USA > North Carolina > North Carolina, 1780-'81 : being a history of the invasion of the Carolinas by the British Army under Lord Cornwallis in 1780-'81 > Part 14
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miles beyond and was ready to turn the captured cannon on his British pursuers.
It is a common error, in the histories of this remarkable retreat. to attribute the escape of Morgan, from the pursuit of Cornwallis, to the sudden rise in the water of the Catawba. Providence may have confounded the judgment of Cornwallis and thus retarded his march, but up to this time, had not sent the floods to redeem the patriot host. Morgan outstripped the British army in the race and had a day of rest before resuming it again. The vigilance of Morgan was unceasing; he was soon informed that Cornwallis had stopped at Ramsour's Mill for reflection and he took advantage of it to rest his own troops on the eastern bank of the Catawba while the militia under Pickens were pushing the prisoners out of reach. Morgan was anxious to secure every one of them to exchange for the Continental line of North Carolina, cap- tured at Charleston, who were then languishing and wasting away in the British prison ships. Greene had sorely lamented the paroling of the King's Mountain prisoners, by which he had lost the opportunity for exchange.
Cornwallis had lost the 17th and 18th of January in his camp waiting for Leslie, and when he did move he took six days of a circuitous route to reach Ramsour's Mill, which he ought to have reached in two. At Ramsour's Mill some fatuity over- shadowed his reason and caused him to stop two days more.
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On the 25th of january, the day that Cornwallis reached Ramsour's Mill, the news of Morgan's victory reached General Greene at his camp on the Pee Dee. His little army was immediately ordered to prepare to march to the assistance of Morgan. The troops were poorly clad and the winter was cold; but they received the orders of their commander with cheerfulness and confidence. The 25th, 26th and 2;th of January were spent in energetic preparation for the march, and the most minute orders were given as to every detail before General Greene would consent to leave.
On the 28th, the day that Cornwallis left Ram- sour's Mill, General Greene did what will be deemed. by many the most imprudent act of his life. " With only a guide, an aid and a sergeant's guard of cavalry, he struck across the country to join Morgan and aid him in his arduous operations." The distance he had to traverse was one hundred miles; yet on the 30th we have his letters dated from Sherrill's Ford .* Erroneous traditions have crept into history that after Greene's arrival he and Morgan disagreed or quarreled, and that for this reason Morgan so soon retired from the campaign. Nothing is further from the truth. They were cordial, confidential and in entire accord. They both agreed that if Cornwallis resumed the pursuit, before the prisoners had been far enough away for security, that they would give him battle as he crossed the stream. They were in no hurry to leave.
#Jolinson's Life of Greene, vol. I, p. 493. The proper name is Sherrill's, not Sherard's Ford.
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The army of Greene had been ordered to march up the Yadkin (called lower down the Pee Deel and to be in position near Salisbury to join Morgan, and were now on their way under General Huger.
Lord Cornwallis, having lost most of his light troops at Cowpens, determined to relieve himself of every possible cucumbrance and enter with. renewed ardor upon the pursuit of Morgan. Sted- inan says that-
"Previously to the arrival of the British troops on the banks of the Catawba, Lord Cornwallis, considering that the loss of his light troops could only be remedied by the activity of the whole army, resolved to destroy all the superfluous baggage. By first reducing the size and quantity of his own, he set an example which was cheer- fully followed by all the officers in his command, although by so doing they sustained a considerable loss. No wagons were reserved except those loaded with hospital stores, salt and ammunition, and four empty ones for the accommodation of the sick or wounded. And such was the ardour, both of officers and soldiers, and their will- ingness to submit to any hardship for the promotion of the service, that this arrangement, which deprived them of all future prospect of spirititous liquors, and eren hazarded a regular supply of provisions, was acquiesced in without a murmur."*
To this destruction of his whole material train and necessary outfit for a winter campaign is attributed the final discomfiture of Cornwallis at
#It is curious to read in this day of the great emphasis laid upon the loss of the liquors ; Stedman gives it preference to " provisions "
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Guilford Court House. The supplies he burned could not be replaced short of Wilmington, and thither he was compelled to go when a reverse met his arms.
