USA > Massachusetts > History of Massachusetts in the Civil War > Part 5
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Immediately after breakfast, I called on the Hon. Charles Sumner. Hle at once understood the object of my mission, and favored me with a statement on the present state of affairs. I also met him again later in the day in the Senate Chamber, when he went over again, with me, the same ground.
He gives as serious an account of the conspiracy to take possession of this city by the secessionists as any you have received ; but he thinks the danger has been steadily diminishing since the 2d of January, - the day on which the President gave General Scott power to concen- trate troops for the defence of the capital. The President has had several relapses since that date; and at times has seemed about to recall all the confidence he had placed in General Scott, and oblige him to undo all that had been done. The most extraordinary scenes have taken place in the Cabinet: only last week it was on the point of breaking up entirely, and the danger seemed to be as great again as at any previous time ; but the general has triumphed in all particu- lars, excepting in his desire to have the militia of the Northern States called out : to that the President will not even now consent.
Mr. Sumner thinks there was a crisis in the Cabinet last week, and that, even after. the general had overcome the hesitation of the Presi- dent, there was a most serious danger to be apprehended from the revolutionary threats of the Democratic leaders in Maryland, in which the leaders of both wings of the Democratic party united. IIe thinks, however, that, the first schemes of the conspirators having been discon- certed, there was nothing to be apprehended in the way of an attack upon this city, unless the conspirators should have been enabled to lean upon State authority for their action. Therefore he thinks that the result of the election of delegates to the convention in Virginia has postponed the danger from this source. He is convinced that the conspirators counted upon a different result in Virginia; that, by the 18th, the Virginia Convention would haye pronounced for secession ; and that they were therefore safe in calling the Maryland Convention for that day, being sure that in that event Maryland would follow suit. If the result of the Virginia election had been in favor of the secessionists, the attack on the Capitol might have been carried out without waiting for the formal action of the Virginia Convention. Mr. Sumner now thinks there is no immediate danger to be feared of such an attack.
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COLONEL RITCHIE AT WASHINGTON.
He is by no means confident of the determination to which that con- vention will ultimately come, but thinks that a delay has been gained which will carry us over the 4th of March in safety. Mr. Adams and Mr. Seward, with both of whom I have had long conversations, agree with Mr. Sumner fully as to any danger of an immediate attack. Mr. Seward thinks all danger is past. Mr. Sumner thinks Mr. Seward has never been aware of the real peril ; and is evidently of the opinion that the crisis is only postponed. Mr. Adams thinks there will be no need of troops before the 6th of March, but thinks we shall have to fight after that date.
Mr. Sumner thinks Congress would be now sitting in Independence HIall, Philadelphia, but for General Scott's action. Mr. Seward seems to think this concentration of troops has been unnecessary. General Wilson appears to be of the opinion that Massachusetts and New York will have to furnish money, but doubts if they will be called upon for any troops. Mr. Seward urged me to write to you, and beg you to secure the passage of the resolutions by which Massachusetts would endorse the bonds of the United States to the extent of the deposit of surplus revenue in her hands, made in 1837. He says this is all they now ask of Massachusetts; that she will never have to pay a cent on account of such indorsement, but that the indorsement must be given, as the new Administration will be without funds. I have also con- versed with Mr. Burlingame, Mr. Thayer, and Mr. Alley, of Massa- chusetts, and particularly with Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, the chairman of the committee who have been inquiring into this conspiracy.
Mr. Adams, Mr. Burlingame, Mr. Thayer, and Mr. Stanton, all talked the matter over together in my presence ; and all were of opin- ion that no call would be made on Massachusetts before March 4.
Mr. Seward is the only one I have seen who stated that he thought all danger was now at an end, owing to the action of Virginia. And even Mr. Seward, at dinner this P.M., at Mr. Adams', stated that the South must succumb, or we should have to exterminate them, or they would have to exterminate us. He thinks the South are anxious to creep out of the movement of their own creation.
I have had to give you as rapid a resume of the opinions of these civilians as possible, as I have hardly time to reach the mail. The only point of immediate importance is, that all agree that there is no probability of an immediate call upon us for militia.
