USA > Massachusetts > Suffolk County > Professional and industrial history of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, Volume III > Part 15
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In 1880 the State gave a piece of land for the erection of a new library building, at the corner of Boylston and Dartmouth streets, the building to be erected within three years, and to be open to all the citizens of the Commonwealth. This estate has been added to by the city, and in 1887 the trustees were given entire control of the new building, its erection and management. In 1869 the city had authorized them to establish branch libraries; but up to 1863 the ordinance vested in the trustees only "the general care and control of the public library," and in the librarian its " immediate care and custody." So far from
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preventing the growth of the establishment were the early ordinances, with their conflict of authority, that those were really the palmy days of the library. The people had found a new idol, the municipality a new mission. The people were passionate in their attachment to the library, and a share of this early love continues, unchecked by the vast expenses incurred in recent years. Apparently the city expends more for its public library than does any imperial government. The services of the trustees are gratuitous.
THE CHARTER, 1822 TO 1854.
The charter of 1822 made the mistake of trying to adapt a city to town government. But the difference between direct self-government by the people and representative government is radical. The mistake of treating the two alike still haunts our municipal jurisprudence (Publ. Stat., ch. 28, sec. 2). and illustrates the conservatism of American democracy. If town government and its departments were sacred, they should have been retained, and Boston should not have become a city. Having become a city, the methods of town government should have been abandoned. The charter of 1822 failed in this, and by false conservatism increased the evils it meant to remedy. In theory the principle was established that the city council should have the powers of the town meeting, and that aldermen should have the powers of selectmen. The theory was wrong; for a town meeting is essentially an administrative body, giving specific orders to its agents and servants, while the city council is not the agent and servant of the government, but itself the most important branch of the government. In substance, the charter placed the actual government of the city in the hands of eight aldermen, requiring them only to obtain in some matters the concurrence of the common council. Instead of dividing and distribut- ing the power of the corporation, in a system of checks and balances, the charter provided for the continuance of town offices, and placed the real authority with the aldermen, who were not required to act as a board only, but had great power as individual aldermen.
The framers of the charter were bound to draw a sharp line between legislative and administrative work in the city government; for the very purpose and essence of a representative government consists in "a government of laws, and not of men," as the Massachusetts declar- ation of rights expressed it in 1780. In a town it is not necessary to legislate much, or to give many permanent orders, because the town
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meeting may issue new orders at short notice. In a representative government legislation is of the utmost importance, because the direct self-government of men has been displaced by the indirect self-govern- ment through law. In a city government that neglects municipal legislation, the administration will become irresponsible and reckless. Yet our charter of 1822 gave the city council chiefly administrative duties, and reserved the legislative work in good part to the General Court. The charter provided for ward officers, firewards, overseers of the poor, school committee, and the treasurer and auditor; and then vested in the corporation " the administration of all the fiscal, pruden- tial, and municipal concerns " (St. 1821, ch. 110, sec. 1). " The care, custody, and management of all the property of the city" were assigned to the city council (sec. 16), and " the administration of police, together with the executive powers " were vested in the mayor and aldermen (sec. 13). What wonder that every man named in the charter tried to administer and manage? What wonder that Mayor Quincy called the common council the legislative branch of the government, and the aldermen its executive board? What wonder that in the general en- deavor to manage and administer, the mayor and the common council were crowded to the wall? What wonder that the city council neglected its legislative duties? It is a wonder that the charter did not work mischief. The government was saved, not by the merit of the charter, but by the character and integrity of the mayor and aldermen.
The standard by which the charter of 1822 should be judged is not the constitution of a Massachusetts town, but the Constitution of the United States, which had been in operation for more than thirty years. Nor is there an essential difference between the governments of Boston and the United States. Both have limited powers; the powers of both can be enumerated; both governments are representative and free. But the Constitution of the United States did not engage in any at- tempt at saving the offices of the Confederation ; neither did it establish executive departments. It divided and distributed government power, and left the rest to Congress and the good sense of future generations. In more than a century it has not been very much changed; the Boston charter of 1822 required amending in 1823, and had received more than fifteen amendments by 1854, when it was revised (see the code of 1850, 453-482). Yet it cannot be harder to make a constitution for a city than for a sovereign nation. The defect of our charter was the imper- fect distribution of power, and the implication that the city council
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might manage and administer, while the real legislative authority was to be exercised by the General Court. In defense of the framers it should be stated that the administrative sub-divisions of the Common- wealth and the United States are as complicated and confusing as those of Boston, and that the fault lies with the legislative bodies that make them. But in the State and nation the fault is not constitutional; in Boston it is. This fault of our charter consisted in reserving to the General Court certain legislative functions that should have been en- trusted to the city council, and in imposing upon the city council administrative duties which should have been withheld. In a repre- sentative government it is fatal to let the same body legislate and administer.
