USA > North Carolina > North Carolina, 1780-'81 : being a history of the invasion of the Carolinas by the British Army under Lord Cornwallis in 1780-'81 > Part 20
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Tarleton, p. 272.
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along the high-road; the dragoons likewise could only move in colunm in the same direction, and Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton was ordered to keep his regiment in reserve till the infantry should penetrate through the woods to the open ground near the Court-House, where the country was rep- resented to be more favorable for the operations of cavalry."* ยท
Colonel Carrington gives the following official figures as containing the number of these respect- ive organizations on the first day of March, 1781, to-wit:
23d Regiment, - 258
33d Regiment, - 322
7Ist Regiment and 2d Battalion. 212
Regiment of Bose, 313
- The Yagers, -
97
British Legion, - - - 174
Total, I376
This does not include the First Battalion of Guards, the artillery or the Grenadiers, whose numbers are not given.
Thus was the front of battle formed, by the British commander, in the valley of Horsepen, a bright and sparkling rivulet, which went on its racy way all unmindful of the bloody carnage which was soon to crimson and pollute its crystal fountains. It was at noon when the scarlet uni- forms and burnished arms of the British soldiery
Tarleton, pp. 272-3.
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were glistening in the sunlight of that beautifu: day. Not a furrow had been turned in the fields: not a bud was yet scen upon the trees, nor a flower in the valleys; but the first warm sunshine of spring was beginning to cast its rays upon the earth and enliven nature into activity again after a dreary winter of repose. It was not a day that suggested the conflict of arms or the shedding of blood, but rather the lassitude of peace and the dreaminess of rest; but war, like death, "has all seasons for its own," and places its iron hand on every scene of beauty and loveliness without con- sideration or remorse.
The last remnant of the Continental army in the South was now arraved in front of the British com- mander, and he fondly hoped that its rout or cap- tivity would be succeeded by the fall of Virginia and the subjection of the States.
It was a supreme moment in the life of Corn- wallis and the crisis in the revolution. This victory won, there was no foe to obstruct his passage into the defenceless province of Virginia; North Caro- lina would be at the mercy of the Crown, and Georgia and South Carolina, already prostrate and subdued, could never rally for defence again.
Should Greene be beaten, Cornwallis could take up his triumphal march to the sea to be welcomed by the English fleets which rode unchallenged in the harbors of Norfolk and New York.
The prisoners of war at Charlottesville, Virginia, would be set free to plunder and pillage their cap-
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tors. France, capricious and fickle, would forsake the waning fortune of the colonies, and, making peace for herself, leave her allies to their fate. Washington would be crushed by the army of Clin- ton in his front and that of Cornwallis in his rear, or be driven into the frozen regions of the North for refuge. Congress would be scattered from its halls and carry dismay wherever they fled for safety.
These were the precious hopes and dazzling vis- ' ions that stimulated the ambition and rerved the hand of Cornwallis for the battle now before him. The greater the odds against him, the greater would be the glory of his triumph and the more important its results.
Not only hope and glory allured him to battle, but retaliation and revenge rankled in his heart and drove him to desperate deeds. His lieuten- ants. Ferguson and Tarleton, had been defeated and humbled by the militia of North Carolina whom they despised, and British pride demanded that the insult be avenged.
Every officer and soldier remembered King's Mountain and Cowpens, and were eager to wipe out the disgrace of those disastrons fields.
Nothing but news of misfortune had gone to Clinton from the army of invasion since the frosts of October, 1780, had, chilled their zeal, and the great rival of Cornwallis was secretly gloating over the misfortunes of his personal and political enemy.
The recovery of prestige and the restoration of
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royal confidence added a powerful incentive to the achievement of victory.
Cornwallis resolved, therefore, that " he would conquer or die" on this field, and the reckless exposure of his person during the battle indicated the determination with which he entered the con- flict. .
None the less was the appreciation of, the Ameri- can army and its officers of the decisive crisis which was now upon them.
General Greene, the confidential friend and trusted counsellor of Washington, had been selected by him as the commander-in-chief of the Southern Department of the American army. Their friend- ship had begun at Boston with the first enthusiastic outburst of the revolution, and had steadfastly ma- tured in the camp and the council.