Mr. Stanton thought, that, if a call were made, it would be for vol- unteers ; and that there would be time to enlist special regiments for the war, as in the Mexican war. After leaving Mr. Sumner, I called on General Scott. He is avowedly very anxious even now, and would
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REBELLION.
at once call for ten thousand men, if empowered to do so. IIe says the President, however, will never issue such a requisition. The President doubts his power ; and, while I was with the general, Mr. Stanton came to consult with him about a bill, which I inclose, intro- duced for the purpose of meeting this objection of the President's.
But even if this bill passes, - and it will pass, unless the Republi- cans are satisfied that the President already possesses the power hereby intended to be given him, - still the President thinks that a call for Northern militia would at once set Virginia and Maryland in a blaze.
They have declared in Maryland, only last week, that the Susque- hanna should flow with blood, if the attempt were made to bring North- ern troops across it.
General Scott therefore agrees that there is no probability of any call being made on you by President Buchanan. He, however, would himself issue such a call at once if he had the power, and would have issued it a month ago.
With Colonel Keyes, of General Scott's staff, I discussed all the points at length, which were considered at the meeting of officers con- vened by you on Monday last.
Colonel Keyes is General Scott's right-hand man, and is the officer who has been charged with ferreting out this whole matter. He also says there will be no call at present, but that we must be prepared. I telegraphed at once, after my interview with Mr. Sumner, General Scott, and Colonel Keyes, to Mr. Albert G. Browne, Jr., " There is not the slightest probability of any immediate call; particulars by mail; take no further steps." Colonel Keyes approved of this de- spatch ; and so did Messrs. Sumner, Wilson, Adams, Burlingame, and Thayer.
Colonel Keyes thinks it would not be safe to come, either by land or by the Potomac, but that the United States must hold the forts at Baltimore ; and that the troops must come by sea to Baltimore, and land there under cover of the forts.
As to this, however, as also the other details, I will give you oral information ; and Colonel Keyes will furnish me with much at a later day to which he could not give answers at once. There are also many things which will depend upon circumstances at the date of the call. I shall see to-morrow if affairs assume any different aspect ; and, if they do not, I shall leave here to-morrow afternoon.
I shall not think it expedient, under the circumstances, to approach the Mayor of Baltimore.
Please excuse this hurried note, as I have been writing to save the
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COLONEL RITCHIE AT NEW YORK.
mail, and been obliged to disregard form. I believe I have given you the substance of all that I have learned here.
Your Excellency's most obedient,
HARRISON RITCHIE, Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
P.S. It is thought that the delay gained by the result of the Vir- ginia election will give time for at least one thousand of the troops from Texas to get here before they are wanted. General Scott thinks he can count upon two thousand of the volunteers of this district. Colonel Keyes says, be prepared ; organize your regiments, and drill them ; furnish them with the new rifle-musket, knapsacks, canteens, blankets, and proper clothing, one hundred rounds of ammunition per man, and a supply of camp-kettles.
As to other camp equipage, it may be necessary : that he cannot tell at present.
Colonel Ritchie left Washington the next day, and, on arriv- ing at New York, wrote another letter from that city, dated February 8th, in which he discusses again the position of affairs at Washington, and makes certain suggestions in regard to getting troops to Washington, which in time became of great practical service : -
" You will have perceived by my first letter that I had already made the acquaintance of Colonel Keyes. In fact we became great friends. When General Scott referred me to his two aides, - Colonels Leigh and Keyes, - I made up my mind after a very short conversa- tion, that Colonel Leigh was a man of 'Southern proclivities,' who did not look with any favor upon my mission, though I had a letter of introduction to him from a mutual friend. He was disposed I thought to prevent my interview with General Scott, - and interrupt it after I had obtained it by introducing other people and other matters, - and he showed evident marks of dissatisfaction at my quiet persistence until I had accomplished my object. Of course I did not appear to notice this .* Keyes, on the other hand, went into the matter with his whole heart. He said he was bored to death with inquiries on these points - but where they were direct and to the point, he would answer them by the hour with pleasure. I had also heard of Mr. Goddard's errand, and conversed with him before receiving your
* Leigh afterwards deserted to the enemy, taking with him many of General Scott's plans and confidential papers.
