USA > New Mexico > Men of our day; or, biographical sketches of patriots, orators, statemen, generals, reformers, financiers and merchants, now on the stage of action > Part 5
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MEN OF OUR DAY.
the remainder to Flag-officer Foote after a brief action, before General Grant reached the immediate vicinity of the fort.
Grant proceeded immediately to attack the much more con- siderable fortress of Donelson, on the Cumberland, which here approaches within a few miles of the Tennessee. This fortress had a garrison of fifteen or sixteen thousand rebel troops, and was not a remarkably strong work, though from its position it was somewhat difficult to carry by assault. Grant had about 16,000 troops with him, most of whom had not been in any action, and the number was insufficient to invest so large a fort properly. He was reluctant, however, to await the coming of the gun- boats, which had carried off the glory at Fort Henry, and hence commenced operations at once, and carried some of the out- works. The gunboats came up on the morning of the 14th (the Carondelet having arrived the previous day, and made a short assault, but without particular result), and went into action, while an attack was made by the troops on the land- side. Unfortunately, the best gunboats were soon disabled, and Flag-officer Foote himself wounded, and they were com- pelled to withdraw; and the land attack was not simultaneous, or forcibly delivered. The assault upon, or siege of a fort, was new business to the national troops, and their commander had had but little experience in it; but he resolved to besiege the enemy. The next morning, however, before the arrangements for the siege were fully completed, the rebels made a sortie, broke the Union line, and captured two batteries of artillery. The Union troops rallied, and retook most of their guns; but the conflict was of uncertain issue, and could have been easily turned in favor of either side, when General Grant, who had been coolly looking on, ordered General Charles F. Smith's division to charge the enemy. The order was obeyed with great spirit by the veteran officer, and General Grant followed
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it by ordering up Lew. Wallace's division, which had broken in the morning, but which now charged bravely at the other end of the line. These divisions gained a position within the outer lines of the fort; and Generals Pillow and Floyd, who were the senior rebel generals in command, were convinced that the fort would be captured, and insisted on making their escape. General Buckner protested, but in vain. They fled before daylight, taking a few troops with them ; and Buckner, who had been at West Point with Grant, sent a flag of truce, on the morning of February 16th, to the Union headquarters, asking for an armistice, and the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation. Grant's answer has become historic, as it deserved. It was :- " No terms, other than uncon- ditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." This brought the haughty Buckner to terms, and though protesting against " the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms," he surrendered at once ; and 14,623 prisoners, and a large amount of materials of war, were de- livered over to the Union general. This success was due mainly to three causes-the superior fighting qualities of Grant's force, though raw troops; the calmness and coolness of the general himself, which enabled him to discern the favorable moment for a bold and decisive stroke when the con- flict was evenly poised ; and the cowardice and weakness of the rebel generals. As a siege, or a systematic action for the reduction of a fort, it would not bear criticism ; and we doubt not the general himself is as fully aware of this, and would now criticise it as severely as any one else.
