USA > Mississippi > A history of the Mississippi valley, from its discovery to the end of foreign domination. The narrative of the founding of an empire, shorn of current myth, and enlivened by the thrilling adventures of discoverers, pioneers, frontiersmen, Indian fighters, and homemakers > Part 26
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But Jefferson was a politician first of all. Foster, in his "Century of American Diplomacy," says he was the greatest politician the Nation has yet produced. And Jefferson's most enthusiastic supporters were found in the Mississippi Valley. Franklin had said that a man might as well sell his front door as for the United States to give up the right of the free navigation
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of the Mississippi, and Jefferson understood very well that the western clamor over the supposed French ac- quisition of Louisiana was not empty declamation; but neither he nor any one else then saw where that oratorical tornado would carry the country.
What Jefferson did on hearing the clamor was to instruct our Ministers at Paris, London and Madrid to do all they could to prevent the transfer. Eventually the rumors said that Spain had already ceded the ter- ritory to France, and at that Jefferson, in a letter to Robert R. Livingston, American minister to France, dated April 18, 1802, said :
"There is on the globe one single spot the possessor of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans. * * France placing herself at that door, assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Circumstances render it impossible that France and the United States can continue long friends, when they meet in so irritable a position. The day that France takes possession of New Orleans * * we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force."
And then to much talk about friendly relations he added the unmistakable statement that "it is not from a fear of France that we deprecate this measure pro- posed by her."
Madison, Jefferson's secretary of State, in a letter of instructions to Livingston, said : "The United States would take the most vigorous measures, even though they should involve war, to avert such a calamity" as the cession of Louisiana to France.
But Jefferson did not really mean it. At heart he
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had no intention of fighting to keep the Mississippi. In October, in spite of the manly words quoted, he told Livingston that the French occupation of Louisiana was not "important enough to risk a breach of peace." He had talked and written in brave words merely to humor the people; his words were not sincere. If the simile may be allowed, Jefferson felt himself in charge of a growing kid on which the British lion, the French wolf and the Spanish coyote were looking with hungry eyes. He supposed that if only this kid could be allowed to feed peaceably in the pastures of the world until it was as big and fat-especially as fat-as a kid could become, it would then be entirely safe from the attacks of the lion, the wolf and the coyote. The quantity of the fat was to protect it; and in order that fat might be accumulated as fast as possible the growth of horns must be prevented. A hornless goat, rolling fat, was literally Jefferson's ideal representative of a great nation. He did say to the British minister that if we were compelled to draw the sword we would "throw away the scabbard," but he did not mean to draw the sword. A nation whose every effort at home should be devoted to accumulation of "material resources," and whose foreign policy should be regulated by those able to "palliate and en- dure," and, if the full truth be told, those who could purchase favors,-that was the Jefferson ideal. For- tunately the Nation was able to survive the fierce on- slaughts that Jefferson's hornless policy made possible during the first ten years of the Nineteenth Century, and different ideals now prevail.
In the course of May, 1802, authentic information
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reached the United States that Spain had sold out to France. Consequently, during the summer of 1802, Livingston was kept busy trying to purchase New Or- leans and the two Floridas, which, it was rumored, had also been transferred to France, but he could make no progress in his negotiations. Napoleon had ob- tained peace at the treaty of Amiens, March 25, 1802, and was contemplating the recovery of all the ancient French rights in America. He supposed that he could readily conquer all the Mississippi Valley, if not Canada, and he ordered an army of 10,000 men, under General Bernadotte, to prepare to sail for New Orleans. General Victor was afterwards (August, 1802) substituted for Bernadotte, and the preparations were pressed with enthusiasm during the fall follow- ing Victor's appointment.
