USA > New Jersey > Monmouth County > History of Monmouth County, New Jersey. Pt. 1 > Part 32
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The knowledge of the co-operation of France in the resistance of the colonies to British au- thority and the impending arrival of a French fleet hastened the movement. As a matter of fact, that fleet appeared at the entrance of Del- aware Bay almost immediately after Admiral Howe turned Cape May for New York.
The evacuation of Philadelphia by the Brit- ish began at three o'clock in the morning of June 18th and by ten o'clock in the forenoon his en- tire army had crossed the Delaware and landed at Gloucester Point. In the evening of the same day his forces encamped at and near Haddon- field, on the south side of Cooper's Creek, five miles southeast of Camden. From that place they moved on the following morning, march- ing up the Delaware, and nearly parallel with it. They marched in three divisions,-one by way of Mount Holly, one through Columbus, and one by Bordentown. This last division, when near the mouth of Crosswicks Creek, was at- tacked by three regiments of New Jersey mili- tia, under Colonel Frederick Frelinghuysen, Colonel Van Dyke and Colonel Webster. It was but a skirmish, resulting in a loss to the British of four killed and a greater number wounded. They then moved to Crosswicks, where they were again attacked by the militia while they were attempting to repair the bridge over the stream. This they finally succeeded . in doing, and moved on towards Allentown.
Maxwell's Jersey brigade had been detached from the main body of the American army, and was now co-operating with the forces of General Philemon Dickinson to obstruct and harass the British columns as much as possible, but they were too weak to interfere with their march oth- erwise than by destroying bridges and obstruct- ing roads before them. Clinton did not attempt to move rapidly, but seemed rather to invite an attack. On the 24th of June his column-the division of General Knyphausen, with the pro vision train and heavy artillery-encamped at Imlaystown, while that of Cornwallis occupied Allentown, thus covering the other division from surprise. "The column of General Knyp- hausen " said Sir Henry Clinton,1 "consisted of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, Second Bat- talion of Light Infantry, Hessian Yagers, First and Second British Brigades, Stirn's and Loos' brigades of Hessians, Pennsylvania Loyalists, West Jersey Volunteers and Maryland Loyal- ists. The Second Division consisted of the Six- teenth Light Dragoons, First and Second Bat- talions of British Grenadiers, the Guards and Third, Fourth and Fifth British Brigades."
Clinton had received information that the American army was already on the east side of the Delaware, in pursuit, and that Washington was expecting to be reinforced by General Gates' northern army. Thereupon, the British com- mander, fearing to hazard the attempt to reach New York by the direct way through New Brunswick, decided to take the Monmouth route to Sandy Hook Bay ; and, placing all his trains in the advance, under escort of Knyphausen's column, with the Second Division in light march- ing order (and accompanied by himself in per- son) as a rear-guard, reached their camps at Al- lentown and Imlaystown on the 24th, as before mentioned. From Imlaystown Knyphausen's division moved forward, on the 25th, to a point within four miles of Monmouth Court-House, and in the morning of Friday, the 26th, marched to the village now Freehold .? The rear divi-
1 In his report, dated New York, July 5, 1778.
2 The fact is shown by the following extracts from the diary of Andrew Bell, then private secretary of Sir Henry Clinton :
" Friday, June 26th .- General Knyphausen moved to
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HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.
sion came up in the forenoon of the same day, and Sir Henry Clinton established his head- quarters in a house (still standing and known in later years as the "Murphy house ") about a mile southwest of the court-house, near the Mount Holly road, The house was at that time the home of the family of William Conover. Here, with its immense trains, with pleasure carriages, women with their saddle-horses and baggage and a variety of other impedimenta brought from Philadelphia, the entire army re- mained from the forenoon of Friday, the 26th, until the morning of Sunday, the 28th of June, its lines extending from the village, a mile or two down the Middletown road, and a greater distance out on the road to Imlaystown. Dur- ing the two days and nights that the British army remained in the vicinity of Monmouth Court-House its horses were put out to pasture, the officers made merry over the wines and liquors (of which they had a plentiful supply), the tents were pitched and the men took a long and welcome rest after the toil and terrible heat of the march from Philadelphia.
