi- sions if he needed them. Calbo advised the general to wait for a dark night for the crossing of Ezpeleta's troops, but added that in this matter Galvez might do as he thought best. The command of the barges was given to Captain Andres Valderrama and First Lieutenant Antonio Estrada. The general replied on the same day to the commodore's letter, and approved what he had done.
On the seventeenth, at eleven in the morning, Galvez ordered Riano to place himself with his schooner at the entrance of the port, accompanied by the brig Galveztown and two gunboats. At four o'clock the alferez Don Miguel Herrera arrived with letters from Colonel Ez- peleta, announcing that he was on his way to the Per- dido River. The general, understanding that there was much delay in crossing the bar, and fearing that, in case of a storm, the convoy would be obliged to set sail in order not to be wrecked on the coast, and that the army would be left on the island without means of subsistence, resolved to be the first to force entrance into the port, firmly believing that this last recourse would stimulate the others and make them follow. In fact, at half-past two in the afternoon of March 18 he embarked in a canoe to go on board the brig Galveztown, which was at anchor at the entrance of the port of Pensacola. He ordered a pendant to be displayed and a salute to be fired, and the Galveztown sailed, followed by Riano's schooner and two
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A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA [1781
gunboats, the only naval force that was directly under Galvez's command. Fort Barrancas fired as rapidly as was possible, especially at the Galveztown, as it was evi- dent by the banner displayed that the general was on board. The valiant little fleet, however, sustained no damage, except in the rigging and sails, which were pierced with balls, and entered the port amid the ex- traordinary acclamations and continuous "Vivas!" of the army, which manifested to the general its joy and its devotion to him.
On seeing the success of Galvez, the squadron resolved to cross the bar on the following day, with the exception of the San Ramon, which was already ballasted. On the nine- teenth, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the convoy set sail, preceded by the two frigates, and in an hour all the ships had entered the harbor in the midst of an extraor- dinary fire from Fort Red Cliffs in the Barrancas. Several ships were injured, but not a man was killed or wounded. Galvez was in a boat among the ships, to give them whatever help they might need. At five o'clock he endeavored to go with his aides, in a boat, to see Ezpeleta and give him his instructions in per- son. He wished to prove that it was as easy to leave the port as to enter it; but contrary winds and currents obliged him to return to his camp at eleven o'clock at night.
In the morning of the twentieth Galvez wrote a letter to Campbell, in which he said that the English at Havana in 1762 intimated that the Spaniards would be treated with the greatest rigor if any of the ships and buildings of
لا السا
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GENERAL CAMPBELL
1781]
the King, as well as those of any private individual, were damaged or destroyed. He therefore made the same in- timation, in the same terms, to General Campbell and whom it might concern.
In the evening Galvez went in a boat to reconnoiter the beach, in order to choose a place to debark the troops that were to attack the town. At eight o'clock at night the enemy set fire to a guard-house on the beach which the general had reconnoitered, and the latter ordered Riano's schooner and the launch of Rousseau's Galveztown to approach the land and fire with grape-shot at any enemy who might be there.
On the twenty-first, at a very early hour, an officer came from Pensacola with a letter from General Camp- bell. The British commander said that the threats of an enemy are considered only as stratagems of war. He trusted that in his defense of Pensacola he should do nothing contrary to the laws and customs of war, but that he was under obligations to Galvez for his frank intima- tion. He assured him, however, that his conduct would depend more upon the Spanish general's reply to the propositions that Governor Chester would make the next day about the prisoners, and upon his own about the city, than upon threats.
At noon an aide-de-camp of General Campbell ar- rived with letters from the latter and from Governor Chester. He was accompanied by Colonel Dickson, who had been made prisoner at Baton Rouge in 1779, and who resided in Pensacola under parole. General Campbell's letter was as follows: 13
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A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA [1781
Humanity requiring that innocent persons should be protected, as much as possible, from the cruelties and devastations of war, and it being evident that the garrison at Pensacola cannot defend itself without the destruction of the city, and consequently with the total ruin of a great number of inhabitants; and being de- sirous of preserving the city and the garrison to the victor, with the hope that the palm of victory will belong to the troops which I have the honor to command, I have abandoned the garrison of Pensacola ; but knowing that the preservation of the city and its edifices depends upon your Excellency and me, or, in other words, that it is in our power to destroy it or not, I propose that the town and its buildings be preserved intact and without wilful damage from either side, during the siege of the redoubt of the marine and Fort George, where I intend to contend for the preser- vation of West Florida to the British Crown, under the following stipulations :
That neither the town nor the buildings of Pensacola shall be occupied or used, by either side, for attack or defense, or for any other advantage, but that the town shall be a refuge for the sick, the women and children, who shall be able to remain in it without any harm on the part of the English, the Spanish troops, or their allies.
But in case my proposition be not accepted by your Excellency, and that any part of the town be occupied by the troops under your command, it shall then be my duty to prevent it from being a refuge by destroying it, and if I should be forced to such a cruel resolution, your Excellency alone shall be responsible to God and men for the calamities and misfortunes which would ac- company such a deed. But the knowledge that we have of your conduct and sentiments forbids the horror of such thoughts, and makes me believe that you will approve my propositions.
Governor Galvez answered that as his health did not allow him to reply on the same day to General Campbell's
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GOVERNOR CHESTER
1781]
letter, he had requested Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson to transmit his opinion, which he would communicate in writing the next day.
Dickson had brought to Galvez two letters from Gov- ernor Chester. In the first the governor offered to lib- erate the Spanish prisoners on parole, as there werc no suitable quarters in the town for them, provided the Spanish general would promise that they should not serve during the war, in any capacity, against the British or their allies, unless exchanged. In his second letter Gov- ernor Chester said that, " as the protection and safety of women and children against the calamities of war had always been considered by all civilized nations as their first object," he took the liberty of expressing the hope, based on Galvez's generous and humane sentiments, that the latter would give orders that no harm be done these persons.