After the capture of Donelson, and the occupation of Clarks- ville and Nashville by Buell's forces, General Grant came near falling into disfavor with General Halleck for trespassing upon General Buell's command. He was however speedily forgiven;
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and sent forward to the vicinity of Corinth, Mississippi, to select a camp for his army, and bring it up to a suitable point for giving battle to the rebels. There can be no question that Corinth should have been the place selected, and that, for two or three weeks, it might have been seized and held without difficulty. Failing in this, through manifold delays, the camp should have been on the north bank of the Tennessee. Instead of this, by some blunder it was located near the south bank of the river, at Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh Church, and the troops as they came up were allowed to choose their locations very much as they pleased ; and though they were less than twenty miles from the enemy's camp, no patrols or pickets were maintained in the direction of the enemy, nor any breastworks erected; and all was ease and unconcern. General Grant's headquarters were at Savannah, six miles below, and the troops as they arrived were sent forward. Meantime, the rebels were at Corinth, under the command of the ablest general of their army, General Albert Sydney Johnston, and, having acccumu- lated a large force, were ready to take the offensive. Grant had been promoted to be major-general of volunteers, dating from February 16th, 1862, the day of the surrender of Fort Donel- son, and had been in command of the district of West Ten- nessee from March 5th ; but he seems not to have had any pre- vision of the magnitude of the coming battles, if indeed his easy victory at Fort Donelson, had not inspired him with a doubt whether there would be a battle at all. He evidently did not consider it imminent, for he had sent word to Buell that he need not hasten. It was to this picturesque, but de- cidedly unmilitary collection of camps, that the rebel general, A. S. Johnston, one of the ablest soldiers of the present cen- tury, was approaching, with a force of over 40,000 men, on the 2d of April, 1862, and anticipating, as he had a right to
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do, an easy victory. The heavy rain and deep mud delayed him for three days within six or eight miles of the Union camp, but no one discovered his approach. On the morning of the 6th of April he attacked Prentiss's division; and though they made a gallant resistance, for men utterly surprised, they were soon broken, and many of them taken prisoners. Sher- man's division held their ground firmly for a time, and finally, by falling back a short distance, obtained a better position, from which they were only partially pushed back during the day. Hurlburt's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions were par- tially broken, but fought sturdily, yet despairingly, through the day. The fugitives and deserters were numerous, and the whole force was driven back for nearly two and a half miles, till they only occupied about half a mile on the river bank. The outlook seemed a gloomy one, but the occasion was one which developed all the great qualities of Grant. On the field from ten o'clock, A. M., directing, with the utmost coolness and imperturbability, the movements of the troops-ordering the gathering of the scattered artillery, and massing it where it could be used most effectually upon the enemy-availing him- self of the gunboats as soon as possible, to protect by their fire the position of his troops-noticing every thing that was trans- piring, and yet to all human appearance the calmest and most self-possessed man on the field-his conduct during the battle merits only the highest praise. Toward the close of the day, an officer said to him, "Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy ?" "Not at all," was his quiet reply ; "they can't force our lines around these batteries to-night-it is too late. Delay counts every thing with us. To-morrow we shall attack them with fresh troops, and drive them, of course !" He was right. The enemy, exhausted, and suffering from the heavy fire of the batteries and gunboats, could not dislodge them that
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night; and during the night Lew. Wallace's division crossed the river, and Buell came up ready to cross. The contest of the next day, April 7th, though a sharp one, was in favor of the Union troops from the beginning, and by a little after noon the rebels, who had lost their commanding general the day before, were in full retreat.
The losses were about equal, and amounted in both armies, in killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, to nearly 30,000. Grant's army held their position, and the rebels fell back ; the former were therefore entitled to claim it as a victory, but it was a costly one. General Halleck now took the field in person, and under the pretence of making Grant his second in command, virtually took all command from him. This led to a coolness between the two, and Grant was for a time greatly depressed in spirits. He took part in the siege of Corinth, but was constantly hampered by the dilatoriness of his chief. After General Hal- leck was called to Washington as general-in-chief, Grant was in command of the Army of the Tennessee, but was unable to do much until September, Bragg and Buell being engaged in the race into Kentucky and back. He planned, however, the movements which resulted in the battle of Iuka, September 19, where he commanded in person ; and in the battles of Corinth, October 3d and 4th, which were fought by General Rosecrans; and in the battle of the Hatchie, October 5th, which was under his immediate direction. In the autumn he made his head- quarters in Memphis, where he soon, by his stringent and de- cided orders, changed that state of affairs, which had led the rebels to say, that Memphis was more valuable to them in Union hands than in those of their own people.
