USA > North Carolina > North Carolina, 1780-'81 : being a history of the invasion of the Carolinas by the British Army under Lord Cornwallis in 1780-'81 > Part 12
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Morgan was an Indian fighter of the frontiers, and when the revolution came it found him ready for war and enjoying the full confidence of his
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people. He entered the army and was captured in the assault on Quebec. After nearly a year's captivity he was exchanged, and feeling the love of his native earth, he fell upon the ground and cried, "Oh! my country." He did not kiss the earth as his mother, but embraced it as his home. I11 1779 he retired from the army, but when Gates was defeated he offered his services and came to Hillsboro for duty. Gates had done him great injustice while serving under him in New York, but this he forgave. He is described as "tall, muscular, vigorous and active ; trained from his childhood to an outdoor life of exertion which gave strength and elasticity to his limbs, with a clear and kindling eye. an open countenance full of char- acter, but full too of good humor, with a keen rustic wit and a hardihood which secured him the first place in bold enterprises and athletic sports."*
General Greene reached his encampment the day after Christmas and immediately bent his whole energy and talent in improving his little army. He healed all jealousies, roused the spirit of the troops, sought for them food and clothing, nursed the sick, encouraged the feeble, and personally supervised every effort to bring them into soldierly training. Here these cold and hungry and naked troops found some repose in their huts, and had many of the social enjoyments of camp life. They soon became acquainted with their commander, and learned to love him and confide in him as their
*Greene's Life of Greene, vol. 3, p. 95.
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leader. He had much magnetism about him, and all soldiers under his command drew closer to him and became devoted to his fortunes. Greene called this encampment the " Camp of Repose"; but while his soldiers were enjoying the repose, his fertile and active brain was conceiving stratagems and snares which were to perplex and worry his antag- onist. From this camp Camden, Georgetown and Winnsboro were all in striking distance, and the lines of their communication exposed, while Morgan threatened the British left and cut off their foragers.
While at "Camp Repose" on the Pee Dee, Colo- nel Henry Lee, known as "Light-Horse Harry," and father of the late General Robert E. Lee, joined General Greene. . Lee commanded a Legion com- posed of 300 men-150 infantry and 150 horse. Both men and officers were picked men: the officers were chosen in reference to their talents and expe- rience: the men in proportion. from the regulars of the army. Virginia furnished twenty-five of these men. The Continental troops of the other Southern States had been sent south, and of course those, States did not contribute."
The uniform of Lee's Legion was exactly like that of Tarleton's, which made it difficult to dis- tinguish them from each other.+
The horses for the three cavalry companies were procured in Maryland and were of the best the country afforded. It was all in all a magnificent
*Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I. p. 354. tJohnson's Life of Greene, vol. I. p. 453.
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Legion, and we can well excuse the vanity of its colonel. whose tardiness of approach was attributed to his desire to be seen and admired of men on his march south. Lee had distinguished himselfalready as a dashing, intrepid soldier, and his advent was hailed with delight. He was young and handsome. Born the 29th January, 1756, he was just about to enter his twenty-fifth year. He was proud and brave but not generous; he was a genius, full of resources, and when acting independently, quick, restless and fierce. He was not just to his comrades when acting with others; self-willed and hard to be restrained. It is to be lamented that to so many virtues he added infirmities and faults which often exposed him to the severest criticism. He was, however, a sincere and ardent patriot and devoted to the cause he had espoused with so much fervor and zeal.
Lee reached the Pee Dee on the 12th of January. and with him came Colonel Green, of Virginia, with 400 men-a fine body of soldiers.
ITSI. General Greene immediately ordered Lee to join General Marion, which he did on the 23d January, and made with him a combined attack on Georgetown, South Carolina. The attempt was unsuccessful, after promising the greatest results; but it produced a panic among the British at that place which soon caused them to evacuate the town. Marion was thereby given greater latitude, and the troops were encouraged. Cornwallis discovered that Greene was never idle.