The governor of Louisiana acknowledged the receipt of Governor Chester's letters, and postponed his written answer to the next day. He told Colonel Dickson what he thought of the propositions of Campbell and Chester, and instructed him to communicate to them his decision. At three o'clock he ordered the grenadiers who were posted on the island on the side facing the city to be drawn up in line of battle, and the troops on the opposite side of the island to place themselves on an elevation so as to be visible, in order that Colonel Dickson might inform Gen- eral Campbell, if he wished, of the kind and number of his troops. He embarked afterward with Dickson in a small boat, and went on board the Santa Clara to see
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Campbell's aide-de-camp. Later in the day he permitted the latter and Dickson to return to Pensacola.
At night several houses were seen burning near Fort Barrancas, a thing that displeased Galvez greatly, as, to prevent any conflagration, he had informed General Campbell of his intentions, as will be seen in his letters. On March 22, in the morning, Ezpeleta appeared on the mainland opposite the island, and Galvez crossed over with five hundred men, including the grenadiers, to rein- force him and to see that his troops were rested. The general returned to the island after sending to Pensacola the following letter to Campbell:
At the very time when we were making to each other the same propositions which were directed toward the protection of the property and farms of the people of Pensacola,-at the very time, I say, in my very presence, the insult was done of burn- ing the houses which are in front of my camp, on the other side of the bay. This deed indicates the bad faith in which you act and you write, and the treatment of the people of Mobile, who were in great part victims of horrible cruelties projected by your Excellency : all this proves that your expressions are not sincere; that humanity is a word which, although repeated on paper, is unknown to the heart; that your intentions are to gain time to complete the destruction of West Florida; and, as I am ashamed at my own credulity and indignant at the attempt to deceive me, I neither can nor will listen to any other proposition but that to surrender, assuring your Excellency that, as it will not be my fault, I shall see Pensacola burn with the same indif- ference as I would see its cruel incendiaries perish in its ashes.
This severe and energetic letter was accompanied by one to Governor Chester, in which Galvez said that, since the
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THE PIO
1781]
day before, circumstances had changed so much that he neither could nor should accept the propositions concern- ing the prisoners and the families of Pensacola. If the governor was interested in the latter, he might deal with General Campbell, as everything depended on the good or bad conduct of that officer. Galvez also sent to Gov- crnor Chester a copy of his letter to General Campbell.
In the evening of the twenty-second the packet-boat Pio returned from its expedition to Perdido River, where it had been sent to protect the barges in which Colonel Ezpeleta's troops were to cross the river. The ship was fired upon from Fort Barrancas, but suffered no injury. At eight o'clock at night Galvez received General Campbell's answer to his fiery letter:
MY DEAR SIR: The haughty tone of your Excellency's letter, far from producing its evident intention of intimidating, has made me more resolute than ever to oppose the ambitious under- taking which Spain has placed under your command. I shall destroy as much as possible, and in this I shall only be fulfilling my duty towards my King and my country, a motive much more potent for me than the fear of your displeasure.
The officer in command of Fort Barrancas Coloradas has re- ceived orders to defend that post to the last extremity. If he has deprived the enemy which is attacking us of any shelter or advantageous post for his attack, he has done his duty, so much the more that in this he has done no injury to women, children, or private property.
I repeat to your Excellency that if he makes use of the town of Pensacola for his attacks on Fort George, or to shelter his troops, I am resolute to execute what I have communicated to him.
With regard to the reflexions which concern me more directly,
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A HISTORY OF LOUISIANA
[1781
as I do not believe having merited them, I despise them. May God preserve your Excellency many years. Your most obedient servant,
JOHN CAMPBELL.
QUARTERS OF PENSACOLA, March 22, 1781.
With this letter ended the correspondence between Gal- vez and the English officers. There was now nothing to be done on both sides but to fight valiantly.
During the night of March 22 the army slept on the coast of the island facing the town, so as to be ready to meet immediately the troops from Mobile. At four o'clock in the afternoon of March 23 the convoy from New Orleans arrived. It consisted of sixteen ships, car- rying fourteen hundred men, several guns, and ammuni- tion. On the twenty-fourth the general ordered that all the troops camping on St. Rosa Island be transported to the mainland, to begin the siege of Fort George and other posts. The order was executed in the afternoon, except that two hundred men remained on the island.
On the twenty-fifth some Indians in ambush surprised a few soldiers who had advanced beyond the outposts, and several were killed or wounded. The Indians mutilated the bodies according to their cruel custom. At noon Colonel Dickson and other English prisoners who resided in Pensacola on parole arrived in the camp. On the twenty-sixth, after prayer, the army set out, and marched laboriously through impenetrable woods a distance of five leagues. In the darkness two detachments that were ad- vancing by different roads mistook each other for ene- mies and fired, killing several men and wounding others.
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THE ATTACK
1781]
On the twenty-seventh the general established his camp in a place that seemed favorable, and resolved to intrench it after a party of Indians had attacked sud- denly some soldiers at their camp-fires. Guns were de- barked in order to fire at the Indians with grape-shot. On the twenty-eighth, while the general had agreed upon stipulations concerning Pensacola, three Spanish sailors who had escaped from the town arrived and reported that they and the other prisoners had been badly treated by the English. Disgusted at this, the general dismissed Governor Chester's envoy and refused all the proposi- tions of the latter. At three o'clock in the afternoon about four hundred Indians attacked the camp, but the militia from New Orleans, both white and colored, marched against them and repelled them. At midnight, however, they returned and killed several men.
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