History of Massachusetts from the year 1790, to 1820. v. 3, Part 9

Author: Bradford, Alden, 1765-1843. cn
Publication date: 1829
Publisher: Boston : Richardson and [etc.]
Number of Pages: 664


USA > Massachusetts > History of Massachusetts from the year 1790, to 1820. v. 3 > Part 9


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"Our constitution, "' said the Governor, "for -. bids any exclusive pretension to the honours of the- State. Every class of men are entitled to partake


* In evidence of a belief, that Mr. Strong would be mode- rate and dignified in his political course, the following extract' of a letter from Mr. L **** then a Senator in Congress, from Massachusetts, may be given -- " I expect to see a communica- tion to the Legislature, from a highly respectable, correct and. dignified Chief Magistrate, replete with sentiments of modera- tion and firmness, of rational liberty, of patriotism and self-re- spect ; which, heretofore, under the same administration, have . been the characteristics of the venerable State of Massachusetts,. the Almamater of the liberties and independence of the Ameri -- can. republic."


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of the same advantages, and have an equal and common right. If this is infringed, we may be sure, that sentiments of discontent and animosity will prevail. We ought indeed, to select persons of ability and integrity for public employments. But if we make it a rule to advance only our po- litical friends, we shall become the heads of a par- ty, and be incapable of preserving, with equity and moderation, the rights of the whole people.


"In monarchies, the prince is the source of all power, and the fountain of honour and office. Hc, therefore, thinks himself authorised, in appointing his subordinate officers, to reward the attachment and to purchase future support of his adherents. But, in Republics, the people are possessed of the sov- creign power : and Legislators and Magistrates, elected by them, are bound to employ their au- thority for the common benefit. They have no right to consider the power, deputed to them, as their own property ; or to make vacancies or ap- pointments, for selfish or party purposes. Should a contrary rule be established, it appears to me, that political feuds would be endless and implaca- ble. The persons in office, and their friends and retainers, would employ every method to prevent. any change in an administration ; while their rivals would be equally assiduous and cager to effect a change. From the frequency of our elections, there would scarcely be any interruptions, in these struggles ; and the longer they should continue, the greater would be their violence."


The Governor submitted to his council the pro- priety and expediency of restoring those persons to office, in the State, who, during the preceding year had been arbitrarily removed, solely on ac-


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count of their political opinions. The council ad- vised that it was proper, and that justice required, such persons should be restored to the respective offices, of which they had thus been deprived. Ac- cordingly, the Sheriff's, Clerks of Courts, Regis- ters of Probate, and other public officers, holding commissions under the Supreme Executive of the State, were re-appointed to the offices, which they held, at the beginning of the former political year.


The calamity, which many had long feared and predicted, from the strange policy of the federal government, was visited upon the country in June 1812. War was solemnly declared against Great Britain, by Congress, on the 17th of that month : But the majorities were small, in favour of the measure, in both branches of the National Legis- lature .* The intelligence reached Boston, on the 23d. while the General Court was in session. The Governor immediately communicated it officially, to the Representatives of the people. The House of Representatives prepared an address to their fellow citizens, regretting the event and expressing their opinion of its impolicy and inexpediency. They were of opinion, that negotiation would have been the most proper and effectual way to obtain re- dress for any wrongs the United States had suffer- ed : and that there was a disposition, in the British . Government, to adjust existing difficulties, on equi-


table and honourable terms. The Senate, at the same time, adopted and published an address to the people of the State, approving of the war, and


* It was also said, by those who had an opportunity of form- ing a correct opinion on the subject, that President Madison was not in favour of war, but was urged to it by some of his . political friends.


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declaring, it in their opinion, just and necessary. The House, had, at an early day of the Session, and before war was declared, forwarded a memo- rial to Congress, in favour of peace and deprecat- ing the evils of war with England. The memori- al was approved by a vote of 406 to 240. The address to the people, published after the declara- tion of war, was adopted by a similar majority.