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We shall now follow General Morgan to victory. 1781. Morgan's march led him across the Catawba River at Biggin's Ferry, just below where the South Fork River empties into that stream, and across the Broad River above the mouth of the Pacolet. He took post on the north bank of the Pacolet on the 25th day of December and began to gather forces and information. . Many of the Whigs of upper South Carolina had been compelled, under duress, to take protection and give their paroles to be inactive, but seeing an opportunity now to recover independence, they began to embody for defence. Andrew Pickens was one of this class, and he determined to take all the risks and enter the field. After sending off their families to the mountains Colonel Pickens and Colonel MeCall joined Morgan with Ico men. Colonel William Lee Davidson, of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, also led to Morgan 120 men and returned to bring 500 more and thereby missed the battle of Cowpens." He reached Morgan's camp on the 29th December. Major Joseph McDowell of "Quaker Meadows " also joined Morgan with 190 North Carolina rifle- men from Burke County ;} aggregating 310 mell from North Carolina at that time with General Morgan, all of whom participated in the battle of "Cowpens."
Judge Johnson commits the unpardonable error of stating that Major McDowell was from South
*Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, p. 362. rGordon's History, vol. 4. P. 31.
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Carolina. It is passing strange that it could have been conscientiously committed, when we consider that Major MeDowell had never quit the field after the battle of King's Mountain, in October, where he had so distinguished himself, and the further fact that after the war he had been a prominent member of the Congress of the United States from North Carolina, and, most probably, was personally known to Judge Johnson. It can only be excused on the ground of intemperate zeal on the part of that author to claim almost everything for South Carolina, regardless of the justice due his neigh- boring State. He shows but little appreciation, in his whole history, of the fact that North Carolina soldiers were foremost in every battle fought to redeem South Carolina from the conquest which followed the surrender of Charleston, and that her whole Continental line defended that ill-fated city to the last extremity when South Carolina troops refused to enter" that pitfall of Lincoln's folly.
Colonel Pickens' command proper was only 70 men.+ He had recently escaped from captivity at Ninety-Sixt and had no time to raise a force or to equip it when raised. Colonel MeCall's Georgians were only 30 in number, but they were trained men, volunteers who had kept the field after the affair at Blackstocks. MeDowell's 190 men were all mounted volunteers, hardy mountaineers who had fought at Musgrove's Mill and King's Mountain, riflemen,
*Johnson's Traditions, p. 308. +Gordon, vol. 4, p. 30. Gordon, vol. 4. p. 31.
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with Deckards in their hands, and withal were as good troops as any that Morgan had in his com- mand. The first dash that Morgan made at the British, MeDowell's mounted men, under Colonel McCall, who ranked Major MeDowell, constituted two-thirds of the force.
On the second day after Morgan's arrival at his camp, information was brought him that 250 Tories had advanced from the Savannah River to a point twenty miles south of him, and were committing outrages on the Whigs. Morgan detached Colonel Washington with 75 cavalry, McCall's small com- mand, and McDowell's mounted men in quest of this party. The Tories, hearing of his approach, retreated to Hammoud's Store, twenty miles further south, where Washington overtook them and imme- diately ordered a charge. It was a bloody retribu- tion that so early overtook these marauders. The killed and wounded were 150, prisoners 40 ; the remainder escaped. These men, cowardly and vindictive, had come to plunder and oppress their neighbors, supposing that there was no resistance to encounter, and they fell victims of justice before an outraged foe. McCall's men remembered that Colonel Brown, the Tory who occupied Augusta, had, a few weeks before, brought twelve Whig prisoners into his house, where he lay wounded, and had them hung in his presence from the stair- way, one by one, and other twelve he had delivered to his Indian allies, who tortured them to death at
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the stake. Such fiends deserved every vengeance that justice could inflict.
Morgan having some apprehension for the safety of Colonel Washington, who was near Tarleton's Legion of 250 cavalry, crossed the Pacolet and advanced to cover lis retreat. This done he resumed his former post.
