USA > Massachusetts > History of Massachusetts, for two hundred years: from the year 1620 to 1820 > Part 40
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party purposes. Should a contrary rule be established, it appears to me that political feuds would be endless and im- placable. The persons in office, and their friends and re- tainers, would employ every method to prevent any change in an administration, while their rivals would be equally assid- uous and eager to effect a change. From the frequency of our elections, there would scarcely be any interruptions in these struggles ; and the longer they should continue, the greater would be their violence." Governor Strong, early in the session, submitted to his council, the propriety of restoring those persons to office, in the state, who, during the year preceding, had been removed solely for their political opinions, The council advised, that it would be proper and just that such persons should be placed in the respective offices, of which they had been deprived on account of party politics. Their restoration, or reappointment to office was accordingly made.
A few weeks after Mr. Strong was inducted into office, war was declared against Great Britain, by the general gov- ernment, as had been sometime apprehended. The country was very poorly prepared for war, though administration
chose the time to make the declaration. Little preparation had been made even for defence on the seacoast, or for the protection of commerce, and navigation which were exposed to the hostile attacks of a powerful enemy, by this unnecessary measure. The president immediately called on the governors of the several states, for aid to protect the country, by the militia ; while the few regular forces, which had been raised,
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by the administration, were sent to invade the British province of Canada.
The opposition to these measures was powerful and exten- sive, especially in the commercial states. It was said, the war was unnecessary, if not unjust; as negotiations, in a proper spirit had not been fully tried; and it was strenuously contend- ed, that it was improper to rely solely on the militia, when the war did not come unexpectedly on the federal rulers, but they had selected the time to begin it; and it was further insisted, that neither the executive nor the legislature of the federal government had authority, by the constitution, to call the mili- tia into the field, except to repel sudden and unexpected inva- sion, when government had no time to meet it in any other manner. No invasion existed, nor imminently threatened ; and it was argued that when it did, and there was no other de- fence, then, and then only, it would be proper to call on the militia. Another objection, but in some measure implied in the general one already noticed, was to the requisition for the militia, which proposed to send a part of them out of the state, to place others at a great distance from their homes, and to station them at a few places, to wait for an invasion, (as it might, or might not, happen in three or six months,) and leav- ing other places, equally exposed, entirely defenceless. It was considered, indeed, that the order from the federal admin- istration for the militia, was assuming a power not warranted by the constitution, in the situation of the country, and was destroying the distinct character of the militia, who ought not to be treated as permanent troops might justly be : as the militia were to be employed only in case of an invasion, and for the defence of a portion of the country, till regular forces could be raised for the purpose.
Governor Strong probably had these or similar views, when he declined to call out the militia of Massachusetts, on a requi- sition made by officers of the general government, in June, 1812, soon after the declaration of war. To the first and second request for the militia he gave no reply ; for he proba- bly was in doubt, what the constitution had made his duty in such a case : and he was also aware that no invasion was about being made, or imminently threatened at that time. When requested a third time, by a military officer of the United States, acting under directions of the secretary of war, the gov- ernor directed a note to the war department; in which he said, " that he was disposed to comply with the requisitions of con- gress, and of the president, where the constitution made it clearly his duty ; but that no invasion existed, or threatened,
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or was apprehended; that the militia were averse from going from their homes, except the emergency absolutely required it ; that the stations proposed for the militia on the seacoasts, by the officer of the United States, who made the requisition, were not the most proper, and that other places equally required to be protected ; and that it would be most economical and effi- cient, to call out the militia when invasion took place, or should immediately threaten.
Before sending this letter, Governor Strong had issued a gen- eral order, calling upon the officers of the militia to have their men in a state of preparation to march at the shortest notice, and to any place invaded or alarmed. And soon after, when application was made by the people of the towns in Maine, near the British territory, for aid, as they feared an invasion for sake of plunder, Governor Strong ordered several companies of militia to those places, and gave the President of the United States notice, that he might appoint a military officer to com- mand them.
The administration and its friends censured this conduct of Governor Strong; but the people of Massachusetts generally approved of it; among whom were many of those who had before supported the measures of the general government. It was believed to be improper to depend on the militia for a long military service, which could justly be required of such only as should engage in that employment ; and it was the prevailing opinion, that the constitution authorized the calling out of the militia only in case of sudden emergency, when there was no previous warning, and no opportunity to provide other defence : The language of the constitution, in reference to the subject, expressly confining the authority to call for the militia, "to repel invasion." The war, besides, was unpopular, and the manner of prosecuting it neither able, judicious, or prudent.