The popular clamor throughout the country, and particularly in the West, was for the opening of the Mississippi. Vicksburg on the north, and Port Hudson on the south, blockaded all
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GENERAL ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT.
transit up or down this great river, so long the free channel of western produce and traffic. The efforts which had been made to break through these obstructions since the war commenced, had all failed, from the inherent strength of the fortifications, the difficulty of assailing them effectually in front, and the strength of their garrisons. General Grant had turned his at- tention to the solution of this great problem, almost as soon as the command of the Department of the Tennessee was assigned to him, in October, 1862. He was aware of the formidable char- acter of the fortifications of Vicksburg, and that they had been, during 1862, strengthened by every method and device known to engineering skill. For ten miles and more, the eastern shore of the Mississippi, above and below the city, as well as all the adjacent heights, Chickasaw Bluffs, Walnut Bluffs, Haines' Bluff, and the shores of the Yazoo, were covered with fortifica- tions, and the rear of the city also. At many points, these stood tier above tier, and were capable of pouring a concen- trated fire upon any object in the river, which it seemed as if nothing built by human hands could resist. His first plan was to distribute his stores and supplies along the Mississippi Central railroad, and then moving rapidly down that road, as- sault and carry Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and march thence swiftly upon the rear of Vicksburg, sending General W. T. Sherman from Memphis, with a considerable force to demonstrate simultaneously on Chickasaw Bluffs, at the north- west of the city.
This plan, which seemed the most feasible one, was defeated by the cowardice and treachery of Colonel Murphy, who, with a force of 1,000 men, was in command at Holly Springs, Miss- issippi, Grant's main depot of supplies, and surrendered with- out attempting any defence, on the 20th of December, 1862, to a rebel force slightly larger than his own. The rebels hastily
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MEN OF OUR DAY.
destroyed the supplies, valued at $4,000,000, and evacuated the place. But Grant could not go on with his expedition, and unfortunately he was unable to apprise General Sherman, and prevent his departure ; and after a succession of disastrous as- saults upon the bluffs, finding that General Grant had failed to come to time, that general was obliged to withdraw with heavy losses. But Grant was not the man to give up an enterprise on which he had set his heart, in consequence of a single re- pulse. Renewing his stock of supplies, he next turned his attention to some plan, as yet he hardly knew what, for carry- ing the fortress, from the front. He moved his army to Young's Point, Louisiana, a short distance above Vicksburg. He soon found that there was no hope of reaching the rear of the city by a movement from the east bank of the Mississippi above it. A line of hills admirably adapted, and as admirably improved for defence, stretched from Vicksburg to Haines' Bluff, on the Yazoo, twelve miles above the entrance of that stream into the Mississippi. The land in front of these hills is a deep marsh, neither land nor water. There remained then but two courses, either to enter the Yazoo above Haines' Bluff, and coming down to the east of that fortified point, attack the city in rear, or finding some mode of passing or evading the batteries on the Mississippi, land some distance below, and approach it from the south. There was also a faint hope that by completing a canal, begun the previous summer, across the neck of land formed by the bend of the Mississippi, and thus creating a new channel for that river, the Union vessels might be able to pass below the city, but the fact that the lower end of the canal was exposed to the fire of some of the heaviest batteries, made this project less feasible, and the flood destroyed their works, and partially filled the canal with silt and mud.
The attempts to gain the rear of the city by way of the Yazoo
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GENERAL ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT.
were equally unsuccessful, both through the Old Yazoo Pass, and subsequently by a more circuitous route through Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, Dutch creek, Deer creek, Rolling Fork and Sunflower river; the rebels having planted earthworks and batteries at such points as to prevent progress by either.
Turning his attention then to the methods of reaching the Mississippi below Vicksburg, two routes were attempted on the west side of the river and both failed ; one was by Lake Provi- dence and the Tensas river, a tortuous route and only practica- ble for vessels of light draft; the other by way of certain Loui- siana bayous, through which in flood time it was possible to reach the Tensas, Red, and Mississippi rivers. Before the vessels could reach their destination, the water fell, and even the steam- ers of lightest draught could not get through. A small quan- tity of supplies was forwarded by the Lake Providence route, but nothing more. General Grant now determined to march his troops by land down the west side of the river as soon as the roads should be sufficiently dry. But it was necessary that a part of the gunboats and iron clads should be below Vicksburg, both in order to ferry the troops across the river and to engage the batteries at Grand Gulf, and a considerable amount of sup- plies must also be sent down by transports. These must all run past the terrible batteries of Vicksburg.
Admiral Porter undertook this heroic and daring expedition, and conducted it successfully, running past the batteries with five or six gunboats and sixteen or eighteen transports, in two divisions, on different nights. Two of the transports were burned, but none of the gunboats were seriously injured.