While at Ramsour's Mill many of the Hessian mercenaries deserted, and some English soldiers; in all it is estimated that 250 deserted. This is accounted for first, on the ground that the Hes- sians found here a German-speaking population. and caring no more for British than American principles, they escaped and became laborers in the country. The English, it is said, rebelled at the loss of the porter and rum-the "want of his gill of rum was more distinctly realized than the love of his King and country."
Finally the British army resumed its march on the 2Sth of January, taking the highway leading to Beattie's Ford, which is the direet route to Salis- bury. This, however, was intended to deceive the Americans, as the real place selected for crossing was Cowan's Ford, a few miles lower down.
We do not know the exact numbers of the British army at this time. In a letter of Cornwallis, dated the ISth December at Winnsboro, he says: " I have a good account of our recruits in general, and hope to march from hence with 3500 fighting men." He, lost, perhaps, Soo men at Cowpens, and received the 1500 men under General Leslie, and in round numbers must have had at least 4oco fighting men.
*NOTE .- The glass from the broken porter bottles were gathered for years by the potters to glaze their earthen-ware.
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Sir Henry Clinton estimates it at "considerably above 3000, exclusive of cavalry and militia."
We must now look to the east and see what preparations were being made on that side of the Catawba to dispute the passage of the British army. General Rutherford was then a captive at St. Au- gustine and General William Lee Davidson, of Mecklenburg, had been appointed to the command of his militia district during his absence. This division, General Graham states, embraced the "old superior court districts of Salisbury and Mor- ganton, now composing the fourth and fifth divis- ions of North Carolina militia, whose returns of effective men at this time (IS21) exceed twenty thousand men."" As soon as General Davidson was informed of the advance of the British army he ordered out the next detachment, which was detailed for duty from the counties under his com- mand, to rendezvous between Charlotte and the Catawba River. On the roth he received informa- tion of Tarleton's defeat and hastened a letter, by special messenger, to General Greene on the Pee Dee. On the 21st a body of twenty Whigs brought in twenty-eight British stragglers whom they had picked up after the battle of Cowpens, and from thein all the details were gathered.
I now incorporate the narrative of General Gra- ham, which is so interesting that I need make no apology for doing so.
"University Magazine, p. 103.
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"General Davidson was without, cavalry and directed Adjutant Graham (afterwards General Joseph Graham), who had now recovered from his wounds received the 26th of September to raise a company of cavalry, prom- ising that those who furnished their own horses and equipments and served six weeks should be considered as having served a tour of three months, the term of duty required by the law. In a few days be succeeded in raising a company of 56, mostly enterprising young men, who had seen service, but found it difficult to pro- cure arms. Ouly 45 swords could be produced, and one- half of them were made by the country blacksmiths. Only Is had pistols, but they all had rifles. They car- ried the muzzle in a small boot, fastened beside the right stirrup leather, and the but ran through the shot-bag belt, so that the lock came directly under the right arm. Those who had a pistol carried it swung by a strap. about the size of a bridle-rein, on the left side over the sword, which was belted higher than the modern mode of wearing it, so as not to entangle the legs when acting on foot. They had at all times all their arms with them. whether on foot or on horseback, and could act as infantry or cavalry, and move individually or collectively as emergencies might require. With those arms, and mounted generally on strong and durable horses, with a pair of saddle-bags for the convenience of the rider and a wallet of provender for his horse, they were ready for service without commissary, quartermaster or other staff.
"General Davidson finding the enemy approaching so near, divided those under his command in order to guard the different fords on the Catawba. At Tuckaseege Ford, on the road leading from Rainsour's to Charlotte, he placed two hundred men under Colonel Joseph Wil-
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liams, of Stmary. At Tool's Ford Captain Potts, of Mecklenburg, twenty-five men under Lieutenant Mecklenburg. With his greatest cavalry, he took post at Beattie's F Rainsony's MEN to Salisbury -- beim Colonel Williams. On the gist of were dispatched over the river, and enemy were encamped within fou inile- they discovered one hundred followed them to the river, but distance. The dispositions that we them to fear an an.buscade.