Lord Cornwallis was restless over these bold movements of his enemy, and concluded to open the campaign again which he had abandoned in the winter. General Leslie had been sent south with 2000 men as a reinforcement, and they were approaching Camden, as Cornwallis explained afterwards, to threaten Greene, and were to be moved rapidly across to Winnsboro, where the combined army was to be thrown forward between the Catawba and the Broad Rivers to separate Greene from Morgan, and Morgan was to be anni- hilated by a corps of the best troops, selected for that purpose, and under the command of Lieuten- ant Colonel Banistre Tarleton, a more vindictive and merciless marauder than Ferguson; but of a class usually chosen by Cornwallis to do the inhu- man work which he was ashamed to do in person. His orders were to "push Morgan to the utmost." He did "push" Morgan in the race, but Tarleton was in front of it-just a little ahead of Washing- ton's cavalry. He underrated Morgan, who, Ban- croft says, "was at that time the ablest commander of light troops in the world; in no European army of that day were there troops like those he trained."*
*Bancroft's History, vol. 5, p. 450.
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The vainglorious correspondence between Corn- wallis and Tarleton reminds one of some of the ludicrous scenes in the comic opera of the "Grand Duchess ":
1-81. " Dear Tarleton," affectionately writes his lordship, on the 2d of January, "if Morgan is still anywhere within your reach I shall wish you to push him to the utmost. No time is to be lost !"
"My Lord," Tarleton responds, " I will either destroy Morgan's corps or push it to King's Mountain.
"I feel bold in offering iny opinion, as it flows from well-grounded inquiry of the enemy's intentions."
"Dear Tarleton : You have understood my inten- tions perfectly. "
Those "intentions" were understood to menn that if Morgan was overcome his corps was to be "destroyed" after the precedent set at the Wax- haws.
Cornwallis was to advance towards Charlotte a few days ahead of Tarleton, in order to capture the fugitives from Morgan's defeated army and prevent them from joining Greene; but without informing Tarleton of his change of mind, he concluded to await at Turkey Creek, forty miles north of Winns- boro, the result of Tarleton's expedition, having wisely considered that it was possible that as unex- pected a reverse might attend Tarleton as that which overtook Ferguson.
On the 14th January, Tarleton crossed the Enoree and Tyger rivers above Cherokee Ford and north-
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west of it. These tributaries of the Broad flow east into that stream. On the 15th, Morgan was at Bur-'s Mill on Thicketty Creek. He there received information of Tarleton's approach with rico men and was anxious to avoid an action if possible. He sent a courier to Greene informing him of his desires and reminding him that he had previously urged that he be recalled to the main army, as the country was laid waste and no subsistence was to be found. ' On the 15th, Morgan crossed Thicketty Creek and marched north toward the Broad, which here runs almost east, while in the evening Tarleton occupied the camp he left at Burr's Mill.
Tarleton's command consisted of 550 meu which constituted his Legion, the 7th regiment of 200 men. the first battalion of the Fist regiment, the light infantry of the zIst, and some loyalists who were the "bummers" of that day. To this was added two field pieces served by a detachment of roval artillery : amounting in all to eleven hundred men. though Tarleton says he had only rooo men.
Morgan's corps consisted of 320 men from the Maryland line, 200 Virginia militia, Colonel Wash- ington's cavalry, 75 men-these making 575 men of all arms with which he started. To this were added McDowell's mounted North Carolina volun- teers. 190 men, Davidson's Mecklenburg volunteers, a part of whom, however, were from Tryon-in all 310 North Carolinians, Pickens' South Caroliniaus, 70 men, and the Georgians under McCall, about 30. Sum total 985 men.
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It is probable that a few Georgia militia were added to this command before the battle took place.
Banistre Tarleton was born in Liverpool, August 2Ist. 1754, and was not yet twenty-seven years old. but he was notorious even at that age-not famous but infamous. He had selected and trained his Legion and infused his own spirit and opinions into it. He set examples and they followed them. He declared "that severity alone could effect the estab- . lishment of regal authority in America," and exer- cised that severity without mercy or humanity whenever opportunity offered.
A writer who was cotemporary with him says: "It is difficult to speak with temper of a man whose invariable aim was to destroy, whose resentments were only to be appeased by an increasing flow of blood."*
The slaughter of Buford's men was so cruel and heartless that an American officer of undoubted integrity, who visited his wretched victims, declares that ----
"Many of them were left in a perfect state of naked- ness, having been stript of every article of clothing ; and that the wounds inflicted amounted on an average to sixteen to each individual."+ Finally, "after partaking of the hospitality of the widow of General Richardson, he not only plundered the house and burned it, but spurned this venerable lady with his foot."#
*Garden, p. 254. +Garden, p. 284. #Garden, p. 284.