The overland march of the troops occupied thirty days, in traversing a distance of seventy miles, to Hard Times, a hamlet of Louisiana nearly opposite Grand Gulf. The squadron were ready and attacked Grand Gulf, but could not silence its bat-
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MEN OF OUR DAY.
teries. That night both the squadron and transports ran past the batteries, and the troops marched ten miles farther, and were ferried over to Bruinsburg and marched rapidly from this point north-eastward toward Port Gibson. The thirteenth and seven- teenth corps encountered a considerable force of the enemy, whom they defeated after a sharp battle, and moved on to and across Bayou Pierre. The next day it was ascertained that Grand Gulf, which had been flanked by this movement, had been evacuated, and General Grant repaired thither with a small escort, and made arrangements to make it his base of supplies for a time. These arrangements occupied nearly a week. By his orders, as nearly as possible simultaneously with the landing of the two corps at Bruinsburg, General Sherman had made a strong demonstration upon Haines' Bluff and the Yazoo, and had thus attracted the attention of the rebels toward that quar- ter, where they believed the entire Union army were concen- trated, and prevented them from opposing their landing below. This being accomplished, Sherman's troops made all speed in marching to the rendezvous on the river, where the transports were in waiting to take them over to Grand Gulf.
Before leaving Young's Point, General Grant had also ordered an expedition by a competent cavalry force, under the command of Colonel, now General Benjamin H. Grierson, to start from Lagrange, at the junction of the Mississippi Central and Memphis and Charleston railroads, to follow the lines of the Mobile and Ohio and Mississippi Central railroads, and destroy as much of these, and the Meridian and Jackson railroad, as possible,-capturing and destroying also all stores, ammunition, locomotives, and railroad cars possible, in their route. This expedition was thoroughly successful, and reached Baton Rouge on the 1st of May, at the time Grant was fighting the battle of Port Gibson. Other raids were ordered about the same time
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GENERAL ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT.
from Middle Tennessee, which aided in breaking up the railroad communications and frustrating the plans of the rebels.
Our space does not allow us to go into details of the subse- quent masterly movements by which, while apparently threat- ening an immediate attack on Vicksburg from the south, the garrison there, under the command of General Pemberton, were prevented from forming a junction with General J. E. Johnston's troops, then in the vicinity of Jackson, nor of the battle of Raymond, the capture of Jackson, and the destruction of the property and manufactories of the rebel Government there ; the rapid march westward, the severe battles of Champion Hill and of Black River bridge, and the eminen ly skilful management of the corps of Generals Sherman and McPherson. Suffice it to say, that General Grant interposed his army between the forces of Johnston and Pemberton, drove the former, broken and routed, northward, and compelled the latter to put himself and his defeated army as soon as possible within the defences of Vicksburg; and on the 18th the Union army sat down before Vicksburg, having completely invested it on the land side and opened communication with their squadron and transports by way of Walnut Bluffs, above the river. On the 19th of May, and again on the 22d, General Grant ordered assaults upon the beleaguered city, neither of which were successful, except in gaining some ground and expediting the subsequent regular ap- proaches. The army now became satisfied that the stronghold could only be captured by a systematic siege, and General Grant accordingly took all precautions to make that siege effective, and to prevent the rebel General Johnston from approaching with sufficient force to raise the siege. Day by day the parallels were brought nearer and nearer, and finally came so near that the rebels could not use their cannon, while the Union artillery from the adjacent hills, and from the squadron, constantly show
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MEN OF OUR DAY.
ered their iron hail upon the devoted city. The inhabitants and the rebel army dug caves in the bluffs, and endeavored to shel- ter themselves from the fiery storm, but these were often pen- etrated by the shells from the batteries, or blown up in the explosion of the forts. At length, on the third of July, General Grant was prepared to order an assault, which could not have failed of success, when overtures were made for a surrender, and the city was delivered into the hands of the Union army on the 4th of July, 1863.