"The same evening General Mon under his command with Colon towards Salisbury. He himself ani came down to Beattie's Ford. ab ten minutes General Greene and h arrived. He had been early infor of the British army an I had first pu then leaving them under command their march towards Salisbury, hel tain the situation of affairs, and giv! in this quarter : General Morgan and inet hin at this place, by appel General Davidson retired with his and seating themselves on a log, h about twenty minutes-they then General Greene and aid took the Morgan and Washington took a
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*At Tuckaseege and Tool's fords, trees and a ditch dug and parapet made. Ther the other fords.
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troops marching under Howard. About the time General Greene had arrived the British vanguard of about four or five hundred men appeared on the opposite hill beyond the river. Shortly after their arrival, some principal officer with a numerous staff, thought to be Lord Corn- wallis, passed in front of them at different stations, halt- ing and apparently viewing us with spy-glasses. In about one hour after General Greene's departure General Davidson gave orders to the cavalry and about two hundred and fifty infantry to march down the river to Cowan's Ford, four miles below Beattie's, leaving nearly the same number at that place, under the command of Colonel Farmer, of Orange. On the march he stated to the commanding officer of the cavalry that, though General Greene had never seen the Catawba before, he appeared to know more about it than those who were raised on it, and it was the General's opinion that the enemy were determined to cross the river, and he thought it probable their cavalry would pass over some private ford in the night ; and in the morning when the infantry attempted to force a passage would attack those who resisted it, in the rear ; and as there was no other cavalry between Beattie's and Tuckaseege fords, he ordered that patrols who were best acquainted with the country should keep passing up and down all night, and on discovering any part of the enemy to have gotten over, to give imme- diate information to him. These orders were carried into effect. The party arrived at the ford about dusk in the evening, and after encamping it was too dark to examine our position.
"At Cowan's Ford the river is supposed to be about four hundred yards wide, of different depths and rocky bottom. That called the wagon ford goes directly across
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the river , on coming out on the eastern shore, the road turus down and winds up the point of a ridge, in order to graduate the ascent until it comes to its proper direc- tion. Above the coming-out place a fiat piece of ground, not much higher than the water, grown over with haw and per-imtion bashes and bamboo briars, five of six vards wide, extends up the river to the month of a small branch and deep ravine.
" Outside of this the bank rises thirty or forty feet, at an angle of thirty degrees elevation ; then the rise is more gradual. That called the horse ford, at the present time much the most used, comes in on the west at the same place with the wagon ford, goes obliquely down the river about two-thirds of the way across, to the point of a large island, thence through the island and across the other one-third to the point of a rocky hill. Though it is longer, this way is much shallower and smoother than the wagon ford, and comes out about a quarter of a mile below.
" From the information received General Davidson supposed that if the enemy attempted to cross here they would take the horse ford. Accordingly he encamped on the hill which overlooks it. Lieutenant Thomas Davidson's picket of twenty-five men remained at their station, about fifty steps above the wagon ford, on the flat piece of ground before described, near the water's edge.
"On the same day, as Cornwallis was marching to Beattie's Ford, about two miles from it at Colonel Black's farin, he left behind him, under the command of Brigadier General ()'Hara, twelve hundred infantry and Tarleton's cavalry, which in the night moved secretly down to Cowan's Ford, only three miles below. The next morn-
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ing at dawn of day, the ist of February, ist, he had his columns formed, the infantry in front with fixed bayonets, muskets empty, carried on the left shoulder at a slope, cartridge-box on the same shoulder, and each man had a stick about the size of a hoop-pole. eight feet long, which he kept setting on the bottom below him to support him against the rapidity of the current, which was generally waist deep, and in some places more. (It is stated by historians that the river was swollen so as to impede the passage of the British. The fact is, it was fordable from the week before until two days after this time, though a little deeper than usual. The cause of the enemy's delay must have been the dis- position by General Davidson to guard the fords. )
" The command of the front was committed to Colonel Hall of the guards, who had for a guide Frederick Hager, a renegade Tory, who lived within two miles of the place. They entered the river by sections of four, and took the wagon ford.