Washington had suspected the design of the British commander to move his forces by land from Philadelphia to New York, but it was not until Clinton's army was safely across the Dela- ware that he became certain that such would be the movement. As soon as positive intelligence of the evacuation reached him he sent Arnold with a small force to occupy Philadelphia, and in the afternoon of the 18th (the same day on which the British crossed into New Jersey) six brigades, comprising the divisions of Greene and Wayne, forming a corps which was under command of General Lee,1 moved towards the
Delaware in pursuit. Passing through Doyles- town, Lee reached the river at Coryell's Ferry, and crossed into New Jersey at that point in the night of the 20th. On the same night Wash- ington, who followed with the remainder of the forces, encamped at Doylestown, and, resuming the march on the following day, crossed at Cor- yell's on the 22d.2 From Coryell's the army moved over the highlands to Hopewell, where Washington remained during the 23d. At that point he detached six hundred riflemen, under Colonel Daniel Morgan, to annoy the right flank of the enemy, while Maxwell and Dick- inson were engaged in the same duty on his left, Lee's column had moved by a more southern route, by way of Pennington, and thence to Princeton. Washington's column, moving from Hopewell, also passed Princeton, and thence, about five miles, to a camp in Hopewell town- ship, where he remained until the morning of the 25th of June, having, on the previous day, sent a second detachment of fifteen hun- dred chosen troops, under Brigadier-General Scott to reinforce those already in the vicinity of the enemy, the more effectually to annoy and retard their march.
On the 26th, the American army moved to Kingston; and having intelligence that the enemy had been seen moving towards Monmouth Court House, Washington dis- patched a third detachment of one thousand men under General Wayne, together with the Marquis de Lafayette, who was assigned to the command of the entire advanced corps, includ- ing Maxwell's brigade and Morgan's riflemen.
Lafayette's orders were to " take the first fair opportunity to attack the rear of the enemy." In a dispatch to Washington, dated "Robins'
Freehold Town (four miles), where the remainder of the army arrived at 10 A.M., nineteen miles from Rising Sun, A very warm day ; very tired.
" June 27th, Saturday .- The whole army halted here this day. A deserter from Washington's army informs that the rebels are extended along our left flank, and are very numerous. .
1 General Charles Lee, who was captured at Basking Ridge, in December, 1776, by the British under Colonel Harcourt, was exchanged in May, 1778, for General Pres- cott. He joined the army at Valley Forge, and was rein- stated in his old position as second in command under · Washington.
2 Washington wrote to the American Congress as follows : " HEADQUARTERS, NEAR CORYEL'S, " June 22, 1778.
" SIR,-I have the honour to inform you that I am now in Jersey, and that the troops are passing the river at Cor- yel's, and are mostly over. . . . As soon as we have cleaned the arms and can get matters in train, we propose moving towards Princeton, in order to avail ourselves of any fav- orable occasions that may present themselves of attacking or annoying the enemy.
" I have the honour to be, etc ..
'. G. W."
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MONMOUTH COUNTY IN THE REVOLUTION.
Tavern, half-past four, June 26th," he (Lafay- ette) said: "I have consulted the general officers of the detachment, and the general opinion seems to be that I should march in the night near them, so as to attack the rear-guard on the march. Your excellency knows that by the direct road you are only three miles farther from Monmouth than we are in this place. Some prisoners have been made, and deserters come in amazing fast. . . . I believe a happy blow would have the happiest effect." At five o'clock in the same day he dispatched: "Gen- eral Forman is firmly of the opinion that we may overtake the enemy. It is highly pleas- ant to be followed and countenanced by the army ; that if we stop the enemy, and meet with some advantage, they may push it with vigor. I have no doubt but if we overtake them, we possess a very happy chance." Again, he dis- patched from "Ice Town,1 26th June, 1778, at a quarter after seven," and, having made refer- ence to a previously-expressed purpose to go to that place for provisions, he said: "When I got there, I was sorry to hear that Mr. Hamilton, who had been riding all the night, had not been able to find anybody who could give him cer- tain intelligence ; but, by a party who came back, I hear the enemy are in motion, and their rear about one mile off the place they had occu- pied last night, which is seven or eight miles from here. I immediately put Generals Max- well's and Wayne's brigades in motion, and I will fall lower down with General Scott's and Jackson's regiment, and some militia. I should be very happy if we could attack them before they halt. . .. If I cannot overtake them, we could lay at some distance, and attack them to- morrow morning. . . . If we are at a convenient distance from you, I have nothing to fear in striking a blow, if opportunity is offered." " If you believe it, or if it is believed necessary or useful to the good of the service and the honor of General Lee to send him down with a couple of thousand men, or any greater force, I will cheerfully obey and serre him, not only out of duty, but out of what I owe that gentleman's
character."2 When it was found by General Lee that the army was really and vigorously pressing the British, he had made an appeal to Lafayette, in which he said: "It is my fortune and my honor that I place in your hands ; you are too generous to cause the loss of either."" And the result proved that he had not miscal- culated the generosity of the gallant French- man.