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REBELLION.
Excellency's note. I, however, had another conversation with him yesterday morning, when he informed me that the answer given to liis request for a detailed plan, was, in effect, that none such could be furnished at present. Some regulars, one company of artillery from Augusta, and one company of dragoons from Carlisle barracks, arrived yesterday ; and, as I believe I mentioned in my first, a draft of infantry arrived at Washington in the train in which I reached the city.
" General Scott and Colonel Keyes are evidently anxious, and would like more men ; but the President will never issue the requisition .. . Floyd has so plundered the United States magazines, arsenals, and depots of munitions of war and warlike stores, that they do not know yet what is left, and so cannot tell what we must bring with us. It is clear, that, if we move, it must be by sea, landing at Baltimore or Annapolis ; that pilots must be secured in advance, as they will be seized by the secessionists ; and that the ships must go to sea with sealed orders, while a false destination is publicly reported.
"I shall take the liberty to recommend one other caution, to be adjusted when I can speak with you in private, and which actual expe- rience has shown me is necessary, if you desire that certain Boston papers should not divulge all your plans, as they have done hitherto. On Thursday morning (yesterday), I saw Mr. Sumner, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Burlingame, Mr. Adams, and others. They had nothing new to communicate, but adhere to their conviction, that there is no prospect, or possibility indeed, of an immediate call upon you. I mentioned in my first, that Mr. Seward was the only person I saw who pretended to think the danger more than postponed. I happened to be present at a conversation between him and some of his most intimate and con- fidential friends, when he evidently spoke out his sincere conviction. I was much impressed with what he said, which satisfied me that his optimist views are assumed, as necessary in his relation to the new Administration, and that in reality he is no more hopeful than Mr. Sumner. I will repeat his remark to you on my return. Mr. Adams also heard this remark; and when I asked him, yesterday, if he no- ticed it, he seemed surprised at my having marked it also, and con- fessed that it impressed him, very forcibly.
" Mr. Adams was on his way to find me yesterday, as I was going to his house. He came to ask me to inform your Excellency that the Secretary of the Treasury had sent for him that morning, to beg him to urge upon you the extreme importance of our Legislature passing the resolves authorizing the indorsement by Massachusetts of the bonds of the United States to the amount of the shares of the surplus
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LETTER OF SECRETARY SEWARD.
revenue deposited with her in 1837. Mr. Adams said that the Secre- tary wished to issue his proposals on Monday, if possible, and hoped these resolves would be passed before that time.
" I told Mr. Adams that Mr. Seward and Mr. Wilson had impressed me with the importance of this on the previous day, and that I had conveyed their request already to your Excellency. Mr. Adams then said I could do no more, and that he would write to you at once. I, however, saw Mr. Wilson about it yesterday morning, and he said he would consult the Massachusetts delegation yesterday, if possible, and get them all to sign a letter to you on the subject, for you to show to the Legislature.
" I should mention that I called the attention of our delegation to the unsatisfactory state of the United-States militia laws, and the ques- tions that have arisen with us already. I left a copy of Lothrop's opinion with Mr. Wilson. IIe will read it, and read again the debates in our Constitutional Convention, and see what can be done. They all saw the delicacy of the points, and their importance, and will do what they can.
" Finding I could do nothing more, I decided to leave Washington last night, though, for my own pleasure, I should have liked to have remained some time longer at the centre of action in this great crisis. I accordingly came here last night. We were detained by ice and the extreme, savage cold; and I found this morning that my baggage, though properly checked and shipped at Washington, had not come through ; indeed, none of the baggage did. This will detain me here ; but I can only repeat in more detail what I have already written to your Excellency, when I have the pleasure of reporting my return to you in person. I hope your Excellency will not think my journey has proved entirely unprofitable. I think, at any rate, that an under- standing and communication has been opened that may prove very useful in the future."