" The morning was cloudy, and a fog hung over the water, so that Lieutenant Davidson's sentinel could not see them until they were near one hundred yards in the river. He instantly fired on them, which roused the gnard, who kept up the fire, but the enemy continued to advance. At the first alarm those under General Davidson paraded at the horse ford, and Graham's cavalry was ordered to move up briskly, to assist the picket ; but by the time they got there, and tied their horses and came up in a line to a high bank above the ford, in front of the column, it was within fifty yards of the eastern shore. They took steady and deliberate aim and fired. The effect was visible. The three first ranks looked thinned, and they halted. Colonel Hall was the first man who
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appeared on horseback, behind, abont one hundred yards. He came pressing up their flank on the lower side and was distinctly heard giving orders, but we could not hear what they were.
"The column again got in motion and Kept on. One of the cavalry riflemen reloaded and aimed at Colonel Hall. At the flash of the gun both horse and rider went under the water, and rose down the stream. It appeared that the horse had gone over the nian. Two 'or three of the soldiers caught him and raised him on the upper side.
"The enemy kept steadily on, notwithstanding our fire was well maintained. As each section reached the shore they dropped their setting poles, and brought their muskets and cartridge-boxes to their places, faced to the left, and moved up the narrow strip of low ground to make room for the succeeding section, which moved on in the same manner.
"By the time the front ranks got twenty or thirty steps up the river they had loaded'their pieces and began to fire up the bank.
"The Americans receded a few steps when loading, and when .cady to fire would advance to the summit of the hill, twenty-five of thirty steps from the enemy, as they deployed up the river bank. They had gained the ford and just commenced firing when General Davidson arrived from the horse ford with the infantry, and finding his cavalry on the ground he chose to occupy, and impressed with opinion given by General Greene, that the enemy's cavalry would attack them in the rear, he ordered Graham's men to mount and go up the ridge and form two hundred yards behind. As they moved off, the infantry took their places, and the firing became brisk on both sides.
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" The enemy moved steadily forward, their fire increas- ing, until their left reached the month of the branch upwards of thirty poles from the ford. The ravine was too deep to pass. The fear of their infantry and front of their cavalry was about the middle of the river, when the bugle sounded on the left. on which their fire slacked and nearly ceased. ( They were loading their pieces. ) In about a minute it sounded again, when their whole line from the ford to the branch advanced up the bank, with their arms at a trail. The hill was in many places so steep they had to pull up by the bushes.
"General Davidson, finding them advancing with loaded guus, ordered a retreat for one hundred yards. On gaining the point of the ridge their fire was so heavy that he had to recede fifty steps beyond the ground assigned for formation ; he then ordered his men to take trees, and had them arranged to renew the battle.
" The enemy was advancing slowly in line, and only Aring scatteringly, when General Davidson was pierced by a ball and fell dead from his horse.
("The General was shot with a small riffe-ball near the nipple of the left breast, and never moved after he fell. It was well known that their pilot, Frederick Hager, had a rifle of this description, and it was always believed that he shot him. Most of the other Tories returned at or before the close of the war, but Hager went to Ten- nessee and stayed there until some of the Davidson family moved to that country, when he moved, with eight or ten others, all fugitives from justice, and made the first American settlement on the Arkansas River near Six Post ; married and raised a family there, and died in the year 1814. Major David Wilson and two others found the General's body in the evening, carried him off
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in the night and buried him at Hopewell Church, higher up on the Catawba River. The grave is yet known, and though Congress afterwards passed a resolution appropriating $soo for a monument, strange to tell, noth- ing is yet done to execute it. )
" His infantry retreated in disorder from the unequal contest. They dispersed in small squads, and took through the thickets in order to evade the enemy's cavalry. Graham's cavalry, which was formed about one hundred yards in the rear of where Davidson fell, moved off in order.
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"At an early hour Cornwallis placed his remaining force 'in array on the face of the hill fronting Beattie's Ford, and as soon as the firing commenced at Cowan's Ford, made demonstrations of attacking the post at Beattie's. A company went into the water forty or fifty steps and fired. Four pieces of artillery fired smartly for thirty minutes, and his front lines kept firing by platoons, as in field exercises. It was only a feint, however. Few shots of the musketry reached the opposite shore, and the artillery did no injury but cut off the branches of some trees near our line, which was masked by the point of the hill from the enemy's fire. The ford was one hundred yards higher up then than now. When the British were deploying up the bank at Cowan's Ford, owing to the fog and density of the atmosphere, the report of the artillery and platoons at Beattie's Ford came down the river like repeated peals of thunder, as though it were within a mile, and was heard over the country, to the distance of twenty-five miles. Although it had no effect on our troops engaged at Cowan's ( for they acted well under the circumstances), yet it had a wonderful effect on the people of the adjacent country. Hitching
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up their teams in great haste, and picking up their most valuable goods and some means of subsistence, the men who were not in service, and women and children, aban- doned their homes, and drove off in different directions.
