USA > New Jersey > Hudson County > Jersey City > Memorial of the centennial celebration of the battle of Paulus Hook, August 19th, 1879 : with a history of the early settlement and present condition of Jersey City, N.J. > Part 4
Note: The text from this book was generated using artificial intelligence so there may be some errors. The full pages can be found on Archive.org (link on the Part 1 page).
Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14
51-This officer was killed in a duel with Adjutant Overton, of Moylan's Dragoons, at English Neighborhood, August 26, 1780. N. Y. Hlist. Soc. Coll., 1875, 466.
52-Vide Appendix, XX.
53-The following letter, written somewhat blindly, but without doubt fully under- stood by Capt. M'Lane, shows where his headquarters were ;
MAJOR LEE TO CAPTAIN M'LANE.
" August 18, 1779.
"I thank you for the Intelligence conveyed in your two letters. I wish you to .continue using your endeavors to penetrate into the designs of the enemy. Know positively whether any troops have arrived or will arrive. Know.also concerning the French Fleet. Let me hear from you when necessary. Direct your. letters to Par- amus, two miles on the Road from the Church to Kakiat Meeting House. Do not harass your men. I have in agitation to mount à Corporal and six of your troop to act always with you, in the mean time impress expresses.
" A foraging party from Lord Stirling will be down this day or to-morrow. Lend every aid in your power by taking care of the road leading to Fort Lee," M'Lane Mss.
54-Vide Appendic, XXVIII.
55-Vide Appendix, XII.
.
1
43
between four and five hundred inen.56 Here he made known to his forces the order of attack and disposition of march, in which was the following address :
" Major Lee is so assured of the gallantry of the officers and men under his command, that he feels exhortation nseless ; he therefore only requires the most profound secrecy. Ile pro- nounces death as the immediate fate of any soldier who may violate in the slightest degree the silence he has ordered to be observed. He recommends to his officers to add to the vigor of their attacks the advantage of surprise ; therefore to continne occult till the moment of action. Success is not at the will of mortals ; all they can do is to deserve it .- Be this our determi- nation and this our conduct, and we shall have cause to triumph, even in adversity. Watchword, Be firm."57
From the New Bridge he took up his line of march at five. o'clock in the afternoon, with Captain Handy's command in the advance.58 For the purpose of diverting suspicion, a number of wagons joined the expedition to give it the appearance of a foraging party.59 Patrols of horse were detached to watch. communications with the North river, and parties of infantry stationed at different roads. What portion of his force was put upon this service is not known and perhaps is not ascertainable. Hle followed the lower road through the English Neighborhood. to a point not known, when he filed into the mountains. But as he followed the Bergen road lower than he intended, and as it was but a "short march." from that point to Paulus Hoeck, and as Captain M'Lane then lay in the woods near Three Pigeons waiting for the arrival of Major Lee, it is probable that he entered the Bergen woods but a short distance to the north of New Durham. The object of this act was manifestly to avoid discovery. Through the " timidity or treachery " of the principal guide his troops became entangled in the "deep
1
56-Vide Appendix, VI.
57-Lee's Memoirs (Edition of 1870), 23.
58-Vide Appendix, XII.
59-Vide Appendix, XVI.
6
44
mountainous woods," and three precious hours were wasted before they regained their ronte. Yet possibly these hours, so important to the expedition, were fortunate hours to Lee ; for Lieutenant-Colonel Van Buskirk, with one hundred and thirty men, had left the Hoeck about nine o'clock that night on a raid to the English Neighborhood, and must have passed up the Bergen road while Major Lee was floundering in the swamps lying between Guttenberg and Union Hill. At this time his force became separated, so that only one hundred and fifty men reached Paulus Hoeck. There is reason to believe there was more design than accident in this separation, so far as some of his men were concerned. Jealousy led nearly one-half of the Virginians to desert him, and those who remained with the expedition were not the most vigorous to second the endeavors of their commanding officer.60
When the troops became disentangled and. had regained their route, it is probable that they came down the hill by the road leading to the Weehawken Ferry, and then by the way of Hoboken and the upland of Ahasimus, passing by file over the narrow causeways and wading the creeks through the marshes.61 " The usual time for such exploits," as Washington observed when planning the attack on Stony Point, " is a little before
60-Vide Appendix, XVIII.