The population of Boston had increased from about 45,000, in 1822, to less than 160,000 in 1854; the taxes were less than $160,000 in the first year of the city; in 1853-54 they exceeded $1,500,000. The city did not inherit any town debt, and the county debt left to the city was $71,815; in 1854 the city owed more than seven million dollars, includ- ing nearly two millions for general city purposes, except the water supply. Yet the government had been honest. It might have done better; but it was not to be expected that it should do better than the charter prescribed or permitted. And the charter prescribed that the city council should manage and administer in general, that the alder- men should administer and manage in particular. They did; and the people might have fared worse. The public schools, those idols of the plain people, are still managed by a committee of twenty-four, and are well managed, certainly with some ability, great fidelity, and entire integrity. General city affairs were equally well managed under the charter of 1822. To be sure, the early city councils were strikingly unfortunate in their ordinances, as is illustrated in the town code of 182. But could city councils do much, when anybody and everybody might go to the General Court for Boston legislation? The special laws relating to Boston, and passed by the General Court, are not less than six hundred, and one-fifth of the number was passed from 1822 to 1854. Such an arrangement must be ruinous to city-council work. And the common council was treated with peculiar contempt. The charter did not intend to give the common council concurrent jurisdiction, which is the greatest protection against haste, negligence, and corruption. In 1842 the mayor and aldermen as a board were authorized to make penal by-laws, known as regulations; and the charter revision of 1854
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made the municipal power of aldermen supreme, save where they shared it with joint committees. But the responsibility for the unhappy arrangements rests with the General Court. The members of the city government must answer for individual shortcomings, if any; the system, the government, the constitution of the city were not of their making. These were made and marred at the State House.
ATTEMPTS AT REFORM, 1822-1854.
When matters did not go to the satisfaction of the people, it was customary, in the early days of the city charter, to hold meetings at Faneuil Hall, under sec. 25 of the city charter. Mayor Quincy thought well of these meetings, and considered them a continuation of the old town meeting. They were nothing of the kind. The town meeting could order the town officers; the "general meetings " authorized by sec. 25 of the city charter might advise or censure, but had no power that bound anybody. Anybody could hold such meetings, and any- body could advise or censure the city government, charter or no charter. Those general meetings merely show how useless it was to retain the form of town government, when the substance was gone. Accordingly a new way at reform had to be found. It became cus- tomary to get an act passed by the General Court, and to let the people vote upon its acceptance. Of course, the people usually rejected such acts, save where some substantial gain was offered. An act enabling the mayor and aldermen to choose one of their own number superin- tendent of police, as under the town, and to order ward meetings to be held outside the respective wards (6 Spec. Laws, 84), fell by its own weight. So did a building law, passed in 1827 (1. c., 564), which called for non-combustible or slow-burning architecture, but gave the mayor and aldermen great latitude. In Mayor Eliot's day the people were twice invited to vote on charter amendments proposed by the city government (city doc. 21 of 1837, doc. 5 of 1838). The amendments were rejected.
The reason why these measures were rejected is apparent. The people favor what they think advantageous; all else they view with indifference or opposition. It was not to be expected, in the early years of the city charter, that the people would add to the power of the mayor and aldermen. Why should they? The charter amendments of 1831 and 1838 proposed to transfer the election of the overseers of the poor from the people to the city council. Why should the people
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support such a proposition? A more radical measure might have been approved, provided some public gain was to be made. How discrimin- ating a popular vote may be, was illustrated by the treatment of St. 1852, ch. 266. The people rejected the offer to choose aldermen and assistant assessors by wards, but gave the common council concurrent authority, with the mayor and aldermen, when more than $5, 000 was to be expended on a county building, or in laying out a street. The people decided correctly that it was immaterial whether they had eight or twelve aldermen, and whether these aldermen were chosen by wards or at large, but that the power vested in the board of aldermen was an important matter, and that concurrent authority should be vested in the common council. Unlike the student or lawyer, the people are in- different as to form; they are disposed to trust, and are not jealous of power where power is properly vested and exercised. They are dis- posed to delegate much, and are not pining for the Swiss referendum. Butt they insist that government shall be orderly and efficient. If the government be orderly, efficient, and creditable, the people are ready to support, to bear much, and to forgive something. But the people have an intuitive dislike for measures not transparently clear and useful. The reforms proposed from 1822 to 1854 were a matter of form, and for that reason could not command public respect.