Governor Strong had the approbation of the justices of the supreme judicial court, in the course he pursued. The consti- tution of Massachusetts provides that the governor may request the opinion of the judges in cases of difficulty. He referred the case to their decision ; and their opinion was, that the gov- ernor of a state, who had the command of the militia thereof, had a right to judge whether there was an invasion, and there- fore whether the militia should be ordered out, when called for ; and that the militia should be commanded by the officers of their choice, as the constitution provided, except under con- mand of a superior officer of the United States. It was an objection, at the time, with some, that the militia, when called into service, were intended to be commanded by an officer of
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the United States, instead of the militia officers, chosen by their respective companies, regiments and brigades.
The decision and conduct of Governor Strong, respecting the militia, furnished matter for dispute between the two poli- tical parties, which had long divided the state and country. The friends of the national government condemned the con- duct of the executive of Massachusetts, with great severity, as disorganizing, and as dangerous opposition to the authority of congress and the president ; while the federal party contended, that the constitution was in his favor, and that the executive of the United States had assumed a power, in calling for the mili- tia, when there was no invasion, not granted by the constitu- tion, nor by the law of congress, which authorized him to make a requisition for them, in the occurrence of such an event. In the law of congress, the phrase of the constitution was carefully adopted, and it empowered the executive to call for the militia " to repel invasion." As there was no invasion when the call was made, and no immediate or imminent danger of invasion, Governor Strong contended, that he was not obliged to order them out. He argued, also, that if the president had a right to call the militia into service, when there was no invasion, and none immediately threatening, then he might call them out at all times, under the pretence that there might be an invasion, and keep them in service as long as he chose: and thus make a standing army of them, and direct and control them in the most arbitrary manner.
There was an extra meeting of the general court, in October, 1812, summoned by the governor, chiefly for the purpose of directing in what manner the electors of president and vice president of the United States should be chosen, as the two branches of the legislature did not agree on the mode, at the session in June. Governor Strong gave them information respecting the course he had pursued as to the militia: and he observed, on the occasion, "if this state had been in danger, I presume the regular troops would not have been ordered away :* and, if they were so ordered, that the militia were not liable to he called into service and stationed in the forts of the United States, to do garrison duty, when no danger of invasion appear- ed. I am fully disposed to comply with the requirements of the federal constitution, and the laws made in pursuance there-
* When the second or third call was made on the governor for the militia, in July, it was stated as an additional reason for the request, that the United States' troops, in the forts in Boston harbor, were ordered to the borders of Canada. If an invasion was expected on the seaboard of the state, it was strange the forts of the United States should be left without troops!
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of; and I sincerely regret that a request should be made, by an officer of the general government, to which I could not con- form. But it appeared to me that the requisition aforesaid was of that character: and I was under the same obligation to main- tain the rights of the state, as to support the constitution of the United States."
" The officer of the United States army supposed, that he was authorized by the president, to require any part and even the whole of the militia, to be called out and marched to such places, in this and the other states, as he may think proper. If this be a correct construction of the constitution, then the presi- dent and congress will be able at any time, by declaring war, to call the whole militia of the United States into actual service, and to march them to such places as they may see fit, and to retain them in service as long as the war shall continue.
" Heretofore it has been understood, that the power of the president and congress, to call the militia into service, was to be exercised only in cases of sudden emergency, and not for the purpose of forming them into a standing army, or of carry- ing on offensive war. But according to the above construction, the right to employ the militia is made to depend, not on con- tingencies which the government might be unable to foresee or provide against, but on its own act ; on the existence of a state of war, which the government has a right to declare, and to continue as long as it may think proper.
" Although many important attributes of sovereignty arc given by the constitution to the government of the United States, yet there are some still belonging to the state govern- ments. One of the most essential of these is the control of the militia, except in the exigencies above-mentioned. This has not been delegated to the United States. It is therefore reserved to the states respectively. And whenever it shall be taken from them, and a consolidation of the military force of the states shall be effected, the security of the state govern- ments will be lost, and they will wholly depend for their exist- ence on the moderation and forbearance of the federal govern- ment. * Whatever sentiments may prevail among the people of this state, as to the justice or expediency of the war, I trust they will perform the duties enjoined on them by the constitution and the laws; and that they will do nothing to obstruct the government in the constitutional measures it may adopt."
The opinion of the governor, respecting his right to judge whether the exigency had occurred, on which the militia were to be called out, by the general government, and as to liis
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duty, in the situation in which he was placed, was approved by the majority of the legislature, and of the citizens of Mas- sachusetts. And individual statesmen of distinction afterwards gave their testimony in favor of its soundness. Mr. Lloyd, a senator in congress, from Massachusetts, said, " The admission of the doctrine to the full extent, that the executive of the general government is the only judge of the exigencies when the militia are to be called into the service of the United States, at the time and in the manner which he may think expedient ; that the militia can, by the junction of a large number to a few regular troops, be officered by the United States, and that the executive of the several states, contrary to their own belief in the existence of such emergency, should be obliged to bow before this tribunal, erected in the breast of a single individual, and to yield implicit obedience to such an opinion, must place them at the mercy of any future tenant of power ; strip the individual states of their physical, as well as of their fiscal force, and scarcely leave a remnant of that self-dependence, which some of them suppose they rightfully possess."