This vote in the House of Representatives was, probably, a just indication of the opinion of the whole body of the people in Massachusetts, relat- ing to the policy of the war of 1812. Three fifths of the citizens, perhaps, a greater proportion were opposed to a war with Great Britain, both before and after the formal declaration of it by Congress. The people generally, believed all wars improper, which were not necessary for maintaining the lib- erty and independence of the country.


The war was also unpopular in other parts of the United States. There was a belief, with many patriotic and intelligent men, in various parts of the country, how well founded, it would be diffi- cult to decide, that the measure was owing, in a degree, to a disposition in the national rulers to keep in favour with the French Emperor, who had undertaken to dictate the policy of the United States ; and that, if war could not be avoided, both with France and England, there were strong- er reasons for engaging in it against the former, than against the latter, as the American Merchants had suffered most by French depredations, without re- ceiving any reparation, and the British had al- ways appeared willing to settle all national dis- putes by negotiation. It was also considered, that a war must be a great burden upon the people, for


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many years, whilst there was yet a heavy debt of the nation to discharge. 'This consideration would not have much weight, indeed, with any portion of the people, in a question of independence, or of right : But where the absolute necessity of war did not appear, and there was reason to believe, that negotiation might have given to the United States all which a war could procure, it must have had an influence with the more prudent and patriotic citizens.


At this Session of the Legislature, the chares- ters of most of the Banks in the State were renew- ed. and extended to October 1831. This term of time was fixed, because some of the Banks, al- ready incorporated, would continue to that period, and it was thought proper to place them all on an equality. Several of these banking companies would expire during the year 1812. By the new acts of incorporation, most of the Banks were al- tered, both as to privileges and liberties, with a view to have them founded on and governed by the same principles. They were made liable to pay an annual tax of half per cent. for ten years ; a- mounting to $16,000, which was to be appropriat- ed to the funds of the several Colleges in the State. The distribution was as follows-To Harvard, 10,000; to Williams, and to Bowdoin, $3000, each.


Early in the year 1812, Congress authorised the President of the United States to order a detach- 'ment of one hundred thousand of the militia ; and in April, the Governor of Massachusetts was re- requested to detach ten thousand, the portion al- lotted to the State. Orders were accordingly


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issued,* but no returns were made for four or five months, nor until further directions were given for the purpose. This was chiefly owing to new ar- rangements, and the forming of new divisions of the militia during the preceding year. Generally, the militia of Massachusetts had been well regu- lated and organized, for many former years. Some days previously to the declaration of war, Gover- nor Strong received notice from the war depart- ment, by a letter dated 19th of June, that the mi- litia, before requested to be detached, would be called for, to be placed at the disposal and under the command of a military officer in the service of the United States. This was considered an ex- traordinary demand. For the law of Congress, authorising the President to order out the militia, was founded in the clause of the constitution, which gives the National Legislature power to pro- vide for calling them out to repel invasion, (other- wise, indeed, the law itself would have been un- constitutional ;) and it was plausibly, if not justly argued, that the militia could not be rightfully call- ed upon, except the country was really invaded, or there was imminent and immediate danger of an invasion.


On the 22d of June, and before the Governor had received direct and official intelligence of the declaration of war, by Congress, against Great Britain, Major General Dearborn, who had been recently appointed to command the few regular troops of the United States, then stationed within the limits of Massachusetts, made a requisition, by authority of the President, for forty one companies


* The militia thus to be detached were to make three divi- sions.


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of the detached militia ; proposing to march eight companies to Rhode Island, for the defence of that State, and to station the others, at certain places within the State of Massachusetts. But in this arrangement, many ports and towns equally expos- ed as any others, if the State were really then in danger of invasion, were left unprovided. To this requisition, Governor Strong made no reply. He was in doubt, whether the exigency had occurred, mentioned in the federal constitution, to justify the President to call the militia into actual service of the United States. The day following the request of General Dearborn, he had, indeed, received in- formation, through one of the Senators in Congress from Massachusetts, that war had been declared : But there was no invasion of the State; nor was there any danger of an invasion for three or four months, whatever might thereafter be the move- ments of the enemy.


