USA > North Carolina > History of North Carolina: The Colonial and Revolutionary Periods 1584 1783, Volume I > Part 45
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After Camden Cornwallis, strangely enough, repeated the blunder he had committed after the fall of Charleston. Tarle- ton and other officers urged upon him the advantages of an "immediate advance of the King's troops into North Caro- lina," 6 but Cornwallis was less impressed by these advantages than he was by "the number of sick in the hospital, the late addition of the wounded, the want of troops," "the deficiency of the stores, the heat of the climate, the scarcity of provisions
6 Tarleton's Campaigns, p. 155.
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in North Carolina," and the other hardships incident to war which he seems to have expected to avoid. But again his chief reason for delay was over-confidence. He believed that at Camden he had struck the American cause its death blow. Former Governor Josiah Martin, who was with Cornwallis, re- flected his views in a letter to Lord Germain in which he de- clared the victory was so "glorious, compleat and critical," that "it could receive no additional splendour. * * *
It is consequential to the Nation, my Lord, in proportion to the importance of America to Great Britain, for her cause and Interests on this continent depending, as I conceive, absolutely on the issue of this action, may be fairly said to be rescued, saved, redeemed and restored." In England the impression was created that "North Carolina was only considered as the road to Virginia."7 Cornwallis was confirmed in his view of the situation not only by the confusion and disorganization of the American army, but also by the protestations of loyalty and assurances of support whichi again poured in upon him from the North Carolina Tories. Unwittingly these inen did _the cause of independence a great service for their profes- sions, together with other reasons, confirmed Cornwallis in his determination to delay his march into North Carolina until his plans were perfected to the last detail.
Consequently it was not until September 8th that he broke camp at Camden and set out on his invasion of North Caro- lina. His advance was far from being the triumphant pro- cession his friends had led him to expect. Partisan bands hung upon his flanks and so harassed his movements that he . did not reach Charlotte until September 25th. On Septem- . ber 20th, Davie, who had recently been appointed to the com- mand of the cavalry with the rank of colonel, with 150 men surprised an enemy detachment of 300 men at Wahab's plan- tation, killed and wounded 60 of their number, routed the rest, and brought off 120 stand of arms and 96 horses. On the morning of September 26th, Davie posted a small force be- hind the courthouse in Charlotte, which stood in the center of the village where its two streets intersected, and when the head of the British column appeared, composed of Tar- leton's famous legion of dragoons, greeted it with so ef- fective a fire that it recoiled three times and Cornwallis was obliged to ride up and rally the troops himself. "The whole of the British army," says its historian Stedman, himself an officer under Cornwallis, "was actually kept at bay for some
7 Annual Register, Vol. 24, p. 54.
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minutes by a few mounted Americans, not exceeding twenty in number."
Thus the British army entered Charlotte, where on Octo- ber 3d Josiah Martin, who accompanied Cornwallis, issued his proclamation announcing the triumph of the king's arms, the suppression of the rebellion, and the restoration of the royal government, and calling upon all faithful subjects to rally to the defence of the royal standard. Seriously as Mar- tin took this proclamation, Cornwallis must have known that it was the merest bombast. It had not taken him a whole week to realize that he was in the "Hornets' Nest" of the Revolution. "It is evident" * * he wrote, "that Mecklenburg and Rowan Counties are more hostile to Eng- land than any [others] in America." The situation of the British at Charlotte, wrote the Board of War, "hath been rendered very troublesome by the close attention paid them by Davidson and Davie." These active young officers with their sleepless bands patrolled the surrounding country day and night, watching every movement of the enemy, break- ing up his foraging parties, capturing his scouts, and cutting off his messengers so effectively that nearly a week passed after the event before Cornwallis, who was anxiously await- ing intelligence of "Colonel Ferguson's movements to the westward," heard of his defeat and death at King's Moun- tain.