Mr. Otis, also a senator in congress, referring to this ques- rion, observed, " If the president has a right, not only of de- ciding upon the existence of the constitutional contingency, which is to justify him in calling out the militia, but also of appointing his prefects * to command them, he possesses the power at any moment, of converting the whole of the militia of the country, into pretorian cohorts. This is a tremendous power, and an awfully pregnant question, which it is not my purpose now to discuss. It is the question about the power of the sword, which settles all other questions. If it is clear the president has it, be it so. But is it so clear, that hesitation and inquiry on the subject become criminal? Was the retaining of the command of the militia by the governor, under the cir- cumstances of the case, equivalent to an obstruction of the laws? a paralyzing of the means and agents of the govern- ment? Certainly, it will not be pretended."
* The president divided the United States into military districts, when war was declared ; and appointed a commander to each; who was to call for the militia when he pleased, station them where he pleased, and retain them as long as he pleased.
CHAPTER XXXV.
Governor Strong re-elected-Measures of defence against invasion-Arms provided by the State for the people in the seaports-Regular troops ordered out of the state-Opinions of Political Parties-Public Declara- tions of a distinguished Federalist-Senate of Massachusetts-Resolu- tions in New York-Senators commissioned as Officers in the Army- ยท Speech of Governor Strong-Disapproves of the War-Party Declara- tions and Opinions-Governor's Speech-Answer of Senate and House- Militia called out for defence, in 1814-Dispute with Military Officer of the United States-Castine taken by the British-Extra Session of the General Court-Governor 's Speech-Answer of Representatives-Res- olutions of General Court-Convention at Hartford-General orders of Governor Strong repeated, for the Militia to repel invasions-Who de- fended the State by his orders.
GOVERNOR STRONG was re-elected for the year 1813, though great efforts were made against him, by those who approved the measures of the general government. The ma- jority of votes in his favor was greater than in 1812, and afforded the strongest evidence of the confidence of the people in his wisdom and patriotism. It was a period of great excite- ment and alarm; the conduct of the general government gave much dissatisfaction to the citizens of Massachusetts, but they confided in the prudence and firmness of Governor Strong to protect them from military despotism, and political harm.
No attack was early made by the British on Massachusetts, and no fears were entertained of an immediate invasion. The general order of the governor, issued in July, 1812, (soon after the declaration of war was published, and the call on him for the militia,) by which he required the militia officers to have their repsective corps in readiness to defend the state, at any and every point, was renewed in 1813. The people, in some parts of the seaboard, who felt themselves particularly exposed, as there were some cruisers on the coasts, applied to the exec- utive for arms and ammunition for defence, which were readily furnished them. The governor liad before recommended to
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the general court to provide means of defence to the people in the seaports, as the regular federal troops had left the state : and he was accordingly empowered to furnish such articles as might be deemed necessary for the purpose. A committee was appointed, consisting of three citizens, who had been offi- cers of high rank in the war of the revolution, to attend to this service, under the direction of the governor.
When the administration, at this period, requested a loan, to meet the expenses of the war, and for its further prosecu- tion, very few in Massachusetts subscribed to it. Some de- clined from a want of confidence in the wisdom and prudence of administration ; but more, from a principle of decided disap- probation of the war. The friends of the general government condemned the capitalists who refused to loan their money ; and even branded them as enemies of liberty and of the union. The spirit of party had become still more exasperated. The federalists denounced the administration, as waging war without good cause, and as intending to give indirect aid to the French nation. The democratic party denounced the federalists, in their turn, as friends of Great Britain, and intending to divide New England from the other states in the union. What were the private views of the leading men of both parties no one is authorized to determine. The difficulty is explained, however, by supposing, that the administration was led to adopt its mea- sures, from prejudices against England, and too great partiality for France, together with a different estimation of the import- ance of commerce from the northeastern states; and that the federalists had the greatest abhorrence of the rulers of France, with whom there was danger of an alliance ; and who wished to maintain a good understanding with Great Britain, whose trade was highly profitable. The federalists, however, had other and higher views. They believed the war unnecessary, and they found it was prosecuted without economy and without system. And they contended, that an open and manly diplo- matic course on the part of the United States would have secured the essential rights and interests of the country without resort to arms.
