USA > Louisiana > Brief history of the Louisiana territory > Part 6
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8
"The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations, who in conjunction can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation."
This was no flourish of the "mailed fist" or blustering threat
62
Brief History of the Louisiana Territory.
of immediate war; it was simply an acute and forcible statement of facts which would readily appeal to statesmen. Talleyrand and Napoleon knew how narrowly a war had been averted only three years before and that the Federalists were still actively hos- tile to France. Moreover the south and west which had furnished the majority that had elected Jefferson were ready at any time to fight for Louisiana. For Jefferson to desert the south and west would have been political suicide and this Jefferson was the last man to commit. His language and attitude have been misin- terpreted by Mr. Henry Adams, whose ideas of Jefferson coin- cide too nearly with those of his bellicose grandfather who had. with such bad grace surrendered the executive mansion to Jeffer- son, and whose opinion has been too generally accepted by later historians.
Jefferson's keen message of warning to France was followed by an event which complicated the situation and forced his hand. That event was the suspension of the right of deposit at New Orleans by the Spanish intendant, Don Juan Ventura Morales. The treaty of 1795 had stipulated that if the right of deposit at New Orleans was denied after three years another entrepot should be provided. This Morales refused to grant and every one recog- nized his action as a result of the retrocession. Tennessee and Kentucky clamored loudly for war. The Federalists echoed the cry and, in those days of violent partisanship, rejoiced at Jef- ferson's dilemma. He must now adopt their policy and declare war or lose his western supporters. All watched eagerly for the result.
Jefferson's political insight never met a severer test and his astute party manipulation never won a greater success. Congress met and waited for the President to declare himself; but in his message he made no allusion to the closure of the Mississippi. Re- garding the matter uppermost in everyone's mind he simply said: "The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the late war, will, if carried into effect, make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations which
63
A Diplomatic Drama: the Great Purchase.
will doubtless have a just weight in any deliberations of the Leg- islature connected with the subject." The war party was ig- nored. Jefferson had no mind to be forced into war nor to lose his western adherents. Beneath a nonchalant appearance of in- difference he concealed the utmost diplomatic activity. Yrujo, the minister of Spain, was urged to protest against the action of the Spanish intendant's closure of the Mississippi. Yrujo wrote "a veritable diatribe" to Morales and succeeded in getting a re- nunciation of his action by the Spanish governor, Salcedo, and later a restoration of the right of deposit by the Spanish govern- ment. The French chargé, Pichon, was deluged with as wily a series of threats as were ever concocted. Gallatin, Madison, and, Jefferson all tried their hands. Pichon was thoroughly fright- ened, and sent home repeated cries of distress. "It is impossi- ble," said he, "to be more bitter than this government is at the present posture of affairs and at the humiliating attitude in which our silence about Louisiana places them. Mr. Jefferson will be forced to yield to necessity his pretensions and scruples against a British alliance. I noticed at his table that he redoubled his civilities and attentions to the British chargé. I should also say that he treats me with much consideration and politeness, in spite of the actual state of affairs." To the British minister the Pres- ident reiterated "with additional force the resolution of the coun- try never to abandon the claim of the free navigation" of the Mississippi, and declared that if "they should be obliged" to draw the sword "they would throw away the scabbard."
All this feminine but surprisingly successful finesse was pri- vate and secret; Congress and the West demanded something pub- lic, something open and tangible. The administration therefore decided to ask for the appropriation of two million dollars to de- fray the expenses of negotiation and send a minister extraordi- nary to support Livingston in buying New Orleans and the Flor- idas. James Monroe, who was specially popular in the south- west, was nominated for this mission. To Monroe, Jefferson wrote: "If we cannot, by a purchase of the country, insure to
64
Brief History of the Louisiana Territory.