61-I have been not a little perplexed as to the route taken by Lee on his approach. No definite Information on the subject has been found, but from the following facts I conclude that he approached by way of Hoboken ;
1-Captain Handy, Vide Appendic, XII., says : " We had a morass to pass of upwards two miles, the greatest part of which we were obliged to pass by files, and several canals to ford up to our breast in water." No other route would answer these conditions. The one I have indicated answers them fully. There was the marsh north of the upland of Hoboken, and the marsh between Hoboken and Ahasimus, both crossed by a narrow and ill-constructed wagon way, and permeated by small tide streams.
2-When Lee moved to the attack, he despatched a messenger to Cornet Neil at Prior's Mill, probably directing him to communicate with Captain Peyton and Inform him of the hour of attack. The sending a messenger seems to imply that Lee had not been at Prior's Mill, and certainly had not seen Cornet Neil. He had apprehensions about the boats, owing to the lateness of the hour. It was natural and prudent that he should send word to Neil and Peyton of the change in the hour of attack. Why should Lee have sent the messenger if he had just left Neil at the Mill? That officer would have known of the delay in the attack and could have received orders In person.
45
day, for which reason a vigilant officer is then more on the watch. I therefore recommend a midnight hour."62 This recommendation was incorporated in Lee's plan of attack. The time designated for the assault was at half-past twelve o'clock. In addition to a negligent watch, this hour would have given the attacking force the advantage of ebb tide in crossing the ditch, more time for the destruction of the works, and opportunity to retreat before daylight.
The design was to attack the post at three different points, 63 but on reaching the place where he was to divide his force for that purpose, which I take to be the upland of Ahasimns near the northerly end of the causeway, Major Lee found this plan impracticable, " both from the near approach of day and the rising of the tide." Before reaching this point, Lieutenant Rudolph had been detached to reconnoitre, and fathom the pas- sages of the diteli at the three several places where the separate columns should pass. But it was now after three o'clock, the tide was approaching half flood when the ditch would be impas- sable. Without a moment's delay Major Lee ordered the troops to advance in the position they then were, without regard to the punctilios of honor or rank, and despatched a messenger to Cornet Neil at Prior's Mill to inform him of the delay in the attack, and to direct him to communicate with Captain Peyton. Just at this time, Lieutenant Rudolph returned and reported that all was silence within the works ; that he had fathomed the canal and found the passage on the central route still admissible. As they were entering the marsh, between Henderson and War- ren streets, Major Clark informed Major Lee of the defection of the Virginians. This must have been a severe blow to him, but at such a supreme moment nothing could daunt this intrepid leader. - True it seriously diminished the number of his attacking force, and deprived him of the aid of several officers of distin- gnished merit. He was, however, equal to the occasion in spite of the defection, "and every other dumb sign " which indicated
62-Irving's Life of Washington, III., 503,
63-Vide Appendic, XVI,
46
lack of hearty co-operation, and pushed on to the attack." He had resolved to capture the post or leave his dead body within the enemy's lines. . The information brought by Lieutenant Rudolph was passed from front to rear and the troops moved forward with resolution, order and coolness. They marched in three solid columns, " with bayonets, pans open, cocks fallen," in the most profound silence. The right column, under Major Clark, and the centre column, under Captain Forsyth, were preceded by the forlorn hopes led by Lieutenant McAllister, of the Marylanders, and Lientenant Rudolph, of the Legion Dra- goons, to assault the works on either flank. The left column, under Captain Handy, was to move against the front, and to act as a reserve should one be found necessary. So silently did they advance and so unsuspecting was the garrison of any attack, that they were either not discovered, or were thought to be - Van Buskirk's force returning, until the forlorn hopes plunged into the ditch.65 Instantly the enemy opened a musketry fire from the block-houses, but the Americans pressed forward and broke through all opposition. The forlorn under Mc Allister, supported by the right column, immediately on passing the abatis filed to the right and captured the fort before a piece of artillery could be fired and "re-echoed the watchword."" This gallant Lieu- tenant was fortunate enough to capture the British flag.67 The centre column, with Lieutenant Armstrong leading the advance, filed to the left and captured the right-hand block-house and the officers and men stationed there. The left column moved forward in support of the whole.
Within the fortifications this audacious and unexpected assault caused the utmost consternation. A soldier rushed to the hut where Lieutenant Cockburne was sleeping, within thirty yards
64-Vide Appendix, XVIII.
65- Vide Appendic, X. In Lec's Memoirs (Edition of 1870), 23, I find the following : "The stratagem relied on was to have eight or ten soldiers disguised as countrymen carrying provisions for sale, who procured the gate to be opened by the sen- tinel, and held it until the rest of their party, concealed near, rushed in " ! !