When Cornwallis began his movement from Camden into North Carolina he sent Colonel Patrick Ferguson, one of his best and most trusted officers, into the Ninety-Six District to arouse the Tories to action and to secure his left flank from at- tack by some bands of over-mountain men who, under Charles McDowell, Isaac Shelby and John Sevier, were showing signs of activity in that region. On July 30th they captured Thick- etty Fort, a Tory stronghold on a tributary of Broad River. A few days later they were themselves defeated at Cedar Springs on the Pacolet River. On August 19th, they had just won a particularly brilliant action at Musgrove's Mill on the Enoree when they received intelligence of the defeat of Gates at Camden, which compelled them to retire into North Car- olina. It was primarily to protect his flank against these men that Cornwallis dispatched Ferguson to the borders of Tryon County, with a force of 200 regulars and 900 Tory militia who, according to Cornwallis, had been "got into very tolerable order." Ferguson boldly pursued the mountain-men as far as Gilbert Town in Rutherford County, whence he sent them a contemptuous message declaring that unless they speedily
1
ISAAC SHELBY
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dispersed and desisted from further resistance to the king's troops, he would cross the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay waste their settlements with fire and sword.
Shelby and Sevier answered this challenge by calling the mountain men to arms. In its suddenness and its numerical strength the response to their call resembled a rising of the Scottish clans when the "fiery cross" was dispatched through the Highlands. To the rendezvous at Sycamore Shoals on Wa- tauga River, September 25th, came Shelby with 240 men from Sullivan County, Sevier with 240 from Washington, McDowell with 160 from Burke and Rutherford, and William Camp- bell with 400 Virginians. Without delay, they set out in search of their enemy, and on the march were joined by 350 men from Wilkes and Surry under Benjamin Cleaveland and Joseph Winston. As there was some rivalry among the North Carolina colonels, Campbell was asked to assume the lead- ership of the expedition. During their long and arduous march over the mountains many of the men dropped out and only about 700 finally reached Cowpens where they camped on October 6th. There, however, they were joined by Fred- erick Hambright with 50 men from Lincoln County and Ed- ward Lacey and James Williams with 400 South Carolinians.
Although Ferguson affected to despise his enemies as "a set of mongrels," still upon learning of their approach he dispatched a messenger to Cornwallis calling for aid and himself sought refuge on the southern extremity of King's Mountain, a ridge about sixteen miles long, running from a point in what is now Cleveland County, North Carolina, southwest into York County, South Carolina. The spur reached by Ferguson is in York County, one and a half miles from the North Carolina line, and six miles from the highest elevation of the mountain. About 600 yards in length, it rises from a base of 250 yards to a top of from 60 to 220 yards wide, and commands a wide view of the surrounding country. The crest can be approached from three sides only; on the north it is an unbroken precipice. On the summit of this ridge Ferguson sought safety from his enemies. To his mind, trained in European methods of warfare, the steep ascent, together with the thick shrubbery and underbrush which cov- ered the rugged mountain sides, seemed to make his position impregnable, and he boasted that all the rebels out of hell could not drive him from it. But he forgot that he was deal- ing with men who were used to climbing mountains and fol- lowed other rules of warfare than those laid down by Euro- pean text-writers.
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On October 6th, while at Cowpens, the American officers selected from their several bands 920 picked men, confirmed the choice of Campbell as their leader, and set out for King's Mountain. Reaching the foot of the ridge about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of October 7th, they organized in three col- umns, and prepared for an immediate assault. On the north side of the mountain were the bands of Shelby, Hill and Lacey, under Shelby's command; on the south, those of Camp- bell, Sevier, and Joseph McDowell, led by Campbell; while across the northeast end were the men of Cleaveland, Ham- bright, and Winston, commanded by Cleaveland. So quickly were these dispositions made that Ferguson first learned of them by the fire of the attacking parties. His own force con- sisted of nearly 1,000 men, of whom 200 were regulars of his old corps, 430 were North Carolina Loyalists, and 320 were South Carolina Loyalists. He arranged his men in two lines along the height, one to resist attack by volleys of musketry, the other under his immediate command to charge the enemy with bayonets."