ourselves a course of perpetual peace and friendship with all nations, then, as war cannot be distant, it behooves us immediately to be preparing for that course, without, however, hastening it; and it may be necessary, on your failure on the Continent, to cross the Channel." When Monroe arrived in Washington the efforts of the administration were redoubled. Madison had sent for Pichon and put before him every argument the United States had to offer and later refused to transact business on the ground that Talleyrand was not recognizing Livingston. The action of the States of New York, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania in declaring for hostilities was unostentatiously paraded in diplo- matic circules; Gallatin talked of war; General Smith, the ad- ministration leader of Congress, at a public dinner to Monroe of- fered the toast, "Peace, if peace is honorable; war, if war is nec- essary !" Before starting Monroe had a shrewd and inflamma- tory talk with Pichon concerning which the chargé wrote: "He did not conceal from me that if his negotiation failed, the admin- istration had made up its mind to act with the utmost vigor, and to receive the overtures which England was incessantly making." Jefferson wrote to Dupont de Nemours: "Our circumstances are so imperious as to admit of no delay as to our course, and the use of the Mississippi so indispensable that we can not hesitate one moment to hazard our existence for its maintenance. If we fail in this effort to put it beyond the reach of accident, we see the destinies we have to run, and prepare at once for them."
All this excited talk had been prepared for by Jefferson's unofficial message through Dupont to Bonaparte; much of it was for political effect and part of it was insincere. Jefferson did not mean to have war. Peace was his passion and in the pur- suit of it he was "steady as the magnet itself." He had not hes- itated to declare war on the Barbary pirates but he did not want to become entangled in European affairs. His war talk was sim- ply a shield for his diplomacy in which he had a sublime confi- dence which would have been ridiculous had it not been justified by the result. Monroe was sent to France with instructions to
65
A Diplomatic Drama: the Great Purchase.
join Livingston in offering any sum within ten million dollars for New Orleans and West Florida.
Meanwhile the time gained by Jefferson in allaying the war excitement in Congress and the West had wrought profound changes in Europe. The King of Spain, under the domination of the imperious Godoy, had held back the actual transfer of his American colony. The First Consul fretted and fumed but Godoy was tenacious. Gouvion St. Cyr was sent over to the Spanish court but not until October 15, 1802, did his bluster ob- tain the final signature of Charles IV., and then under the most exacting and definite conditions. Spain demanded, first, that the new kingdom of Etruria should be recognized by England, Aus- tria, and the Duke of Tuscany, who had been dethroned to make room for Parma; second, that France should give a written pledge that she would never alienate Louisiana and that she would re- store it to Spain in case the King of Etruria should lose his power. Both these things St. Cyr pledged in the name of the First Con- sul. Before anything definite could now be done, however, Na- poleon was fast caught in the toils of European politics.
"What Bonaparte," says Mr. Schouler, "regarded as indis' pensable in military science, Jefferson had applied to politics- an accurate calculation of all contingencies in the first place and then giving to accident its due allowance. The accident for which Jefferson had allowed was, in truth, the speedy renewal of hostilities between France and England." This expectation was to be realized sooner than he had hoped. Early in February, 1803, came warnings that the peace of Amiens was to be broken. France charged England with perfidy in not surrendering Malta; England preferred counter charges of bad faith against Napo- leon; war was in the air. The tense situation was ended on March 12th, when at a reception in the drawing room of Jose- phine, the First Consul abruptly confronted the British ambassa- dor, Lord Whitworth, before the assembled ambassadors of Eu- rope, with the remark: "I find your nation wants war again." 5
66
Brief History of the Louisiana Territory.