66-Vide Appendix, XVI.
67-This has been doubted, but see Lee's Report and Appendic, VIII, and XIV.
47
of the fort, and gave him the aların. The lieutenant ran to the fort, but found Major Lee's force in possession. "He then fled, to the left-hand block-house, and thus saved himself from cap- ture. At the first alarm Major Sutherland, with Captain Van Schallern and twenty-five Hessians,68 escaped through the dark- ness into the round redoubt69 and opened an irregular fire upou the assailants." But in a few minutes" Major Lee had posses- sion of the works, excepting this redoubt and the left-hand : block-house. It is very probable that the firing from the redoubt and the alarm thereby given had more to do with preventing the Americans getting into the magazine than the alleged fail- ure to find the key, or to obtain means to break it open.72
. 68-There is great discrepancy among writers as to the number of the Hessians with Major Sutherland. Sir Henry Clinton, Appendic, X., says : "forty Hessians; " Marshall's Life of Washington, IV., 139, " forty or fifty Hessians; " Murray's War in America, HIT., 169, " forty Hessians ; " Stedman's History of the American War, . 11., 153, " sixty Hessians ; " Dawson's Battles of the United States by Land and Sea, 1., 517, " forty or fifty Hessians ; " Irving's Life of Washington, [IT., 515, "about sixty Hessians ;" Duer's Life of Lord Stirling, 205, " forty or flity Hessians; " Schroeder's Life and Times of Washington, II., 94, "sixty Hessians ;" Thatcher's Journal, 174, " about fifteen of his men ; " Rivington's Royal Gazette, August 28, 1779, "a captain, subaltern and twenty-five gallant Hessians ; " General Pattison, . AAppendir, XI., " a captain and twenty-five Hessians." I credit the last number. Only forty-one Hessians were sent over to Panlus Hoeck on the 18th to increase the force of the garrison in Van Buskirk's absence. Eleven of these were cap- thred. This would leave but thirty on the Hoeck. If some of the killed were lessians (which is probable), those left could not have exceeded the number mentioned by General Pattison. Vide Appendix, XV.
69 - There has been a variety of statements as to what works Lee's force captured, and into what Major Sutherland and the Hessians threw themselves. Sir Henry Clinton and the historians Murray and Stedman say the Americans carried a block-house and two redonbts, and that Sutherland was in a redoubt. Gordon and Irving say Sutherland entered a block-honse on the left of the fort. Major Shaw says Sutherland was in "a little enclosed work inside the main one." Marshall says there were "a fort, three block-houses and some redoubts." The Pennsylvania Packet of August 28, 1779 (.Appendix, XVI.), speaks of a " Grand Fort," an " Impregnable fort assisted by a chain of redoubts." But Gen. Pat- tison (Appendic, XI.), who wrote with a plan of the works before him, says the Americans captured the principal fort and the right hand and centre block - houses, while the " Round Redoubt" in which Major Sutherland was, and the left hand block-house were defended.
70-Appendix, XV.
71-"In less than thirty minutes," Appendic, XII. "In less than ten minutes we were in complete possession of the works." Appendir, XVI.
72-Lee's Report. How he expected to find the key in the confusion and darkness is a problem difficult to solve.
48
It was now four o'clock. The firing of guns in New York and from the ships in the harbor proved that the alarm was" completely given." The ammunition having been destroyed when crossing the ditch, Major Lee's men had not fired a musket . during the assault. They had no means to dislodge Major Sutherland and the Hessians. The ammunition in the maga- zine was beyond their reach. The barracks contained some sick soldiers, women and children, and humanity forbade their destruction. To spike the guns was useless, to bring them off impossible. The British, being now on the alert, could in a short time cross to the Hoeck in large bodies. The expedition thus far had been successful. The post had been surprised and its garrison captured. The next consideration was to effect a safe retreat with the prisoners. Because of this strict com -. pliance with the orders of Washington, and the plain dictates of ordinary prudence, the enemy affected to sneer at the victo- rious assailants." That enemy had fled from the charge of the bold one hundred and fifty, yet bad the courage to criticise the manner of " making a retreat from under the very nose of the enemy's whole force."75 If they did not move with sufficient grace to suit such fastidious taste, the bold defendants should have considered the fact that each American had his prisoner, and yet there were nine! With the enemy's ships of war in the harbor, their headquarters one mile away, and their army stretching for nine miles along the line of his retreat, Major Lee acted with prudence by retiring with all possible dispatch. Major Clark, with the right column and the greater part of the prisoners, was put in motion over the causeway. Captain Handy followed with the left and the remainder of the prisoners.