He had been intrusted with almost dictatorial powers, and he knew that the eyes of the confeder- ation were upon him. . He was fully aware of the discipline and strength of the magnificent soldiery in his front; that they were led by men whose honor was dearer, by far, to them than life, to whom disgrace and defeat meant ruin and shame. Greene knew the desperate straits to which he had driven his adversary, and the obstinacy that characterized his nature. He sadly knew the want of discipline in his own hastily-gathered forces, and how inferior were their arms; that the larger part of them had never faced a British column with their dreadful "push of the bayonet"; that few of his militia
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had ever endured the suspense and terror of a can- nonade, while compelled to inaction themselves. He hardly hoped for victory; but he was confident that he could wound and cripple his adversary and prevent that adversary from destroying his army.
He trusted that the militia would so stagger and demoralize the British columns that when they encountered his regular troops they would fall a prey to the Continental line as they did at Cow- pens. Desiring that in all things this battle should be a repetition of that, he seems to have endeavored to imitate Morgan in the details and particulars of that splendid achievement.
"When his arrangements were completed, Greene passed along the first line. The day was hot, and, hold- ing his hat in one hand, he was wiping the perspiration from his ample forehead with the other. His voice was clear and firm as he called his men's attention to the strength of their position, and, like Morgan at the Cowpens, asked only THREE ROUNDS. THREE ROUNDS, MY BOYS, AND THEN YOU MAY FALL BACK " Then taking his posi- tion with the Continentals, he held himself in readiness to go wherever his duty might call him."
The only error in this statement is that it was Two, not thice, rounds which Greene required. The quotation above is taken from "The Life of Major General Nathanael Greene," by his grandson George Washington Greene, vol. 3, page 196.
The error was from inadvertence, not intentional; for on pages 143-4 of the same volume, the author
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gives this account of Morgan's speech and require- ment of his troops at Cowpens. Addressing the militia, Morgan
"Bade them call to mind his own long experience and unvarying fortune, and & vhorted them to take confi- dence from his example, be firm and steady and above all aim true. Give me TWO FIRES, at killing distance, he exclaimed, and I will make the victory sure !'"
The author says he received the knowledge of this incident from "tradition"-no doubt a direct tradition from his grandfather, and handed down from sire to sou as one of the circumstances of this battle often repeated around the fireside.
It is a fact so significant as to become a pivotal one in the further narrative of this battle. I verily believe that "upon this rock" the North Carolina militia may rest their vindication against the asper- sions cast upon them in history, and that neither the excuses and pretexts of defeated soldiers, nor the jealousies of States, nor the slander of enemies, nor the oft repeated misrepresentations of careless and superficial writers, can drive them from this solid foundation of eternal truth and justice. When this incident and order, now established in history, shall be accepted as truth, it is easy to demonstrate, from the testimony of eye-witnesses and participants in this battle, that the requirement of General Greene was fulfilled; that the order given to the North
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Carolina militia by him in person was obeyed, and that their
"Twice-lit tongue of bolted flame Blazed full upon their foemen."*
I propose to fortify iny position, that General Greene gave this order, or made the requirement of only "Two Fire" from the North Carolina militia, by the testimony of other authors and writers.
Johnson, in his Life of Greene, vol. I, p. 37S, says, that the
"Orders to the first line (at Cowpens) were to deliver tivo deliberate discharges at the distance of fifty yards and then to retire."
Lee, in his Memoirs, page 227, repeats this speech in these words:
"If you will pour in but two volleys, at killing dis- tauce, I will take upon myself to secure victory."
All historians agree that "two rounds" were required by Morgan, and then the militia were to fall back.
In further confirmation of George Washington Greene, that this same order was given the North Carolina militia at Guilford Court-House, I add other testimony. Garden, who was one of Lee's Legion, and heard the speech, says:
*J. W. Rumple, poem on this battle. 22
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"The North Carolina militia were assured by General Greene that if they would only preserve their station long enough to give their enemy two fires they should obtain his free permission to retire from the full." Garden's Anecdotes, p. 40.