In connection with the letters of Colonel Ritchie, the follow- ing extract from a letter addressed to me by Secretary Seward, dated Washington, June 13, 1867, is of interest and impor- tance : -
" In regard to February, 1861, I need only say, that, at the time the secession leaders were all in the Senate and House, with power enough, and only wanting an excuse, to get up a resistance in the capital to the declaration of Mr. Lincoln's election and to his inaugu- ration; in other words, to have excuse and opportunity to open the
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REBELLION.
civil war here before the new Administration and new Congress could be in authority to subdue it. I desired to avoid giving them that advan- tage. I conferred throughout with General Scott and Mr. Stanton, then in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet. I presume I conversed with others in a way that seemed to me best calculated to leave the inauguration of a war to the secessionists, and to delay it, in any case, until the new Admin- istration should be in possession of the Goverment. It was less military demonstration that was wanted at that particular moment than political discretion.
" Discretion taught two duties ; namely, to awaken patriotism in the North, and to get the secessionists, with Buchanan's Administration, out of Washington. Mr. Adams well and thoroughly understood me. On the 22d of February, in concert with Mr. Stanton, I caused the United-States flag to be displayed throughout all the Northern and Western portions of the United States."
Colonel Ritchie did not leave Washington until he had come to a definite understanding in. regard to the route by which to forward troops to Washington, should a call for them be made. He had been cordially received by General Scott, to whom the purpose of his mission was made known, and he was referred to Colonel Keyes of General Scott's staff for information upon matters of detail. It was then arranged, that, in case of a call, the troops should be forwarded by sea to Annapolis or Balti- more. Golonel Keyes stated, that all other routes to Washing- ton would be unsafe ; that, for this reason, General Scott had placed an officer in command of Fort McHenry in Baltimore Harbor, upon whom he could rely to hold it to the utmost. Immediate measures were taken by the Governor to have the necessary transports in readiness, and Colonel Lee, of his staff, was detailed to attend to this duty. The following extract from a letter dated Boston, Feb. 2, 1861, addressed to the Governor, by Colonel Lee, relates a conversation he had held that day with John M. Forbes, Esq., in regard to chartering steamers to be used as transports, which shows that the atten- tion of the Governor had been given to this subject before Colonel Ritchie had returned from Washington : -
"Mr. Forbes assures me that he and others will have the trans- ports ready as soon as the men can be, waiting until orders come before the vessel is chartered, so as to keep as quiet as possible. And
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MEETING IN CAMBRIDGE.
he thinks, with me, that we had better wait for New York, as we ean get ready and move quicker ; and any forwardness on the part of Massachusetts would be more offensive than that of New York. He urges also to write or telegraph to General Scott, that we can at once send three hundred men to relieve the garrison at For- tress Monroe, if he desires to have the present garrison march to Washington. The cost of steamer per month, with crew, would be three to four thousand dollars, probably. I send a list in order of merit."
A very large and respectable meeting of the citizens of Bos- ton was held in Faneuil Hall, on the 5th of February, to indorse the resolutions of Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, in favor of a compromise with the South. J. Thomas Stevenson, Esq., presided, and made a strong and able speech in favor of compromise, in the course of which he said " he would almost pray for a foreign war, that it might bind us again as one, and prevent the shedding of fraternal blood. He would give up every thing but honor." B. R. Curtis, Esq., ex-judge of the United-States Supreme Court, made the leading speech, which was received with great favor. The resolutions were read by Colonel Jonas French. Speeches were made by Mr. Wight- man, mayor of the city, Mr. Saltonstall, Mr. G. S. Hillard, and others, some of whom afterwards distinguished themselves as officers in the war.
This meeting spoke the sentiments of the conservative citi- zens, who regarded war and disunion as evils greater than the existence of slavery, or even of its further extension ; and yet they were anti-slavery men, and regarded slavery as a great moral and political wrong, and would gladly have seen it abol- ished.
A few days later, on the 11th of February, a great meeting was held in Cambridge. The City Hall was crowded. The meet- ing was called without distinction of party. Hon. John G. Palfrey spoke briefly. He said, " South Carolina has marshalled herself into revolution ; and six States have followed her, and abandoned our Government." Richard II. Dana, Jr., Esq., made the speech of the occasion. He said the South was in a state of mutiny ; he was against John-Brown raids, and uncompro- misingly for the Union. He was opposed to the Crittenden
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MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REBELLION.
compromise, and held to the faith of Massachusetts. This meeting uttered the sentiments of the majority of the State, and was designed as a counterblast to the meeting held the week before at Faneuil Hall.