73 - Marshall's Life of Washington, IV., 139. As to the way. the alarm was given, vide Appendix, XI.
74-Vide Appendix X. "The Americans shamefully deserted their new posts with as much expedition and as little difficulty'as they had been obtained, and so by a retreat as disgraceful as the attempt was apparently bold and well conducted they abandoned a conquest already evident in their hands, without even having courage to spike the artillery, or set fire to the barracks." Murray's War in America, III., 169.
75-Shaw's Journal, 66.
49
Lieutenants Armstrong and Reed with the centre formed the rear guard. At the commencement of the retreat, Captain Forsyth was sent forward to Prior's Mill to collect men from the different columns most fit for action, and take post on the Ileights of Bergen, to cover the retreat. When Major Lee, who remained with the rear of his retreating forces, reached Prior's Mill, he was surprised to hear from Cornet Neil, that the mes- senger sent to him previous to the attack had not arrived, nor had he heard from Captain Peyton. Apprehending some disap- pointment in regard to the boats, he rede forward and reached the advance when near the ferry. To his dismay, not a boat was to be seen. It had been understood by Captain Peyton that Major Lee would be at the ferry before daylight, but in the morning, no intelligence having arrived, he supposed the attack had been postponed. The danger of his situation, the fear that the discovery of the boats would disclose the design and prevent its execution on a subsequent night, induced him to retire with the boats to Newark." The retreating forces were pouring down Cherry Lane leading to the ferry, anxious to place the Hackensack between themselves and the enemy, who were hastening their preparations to pursue. Major Lee immediately conntermarched his troops to the " road leading from the town to the English Neighborhood," afterwards known as the Bergen- wood Road.77 He despatched a messenger to Lord Stirling, who had moved from his camp at Ramapo to the New Bridge, for assistance, and then returned to the rear guard at Prior's Mill. As he stood upon the bridge near this mill in the early gray of that morning, and thought of the difficult march before him, the possible ruin of all his plans, and the certainty of. a vigorous pursuit by an insulted foe, he was overwhelmed by the gloomy prospect .. He speaks of this in his report : "Oppressed by every possible misfortune, at the head of troops worn down by
56-Marshall's Life of Washington, IV., 139.
77 -Shaw's Journal, 67. It is here said, "By the time he found out the boats were gone, the troops who had separated during the night came up. Lee picked out about fifty of these men as a rear guard of which he took command." It is evi- dent that this refers to Capt. Catlett's Company who joined Lee at Union Hill. What became of the remainder of the Virginians who left Lee ?
50
a rapid march of thirty miles, through mountains, swamps and morasses, without the least nourishment during the whole march, ammunition destroyed, encumbered with prisoners and a retreat of fourteen miles to make good, on a route admissible of inter- ception at several points by a march of two, three and four miles ; one body moving in our rear, another in all probability well advanced on onr right, a retreat naturally impossible on our left * * iny sole dependence was in the persevering gallantry of the officers and the obstinate courage of the troops." But the. shouts of his soldiers when informed of the approach of the enemy, dispelled all doubt in case of a conflict. He was entirely without ammunition, but the bayonet had done its service in the attack, and on it was his reliance for defence. The whole force now moved as rapidly as possible. On reaching the Hackensack road at Union ITill, Major Lee divided his force. Major Clark's column, with the prisoners, took the road by way of Three Pigeons and the English Neighborhood. In his rear on the same road moved the centre column. To guard against an attack upon the right flank of these columns by forces pene- trating the mountain through the passes leading from the river, Captain Handy with the left column took the road on the bank of the river, now known as the Bull's Ferry Road. Just after this disposition had been made, Captain Catlett, of the Second Virginia Regiment, came up at the head of fifty men with good ammunition, a portion of which was distributed among the different columns. With Captain Catlett and his force Major Lee took the centre route. It is probable that both detachments moving on the mountain deflected to the left on reaching a point just above Bull's Ferry and joined the two columns moving on the main road, at the English Neighborhood. As the rear approached the Fort Lee road, at the place now called Leconia, they met Colonel Ball with two hundred men, who had been pushed forward by Lord Stirling, to support the retreat. Colonel Ball moved on and took position to meet the enemy who were in rapid pursuit. Early in the morning Lieutenant- Colonel Cosmo Gordon had been sent from New York with the flank companies of the guard and one hundred men from the
M
51
brigade, and nearly the same number of Hessians. He took command of the post and sent out Major Sutherland with one light infantry company of the guard under Captain Dundass, and another light infantry company consisting of ninety rank .. and file under Captain Maynard, in pursuit of . Major Lee.78 This was the party which now confronted Colonel Ball. But they thought it prudent to halt before coming in contact with the victorious Americans.79
While Major Lee was pushing along between the Fort Lee road and the Liberty Pole, Lieutenant-Colonel Van Buskirk emerged from the woods upon the right, marched through the fields to the road and opened fire on the rear of the retreating forces. Major Lee ordered Lieutenant Reed to face them, while Lieutenant Rudolph with a party threw himself into a stone house which commanded the road. This checked Van Buskirk and gave the retreating forces time to cross the creek at the Lib- erty Pole. Colonel Ball now finding a detachment of the enemy between him and Major Lee, and taking it for granted that this was only the advanced corps of a much larger body, made a circuit to avoid contact with them. Van Buskirk, finding a detachment he had not expected, took the same means to secure his own retreat.80 Without further molestation, Lee arrived at the New Bridge at one' o'clock in the afternoon, "after a march of upward of eighty miles in three days."81
78-Vide Appendix, VII.