Gordon's History, vol. 4. page 55, has also this language:
"General Stevens had the address to prevent his brigade from receiving any bad impression from the retreating North Carolinians by giving out that they had orders to retire after discharging their pieces. To cherish this idea he ordered his men to open their files to favor their passage."
It is evident that General Stevens and his whole command were apprised of the order to the North Carolina militia (as they should have been) to prevent surprise and panic in their ranks by the retreat of the North Carolinians in their front. Gordon affects to believe this was a ruse of General Stevens, but in this he is manifestly in error. The order was given just as General Stevens commu- nicated it to his command.
Rev. E. W. Caruthers, D. D., who wrote the Life of Rev. Dr. David Caldwell in 1842, had been over the battle-field of Guilford Court-House very often in company with the soldiers who participated in the battle and had conversed with many old people of the neighborhood who knew its history from their cotemporaries, and was therefore familiar with
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the incidents and traditions of the battle. Robert Rankin, a member of the Buffalo Church, often pointed out the different localities of the field, especially on the left, where Rankin fought under Colonel Campbell among the North Carolina rifle- inen. With this familiar knowledge of events, Dr. Caruthers assumes, in his Life of Caldwell, as an established fact, known by everybody, that the militia were ordered to fire twice and then retreat. Speaking of Captain Forbis' command, page 236, he says:
"They stood firm until they had fired twice, accord- ing to orders."
Again, he says :
"They were placed in the front rank, stood firm and fired the number of times prescribed in the general order. Forbis himself fired the first gun in that division, and killed his man."
There are several incidental allusions to this "order" to fire twice, and always as one of the unquestionable facts connected with the battle.
It is not, however, emphasized because the Doctor was writing the biography of a minister of the Gospel, and not a defence of the North Carolina militia, and the order was only a collateral fact in the narrative.
Subsequently, in 1856, Dr. Caruthers, in his Sketches-Second Series-vindicated the North
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Carolina militia from the charge of inefficiency in the battle.
It was indeed a fact well known, and often spoken of by old persons to succeeding generations ; and it is incomprehensible that a circumstance so well known and understood should have been omitted in his Memoirs, by Colonel Lee, who must have been cognizant of it, for he was on the front line when the order was given. It is inexplicable that Johnson, too, who had access to General Greene's correspond- ence and papers, should have suppressed it, while he gives great prominence to the like order of General Morgan at Cowpens.
I have in my possession also an interesting letter from Captain James F. Johnson, of Charlotte, North Carolina, giving me the statement of Abram Forney, of Lincoln County, who remained from Pickens' brigade to participate in the impending battle. Forney states distinctly that it was " two rounds," and adds that his portion of the line obeyed the order.
There can be nothing settled, by testimony, more certainly than the fact that the North Carolina militia were, by the personal order of General Greene, directly instructed to fire twice, and assured that he required no more of them. And it is the failure to observe and state this all-important fact that has placed these troops in a false light before their posterity. When we reflect for a moment, this order is so reasonable and natural that we
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cannot doubt the truth of the assertion that it was given.
The North Carolinians were armed with their hunting rifles. They carried their powder in a powder-horn with a charger attached. Their bul- lets and patching were in a pouch to their left side, and the tallow to grease the patching under a spring in the stock of the riffe. To load a rifle required that the powder be measured in the charger and poured carefully into the small muzzle bore of the rifle. The patching was to be greased and placed over the muzzle and the ball placed upon it and pressed into the gun. A knife was tlien used to cut off the surplus patching. The ball was to be ramined down the gun with a ramrod, which was then to be replaced in the thimbles along the barrel. The last operation was to prime the pan in the flint and steel lock before the rifleman was ready to fire upon his enemy. The operation required at least three minutes to perform it.
If the British line were fired upon at fifty yards, they could be over the intervening ground in less than fifty seconds, or if at one hundred yards, in one and a half minutes. So that, unless the British line was repulsed in its advance by the deadliness of the fire, they would be upon the militia before it was possible to load three times, or, if the opera- tion of loading were delayed, by trepidation or accident, before they could fire twice.