On the evening of June 26th the main body of the American army advanced from Kingston, leaving their baggage behind, to enable them to support the advanced corps with promptness. Early in the morning of the 27th they reached Cranbury, where they were delayed several hours by a heavy rain and the oppressive heat which succeeded. Later in the day they ad- vanced to a point within three miles of English- town, and five miles from the British army ; and there Washington made his headquarters for the night.
During the day (the 27th) the advance corps had been strengthened by two additional brig- ades (as suggested by Lafayette), and General Lee assumed command,-his whole force then numbering about five thousand men. The of- ficial reports of General Washington show that Lee positively declined the command of this advance corps, until its large increase made it certain that it was to hold the position of honor, and to be pushed on the enemy. Lafayette was first assigned to the command after a heated discussion, in council of war, as to the propriety of attacking Clinton's army at all; and General Lee, when that assignment was made with his concurrence, said that he was "well pleased to be freed from all responsibility for a plan which he was sure would fail,"-a statement which later events made important.
The British left was now threatened by General Dickinson's force of nearly eight hundred men, while Morgan, with his light infantry, was on the right flank. During the battle which en-
1 The place which Lafayette calls Ice Town was prob- . ably Hightstown, he mistaking the sound of the name.
2 This was not italicized in the original dispatch.
3 Lafayette says in his memoirs : "This tone succeeded better,"-referring to Lee's change of opinion and claim to the command of the advanced corps. The letter of June 26th, above quoted from, shows how Lafayette responded to the appeal.
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HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.
sued, Morgan lay with his corps of riflemen three miles south of Monmouth Court-House, at Richmond's Mills,1 awaiting orders, only kept from participation in the engagement by failure to receive the instructions which he promptly sent for as soon as he heard the roar of the opening conflict.
The division commanded by Major-General Charles Lee in the battle of the 28th of June was composed (according to the statement of General Wayne) of the following-named troops, besides the flanking detachments of Dickinson and Morgan : " In front, Colonel Butler with two hundred men ; Colonel Jackson, with an equal number ; Scott's own brigade, with a part of Woodford's, six hundred, with two pieces of artillery ; General Varnum appeared about the same number, with two pieces of artillery ; my own detachment was about one thousand, with two pieces of artillery; General Scott's detachment, fourteen hundred, with two pieces of artillery ; General Maxwell's was one thou- sand and two pieces of artillery ; in all, five thousand, with twelve pieces of artillery, exclu- sive of the militia.". General Lee claimed that this was a loose statement, and that his force did not exceed four thousand one hundred men; but the force which Grayson took to the front was nearly eight hundred men, and although temporarily detached from Scott's and Varnum's brigades, it should enter the aggre- gate, and be counted as if not detached. The entire force which Lee had at his disposal on the evening of the 27th and morning of the 28th considerably exceeded five thousand men, including the corps of Dickinson and Morgan, though he took no steps to communicate with these two leaders until after aroused to action by Washington's stern censure. General Lafay- ette accompanied Lee with his consent as a vol- unteer.
nerve and energy. The supply of provisions was scanty, but the army was eager in the pur- suit. It felt the onward spur when the force which had so long kept it on the defensive crossed the Delaware in full retreat from the theatre of the conflicts of the fall of 1777. Washington neither underrated nor despised his enemy, but giving credit for courage and wisdom equal to his own, measured the forces that were to meet in conflict, and, as usual, struck or . struck back as best he could.