"You have just finished a war of fifteen years. You want an- other war of fifteen years." "I must either have Malta or war!" In England preparations for the inevitable conflict already busied the ministry and enlivened the nation. Two months before Na. poleon's mind had been made up. He was tired of peace. The fifty thousand men and vast amounts of money he had sunk in St. Domingo without any effect except to make the island worthless for a generation, aroused infinite disgust in his impatient soul. The news of the death of Leclerc which reached him in the first week of January, 1803, was the last straw. Yet he kept his own councils for two months. The orders for the assembling of the thirty-five thousand men for which General Rochambeau in St. Domingo had called were allowed to stand. Napoleon was no stranger to defeat and could abandon his dearest enterprise with equanimity when pursuit became hopeless; but abandonment of St. Domingo would be a public confession of failure for which he was not ready until he could create a diversion in Europe. Early in April he was ready for the startling announcement. He had made up his mind to part with Louisiana; and while Monroe was hastening to the French coast his plan was announced to Talleyrand. The building up of the French colonial empire in America had been Talleyrand's highest ambition and he opposed the renunciation. But Napoleon was not to be balked by a sub- ordinate. On April 10, 1803, he summoned two of his ministers, of whom his Finance Minister, Barbe Marbois, was one, and an- nounced that he feared that England would seize Louisiana. "The conquest of Louisiana," said he, "will be easy if they will only descend upon it. I have not a moment to lose in putting it out of their power. If I were in their place, I certainly
would not have waited. I contemplate turning it over to the United States. I should hardly be able to say that I cede it to them, for we are not yet in possession of it. But even a short delay may leave me nothing but a vain title to transmit to these republicans, whose friendship I seek. They are asking me for but a single city of Louisiana, but I already regard the whole
$
67
A Diplomatic Drama: the Great Purchase.
colony as lost, and it seems to me that in the hands of this rising power it will be more useful to the policy and even to the com- merce of France than if I should attempt to keep it." The next day he summoned Barbé Marbois and delivered to him one of his short, sententious orations of command:
"Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season; I re- nounce Louisiana. It is not New Orleans that I cede; it is the whole colony, without reserve. I know the price of what I aban- don. I have proved the importance I attach to this province, since my first diplomatic act with Spain had the object of recov- ering it. I renounce it with the greatest regret; to attempt ob- stinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate the affair. Have an interview this very day with Mr. Living- ston."
Talleyrand, however, had seen the determination of Bona- parte and determined to keep a hand in the negotiations. For months Livingston had applied himself with a sublime pertinacity to the end to which Napoleon was now advancing. He had plied Talleyrand with arguments and memorials. Finding him obdu- rate and supercilious he had directed his efforts toward the First Consul himself to whom he presented a memorial which Joseph Bonaparte assured him the First Consul had read and considered with care. So meager had been his success that the only encour- agement he could send Jefferson was the disconsolate note: "Do not absolutely despair." But within a few hours of the above orders to Marbois imagine his surprise when the imperturbed Talleyrand asked him what the United States would give for the whole of Louisiana! Livingston was disconcerted, and to gain time for reflection, stated that the aims of the United States extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas and announced that Monroe was speedily expected with fuller instructions. Monroe arrived in Paris the next day, April 12, but Livingston, recovered from his surprise, hung about Talleyrand all the fore- noon hoping to reap alone the fruit of his assiduous labors. The next afternoon the French ministers were entertained by Living-
68
Brief History of the Louisiana Territory.
ston in order that Monroe might be introduced. Livingston con- fided to Barbe Marbois, Talleyrand's "extraordinary conduct" and after the party had broken up went home with him and those two men, in a midnight conversation, practically sealed the bar- gain. Bonaparte had mentioned fifty million francs as the price to be demanded; but Marbois set the price at one hundred million francs, leaving the American government to pay to their own citizens the spoliation claims demanded from France. The Amer- ican claims amounted to twenty-five millions-making the price one hundred and twenty-five million francs or twenty-five million dollars for the whole western bank of the Mississippi, extending from New Orleans to the Lake of the Woods, and indefinitely westward. This was not an exorbitant price, but Livingston had the effrontery to offer twenty million francs or about four million dollars, professing not to want the western bank, but only New Orleans and the Floridas. Livingston, overjoyed at the pros- pect, went home and sat up until three o'clock to write Jefferson of the opening of the negotiations without Monroe's help. "We shall do all we can," he wrote, "to cheapen the purchase; but my present sentiment is that we shall buy."