This was a subject of such a serious nature, as to principle and right, as well as to the consequences of a decision, that a character like Governor Strong, who was superior to all party considera- tions, and was sincerely desirous of acting correct- ly, in his responsible station, was not to be expect- ed to determine upon his course, except after the most deliberate and mature consideration. And it was so, in fact ; for the Governor discovered extreme anxiety to weigh, impartially, all the cir- cumstances of the crisis, and to ascertain what was his duty, as the Chief Magistrate of the State, sovereign and independent, in many respects, and yet formning a part of the great national, federative republic. His hesitation was not the effect of timi- dity, or of an intention to oppose the measures and


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laws of the federal government; but it was the natural effect of the most ardent and elevated pat- riotism. Judging from his public speeches, and from all his declarations on the subject, it is evi- dent, that the Governor was actuated by a sincere desire to fulfil the duties of his high station, both to the Commonwealth and to the Union. The pe- culiar circumstances of the occasion rendered his situation a novel as well as a delicate one. He was bound to preserve the rights of the militia of Massachusetts, as well as to comply with the just requisitions of the federal or national rulers ; and whether their requisitions were constitutional and just, he was inclined to believe, it was his preroga- tive to judge.


On the 26th of June, General Dearborn renew- ed his call for the militia of Massachusetts, to the number and for the purpose before required.


The Governor still declined calling out the mi- litia ; but issued a general order, on the 3d of July, as commander in chief of the militia of the State, (a copy of which, he directed to be sent to Gener- al Dearborn,) requiring them to be in preparation to march, at the shortest notice, to any place of danger, for the defence of the inhabitants, as they might be directed by their immediate officers, whether commanders of divisions, brigades, regi- ments or battalions .* The militia officers of these grades were authorised and expressly enjoined, by the Governor, in this order, to see that the men were equipped, and to march them wherever and whenever danger should exist, within the State. He also gave orders for completing the detach- ment required in April, and for having the returns


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made to the Adjutant General without further de- lay. To command the militia, thus detached, if called into actual service, he designated three Ma- jor Generals, who had been officers in the war of the revolution.


By direction of the President, the Secretary of War addressed another letter to Governor Strong, dated July 15th, urging him to order out the mili- tia of Massachusetts, as requested by General Dearborn, and stating " that the danger of invasion had increased, since the date of his former note,"' which was several days before the declaration of war, when there was, in fact, no danger of invasion whatever. For there was no pretence, that the British were meditating an attack on the United States, or were desirous of a war with this coun- try. However unjust or arbitrary the conduct of that government had been, in particular instances, there was no doubt of its wish to keep peace with America.


As an additional reason for calling the militia, immediately, into the service of the United States, it was also stated, "that the regular troops, sta- tioned in the forts on the sea-board, were ordered to the North- Western frontiers, and that the towns and people on the coast would require other pro- tection." General Dearborn, who was the military chief in the district, in which Massachusetts was in- cluded, gave the same reason, in another letter, to the Governor, of July 15th, requesting him to or- der the militia into the service of the United States. And soon after, he left the sea-board of Massachu- setts, with most of the regular troops in the forts, and marched them to the borders of Canada. Gov- ermor Strong again declined ordering the militia


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into the service of the United States, in the manner requested ; and seemed to rely, for the protection of the State, in case of invasion, on a compliance with the order of the third of July, by the whole body of citizens, both officers and men. The rea- sons, which induced him to adopt this system, with reference to the militia, though he probably acted with the advice of his council, are given in a let- ter, which he sent to the war department, bearing date August 5th.