The military issue between Clinton and Wash- ington was in some respects unequal. Clinton must get to New York. He had nothing to hope from a battle, more than to gain a clear path to Sandy Hook. His heavy baggage-train restricted his operations to the repulse of an at- tack, and rendered any protracted pursuit, even of broken columns, a fruitless strain upon his command. But for Washington to have shrunk back from that retreating army, which he had been prompt to meet on reasonable terms, would have accredited the British forces with that in- vincibility which Lee affirmed of it, would have sacrificed the impetus which the offensive position imparted to his command, and would have made every subsequent issue of the war more hopeless or uncertain. It would have canceled the memory of Trenton and Princeton. It would have stultified the movement which made Germantown a pledge that the American commander-in-chief was ready at all times to seize opportunity and to do real fighting.
The situation of the British army-occupying the village and vicinity of Monmouth Court- House during the two days and nights preceding the memorable Sabbath when the opposing hosts joined in battle-has already been noticed. It held a strong position, with its "right extending about a mile and a half beyond the Monmouth Court-House, in the parting of the roads leading to Shrewsbury and Middletown, and its left about three miles west of the court-house." This position, well protected on the right and left, and partially in front, by low grounds and woods, was regarded by Washington as "too strong to be assailed with any prospect of sue-
The total numerical strength of the American army was more than equal to that of the Brit- ish, and although fresh from the squalid can- | along the road from Allentown to Monmouth, tonments of Valley Forge, it was not wanting in
1 Now called Shumar's Mills, the pond or reservoir of which has been named Morgan Lake, in honor of the bold leader who unwillingly kept his station there during the battle of Monmouth.
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cess." The general direction of the British line while thus encamped, and when its march began on the following morning, was northeasterly, exposing its left and centre to an attack from the American troops, whose offensive advance was from a northwesterly direction. It there- fore became important for General Clinton to change his position and gain the Middletown road to the sea as quickly as possible, especially "as a march of only ten or twelve miles would place him upon strong defensive ground, beyond danger of successful pursuit. Lieutenant-Gen- eral Knyphausen was under orders to move at daylight on the following morning. The single road which was available for the proposed march passed almost immediately into a series of bluffs, where a baggage-train would be greatly exposed to attack from skirmishing parties, and General Clinton undertook the protection of its rear by his own division of selected troops.
The main body of the American army was about three miles beyond Englishtown and less than seven miles from the camps of the British centre. The advance division, under command of General Lee, was about two and a half miles west-northwest from Monmouth Court-House, the headquarters of that general being on a hill near Wemrock Creek. The detachments under Morgan and Dickinson respectively were already on the alert, ready to attack the British flanks when that army should break camp and move out on the road towards Middletown.
No general engagement in the Revolutionary War has been so vaguely and unintelligibly described, as to localities and the movements of the opposing forces, as the battle of Monmouth.1 The country had not been reconnoitred, and very blind statements were made, even by officers
who were present, and who afterwards testified before the court-martial which was convened for the trial of General Lee. The official re- ports of Washington, Clinton and other general officers who took part in the engagement are so ambiguous and imperfect as to localities that some explanation is necessary for a clear under- standing of the narrative. The distinctions of "right" and "left" are greatly confused through the changing positions of the troops, especially as the right and left of Clinton's line were re- versed when he assumed the offensive, and the statement of American officers that "Morgan was on the left" did not become true until they commenced their retreat. Thus, though Dicl :- inson threatened the British left on the morning of the battle, his demonstration was upon their right when, later in the forenoon, they changed front to assume the offensive.