It is stated that at the interview between General Grant and General Pemberton, after shaking hands, and a short silence, General Pemberton said :
" General Grant, I meet you in order to arrange terms for the capitulation of the city of Vicksburg and its garrison. What terms do you demand ?"
" Unconditional surrender," replied General Grant.
" Unconditional surrender !" said Pemberton. "Never, so long as I have a man left me ! I will fight rather."
" Then, sir, you can continue the defence," replied Grant. " My army has never been in a better condition for the prosecution of the siege."
During this conversation, General Pemberton was greatly agi- tated, trembling with emotion from head to foot, while Grant was as calm and imperturbable as a May morning. After a somewhat protracted interview, during which General Grant, in considera- tion of the courage and tenacity of the garrison, explained the terms he was disposed to allow to them on their unconditional surrender; the two generals separated, an armistice having been declared till morning, when the question of surrender was to be finally determined. The same evening General Grant transmitted to General Pemberton, in writing, the propositions he had made during the afternoon for the disposal of the garri-
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GENERAL ULYSSES SIMPSON GRANT.
son, should they surrender. These terms were very liberal, far more so than those usually acceded to a conquered garrison.
The rebel loss in this campaign had been very great, larger than has often been experienced in the campaigns of modern times, and utterly without precedent in the previous history of this continent. The number of prisoners captured by the Union troops, from the landing at Bruinsburg to, and including the surrender of Vicksburg, was 34,620, including one lieutenant- general and nineteen major and brigadier-generals; and 11,800 men were killed, wounded, or deserters. There were also among the spoils of the campaign two hundred and eleven field-pieces, ninety siege guns, and 45,000 small arms. The Union losses had been 943 killed, 7,095 wounded, and 537 missing, making a total of casualties of 8,575, and of the wounded, nearly one half returned to duty within a month.
Having disposed of his prisoners at Vicksburg, General Grant dispatched General Sherman with an adequate force to Jackson, to defeat and break up Johnston's army, and destroy the rebel stores collected there, in both which enterprises he was suc- cessful.
During the long period of two and a quarter years since he had entered the army, General Grant had never sought or re- ceived a day's furlough. But after this great victory, and while the thanks of the President, the Cabinet, Congress, and the peo. ple, were lavished upon him without stint, he sought for a few days' rest with his family, and received it. His stay with them was brief, and he returned to his duties, descending the Missis- sippi-now, thanks to his skilful generalship, open to the navi- gation of all nations, from its mouth to the falls of St. Anthony -to New Orleans, to confer with General Banks relative to the operations of the autumn. While here, on the 4th of Septem-
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ber, he was seriously injured by being thrown from his horse while reviewing the troops of General Banks' department.
From these injuries he did not recover sufficiently to take the field, till late in October. Meantime, there had been hard fighting, as well as weary marches, and severe privations en- dured by the Army of the Cumberland. General Rosecrans, moving forward in June, had driven General Bragg, not with- out considerable fighting, from Tullahoma, and through south- ern Tennessee, into and out of Chattanooga, and, throwing a small garrison into that town, had marched southward to inter- cept Bragg's further retreat, and compel him to fight. Bragg, meantime, strongly reinforced from the Army of Northern Vir- ginia, had joined battle with him in the valley of Chickamauga creek, where on the 19th and 20th of September, 1862, was fought one of the great actions of the war. Though not abso- lutely defeated, Rosecrans had found it necessary to fall back to Chattanooga, which he held, though closely beleagured by Bragg, who had compelled him to relinquish some of his most important communications, and drag his supplies over sixty miles of the worst mountain roads in the southwest. This measure was but temporary, however, and was about to be reme- died, when he was relieved of the command, to which General Thomas was assigned. General Sherman, now in the command of the Army of the Tennessee, was ordered up to his support, and two corps sent from the Army of the Potomac, under Gen- erals Hooker and Howard. This magnificent army was placed under General Grant's command, as the Military Division of the Mississippi. On Grant's arrival at Chattanooga, his first care was to open communications, and provide for full supplies for his soldiers, who had been on half rations for some time. Bragg, at this time, sent Longstreet's corps to Knoxville, to drive Burnside from east Tennessee, and unaware of Grant's
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