Nobody floundered more than the members of the government, ex- cept the eight aldermen. They used the power they had, and did not complain. They said very little, and during the period under discus- sion did not even publish their rules of procedure, if they had any. They acted as a legislative board, as a branch of the city council, as an executive board, and as individ .:. ' executives. The common council demanded more power, but met with opposition both quiet and effect- ive. The concession made by the aldermen consisted in the appoint- ment of joint committees, which rose to such importance that they figure in the charter of 1854 (sec. 40). The charter amendments of 1831 and 1838 had proposed that either branch of the city council, or any committee thereof, should have power to lease or sell city property. This passion for committees was honestly inherited. Under the town, orders were usually carried out by committees. Indeed, the selectmen were a standing committee of the town meeting. Under the city charter all executive and administrative work should have been done, as since 1885, by paid officers. The members of the city council were not so anxious to do work as they were willing to supervise and direct
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the work of others, to help in selecting these others, to wield patron- age, and to dine or celebrate at the public expense. They have been bitterly denounced for this; but they did not create the absurd system that required the city council to give orders and to manage the execu- tion. The chief sufferer was the mayor. Mayor Bigelow explained this with insight when he retired in 1852. The duties of the mayor, he said after three years' experience, should be purely of an executive character, whereas he presided over the board of aldermen, the school committee, and many other committees, to the exclusion of adminis- trative work. As a member of these bodies he had one vote, and no more. He had no veto power, and as an executive he had about the same power as an alderman, except that he nominated police officers, undertakers, and weighers. Mayor Bigelow (see doc. 80 of 1851) was the first to point out the true reform.
CHARTER OF 1854.
Mayor Bigelow had pointed out that the mayor should be an execu- tive officer, and that he should not be a member of the board of alder- men and the school committee. The city goverment of 1854 undertook to act upon this hint, the outcome being the charter of 1854, which is still in force, though literally reformed by many amendments. The immediate impulse for the new charter came from Mayor Smith and Henry J. Gardner, prominent members of the Native American party. There is no reason why such a party might not produce a good charter. But the charter was drafted under directions from the city council, and the city council was not likely to deprive itself of the administrative powers conferred by the charter of 1822. Nor were the times favorable to sound legislation. The Constitutional Convention of the State, assembled in 1853, had failed of success; the Commonwealth was divided into three or more parties, none of which commanded a majority, and Boston was more divided than the Commonwealth. The contest for the mayoralty, in 1853, had been led by a Whig, a Prohibition- ist, and a Know-Nothing, the last named being elected on the third trial. This contest led the General Court to establish the principle of election by plurality vote in all town, city, and county elections, in the place of elections by majority vote that had been in force up to that time (St. 1854, ch. 39). That the General Court should improve the charter submitted by the city council, was not to be expected. It was not apt to have better views of a city charter than the men of Boston.
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The new charter, as first proposed, placed the election of the school committee under the control of the city council. This was expunged. In order to make the mayor an executive officer, he was deprived of his vote in the board of aldermen, over whom he was to preside; and it was decided that the term "mayor and aldermen " should virtually mean "aldermen," except that the mayor was to have the qualified veto power over formal votes of the board or the city council, and that he should continue to nominate a few petty officers whose appointment was vested in the mayor and aldermen. These he might also remove. But all important officers, save the police, were chosen and removed by the city council. Over the executive power vested in the aldermen the mayor had no control. Indeed, the only new power given to the mayor was the qualified veto; but every alderman could nominate officers, give information to the city council, direct the department officers, and watch the execution of the laws and orders. The charter was just such an instrument as the aldermen wished, and ought not to have had. It made the mayor a figure head of the administration, it con- firmed and increased the power of the aldermen, and virtually estab- lished government by legislative committees. The provision that ordinances might carry a penalty up to $50, has not been carried out by the city government. But a term of three years was wisely estab- lished for members of the school committee. The number of aldermen was increased to twelve, but the plan of electing them by wards was rejected by the people. As nothing better was offered, the people accepted the charter, but in a light vote. The yeas were 9,166, the nays 990; the population of the city more than 150,000. The proposed election of aldermen by wards was rejected by 5,138 votes, against 4,833 in its favor. At the previous city election more than 13,000 ballots were cast.
The common council attempted to get the same power as the board of aldermen, but failed. Public opinion acquiesced in the idea that municipal business was mainly administrative, that aldermen were the legitimate administrative officers, like selectmen in towns, and that common councilmen might possibly do the work of minor town officers who did not draw pay. The common council itself supported this position by giving much attention to purely administrative work, to the neglect of municipal legislation. The lawyers seemed partial to the prerogative of aldermen, and the germ of power entrusted to the com- mon council was never allowed to develop beyond the state of a modest
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bud. Yet the city council had the power of towns, aldermen had only the power of selectmen, and towns were not obliged to employ select- men as their agents for every kind of town business. The philosophy and jurisprudence of the charter were neglected in the general attempt of the city council to administer and manage as much as possible, and to avoid theoretical questions. In this misplaced endeavor the common council could not compete with the aldermen. It fought for executive rights; the more important field of legislation was neglected, and the great constitutional problems of municipal government were not touched. In fact, whenever important legislation was desired for the city, application was made to the General Court, and the General Court, always partial to special legislation, rarely refused to consider problems which should have been solved by the city government.