The attack was opened by Campbell whose men ascended the most difficult part of the ridge. Near the summit, Fer- guson repulsed them with a bayonet charge, but before he could regain his position, he was assailed in the rear by Shelby's men advancing up the opposite side of the mountain. Turning upon these new assailants, he drove them back in their turn, but while he was thus engaged, not only did Camp- bell's men rally and return to the attack, but Cleaveland's men also came into action. The Americans were unerring marksmen and advancing with the utmost deliberation from tree to tree and from rock to rock, firing with great precision, they made easy marks of Ferguson's men whom they picked off by the score. The British on the other hand from their ele- vated position fired wildly over the heads of their elusive foes, while their bayonet charges were broken up by the thick un- derbrush, trees, and rocks which covered the mountain. Though assailed first from one side and then from another; though repulsing Campbell only to be attacked in the rear by Shelby; though turning on Shelby only to have his flank fiercely as- saulted by Cleaveland, nevertheless Ferguson sustained his high reputation as a gallant and skillful officer. Mounted on his white charger, making his presence known by a silver whistle, he fearlessly exposed himself in order to animate the drooping spirits of his men. Twice they raised the white flag, twice he struck it down with an oath that he would never sur- render to such a damned set of banditti. Finally a bullet
COLONEL JOSEPH MCDOWELL, OF "QUAKER MEADOWS"
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pierced his heart and saved him from the disgrace of having to hoist the white flag. His second in command, Captain Abra- ham De Peyster, seeing the hopelessness of further resistance, thereupon raised the symbol of surrender.
The battle had lasted about an hour. No victory could be more complete. Ferguson's corps was entirely wiped out. Himself and 119 of his men were killed, 123 wounded, and 664 captured. This signal achievement had cost the Americans 28 killed, 62 wounded. It was the first ray of light to pierce the general gloom which had enveloped the country since the fall of Charleston. Washington saw in it "a proof of the spirit and resources of the country ;" Clinton lamented it as a "fatal catastrophe." Everywhere patriots hailed it as the turning point in the struggle. "The victory at King's Moun- tain," says Bancroft, "which in the spirit of the American soldiers was like the rising at Concord, in its effects like the successes at Bennington, changed the aspect of the war. The Loyalists of North Carolina no longer dared rise. It fired ยท the patriots of the two Carolinas with fresh zeal. It en- couraged the fragments of the defeated and scattered Amer- ican army to seek each other and organize themselves anew. It quickened the North Carolina legislature to earnest efforts. It inspirited Virginia to devote her resources to the country south of her border." 8 It "Threw South Carolina (wrote Clinton) into a state of confusion and rebellion." It "totally disheartened" the Tories, disconcerted Cornwallis' plans, and made his position at Charlotte untenable. Deserted by his "friends" and threatened by fresh swarms of enemies, Corn- wallis thought no longer of conquest, but of flight, and on October 12th hastily abandoning Charlotte, fled "with great precipitation" to Winnsboro, South Carolina. The fugitives, reported the Board of War to the governor, were closely pur- sued "by Davidson and Davie, who, with Colonel Morgan, are now hanging on and greatly distress them." Thus was the soil of North Carolina once more freed from the invader.
8 History of the United States, (ed. 1888), Vol. V, p. 400.
CHAPTER XXVI
THE INVASION OF 1780-1781
The rapidity with which the patriots of the two Carolinas rallied from the disaster at Camden was proof enough that they possessed both the physical force and the spirit to de- fend their country if only they could have competent leader- ship. Congress had tried its favorites-Howe, Lincoln, Gates, -and had lost two states by the experiment. In a chastened mood, therefore, it now turned to Washington and requested him to select a commander for the Southern Department. Both Congress and the army knew well enough who Wash- ington's choice would be for he had urged the appointment of Nathanael Greene when Congress selected Gates. "In every campaign since the beginning of the war," says John Fiske, "Greene had been Washington's right arm; and for indefatigable industry, for strength and breadth of intelli- gence, and for unselfish devotion to the public service, he was scarcely inferior to the commander-in-chief."1 Con- gress promptly ratified Washington's choice and conferred upon Greene every power, subject to the control of the com- mander-in-chief, necessary to carry on the war in the South and recover the conquered states.