" In one hour after the firing the whole country appeared in motion, but unfortunately too many of them fled into the Salisbury road. The baggage and provision wagons had started from Cowan's as soon as the action began. Graham's cavalry maintained their order, and expected the enemy's cavalry would pursue the baggage.
"A disposition was therefore made by placing four men with good horses as a rear guard, and despatching two others to give directions to the wagon-master, if he heard firing in his rear, to cause the teamsters to cut the horses from their wagons and clear themselves. Moving on slowly, halting occasionally, and no enemy appearing, it occurred to the commanding officer that the enemy's design must be to take Colonel Farmer in the rear, at Beattie's Ford (if he had maintained his position against the tremendous cannonade). It was believed he had no intelligence of their being actually across below the ford. The cave ley filed off along a by-road to give him notice. intending to form a junction with the foot one and a half miles from the ford at a farin. An old lady (the only person at the place), informed them that shortly after the firing had ceased General Davidson's aid had given notice to the party at Beattie's and they had retired already some distance on the Salisbury road. Some rain had fallen, and the men were wet and cold, and both men and horses having had but a scanty supply of pro- visions at Cowan's the evening before, it was concluded to get some sustenance and take it off a mile or two in the woods and eat it. Videttes were ordered out, and,
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agreeably to rule in such cases, each right-hand fle ordered to dismount and procure food for himself, con- rade and their horses, while the left file held the horses. They had not gotten half their supply when one of the videttes gave notice that on the other side of the farm somne men were in view, believed to be the enemy, but, having Hussar cloaks over their uniforins, could not be clearly ascertained, but by the tails of their horses being docked square off, which all'knew was' the mark of Tarleton's cavalry, they were instantly recognized , and orders given to mount, fronting the enemy. When all were in their places, they wheeled off, and up a lane, the whole British cavalry coming briskly round the farm on the other side. When Graham's party passed over a rise in the ground beyond the lane, they turned short to the right, and in twenty-five poles crossed a swampy branch. When the advance got over they wheeled to protect the rear, but the enemy were so eager in the pur- suit that they did not discover them, but kept on, at a brisk gallop, along the Salisbury road. This was about two miles from Torrence's tavern, whither they were bound.
"The men who retreated from Beattie's Ford, and some of those who had been at Cowan's, and many others, some of them South Carolina refugees, as they arrived at Torrence's tavern, halted. Being wet, cold and hungry, they began to drink spirits, carrying it out in pailsful. The wagons of many of the movers with their property were in the lane, the armed men all out of order and mixed with the wagons and people, so that the lane could scarely be passed, when the sound of the aların was given from the west end of the lane, 'Tarle- ton is coming " Though none had had time to become
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intoxicated, it was difficult to decide what course to pursue at such a crisis. Captain Nathaniel M. Martin, who had served under Colonel Davie, and six or eight others (anmed as cavalry), rode up meeting the enemy, and called to the men to get over the fences and turn facing the enemy ; that he could make them halt until they could be ready ; some appeared disposed to do so ; others, when they crossed the fence, kept on, some with their pails of whiskey. Martin moved forward until within fifty yards of the enemy. They halted near two minutes. Tarleton could readily discover the confusion and disorder that prevailed. One of his party fired a carbine and shot down Captain Martin's horse ; he was entangled and taken prisoner, but escaped from the guard two days after. Tarleton and corps charged through the lane. The militia fled in every direction. Those who were on horse-back and kept the road were pursued about half a mile. Ten were killed, of whom several were old men, unarmed, who had come there in the general alarm, and a few were wounded, all with sabres. But few guns were fired. On the return of the dragoons from the pursuit they made great destruc- tion of the property in the wagons of those who were moving ; ripped up beds and strewed the feathers undil the lane was covered with them. Everything else they could destroy was used in the same manner.
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