Livingston was right. Two weeks of dangerous haggling 'over the price followed during which a violent quarrel took place in the Bonaparte family over the intended transfer. Both Lucian and Joseph Bonaparte vigorously opposed the sale of Louisiana and the picturesque scenes between the three brothers are por- trayed in dramatic chapters in Hosmer's "History of the Louis- iana Purchase." On April 29 the price was agreed upon at sixty million francs in money plus twenty million francs in spoliation claims to be assumed by the American government-in all eighty million francs, or fifteen million dollars. The treaty of cession was dated April 30, 1803, and closed the negotiations.
The purchase of Louisiana was the grandest diplomatic achievement in American history. When Livingston signed his name to the treaty, he arose excitedly and shook hands with Mar- bois and Monroe. "We have lived long," he exclaimed, "but this
69
A Diplomatic Drama: the Great Purchase.
is the noblest work of our lives." And indeed it was, though Livingston had signed the Declaration of Independence and Mon- roe was to be, next to Washington, the most popular President of the United States. Monroe deserved little credit for the negotia- tions and claimed little; it was a triumph for Livingston, backed by the administration at Washington. If Livingston is not our greatest diplomat he was, at least, the most fortunate; for next to the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Con- stitution, the annexation of Louisiana was the most important event in American history. It opened the portals of the United States to an illustrious career beyond the Mississippi. Hitherto our national ambition had halted at the Father of Waters and our government had trembled at the prospect of this outlet to our western commerce being closed at the nod of a foreign potentate. A storm of western wrath, a few sly presidential innuendoes, a holocaust of barbarian frenzy and tropical pestilence, a tenacious diplomatic siege, a rumble of European war, and a few strokes of the destiny-laden pen changed all. The barrier to our west- ward expansion vanished like a dream; a vast, seemingly illim- itable empire stretched away toward the setting sun. The United States was now assured of a dominating influence on the Amer- ican continent; the danger of undesirable neighbors pointing can- non at our western frontier was forever removed, and the advanc- ing tide of our civilization could only be checked on the shores of the broad Pacific. This was the conquest of peace and of peaceful methods; the annals of war present few greater tri- umphs and no results of greater significance to the nations in- volved.
CHAPTER V.
LOUISIANA TERRITORY UNDER THE UNITED STATES.
T HE news of the purchase of Louisiana arrived in America the latter part of June, 1803. Its importance was im- mediately felt and the consequences of the purchase be- came the all-absorbing topic of the day. At bottom the whole country was filled with serene joy; but on the surface ripples of discontent foreboded the lashing waves of partisan . conflict soon to roughen the political sea. The Republicans were pleased but perplexed. The loyalty of the southwest had been retained; they had lowered the taxes and at the same time paid off huge shares of the national debt; their policy had been pop- . ular at home and their diplomacy had been brilliantly successful abroad; the Federalists had first been put on the defensive and then routed. They were therefore happy; but this feeling of content was clouded by the fact that new responsibilities were upon them. They had preached strict construction and a limited executive, put forth the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions, and stormed at the monarchism of the Federalists; and now Jefferson. democrat of democrats, the extreme advocate of State Rights, had assumed an authority exercised by no previous president and had arbitrarily bought a foreign empire to be incorporated into the territory of the United States. New constitutional problems had to be faced, the new territory to be governed, and the Re- publican supremacy to be maintained.
Jefferson set about the new task with his usual energy and adroitness. He was too true to his political theories not to have constitutional scruples, and without delay drew up an amendment embodying his ideas of the proper way to dispose of the newly acquired territory without doing violence to the constitution.
(70)
-
-
71
·
Louisiana Territory Under the United States.
This he submitted to the cabinet. The cabinet, however, were not so tenacious in upholding the theories they had advanced while in opposition and received the proposed amendment coldly. Jefferson then appealed to party leaders outside the cabinet. His proposition met with so little encouragement that he drew up an- other amendment which he hoped would meet with greater ap- proval; but before it could be thoroughly canvassed, circum- stances intervened to force his hand. Rumors were spread abroad that Napoleon was about to change his mind. Living- ston's letters became alarming and the Spanish minister Yrujo, who had been such a friend to the administration at Washington, sent to Madison protest after protest against the sale of Louis- iana. He quoted the engagement entered into by St. Cyr which bound Napoleon not to alienate the province and declared that since . France had not carried out the conditions of her contract for Louisiana, she could not rightfully dispose of it as her own. It was necessary then to act quickly and to present a united front to the enemy. Spain was, in fact, still in possession and who knew what attitude Napoleon would take in the end.