The strongest language used by the federalists, at this period of irritation and alarm, was as follows :- "They feared the anti-commercial system, and other impolitic and injurious mea- sures of the general government, might lead to a severance of the states"-"that they considered the union of the states as an inestimable blessing, and that they deeply deplored a system of measures, which might disaffect a portion of the community to the national compact." An eminent man of the federal
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party, in a public address, said, " Let us cleave to the union, to the last extremity." And he added, "It is the universal sentiment among thie federalists, that the force of the motives which led to the union, though weakened, is not so impaired as to justify the attempt, or even the wish for a separation. With great regret some are compelled to believe, indeed, that public affairs are sadly conducted, and may hasten such an event. In order to prevent it, therefore, they sometimes express their fears of such a calamity. But they are desirous the people of the commercial states should exercise patience and forbearance, submit to all reasonable privations, and attempt all practicable experiments to obtain relief from the oppressions of the present system. We ask that commerce, for the pros- perity and protection of which the federal government was chiefly instituted, may not be systematically crippled in peace, nor systematically burdened in war. Such a system is unequal, and cannot be endured. The union is dear to the people of Massachusetts. Commerce is also dear to us. But what symptoms of disaffection or disunion in this declaration? When the people fully perceive the destructive tendency of the anti- commercial system, they may prefer to follow the example of their virtuous ancestors, and quit a country which will not pro- tect their rights, rather than to suffer oppression and ruin." *
The senate of Massachusetts, for 1812, was democratic, owing to the formation of new senatorial districts the preceding year. It was designed for party objects, so as to give a demo- cratic majority to that body, when, according to the usual and most convenient division of the state, the majority would have been federal. Great complaint was made of this measure, and eventually it injured the party which projected it, to perpetuate its own political power. The members of that branch of the legislature were very firmly fixed in their respective opinions
* The following resolutions, passed at a large meeting of highly respect- able characters in New York, about this time, will shew their views of the policy of the war. The public paper, which published them, stated, that the resolutions were approved by Mr. Jay, Mr. King, Judge Benson, Matthew Clarkson, and Richard Varick : - " That war, one of the greatest calamities which affliet mankind, when waged without just cause, is an affront to the Divine Being - that the war, lately declared, by a bare major- ity of congress; is unwise ; that it would have been difficult so select a period more unfavorable for a measure so portentous ; the United States being unprepared, the treasury empty, the property of our citizens in the hands of those now made our enemies, the revenue impaired by imprudent commercial restrictions, and now by the war destroyed. And that we are irresistibly drawn to the conclusion, that the American people will be sub- jected to the will and power of the French emperor. We are therefore under the dire necessity of declaring, that we have no confidence in the men who have brought us to this perilous situation."
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and measures. But some of the democratic members discov- ered a commendable spirit of independence, in a vote taken by that body, attempted to be decided by mere party feelings. Two of the senators received commissions for the regular army of the United States, in the summer of 1812, after they had been chosen ; and after they had occupied their seats at the board. It was generally considered highly improper for them to retain seats in the legislature after accepting their military commissions in the army of the United States. The resolution introduced in the senate, declaring their seats vacated by their acceptance of military commissions in the army, was approved by the majority ; five of the democratic members voted for the resolution. There were only nine members against it. Some of the persons who voted in favor of these senators retaining their scats, under these circumstances, had expressed an opin- ion against the propriety of Mr. Jackson reinaining there, in 1789, when he was federal marshal of the district.
The remarks of Governor Strong, in his public speech to the general court, in June, 1813, will develope similar views to those given at a former session, respecting the war, and the rights and duties of the people at that critical juncture; but they are so important to the cause of well-regulated liberty, and to the support of republican institutions, that they ought to be often presented ; especially as he thought proper to press them on the minds of the people. "We are bound to obey the laws made in conformity to the constitution. But that en- sures to us the freedom of speech: and at this momentous period, it is our right and duty to inquire into the grounds of the present war; to reflect on the state of public affairs; and to express sentiments concerning them with decency and frank- ness ; and to endeavor, as far as we have influence, by temperate and constitutional. means, to promote an honorable reconcilia- tion. By an unnecessary war, the deepest guilt is incurred; and therefore every belligerent nation should inquire, which of the contending parties is justly chargeable with that guilt. It has been said, that our national honor compelled us to engage in a war with Great Britain. The honor of a nation consists in the display of its wisdom, justice, moderation, and magna- nimity. It requires the government to regulate its conduct for the greatest advantage of the state, and to pursue that series of measures, which will most effectually promote the welfare of the people. But that species of honor which would prompt us to wage war for every supposed instance of abuse or disrespect, is not the honor of a wise and moral people. So far as con- quest is the object of the present war, its policy, to say nothing
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