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Such was the venomous character of the man who was nearing the Cowpens, and in sight of King's Mountain was burning with rage against Ferguson's conquerors. How many horrors were averted by his defeat no human wisdom can calcu- late.
Morgan's camp was at the Cowpens, "on a wide plain covered with primeval pines and chestnut and oak, about sixteen miles from Spartauburg, seven miles from Cherokee Ford on the Broad River, and a little less than five miles south from the North Carolina line."# It was also on the same ground where the "Backwater men" encamped the even- ing of the 6th of October and refreshed themselves for the night march in pursuit of Ferguson, and in Morgan's camp were a part of those same men who had brought him to bay and scattered his army to the four winds of heaven. 1. Feeling the pride of conquest, they were ready to pluck fresh laurels for their brow by disposing of Tarleton as they did of Ferguson. McDowell's men were eager for the fray. Morgan's little army were in the best spirits over their recent adventure with the Tories, .and the regulars were anxious to wipe out the recollection of Camden by a victory at Cowpens. Tarleton believed at that time that Cornwallis was in the rear of Morgan, instead of being a day's march southeast of him, waiting events at Turkey Creek ; consequently Tarleton moved northwest towards the upper Pacolet to drive Morgan east into the *Bancroft, vol. 5. p. 482.
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snare they had set for him. Morgan had announced at Cowpens, to his army, his resolution to fight. and the cry to "lead them to victory" was the response from every lip. He therefore moved south on the 16th to intercept and fight Tarleton at the crossing of the Pacolet, but Tarleton, suddenly turning down from the upper Pacolet, crossed that stream above Morgan to its northern bank. This necessitated the falling back of Morgan to his · former position at the Cowpens, where he deter- mined to give Tarleton battle.
I-SI. . Tarleton halted the evening of the roth on the ground the Americans had left. and finding that Morgan had retreated, supposed that he intended to fly in order to avoid a battle. Early on the morning of the 17th day of January Tarleton resumed his march to overtake Morgan.
"It was & o'clock A. M. that the British army arrived in view of the Americans; and instead of overtaking his adversary in the hurry and confu- sion and fatigue of a flight, Tarleton found him rested, breakfasted, deliberately drawn up, every man at his post, and their commander in a popular and forcible style of elocution haranguing them."*
Tarleton had been five hours on the march through the darkness and his troops were much fatigued, but he determined to take advantage of the excitement and attack at once.
Morgan has been criticised severely by tacticians for his selection of ground, the Broad River being
*Johnson's Life of Greene, vol. I, p. 372.
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in his rear and his wings unprotected "in the air," but Morgan's genius rose above the rules of theorists and was successful. In defence of himself he wrote :
"I would not have a swamp in view of my militia for any consideration. They would have made for it and nothing could have detained them. As to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to . retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton if he had surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks. When men are forced to fight they will sell their lives dearly: and I knew that the dead of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of my bayonets and keep my troops. from breaking as Buford's regiment did. Had I crossed the river one-half the militia would have immediately abandoned me."
The reasoning is sound and the result proved that it was correct.
There was a slope of three hundred and fifty yards gently ascending to an eminence on which Morgan had taken his ground. It was covered with an open wood. "On the crown of this eminence was posted 290 Maryland regulars, and in line on their right the two companies of the Virginia militia under Triplet and Tate and a company of Georgians under Captain Beattie, about 140 in the whole, making his rear line to consist of 430 men. This
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was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard of Maryland."