79-" Had the tide proved favorable, not a single animal of the rebel host would have escaped." Vide Appendix, VII.
80 - Marshall's Life of Washington, IV., 140.
81-Vide Appendix, VI. As to the date of this event It is surprising that so many writers have gone estray. Error seems to be immortal. Captain Handy, who commanded the left column, wrote to his brother a letter, dated July 19th, in which he described the event. The following works fix the date as of July 19th. . Appleton's Encyclopedia, tille " Henry Lee"; Allen's American Revolution, Il., 245 ; Gordon's History _1m. War, 111., 284; Lassing's Pictorial History of the U. S., 217; Wilson's American History, 339; Holmes' Annals of the U. S., II., 300; Ram- say's History of the Am. Rev., IT., 109; and Snowden's Medalie Memorials of Wash- ington, 65, with the medal before him; Murray's War in America, III., 169, gives July 15th as the date; Hildreth's History of the U. S., LLC,, 284, gives August 18th ; t and Ollier's History of the U. S., 1[., 364, says August 20th. In Lee's Memoirs, (Ed. 1870) 23, it is said, the forces "set out the 25th of August, upon their dangerous expidition." But Schroeder, Life and Times of Washington, in vol. I., 699, says July 19th, and in vol. 11., 91, August 20th. Two dates, and both wrong.
7
52
The prisoners taken in the surprise of Paulus Hoeck num- bered one hundred and fifty-nine, viz :
Sixty-fourth Regiment .-- One captain.
Garrison Regiment .- Six sergeants, sixty-seven rank and file.
Van Buskirk's Regiment :- One surgeon, one surgeon's mate, one quartermaster, four subalterns, two sergeants, thirty-nine rank and file.
Ilessians .- One sergeant, ten rank and file.
Artificers .- Two.
Inhabitants .- Ten.
Artillery .- One sergeant, one corporal, two gunners, nine mattresses.
The surgeon was released on parole. On the following day Lord Stirling sent the prisoners to Philadelphia, where, on the 26th, we leave them "safely lodged in the New Gaol."82
The number of killed and wounded on the side of the British is somewhat uncertain. In the nature of things it was impos- sible for the attacking force to make a correct estimate. Lord Stirling says " the killed and wounded left behind is uncertain, as it was necessary for the troops to come off before the day appeared." Major Lee reported " not more than fifty of the enemy killed and wounded."83 Marshall says, "very few of the British were killed."84 Dunlap says, "a few of the British were killed at the first charge."85 Irving says, "few of the enemy were slain. ">86 Gordon estimates the number at about thirty.87 Holmes, Lossing, Willson and Allen say, " thirty were killed.">88 Thatcher says, "about forty were killed."'89 Dawson
82-Letter dated August 26, 1779. In the Pennsylvania Packet, September 2, 1779, I find : "Saturday, August 28th, five of the British officers, the others being ou parole elsewhere, and 148 privates taken at Paulus Hook arrived at Philadelphia."
83-Vide. Appendix, VI.
84-Life of Washington, IV., 139.
85-History of New York, II., 163. 86-Life of Washington, III., 515.
Need help finding more records? Try our genealogical records directory which has more than 1 million sources to help you more easily locate the available records.