In order to deceive the Americans Napoleon an- nounced that Victor was going to reinforce the French army in San Domingo, but the truth of the matter be- came very well known throughout the United States. The excitement and indignation caused by this knowl- edge were soon to be increased, however, to a far higher pitch. On October 16, 1802, in the midst of the most prosperous shipping season the merchants of the Miss- issippi Valley had ever known, the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, Don Juan Venturo Morales, ordered that the American right of deposit should thence- forth cease. Foreign commerce, save in Spanish ships only, was to be stopped-this in the face of the fact that a free export trade had been allowed for seven years since the signing of the treaty permitting such commerce.
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As the report of the order of Morales, in violation of the treaty, spread up the Great Valley, the people almost to a man were found ready to grasp their rifles, three feet and six inches long, and embark for New Or- leans. There was talk of raising enough men in the Mississippi Territory alone to capture New Orleans immediately, and it could have been done easily, had the right leader appeared.
It was natural that the Americans should suppose that Napoleon had dictated the Morales prohibition of commerce and the American right of deposit at New Orleans. In this it appears they were in error as to the fact, although as to the feeling of Napoleon they were entirely right. Morales had acted on his own impulses. The Governor of New Orleans, (Salcedo Gayoso had died after a drunken spree with Gen. Wilkinson), op- posed the order. The Spanish minister to the United States opposed it with anger. But under Spanish law, Morales could prevail until an order came from the Spanish King.
With this new aggression to urge him on, Jefferson still baulked at the thought of securing the rights of the Nation by the use of force. He was determined not to use force. His message to Congress, read De- cember 15, 1802, "discussed everything except the danger which engrossed men's minds." (Henry Adams's "History of the United States"). "No change" was "deemed necessary in our military es- tablishment," and as for the navy the chief item of new expense recommended was a "dock within which our present vessels may be laid up dry and under cover from the sun." In a special message to Con-
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gress on December 22, 1802, he spoke of Morales's act as "the irregular proceeding at New Orleans," and said he had not lost "a moment in causing every step to be taken which the occasion claimed." On January 5, 1803, he transmitted to the house, "a statement of the militia" of the various states, (a showing of the mailed fist, that!), and then on the IIth, in a special message, he nominated James Monroe as min- ister extraordinary, to act "jointly or either on the death of the other," with Livingston, in or- der to "enter into a treaty or convention with the First Consul of France," for the purchase of New Or- leans and the French territory east of the Mississippi. The nomination was promptly confirmed.
As Henry Adams has pointed out, Monroe was sent on this special mission, "not so much to purchase New Orleans, as to restore political quiet at home." In his letter asking Monroe to accept the mission, Jefferson said :
"The agitation of the public mind on occasion of the late suspension of our right of deposit at New Or- leans is extreme. In the western country it is natural and grounded on honest motives. In the Federalists generally, and especially those of Congress, the ob- ject is to force us into war if possible, in order to de- range our finances; or if this cannot be done, to detach the western country to them as their best friends, and thus get into power."
And when the nomination had been confirmed Jef- ferson again wrote to say that "the measure has si- lenced the Federalists here."
To silence the Federalists was the thought upper-
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JAMES MONROE.
The original portrait by Vanderlyn, from which this was engraved by Durand, can be seen in the City Hall, New York.
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most in Jefferson's mind in this crisis brought on by foreign aggression, and the next thought was to "palli- ate and endure" (letter to Dr. Priestley), the aggres- sion in such a fashion as to soothe his own party.
Meantime, however, Napoleon's hopes of conquest in America had vanished. Barbe Marbois, one of Napoleon's ministers, had pointed out that to occupy New Orleans was to drive the United States to declare war against France at the first shot of a gun in Eu- rope, and he was ready to ask, as Jefferson had asked, will "a short lived possession" of New Orleans be an equivalent to France "for the transfer of such a weight into the scales of her enemy?"