In front of this line and about one hundred and fifty yards distant was the second line composed of 190 North Carolina militia," all of whom had seen service and were good soldiers, and about So South Carolinians. Jolinson puts this line as 270 men. I ani persuaded, however, that it was stronger than this, because the Mecklenburg militia numbered 150 and perhaps only one-half, or 95. of MeDowell's men were detailed as sharp-shooters in the front. This would leave 245 North Carolinians for the second line, and these added to the zo South Caro- linians would make the total 315 instead of 270 mien, which is approximately correct. I judge this too from the gallant stand made by these troops, who were really veteran militia, except the new recruits recently organized by Pickens. It was these veterans who did the destructive work with their Deckard rifles that caused such slaughter among the British officers and threw them into con- fusion for want of orders and leaders. The militia, or second line, was put under the command of Colonel Andrew Pickens, of South Carolina, who was the ranking officer.
In front of the militia, and one hundred and fifty yards in advance, General Morgan posted 150 picked riflemen as sharp-shooters, whose orders were to shoot for the "men who wore the epaulettes"-kill the officers. It is probable, as we have seen, that
*Ramsay's South Carolina, p. 225.
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at least 95 of these men were North Carolinians; the other 55 were Georgians, remnants of Clark's command. The Georgians were on the right, com- manded by Cunningham and Jackson, and the North Carolinians, under Major Joseph Mc Dowell of Burke County, North Carolina, were on the left.
In the rear of the regulars, under Howard, the ground descended gently and then rose again to another eminence, and behind this eminence, and concealed from view and secure from the cannonade. was Washington's cavalry, numbering about 90, and McCall's mounted men, about 35, making only 125 cavalry, to oppose the Legion of 550 men.
The order to the sharp-shooters was to cover themselves by trees, if necessary, and not to fire until the enemy was in fifty yards: after the first fire they were to fall back, loading and firing until they came to the main line under Colonel Pickens, where they were to fall in with the militia. This would give the second line a force of 450 men at least.
The order to the inilitia or second line was to deliver two deliberate charges at the distance of fifty vards and then retire and take their post on the left of the regulars. If charged by cavalry every third man was to fire and two remain in reserve, lest the cavalry should continue to advance after the first fire, or these reserves were to fire if the cavalry wheeled to retire.
The orders to the regulars were to fire low and deliberately, not to break on any account, and if
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. forced to retire to rally on the eminence in their rear.
The baggage and militia horses had been sent several miles to the rear under a small escort.
The order was then given to all the force to "ease their joints," that is, to assume comfortable attittides until the enemy came in sight. Allwere in high spirits and full of confidence. .
Morgan went along the lines encouraging the men and exhorting them to stand firm and assuring them that they were about to gain a great victory. No doubt too that all eyes had surveyed the King's Mountain, not far distant in their view, and gathered from that glorious field fresh inspiration to their courage. They were reminded that militia alone had defeated Ferguson and that Tarleton's troops were, many of them, only galvanized regulars recruited from the ranks of desperate Tories who cared to follow Tarleton more for plunder than for fight.
These noble men calmly surveyed the British as they deployed into line and waited their onset with the coolness of men determined to win.
Tarleton gives the formation of his troops as follows:
"The light infantry were ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line; the Legion infantry were added to their left and, under the fire of a three- pounder, this part of the British troops was instructed to advance within three hundred yards
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of the enemy. This situation being acquired, the 7th regiment was commanded to form on the left of the Legion infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the 7th; a cap- tain with fifty dragoons was placed on cach flank of the corps, who formed the British front line, to protect their own and threaten the Ranks of the enemy; the first battalion of the ;ist was desired to extend a little to the left of the second regiment and to remain 150 yards in the rear. This body of infantry, and near 200 cavalry, composed the reserve. During the execution of these arrange- ments the animation of the officers and the alacrity of the soldiers afforded the most promising assi1- rances of success."
Tarleton now advanced to reconnoiter the Amer- ican lines, but received a volley from the sharp- shooters in ambush. The cavalry were ordered to dislodge them. but fifteen saddles were quickly emptied. The sharp-shooters then retired, slowly firing as opportunity offered, until they reached the main line of the militia.
The deadly aim of these riflethen. now for the first time encountered by Tarleton, so demoralized his cavalry that they could not be induced, after this, to charge upon them, and Tarleton complains severely against his troops for their consternation and want of daring. This rifle was an arm so destructive in the hands of men trained to its use in the hunting grounds of the mountains that it
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required the most desperate courage to advance within its range.
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