The speeches made and resolutions passed at these meetings expressed the sentiments of the people of the State. Those who were at Faneuil Hall would rather compromise the issues than have bloodshed and civil war. The men who were at Cam- bridge would risk the chance of civil war rather than compro- mise.
There was another party, which, though small in number, was powerful in eloquence, moral character, and cultivated in- tellect. Its zeal never flagged, its leaders never faltered. Its hatred of slavery was chronic. Its martyr spirit was felt and acknowledged. Its policy was aggressive. It made no com- promises ; it sought no office ; it . asked no favor ; and it gave no quarter. This was the abolition party. The leaders of it were Mr. Garrison and Mr. Phillips. The Federal Constitution, as interpreted by them, was a pro-slavery instrument : they would not, therefore, support it. The Union was "a covenant with hell :" therefore they would break it. For a quarter of a century they had thus spoken, and consistently acted, and held their ground up to the very day that the rebels fired on Sumter.
The following extract from a speech delivered in New Bed- ford by Mr. Phillips, on the evening of the 9th of April, 1861, is eurious and remarkable, when we consider the positions held by that gentleman before the war, during the war, and since the war. It shows that learned men and orators are sometimes false prophets ; and what is visible to plain men is hid from them : --
" The telegraph," said Mr., Phillips, " is said to report to-night, that the guns are firing, either out of Fort Sumter or into it; that to-mor- row's breeze, when it sweeps from the North, will bring to us the echo of the first Lexington battle of the new Revolution. Well, what shall we say of such an hour? My own feeling is a double one. It is like the triumph of sadness, - rejoicing and sorrow. I cannot, indeed, con- gratulate you enough on the sublime spectacle of twenty millions of
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SPEECH OF WENDELL PHILLIPS.
people educated in a twelvemonth up to being willing that their idol- ized Union should risk a battle, should risk dissolution, in order, at any risk, to put down this rebellion of slave States.
" But I am sorry that a gun should be fired at Fort Sumter, or that a gun should be fired from it, for this reason : The Administration at Washington does not know its time. Here are a series of States gird- ing the Gulf, who think that their peculiar institutions require that they should have a separate government. They have a right to decide that question, without appealing to you or me. A large body of people, sufficient to make a nation, have come to the conclusion, that they will have a government of a certain form. Who denies them the right? Standing with the principles of '76 behind us, who can deny them the right? What is a matter of a few millions of dollars, or a few forts ? It is a mere drop in the bucket of the great national question. It is theirs, just as much as ours. I maintain, on the principles of '76, that Abraham Lincoln has no right to a soldier in Fort Sumter.
" But the question comes, secondly, 'Suppose we had a right to in- terfere, what is the good of it?' You may punish South Carolina for going out of the Union : that does not bring her in. You may subdue her by hundreds of thousands of armies, but that does not make her a State. There is no longer a Union : it is nothing but boy's play. Mr. Jefferson Davis is angry, and Mr. Abraham Lincoln is mad, and they agree to fight. One, two, or three years hence, if the news of the after- noon is correct, we shall have gone through a war, spent millions, re- quired the death of a hundred thousand men, and be exactly then where we are now, - two nations, a little more angry, a little poorer, and a great deal wiser; and that will be the only difference : we may just as well settle it now as then.
" You cannot go through Massachusetts, and recruit men to bombard Charleston or New Orleans. The Northern mind will not bear it; you can never make such a war popular. The first onset may be borne ; the telegraph may bring us news, that Anderson has bombarded Charleston, and you may rejoice ; but the sober second thought of Massachusetts will be, 'wasteful, unchristian, guilty.' The North never will indorse such a war. Instead of conquering Charleston, you create a Charleston in New England ; you stir up sympathy for the South. Therefore it seems to me that the inanguration of war is not a viola- tion of principle, but it is a violation of expediency.
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