It is evident that General Greene, as well as every reasonable person, expected that the militia
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would give way whenever the bayonet did reach them; for against it they had no arm of defence nor discipline to beat it back. Johnson well remarks. in speaking of the terror of the bayonet. that "nothing but the absolute subjection of every human feeling to the restraints of discipline cau dissipare the real or imagined terrors of such a conflict:" and Lee has said that "to expose militia to such a charge, without discipline or arms to repel it, is murder." Therefore. General Greene instructed them, so they could understand it, to fire until the bayonet did reach them, which he calculated would be two rounds, and then to retire. Otherwise it would have been to expect more of them than of the conquerors of Ferguson at King's Mountain.
The sequel will show that the North Carolinians disobeved no order in retreating before the bavonet. and that they performed the whole duty required of them, and if the day had gone as did Cowpens, the order of Greene to the militia would, most prob- ably. not have been suppressed.
General Greene having now retired to the Con- tinental line, exhorted the second Maryland, which was a fresh regiment, though regulars, to firmness and courage. He was no more on the front line. and as to its conduct he could only afterwards speak from hearsay.
The British army having completed its array, advanced with that steadiness and coolness charac-
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teristic of veteran and disciplined soldiers. The ground, on the north side of the road, is compara- tively level for several hundred yards in front of the position occupied by Brigadier General Eaton's brigade, and being an open field, the line of the enemy, with their bright uniforms, presented a tempting mark to the riflemen. Impatient to fire and have time to reload for a second discharge, they threw in their first fire at one hundred and fifty yards-a distance at which an ordinary rifleman could bring down a turkey or a deer at almost every shot, and it is not surprising that they felt sure of hitting the scarlet body of a British soldier.
Lieutenant Colonel Webster, seeing the effect of this first fire, and desiring to reach the militia before it could be repeated, rode to the front and gave the order to charge and he himself headed the advance.
Colonel Tarleton, who was in the road, in the rear of Webster's brigade, and in full view of its advance against Eaton's brigade, thus describes the scene transpiring before his eyes:
"The order and coolness of that part of Webster's brigade which advanced across the open ground exposed to the enemy's fire cannot be sufficiently extolled. The extremities were not less gallant, but were more pro- tected by the woods in which they moved. The militia allowed the front line to approach within 150 yards before they gave their fire."
Stedman, the English historian, who was the
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Commissary General of Cornwallis, and was also a spectator of the scene, repeats this account of Web- ster's advance and vouches for Tarleton's general description of the battle. Colonel Lee, who knew Stedman's character well, and the incidents of the whole campaign, in correcting an unintentional error into which Stedman had fallen about the defeat of Pyle, says: "I have acknowledged my conviction of Stedman's impartiality and respect for truth." Therefore, this account of Tarleton's conies endorsed by Stedman, and Stedman's char- acter is endorsed by Lee.
Tarleton's statement is a prominent and important fact, because, if " the order and coolness of" Web- ster's brigade under the fire of the North Carolina militia cannot be "sufficiently extolled." the fire must have been very deadly and continuons.
Tarleton and Stedman would not acknowledge the insufficiency of the English language to describe this charge unless it was made in the face of a gall- ing and destructive fire. The tribute to the "cool- ness and courage" of Webster's brigade involves the highest tribute to the firmness of the North Carolina brigade.
Another English historian, Lamb, who was at that time an officer of the Thirty-third regiment and participated in this charge, has also quoted Tarleton's language with approbation, and in order to give further and greater emphasis to the coolness and courage of Webster's brigade, he says:
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" As the author belonged to Colonel Webster's brigade, he is enabled (and the reader will naturally expect it of him) to state some circumstances, unnoticed by any his- torian, from his own personal observation. After the brigade formed across the open ground, Colonel Webster rode on to the front and gave the word, .Charge!' Instantly the movement was made in excellent order at a sharp run, with arms charged ; when arrived within forty yards of the enemy's line it was perceived that their whole force had their arms presented and resting on a rail.fence, the common partition in America. Theywere taking aim with the nicest precision.
""Twixt host and host but narrow space was left- A dreadful interval, and front to front. Presented, stood in terrible array."
"At this awful period a general pause took place; both parties surveyed each other a moment with most anxious suspense. Colonel Webster then rode forward in front of the Twenty-third regiment and said, with more than his usual commanding voice, which was well known to his brigade, 'Come on, my brave Fusileers !' This operated like an inspiring voice. They rushed forward amidst the enemy's fire. Dreadful was the havoc on both sides.