Moreover, Napoleon's agents in the United States had repeatedly written him that it would be impossible to accomplish his purpose. The agents knew the num- ber and the quality of the "Prime Riflemen" of the west. They had doubtless heard of the men whom "Mad" Anthony Wayne trained to load rifles while charging the enemy, and if not, they knew that the frontiersmen always shot to kill. Pinchon, the French charge, wrote to Talleyrand to say that "however timid Mr. Jefferson may be, I find [among the people] in general a bad temper as regards us; and I cannot help seeing that there is a tendency toward adopting an irrevocably hostile system." It was clearly seen by the Frenchmen in America that it would be an easy task to raise an army of 30,000 skilled riflemen, west of the Alleghanies, embark them on boats which they were accustomed to handle, and send them, hot for a fight, down the river. Napoleon's men, with all their European experience, would find a different kind
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of warfare when, after landing in New Orleans, they tried to push up the river in boats, or through the road- less forests and lowlands on either border.
To such arguments as this, Napoleon, as a states- man, was obliged to give heed. He saw that any force that he could send to New Orleans would be wholly lost to his uses in Europe, and it would ac- complish nothing in America. He saw further that the supremacy of the British naval power on the high seas would prevent his reinforcing New Orleans, in time of war-would even prevent his rescuing the garrison there from certain defeat. He believed that in case of war with England, Louisiana would become a British colony, and a war with England was now seen to be at hand. These considerations prevailed. It is a proof of the wisdom of Napoleon that they did prevail. To his counsellors he said :
"They [the British], shall not have the Mississippi which they covet. The conquest of Louisiana would be easy, if they only took the trouble to make a descent there. I have not a moment to lose in putting it out of their reach. I think of ceding it to the United States. I can scarcely say that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title to those republicans whose friendship I seek. They only ask of me one town in Louisiana, but I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that in the hands of their growing power, it will be more useful to the policy and even to the commerce of France than if I should attempt to keep it."
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When objections were urged he continued :
"Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede, it is the whole colony with- out any reservation. * *
* To attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoys of the United States."
And when the matter had been fully determined he said :
"This accession of territory strengthens forever the power of the United States, and I have just given to England a maritime rival that will sooner or later humble her pride."
With American capitalists in control of the leading lines of transatlantic steamships in this present year of 1903, the last statement is of interest. But it is worth noting here that one of Napoleon's ideas in this matter was by no means well founded. He supposed, as he said, that if he tried to occupy the Louisiana territory the British would promptly take it away from him. Curiously enough nearly all American historians have agreed with him. But we will believe that as soon as Napoleon's army had sailed for New Orleans, the "Prime Riflemen" of the West would have gone aboard their flat boats, and in an irresistible tide would have swept all foreign power from the Great Valley before either French or British could have done so much as to make a landing. Livingston, who had reverence for the eagle, not the porcupine, said : "Only force can give us New Orleans. We must employ force. Let us first get possession of the country and negotiate afterwards."
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He understood the beneficent effect of showing the mailed fist at the right time in some kinds of diplo- matic proceedings. It was not necessary to do that on this occasion, but if the necessity had arisen, it would have been done. Let no one think that Great Britain would have forestalled Napoleon at New Orleans, even if the "timid" Mr. Jefferson was President.
Barbe Marbois was commanded to conduct the negotiations with Livingston and Monroe. He was well acquainted personally with both of them, personal regard smoothed the way, and the negotiations were conducted with unparalleled expedition. Napoleon at first demanded a price that seemed enormous, but he modified his demands to a point where the conditions were written to the satisfaction of both parties. Liv- ingston and Monroe felt that they were stretching their powers to the utmost in buying the whole terri- tory, but there was ( fortunately), no time for consul- tation with Jefferson, and a treaty, (dated April 30, 1803, though concluded in part as late as May 9), was , signed whereby :
"The First Consul of France, desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby cede to the United States, in the name of the French Republic, forever and in full sovereignty the said territory" of Louisiana. For this broad territory the United States paid $11,250,000 in six per cent. bonds, and assumed a debt of $3,750,000 due Amer- ican citizens from France, or $15,000,000 all told.
When Livingston had signed this document, (and his name was the first appended to it), he arose, shook hands with Marbois and Monroe, and said :
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"We have lived long, but this is the noblest work of our lives."