" I received your letter, of the 15th, of July, at. Northampton, and the day following set off for Boston .* The people of Massachusetts appear to be under no apprehension of any invasion. Some towns on the sea coast have, indeed, applied for arms and amunition, and they have been supplied, in the manner they were furnished in the war of the revolution. But they express no desire, that any of the militia should be called out for their defence. You observe that the danger of invasion has in- creased. But it can hardly be supposed, that if this State had been in great danger of invasion the troops would have been called hence, to carry on offensive operations in a distant province. The opinion generally prevailed, that the Governor had no authority to call the militia into actual service, unless one of the exigences, contemplated by the constitution, exists. I therefore, thought it expe- dient to call the council together ; and having laid


* When Governor Strong left Boston, in July, to visit his fam- ily at Northampton, for a short time, a committee of the Coun- cil was appointed, consisting of the Lieutenant Governor and two other members, one of whom lived in Boston, and the other in the vicinity ; to give notice to the Governor and the other members of the Executive Council, if any important event should occur, requiring a meeting of the Board.



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before them your letter and those received from General Dearborn, I requested their advice on the subject of them, The Council said, that they could not see that the exigency existed ; and they advised me to ask the opinion of the Justices of the Su- preme Judicial Court of the State, on these two questions-whether the Commanders in Chief of the Militia of the several States, have a right to deter- mine, whether any of the exigencies, contemplated by the Constitution of the United States, exist, so as to require them to place the militia in the ser- vice of the United States, at the request of the President ? And, whether, when either of the exi- gencies exist, authorising the employment of the militia, in the service of the United States, the mi- litia thus employed, can be lawfully commanded by any officer, but of the militia, except by the President of the United States ?"*


The Governor proceeded to state, in the letter to the Secretary of War, that an application had


* The opinion of the Judges, on the first question, was, that the Commanders in Chief of the militia of the several States, had a right to judge whether the exigency existed, which would authorise the President to call the militia into the service of the United States, according to a provision of the federal constitu- tion. But, on the other point, they were not so explicit. They declined giving any opinion, as to the comparative superiority of rank between officers of the militia and of the United States troops. They believed the President had the right to appoint officers to command any detachment of militia, in his stead ; but they were also of opinion, that the militia ought to be kept dis- tinct from regular troops, and that it was their just right to in- sist on being under the immediate command of officers chosen by themselves .- It may be proper here to mention, that, in 1794, when President Washington called for a part of the militia of Pennsylvania and Virginia, to suppress a daring and formidable insurrection, which had taken place in Pennsylvania, they were under the immediate command of the Governors of those States. VOL. III.


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been made to him from the inhabitants of Eastport and vicinity, on the Eastern boundary of the State, and near Passamaquoddy Bay, for arms and also for three companies of militia, for the protection of those frontier towns ; and that, believing their sit- uation peculiarly exposed, at that time, being but a short distance from New-Brunswick, he had com- plied with their request. The people in that quar- ter were supplied with munitions of war, as desired ; and three companies of militia from the county of Hancock, where no attack was then apprehended, were ordered to Eastport for the protection of the place. The Governor also gave notice, in this let- ter, that these companies would be placed under the command of an officer of the United States.


He adds-" I have no intention, officially, to in- terfere with the measures of the general govern- ment ; but if the President was fully acquainted with the situation of this State, I think he could have no wish to call the militia into service, in the way proposed by General Dearborn. He proposes, that the militia should be stationed at only a few of the ports and places on the coast. From other places (according to his plan) a part of the militia were to be called away. This would increase their danger, and diminish their power of resistance .- The whole coast of Cape Cod is exposed, as much as any part of the State, to depredations and inva- sions. A part of the militia, according to his or- ders and proposals, must be removed from their homes ; and yet no place in that part of the State is assigned as a rendezvous for the militia. Every harbour or port within the State, has a compact settlement ; and generally, the country around the harbour is populous. The militia are well organ-


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ized, and would prefer to defend their own firesides in company with their friends, under their own of- ficers, rather than to be marched to a distant place, while strangers might be introduced to take their places at home."