" . Amazing scene : What showers of mortal hail, what flaky fires !
"At last the Americans gave way and the brigade advanced to the attack of the second line."*
Lamb wrote his work in 1809, after seeing other #Lamb's History of the American Revolution. p. 361.
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accounts of this battle, and felt constrained to give his personal recollections of this particular part of the engagement, because he was an active partici- pant in it and no other historian had described the action in detail in that part of the field. This anthor is one of the highest respectability and is frequently quoted by American historians. In Carrington's " Battles of the American Revolution," a standard work of recent date, copious quotations are made from Lamb. He is also quoted by George Washington Greene in his biography of the General. Lamb's work was published by subscription. and among the list of subscribers are most of the noble- meli and literati of his day. Lamb was a teacher in a high school in Scotland and a man of letters as well as a soldier.
Can any one doubt the truth of such a statement, coming from a participant in the scene, who gives such emphasis and particularity to details, and who is of unimpeachable character for truth and intelli- gence ?
I can safely rest the reputation of that part of the North Carolina militia under General Eaton, on these splendid tributes to their courage and firmness.
It establishes the fact that they had fired once and reloaded, and when the enemy were in forty paces were resting their rifles on the rails and aim- ing with the "nicest precision" at their foe. So appalling was their martial array that even the
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British veterans, who had faced so many dangers from Quebec to Camden, paused and stood aghast at the spectacle, and that only the magic voice of their commander, accompanied with his reckless exposure in their front, could prevail upon them to advance.
The " havoc" was great, says Lamb, and we may well believe it. Riflemen who could take a squirrel's head from the highest tree would not be likely to miss a scarlet uniform at forty paces .
In Foote's Sketches of Virginia, Second Series, p. 149, is a biography of the Rev. Samuel Houston, a Presbyterian minister, whose simple epitaph tells the story of his useful and honorable and pious life :
SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF THE REV. SAMUEL HOUSTON,
WHO IN EARLY LIFE WAS A SOLDIER OF THE . REVOLUTION,
AND FOR 55 YEARS A FAITHFUL MINISTER OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST.
HE DIED ON THE 20TH DAY OF JANUARY, IS39, AGED SI YEARS.
Mr. Houston was a student at Lexington Academy. but responded to a call for volunteers, and was one of General Stevens' command at this battle, and kept a diary of his movements from February 26th to March 23d, in which are related many interest-
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ing incidents. He was fond of telling the story of this battle, and thus describes its opening :
"The Virginia line was in the forest, the Carolina militia partly in the forest and partly in the skint of the forest and partly behind the fence inclosing the open space, across which the British force was advancing with extended front.
"According to orders, the Carolina line, when the enemy were very near, gave their fire, which on the left of the British line was deadly, and having repeated it, retreated. Some remained to give a third fire and some made such haste in retreat as to bring reproach upon themselves as deficient in bravery, while their neighbors behaved like heroes."
Here is a direct confirmation of Lamb's account of the "deadly fire" on Webster's brigade, and a positive assertion that the fire was "repeated," aud that some remained to fire the third time, and that they acted "according to orders."
That there was "haste in the retreat" when it began, is conceded; but no military man or intelli- gent reader of the history of militia contests would have expected it to be otherwise. The Virginians and North Carolinians, being undisciplined troops. were alike disorderly when retreating from the field. The North Carolinians had done all they were commanded or instructed to do, and hastened to the rear, where they were ordered to rally again. Mr. Houston was frank and just as well as truthful, for in describing the advance of the British on Stevens'
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brigade, after the North Carolinians retreated, he relates as the first fact occurring that "our brigade Major, Mr. Williams, fled."
The Rev. J. Henry Smith, D. D., one of the most distinguished ministers of the Presbyterian Church in the South, and for twenty-five years pastor at Greensboro, North Carolina, has seen Mr. Houston in his old age and knew his character well, and testifies to the great esteem and reverence in which he was held by all who knew him. He was one of the leading spirits of the Presbyterian Church in Virginia in his day.
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