The papers reached Washington on July 14, 1803. The treaty attracted the widest attention. No one had foreseen such an outcome of the negotiations. A great number of the people supposed that the Nation had no power under the Constitution to annex foreign terri- tory. Others were opposed to the policy of enlarging the territory of the Nation. Jefferson himself fully believed Congress had no power to annex the purchased territory, and favored passing an amendment to the Constitution to permit it. He thought, too, that the land west of the Mississippi would be useless save as a refuge for the Indians then living in the East. Mon- roe, fearing that he had paid too much for the cession, suggested the sale of "the territory west of the Miss- issippi to some power of Europe whose vicin- ity we should not fear."
But when a letter was received from Livingston saying that Napoleon might yet undo the work al- ready accomplished, and when this was followed by another letter saying "I most earnestly press you to get the ratification as soon as possible," Jefferson called a special session of Congress. He had written to Sen- ator Breckenridge "The executive * * * have done an act beyond the Constitution," but on the following day he wrote to ask that this letter be suppressed, and added that "we should do sub silentio what shall be found necessary." He would not let his interpretation of the Constitution interfere with a good business prop- osition.
Congress met on October 17, 1803, and the an-
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nexation of Louisiana was discussed. On October 25, the House resolved, "That provision ought to be made for carrying into effect the treaty." The vote stood ninety to twenty-five. In the Senate a bill, introduced by John Breckenridge, of Kentucky, "to enable the President of the United States to take possession of the territories ceded by France," was passed on Wed- nesday, October 26; yeas, twenty-six; nays, six. This bill was approved October 31, 1803, (annals of Con- gress, 1803-'04).
Foster's "Century of American Diplomacy" sum- marizes the arguments against admission as follows :
"The boundaries were in dispute and it would prob- ably lead to war-a prediction that was realized some forty years later; the large territory was useless and not wanted; the price was too high-it was equal to 433 tons of silver, it would load 866 wagons, extend- ing 5 1-3 miles, would make a pile of dollars three miles high, equal to 25 ship loads, would provide $3 to each man, woman and child in the country."
Such a vast, unmanageable extent of territory threatened the subversion of the Union, said the leader of the Federalists.
It may be noted, however, that an argument which was urged against the annexation of the Philippines, in recent years, was not heard in 1803. No one arose to say that the native population of the new territory was sure to flood the old, and by competition cut down the wages of the poor working man.
To go back a little and take up the thread of events in the Mississippi Valley, it is found that the formal work of transferring Louisiana from Spain to France
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THOMAS B. ROBERTSON.
First Congressman elected from the State of Louisiana, afterward Governor. This portrait is by St. Memim.
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had been begun before the territory had been sold to the United States. Pierre Clement Laussat, (a man who "could swim well in rough water," he), was sent by Napoleon to New Orleans as civil Governor, and he arrived on March 26, 1803. He knew nothing about the negotiations for a sale to the United States, and his proclamation to the people of the region filled them with "a delirium of extreme felicity," as they said. Some weeks later came the Marquis de Casa Calvo to represent the Spanish King in the transfer. A pro- longed series of public entertainments followed, re- garding which Laussat made this significant remark :
"The tendency of these festivities was, no doubt, to spread the taste for pleasure and luxury in a colony which being in its nascent state, still needs a great deal of economy and labor."
Laussat saw dimly why both France and Spain had failed in colonizing the Great Valley.
While the happy-go-lucky Creoles danced, a ship came from Bordeaux with the news that the territory had been sold to the Americans. It was first to be transferred to France, however, and this was done on November 30. As Miss King says in her New Or- leans, an "elaborate but uninteresting formality took place." French municipal officers were appointed, and a Creole took command of the militia.