The terms "ravine" and "morass" are extremely confusing and almost unintelli- gible in the narrative, and need an explana- tion, which is here given, having especial refer- ence to the account of the battle, which follows farther on. Three ravines or morasses, as they were indiscriminately termed, were mentioned by American officers in their accounts of the battle. Only two of these are mentioned. by Sir Henry Clinton in his report as intervening between his advance from the Middletown road and the main army of the Americans. The ravine or morass behind which Washington formed the divisions of Greene and Stirling, to cover the retreat of Lee's brigades, is about a half mile southeasterly from the old Tennent Meeting-house and about two and a half miles from Englishtown. The skirmish which oc- curred early in the morning, and which led General Diekinson to believe that the British army had not left Monmouth, but was advanc- high ground just east of this "west ravine" or morass. It was simply a demonstration by the enemy's light troops to beat back the militia and conceal the withdrawal of the main army of Clinton. On this same high ground were located the hedge fence, the orchard and the parsonage, near which the principal engagement was fought.
1 This, as well as much that precedes and follows rela- tive to the situation and movements preliminary to the | ing in force towards the hill, took place on the Monmouth battle,-including the events of the forenoon of June 28th, and down to the time when Lee's retreating forces joined the main army, near the old Tennent parson- age,-is largely from Carrington's " Battles of the Amer- ican Revolution." The narrative of the general engage- ment which followed in the afternoon of that bloody day. is taken from Marshall, Custis, Lossing, Thatcher and other standard accounts, and also to a great extent from the reports of Washington and his subordinate officers, and · from other official documents having reference to the battle.
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HISTORY OF MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY.
A second ravine or morass, called the middle ravine, crossed the road nearly a mile farther east, and on the high ground on the east side of this ravine the British troops remained a few hours after the battle. This high ground extended still farther eastward, blending with the so-called "heights of Monmouth " (just west and southwest of the village of Freehold), and then dipping towards the low plain, about a mile wide, and three miles long, just east of the Amboy road, running from the court- house nearly north. This plain or valley, where Clinton first formed his line of attack, was also marshy, near a little pond and along a small rivulet,1 the latter extending from near the court-house, northeasterly, past Briar Hill, the low ground bordering it being the eastern ravine or morass, which was crossed and re- crossed by Wayne, Varnum, Jackson, Scott, Grayson, and Oswald's artillery, and behind which they retired when the British line ad- vanced in force. Just west of the Amboy road, and nearly parallel with it, " so as to cover both roads," is the high, wooded ground where Lee proposed to re-form his line, and from which, in fact, the divisions had advanced into the plain without definite orders or due regard to their mutual dependence and relations.
At the head of the Manasquan, near Mon- mouth Court-House, there was formerly marshy ground, where the small tributaries of the stream gathered their waters, and on the north side of Monmouth village Geblard's Branch was bordered by marshy ground. The small stream, or drainage, west of Briar Hill, and sometimes called Briar Creek, had across it and the marshy ground bordering it, at the time of the battle, a bridge and causeway. A small fork of the Manalapan Brook flowed north- easterly from the Allentown road, and along its sides was the swampy ground which protected the British camp on the night preceding the battle.
The low plain below the slope from the court- house and the Amboy road was quite open for at least a quarter of a mile, with woods well
distributed beyond this narrow belt as far north as Briar Hill, to the Middletown road, on the edge of which Colonel Grayson halted his command, nearly parallel with the road on which the British column was marching. The summit between the Amboy road and the mid- dle ravine was mostly in woods, with open ground near and just northwest of the court- house, where Butler drove back the Queen's Rangers. To the left of the British line, after it faced west to return the offensive, was an- other piece of woods out of which the dragoons advanced, and from which a strong column emerged for an advance towards the court- house to turn the American right and cut off Grayson, Scott, Jackson, Maxwell and Oswald, when they retired behind the eastern ravine and reached the summit. Until within six or seven years-if not until the present time-the middle ravine remained covered with tangled under-brush and briars, as was mentioned by officers who passed through it during the bat- tle. The present road to Englishtown runs considerably north of the ancient road, and there are now no traces of two old paths, which were particularly mentioned by witnesses on the Lee trial. The fact that all the com- manders made reference to the " west ravine," or or morass, indicates clearly that the bridge over it was a common crossing ; and although one division marched to the left from the old meeting-house, while other troops took the sharp turn to the right at the forks, the two divisions took two routes for the double purpose of extending their front to prevent flank attacks in a general ad- vance, and also to gain room for the movement.
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