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The sentiments and views of Governor Strong, as to the requisition for the militia, by order of the President of the United States, are also fully de- veloped, in his speech to the Legislature, at the session held in October following, when he gave a particular statement of his correspondence with the officers of the federal government ; and of his pro- ceedings subsequent to the call for the militia. " I presumed, if this State was in danger, that the reg- ular troops would not have been ordered to the North-west frontiers; and, if they were so ordered, that the militia were not liable to be called into ser- vice and stationed in the forts of the United States, to do garrison duty, when no danger of invasion appeared .- I have been fully disposed to comply with the requirements of the constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof; and sincerely regretted that a request should be made, by an officer of the national gov- ernment, to which I could not constitutionally con- form. But it appeared to me that the requisition aforesaid was of that character ; and I was under the same obligation to maintain the rights of the State, as to support the constitution of the United States."*


* When the act of Congress was passed, providing for call- ing the militia into the service of the United States, by the Pres- ident, a special reference was made to the exigencies mention- ed in the constitution ; and he was authorised by the law to exercise this power only when such exigency occurred. Was it


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The Governor was condemned and censured at the time, by the friends of the existing adminis- tration, and, at a subsequent period, by some of his own political party, for declining to order the mili- tia into the service of the United States, as he was requested. They believed the President should have the entire disposal and controul of the militia, in time of war. But the position assumed by Gov- ernor Strong has been often avowed since, that the State authority has a right to judge of the meaning of the constitution, as otherwise, the people may be subjected to unconstitutional laws, and the sep- arate States be deprived of all sovereign and in- dependent power. This doctrine has been, recent- ly, expressly asserted and advocated by the ancient and respectable State of Virginia, and it was ad- vanced, in 1812, by Governor Griswold of Connec- ticut .*


not a great assumption of power, then, to call for the militia be- fore war was declared ; or immediately after, when there was no invasion, and none soon expected ? Was it " moral treason," in the State anthority to question the constitutional right of the President, to require the service of the militia in such a situa- tion ?


* Whether Governor Strong's objections were grounded on a just construction of the constitution, or were warranted by its spirit, his sincerity and patriotism were never doubted. He is- sued a proclamation for a public Fast, at this time ; which, though criticised by a few, was highly creditable to him, as a patriot and christian. (See Appendix. )


It may not be out of place here to refer to the opinion of two distinguished Statesmen of Massachusetts, given some time after the war of 1812, and when party feelings, probably, had little influence on the judgment. In 1817, when pleading for the allowance of the claim of the State on the general govern- ment, for expenses incurred during the war, Mr. Lloyd said, " The admission of the doctrine, to the full extent, that the Ex-


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In the month of August, Captain Isaac Hull, who commanded the United States Frigate Con- stitution, attacked and captured an English Frig- ate ; and soon after came into the port of Boston, where he was received by all classes of citizens, with the most enthusiastic greetings. "They invit- ed him to a public dinner on this occasion, which was attended by all the respectable merchants of the town, and by public officers, both of the Stato and Nation. This was a very brilliant victory on


ccutive of the Union is to be the only judge of the exigencies, in which the militia is to be called into the service of the Uni- ted States, at the time and in the manner which he may think expedient-that the militia can, by the junction of a large num- ber to a few regular troops, be in fact officered by the United States-and that the Executive of the several States, contrary to their own belief in the existence of such emergency, should be obliged to bow before this tribunal, crected in the breast of a single individual, and to yield implicit obedience to such an opinion, must place them at the mercy or disposition of any fu- ture tenant of power ; strip the individual States of their phys- ical as well as their fiscal force ; and scarcely leave a remnant of that self-dependence, which some of them, at least, suppose they had obtained."




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