Greene arrived at Charlotte and took command Decem- ber 2d. He found there "only the shadow of an army." On paper it numbered 2,000 men, but fully half of them were untrained militia, 300 were without arms, 1,000 too naked to take the field, and only 800 sufficiently armed and equipped for active service. Upon reviewing the situation, Greene's heart sank, but he did not despair. His message to Washington- "I will recover the country or die in the attempt" -- truly ex- pressed his indomitable purpose. His quick intelligence dis- cerned in his men, beneath their tattered clothes, a spirit like his own, and in the unorganized mass before him he saw the raw material of a great army. To organize, train, and equip it, and to inspire it with his own unconquerable spirit, was
1 The American Revolution, Vol. II, p. 250.
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his first task. In this task he had the help of as brilliant a group of subordinates as ever surrounded a general,-Kos- ciusko, the able Polish engineer; Smallwood of Maryland; Daniel Morgan, "always a host in himself," William Wash- ington and "Light Horse Harry" Lee of Virginia; Sumner, Davidson and Davie of North Carolina; Isaac Huger, Pickens, Sumter and Marion of South Carolina. The services of most of these men had been available to Gates, but he did not know how to use them and looked with contempt upon their ir- regular methods of warfare. Greene, on the contrary, fully appreciated their value, while they recognized in him their master genuis.
From the beginning general and subordinates felt for each other complete confidence and gave each other unstinted support. Greene's most pressing need was supplies. His quick eye had already discerned the merits of Davie whom he induced reluctantly to become his commissary-general. Colonel Edward Carrington, of South Carolina, was ap- pointed quartermaster-general. To the tireless energy and patriotic sacrifices of these two officers, who cheerfully gave up their commands in the field with their opportunities for military renown to accept the drudgery of less conspicuous but more important positions, Greene owed much of the suc- cess of his southern campaign, which he acknowledged with generous appreciation. Gates rejecting the advice of those who knew the country had plunged headlong down the wrong road to destruction at Camden, but Greene followed an en- tirely different course. Trusting nothing to chance, he studied carefully every detail of the topography of the probable field of his operations. He sent Carrington to map the Dan, Ste- vens the Yadkin, and Kosciusko the Catawba, and so com- pletely did he master their maps that afterwards in a dis- cussion of the fords of the Catawba during the retreat across North Carolina, Davidson exclaimed in admiration, "Greene never saw the Catawba before, but he knows more about it than those who have been raised on its banks."
Greene determined upon a daring plan of operations. Since his army was too small to take the field against Cornwallis, he resolved to divide it into two strong partisan bands to operate against the smaller posts held by the British in the interior. One consisting of 1,100 troops, under Huger, which he himself accompanied, he ordered to Cheraw on the Pee Dee River to support Marion's movements in Eastern South Carolina and to threaten Rawdon at Camden. The other,
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consisting of about 1,000 men under Morgan he ordered to cross the Catawba, join Sumter and other partisans operat- ing in that region, and threaten the British hold on Ninety- Six and Augusta. Morgan's command was made up of 320 Maryland Continentals, 200 Virginia militia, 60 Virginia dragoons under Washington, 300 North Carolina militia un- der Joseph McDowell, and enough militia of South Carolina and Georgia to bring his force up to 1,000 men. To cover as much territory as possible, he pitched his camp on the Pacolet River. Thus the two detachments of- the Ameri- can army were 140 miles apart with Cornwallis at Winns- boro between them. Greene was playing a hazardous game for Cornwallis, whose force was superior to both the Ameri- can detachments combined, might easily have crushed either of them before the other could come to its aid. But such a movement required a quickness of comprehension and ag- gressiveness of character which Greene believed his lordship did not possess, and events proved that he had correctly fore- cast what Cornwallis would do. Reinforced by the arrival of General Alexander Leslie with 2,500 men, Cornwallis had in South Carolina a total of more than 11,000 men, but they were so scattered among the garrisons of the several posts throughout the State that he had not more than 4,000 under his own command. Upon learning of Greene's movements, he still further weakened his force, as Greene had foreseen, by dividing it. Ordering Leslie to Camden to protect that post against Huger, he sent Tarleton with 1,100 men to pur- sue Morgan, while he himself kept his main army idle at Winnsboro.