In the meantime the preparations for annexing the territory had been completed in the United States. Because Spain had protested against the transfer to the United States, (Napoleon had agreed not to sell without Spain's consent), a large body of militia was ordered out along the upper rivers, and flat boats for
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their use were provided. A force 500 strong was sent to Natchez. W. C. C. Claiborne, then Governor of Mississippi, and General James Wilkinson, the head of the regular army, were appointed commissioners to receive the Territory at New Orleans. Each of these two men are still well remembered-Claiborne for the skill with which he managed the people of New Or- leans ; Wilkinson as one of the most detestable of trait- ors. The commissioners met at Fort Adams, below Natchez, and on December 7, with a sufficient escort of soldiers, began their march to New Orleans. The schooner Bilboa, (chartered for $1,854.18, if any one is anxious for details), floated down the river carrying the baggage. On December 17 the party camped two miles from the city, and two days were then passed in formal visits, and in agreeing on the details of the coming ceremonies.
December 20 was the day selected for the transfer. As the people of the city of New Orleans awoke on that morning, it was noted as a good omen that "in- stead of the rain and clouds that had attended the Spanish ceremonies, the day dawned clear and bright." At sunrise the French tricolor was spread to the gentle breeze at the top of the tall flag pole that stood in the centre of the Place d'Armes, while the ships at the levee, and at anchor in the stream, were decorated with a great spread of bright bunting. At 9 o'clock the militia began to muster, and at II o'clock they marched, with beating drums, into the Place d'Armes. A notable throng gathered about them, and along the street by which the Americans were to come-a throng that included the gentry in their colored silks and
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velvets, and slaves in osnaburgs; pirates in sea "togs" from the West Indies, and tall, lank backwoodsmen in fringed leather hunting, or red flannel shirts-men of every nation, and men without a country. But gathered at the foot of the flag pole was a band of fifty old French soldiers who, on November 30, had been organized as a guard for the tricolor flag.
Soon after the local militia had been paraded in line facing the flag pole a gun was fired at the Amer- ican camp to announce that the American forces had started for the city. In due time they reached the Tchoupitoulas gate, where they received a salute of twenty-one guns. Then they marched into the city.
At the head of the column rode the commissioners. They were followed by "a detachment of dragoons in red uniform, four pieces of artillery, two companies of infantry and one of carbineers." Marching to the cen- tre of the Place d'Armes the column was paraded to face the local militia. Then the commissioners dis- mounted and walked to the Cabildo, or City Hall, where they were received by Laussat, who, with the officers of the municipality, conducted them to the great hall of the building. They found there the most notable citizens of the city. At the head of the hall stood three elevated chairs. In the centre and most elevated of these three Laussat sat down, and placed Claiborne on his right and Wilkinson on his left. The reading of the various commissions, the treaty of ces- sion, etc., followed, and then Laussat gave the keys of the city to Claiborne, and changed seats with him. The citizens who wished to remain in the country were next absolved from their allegiance to France.
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Finally Laussat, Claiborne and Wilkinson walked out on a balcony where they could look over the motley throng that had gathered in the Place d'Armes, and away to the decorated shipping in the harbor. The supreme moment of the transfer had now come. As the commissioners appeared on the balcony the sergeant of the old French guard loosened the halliards and be- gan to lower the tricolor. At the same instant an American soldier commenced hoisting the Gridiron Flag. Midway the two flags met, and as they fluttered together for a moment, a single gun was fired. And then, as the two flags were separated, every gun in the city began to fire a national salute; the guns on the shipping joined in; a brass band played "Hail Columbia," while the backwoodsmen and the keelboat- men in their fringed and red flannel shirts, cheered with frantic joy, and leaping up, slapped their hands on their sides and crowed until they were hoarse. But the gentry, in colored satins and laces, wept.
At the end of August, 1656, those enterprising and courageous Frenchmen-the coureurs de bois, known as Grosseilliers and Radisson-men who would and did work according to the powers given them, re- turned to Montreal and reported that they had been on the waters of the Great River. And "their arrival caused the country universal joy."
On April 9, 1682, La Salle, the greatest of all the French-Americans, a man who worked as few of any nation have done, standing on a sand bar at the mouth of the Great River, proclaimed the sovereignty of his King over all the wondrous unknown valley whose waters flowed at his feet.
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