Such considerations led Jefferson to defer to the wishes of his party and to trust the future to right the constitutional error. In the presence of a threatened war with Spain a mistake would be serious and he decided that Congress should share the respon- sibility with the president. A special session was called to meet October 17, 1803. In his message to this Congress, Jefferson said not a word about his proposed amendment or the unconsti- tutionality of the purchase. He had decided that the all-impor- tant thing was to get possession of Louisiana and declared that "with the wisdom of Congress it will rest to take those ulterior measures which may be necessary for the immediate occupation and temporary government of the country, for its incorporation into our Union, for rendering the change of government a bless- ing to our newly adopted brethren, for securing to them the rights of conscience and of property, for confirming to the In- dian inhabitants their occupancy and self-government."
72
Brief History of the Louisiana Territory.
The treaty signed by Livingston and Monroe for the pur- chase of Louisiana consisted of three parts, the treaty of cession and two conventions. The first stipulated that France should turn over to the United States the province as obtained from Spain by the treaty of San Ildefonso; that the inhabitants were to be, as soon as possible, incorporated into the Union as citizens; that in the meantime they should be protected in their liberty, property and religion; and that for twelve years French and Spanish ships should trade in Louisiana on the same basis as American ships. The second part stipulated that the eleven million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars was to bear six per cent interest for fifteen years and then to be paid in yearly installments of not less than three million dollars each. The third document related to the payment of the spoliation claims which were not to exceed three million seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars.
These documents were put before Congress and the results of the action of the political parties at this time are of two-fold constitutional importance. It marks the extent of the degrada- tion of the Federalists and sounds the death-knell of their party; and it begins an epoch of constitutional expansion by committing the Republicans to a liberal interpretation of the written Con- stitution.
Regarding the first Mr. McMaster says: "Nothing so finely illustrates the low state to which the once prosperous Federalists were fallen as the turbulent and factious opposition they now made to the acquisition of Louisiana. But a remnant of the great party remained. Tens of thousands of independent thinkers, to whom good government was better than political strife now gave a warm support to the Republican cause. They had seen promised reforms become actual reforms. They had seen the Federalists add eight millions to the public debt in five years. They had seen the Republicans reduce the debt by five millions in two years. They had seen the Federalists go to the very limit of constitutional taxation in the laying of a direct tax. They had seen the Republicans dry
73
Louisiana Territory Under the United States.
every source of internal revenue and still have money to spare. Never had the government been so smoothly, so savingly, carried on." By way of contrast to these independents he continues : "To the narrow partisans who remained in the Federal ranks the good which Jefferson accomplished went for nothing.
They received the news of the best and wisest act of Jefferson's whole administration with a roar of execration they ought to have been ashamed to send up. Some were worried lest the East should become depopulated. Some feared the mere extent of ter- ritory would rend the Republic apart. Some affected the language of patriots and lamented the enormous increase the purchase would make in the national debt. Soon Federal writers and printers all over the land were vieing with each other in attempts to show the people what an exceed- ingly great sum of money fifteen millions of dollars was. Weigh it, and there will be four hundred and thirty-three tons of solid silver. Load it in wagons and there will be eight hundred and sixty-six of them. Stack it up dollar upon dollar, and the pile will be more than three miles high. It would load twenty-five sloops; it would pay an army of twenty-five thousand men forty shillings a week each for twenty-five years; it would, divided among the population of the country, give three dollars for each man, woman, and child. All the gold and all the silver coin in the Union would, if collected, fall vastly short of such a sum. We must for fifteen years to come pay two thousand four hun- dred and sixty-five dollars interest each day. . For whose interest is this purchase made? The South and West. Will they pay a share of the debt? No, for the tax on whiskey has been removed."
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.