When Morgan learned of Tarleton's movements, he fell back upon Cowpens on Broad River, and there prepared for battle. He threw out first a skirmish line of 150 picked Geor- gia and North Carolina militia under Major John Cunning- ham and Colonel Joseph McDowell. These men were to fire two volleys "at killing distance" and then retire. Be- hind them was the main body of militia, 270 in number, under Pickens. The third line, 150 yards fartlier back, was com- posed of 290 Maryland Continentals and 140 experienced Vir- ginia and Georgia militia. Still farther in the rear, 125 dragoons under Washington formed the reserve. Behind the whole flowed the Broad River. Except for his legion of New York Loyalists, who were veterans of several years' ex- perience, Tarleton's command was composed entirely of reg- ulars from the British line. Tarleton reached Cowpens at
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about 8 o'clock in the morning of January 17th, and rushed precipitately into battle, expecting to drive Morgan's un- trained militia into the Broad River, which flowed behind his lines, and to capture or destroy the rest of his force. But the militia met the enemy's assault with several volleys at close range, and after doing terrible execution, retired in good order to make way for the Continentals. Mistaking their movement for the retreat which they had expected, the British charged impetuously only to be met by an unexpected fire from the Continentals at a range of thirty yards. As the enemy recoiled, the Continentals dashed forward in a bayonet charge. Thrown into confusion by this unexpected onset, the British troops became panic stricken when Wash- ington's dragoons, appearing suddenly from behind the Con- tinentals, swept down upon their flank. Most of them threw down their arms and surrendered at discretion, the rest fled, pursued by Washington's dragoons. Tarleton himself after a desperate hand-to-hand fight with Washington escaped cap- ture only by the fleetness of his horse. But 270 of his men found their way back to Cornwallis's camp; 230 were killed or wounded, 600 captured. The loss of this corps, following hard upon the loss of Ferguson's corps at King's Mountain, was a blow from which Cornwallis never recovered. "Had Lord Cornwallis had with him at the action at Guildford Courthouse. those troops that were lost by Colonel Tarleton at the Cowpens, on the fifteenth of March, 1781," says Sted- man, "it is not extravagant to suppose that the American colonies might have been reunited to the empire of Great Britain." 2
Morgan lost no time in rejoicing over his victory. With Cornwallis only twenty-five miles away, his situation was too dangerous for delay, and his first thought was to secure his prisoners, save his own army, and unite with Greene and Huger before Cornwallis could overtake him. Before his cavalry returned from the pursuit, therefore, he started for the fords of the Catawba to put that stream between himself and the enemy. Cornwallis, stung to unwonted celerity by the great disaster which had befallen the British arms, set out in hot pursuit. On January 25th, he reached Ramsaur's Mill. but in the meantime Morgan had crossed the Catawba at Sherrill's Ford about twenty-five miles away.
On the same day that Cornwallis reached Ramsaur's
2 American War, Vol. II, p. 346.
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Mill, Greene at Cheraw learned of Morgan's victory and re- treat. His quick mind took in the situation at once and he prepared his plans accordingly. Directing Huger to move rapidly up the Yadkin to the vicinity of Salisbury, he him- self struck out across the country to lay his plans before Mor- gan. Traversing the intervening distance of 125 miles in three days, he joined Morgan at Sherrill's Ford on January 30th, and there these two consummate leaders completed the details of their campaign. They would draw Cornwallis as far as possible from his base of supplies and uniting their two armies turn upon the enemy and destroy him. On Janu- ary 31st, accordingly, they took up their retreat from Sher- rill's Ford with Cornwallis following twenty-five miles in the rear. Greene's management of this retreat entitles him to a place among the first soldiers of his age. No detail of routes, marches, supplies, or camps; no means of facilitat- ing his own movements or of obstructing those of the enemy escaped his active and restless mind. From the maps of his engineers he had acquired accurate knowledge of the country, its roads, streams and fords, and had sent out parties to scour the streams and collect at designated fords all the boats that could be found, while he posted guards at every ford to delay the passage of the enemy. His personal par- ticipation in the dangers and hardships of the retreat was a constant inspiration to his men whose suffering and heroic endurance equalled if it did not surpass that of Washing- ton's men in the Trenton campaign. In was the depth of winter. The weather was wet and cold. The roads were knee-deep in mud and ice. Drenched with constant rain and sleet ; often compelled to wade waist-deep through foam- ing rivers; without tents, without blankets; pinched with hunger; half naked; marking the line of their march with the blood which flowed from their bare feet; constantly fight- ing rear-guard actions, Greene's men outmarched, outma- neuvered, and outfought their better-equipped adversaries, and when, after a continuous retreat of twenty-two days, they finally united forces with Huger at Guilford Court House, the British at Salem twenty-five miles distance were no nearer to them than they were on the day of Morgan's vic- tory at Cowpens.
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