The aldermen worked night and day, the common councilmen were faithful, the people could not understand their government. Its fattlt was not want of integrity or diligence, but constitutional. The mayor, who should have had full executive power, was confined to ornamental speeches. The city council, which should have legislated for all mu- nicipal departments and concerns, was required by the charter to admin- ister and manage, and the General Court never hesitated to legislate for the city of Boston. The city, therefore, had three legislatures,- two at city hall, another at the State House. For the aldermen could legislate without the concurrence of the common council. The mayor was to be "taken and deemed" the chief executive officer; but the ex- ecutive powers of the corporation were vested in the aldermen (not in the board of aldermen); yet the city council was to appoint the prin- cipal city officers, and had the care, custody, and management of all city property, as well as " the administration of all the fiscal, pruden- tial, and municipal concerns." The lawyers decided that cities were " created " by the General Court, and the people were too civil to find fault with their creators at the State House, but blamed the city government when taxes or debts were too high, or improvements too slow. They demanded the best that money would buy, and insisted that taxes must be low. With few exceptions all publie expenses were met from the general tax levy or loans, and there is still a lurking belief that a government may be rich while taxes are low, or that skill and influence can get improvements for which the beneficiary need not pay. As the city could assess taxes and incur debts without limit, it is greatly to the credit of the city governments and their committees
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that the people who pay the bills fared so well. Surely, worse things might have come from a city council that both levied and disbursed the tax, and could borrow millions to satisfy the popular cry for the latest improvements. Future generations will marvel when they read the Boston charter of 1854.
CITY HOSPITAL.
Before the charter of 1854 went into the effect, the machinery for governing the city was complete. Great ingenuity in establishing a variety of conflicting departments and city organs had been shown. The departments created since then might have been made a part of some department to which the people were accustomed; but the Gen- eral Court and the city council were determined to create a new depart- ment for every kind of work that could be entrusted to new officers and at least one governing committee. From time immemorial the town had established a hospital when occasion required, and the Province had a regular establishment on Rainsford island. This hospital was at first kept by the Province; it was then kept by the town at the expense of the Province; finally it was ingeniously transferred to Boston. When Boston indicated a willingness to establish a permanent hospital, nominally for emergency cases, the General Court hastened to grant permission (St. 1858, ch. 113). The usual committees were appointed; in addition a board of trustees was created, and on May 24, 1864, the city hospital was dedicated. The late Elisha Goodnow had left a bequest of $26,000 for a hospital to be erected in or near South Boston, half the income to be used for free beds; in 1862 the city pro- vided for a board of trustees of the hospital; the building was erected under the joint management of the committee on public buildings, the committee on the city hospital, and the trustees. Between them they laid a very broad foundation, though Thomas C. Amory, jr., chairman of the trustees, confessed at the dedication that, " were we permitted, with our present experience, to recommence our task, the control would be left with a single committee, and to fewer minds" (1864, city doc. 40, 31).
The city hospital has become a whole colony, with more than twenty buildings, and an annual requirement of not less than $250,000 for maintenance. It is well managed, and one of the few city departments that have undertaken to enrich knowledge, and not simply to consume. In 1880 the trustees, now five in number, were incorporated, and have
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"the general care and control " of the hospital with all its branches, training school, convalescent home, and out-patient departments. Yet when this enterprise was proposed, in 1849, so distinguished a man as Dr. D. Humphreys Storer, whose opinion was entitled to attention, de- clared that the institution was not required, and that he was not the only physician who held that view. Mr. Amory comforted his dedica- tion audience in advance, "if our beds are not immediately in requisi- tion," with the statement that the Massachusetts General Hospital re- ceived its first patient on Sept. 3, 1821, and " no other application be- fore the twentieth." Of course, a hospital offering the best treatment free of expense was not to be wholly without applicants. The building, when delivered to the trustees for use, had cost $350,000; the expense in the first year thereafter was $113, 432, a large part of this being bor- rowed, while the building was erected almost entirely from borrowed money. The city thus committed itself to expenses not exclusively of a public nature, and the General Court consented. The people rejoiced, and look upon the city hospital with almost the same delight they take in the Public Library. The trustees are not paid, they are appointed for five years each, and they collect from patients that are able to pay. The city council leaves the management of the hospital entirely to the trustees.
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