A history of Long Island, from its earliest settlement to the present time, Part 34

Author: Ross, Peter. cn
Publication date: 1902
Publisher: New York ; Chicago : The Lewis Publishing Co.
Number of Pages: 1188

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At the same time the heroic resistance of- fered by the Continentals, their behavior un- der the most dispiriting circumstances, their stubborn defense, their willingness under a misconception of orders to resume the fray, and the masterly retreat from their position, not only saved the military reputation of the Patriot forces but proved that the men had in them that stuff of which heroes-victorious heroes-are made. The courage of Small- wood and the dash of Stirling were in them- selves lessons to the militia forces; the stolid

resistance of Sullivan was worthy of all praise, even although his inactivity at a critical mo- ment was among the primal causes of the de- feat ; and up to a certain point the disposition of his forces by Putnam was masterly, while the tactical pre-eminence of Washington, aided by fog and the elements, turned the edge of what might have been an irrecoverable blow into merely a military mishap.

Certainly the generalship of the British commander in putting his finger upon the weak point in the American line of defense and taking full advantage of it was a personal triumph which, at this day, need not be with- held from him. But he lost the fruits of his victory by his remarkable inactivity, an inac- tivity which it is said to his credit was prompted by a hope that his victory might lead to a cessation of hostilities and a stoppage of the shedding of blood. But the time for that had not yet come on either side, and Washington took advantage of the halt in affairs and of a generous fog to concentrate the Continental forces of the northern part of Manhattan Island. The principal result of the battle to the British was that it gave them the control of Long Island and Man- hattan Island, both of which they continued to hold until peace was declared and the new nation was formally recognized on every lıand.

With the triumphant ending of the cam- paign at Boston and its occupation by Wash- ington, one chapter in the story of the Revo- lutionary struggle was closed, and closed in

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HISTORY OF LONG ISLAND.

a manner that inspired the Patriots with high hopes for the ultimate success of their arms. It was felt that now they were in a better position, with the prestige of success behind them, and the experience gained in actual conflict, to meet the further onslaughts of the enemy. The result of the evacuation of Boston in fact left the country in the en- tire possession, in a military sense, of the Patriot force, and great naturally were the rejoicings.

But Washington and the leaders of the Revolution well knew that only a chapter had been closed and that another would soon open. In fact, across the St. Lawrence an- other chapter had even then been worked out, with disastrous results. Montgomery was killed at Quebec and that fortress with its rich stores of munitions of war defied the efforts of the American army. Montreal and other places were still in their hands, but sickness as well as the fortunes of war was decimating their ranks, and step by step the Patriots were forced to recross the St. Law- rence. That territory, therefore, was then more than a menace to the fortunes of the movement of Freedoni: it .was a storehouse for the common enemy, and its port of Hali- fax was a convenient gathering place for fu- ture operations.

Then General Howe had practically left Boston with his forces intact, with the honors of war, carrying with him his arms and his supplies, and his baggage; and although his destination was unknown for some time the existence of that force was a menace. Wash- ington naturally thought that New York, with its magnificent opportunities for naval and military manoeuvres, would be the scene of its operations, and accordingly orders were issued for the immediate defence of that port. General Lee was at once dispatched to hurry on and superintend this work; and the army, as rapidly as possible, was transferred to Man- hattan Island and its vicinity. It was felt, indeed, by many that the Continental army could not hold the island against a combined

attack of the military and naval forces of the enemy, but the strategical importance of the place, its immense value to the British as an entreport, and its pre-eminence as an indus- trial centre-which it had even then assumed- made its retention in the hands of the Patriots a matter of prime importance. If it could not be held, it could at least be made de- batable ground, and unless a signal victory was gained by them at the outset this was the most that could be hoped for. All prep- arations were therefore made for defense, when it was learned that Howe had sailed to Halifax, determining to wait there for rein- forcenients before entering upon a new canı- paign.

When he returned a significant change was taking place and the separate Colonies were formally united into one defensive govern- ment by the signing of the Declaration of In- dependence at Philadelphia July 4, 1776, by the representatives of the thirteen original States.

With the defenses of Manhattan Island, except in a general way, this history has nothing to do; but it may be said that quite an extensive chain of forts was constructed in what was then the city with a grand battery of twenty-three guns at the most southern point. Beside it was Fort George, and near Trinity church was another, and two more further along the water-front were intended to command the approach to the Hudson. The other side of Manhattan Island, opposite the Long Island shore, was protected by an even more formidable chain, Coentie's battery of five guns, Waterbury's battery of seven guns, Badlam's battery of eight guns, on Rut- gers Hill near the old Jewish burying-ground ; Thompson's battery of nine guns at Hoorne's Hook, and a battery at what is now the junction of Grand and Centre streets. There were also breastworks covering other points, and sunken ships and chain lines were added to the means by which it was hoped to pre- vent the passage up either the North or East rivers and hamper the efforts of a fleet to

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THE BATTLE OF BROOKLYN.

aid any landing party. The main reliance of Washington, however, was the elaborate scheme of defense at Kingsbridge and the upper extremity of the island, knowing that so long as they remained in his hands the island itself would be practically useless to the invader, for by that term the British forces could then justly be called.

Second in importance only to Harlem Heights in that it did not hold the key to

close attention. The fort on Red Hook was strengthened, and, as Fort Defiance, was ex- pected to challenge any ship or landing party before the guns on the Grand Battery be- came available. 'Gen. Nathanael Greene took charge of the defense of the island and lost no time in completing his work. Brooklyn at that time lay between the Wallabout and Red Hook and was encircled by a chain of small hills, some of which are still to be seen in

THE BATTLE PASS. (Sketched by G. L. Burdette in 1792.)

the continent but of equal importance to the defense of Manhattan Island itself, was the retention of Long Island to the Patriot forces. With that in the hands of the British Man- hattan Island was at their mercy practically, and so the campaign of the midsummer of 1776 resolved itself into this: the defense of Long Island for the protection of New York City proper and the defense of the Heights around the Harlem and the southern part of Westchester county for the protection of the Hudson River and the northern States.

Long Island was therefore the subject of

Prospect Park and Greenwood Cemetery, although the landscape has been sadly changed by the march of modern improvement. Be- tween this stretch of hills and the water-front facing Staten island and Sandy Hook was a stretch of flat ground dotted with such villages as Gravesend, Flatlands and New Utrecht, an admirable landing ground for an offensive force. But the screen of hills formed a natural line of defense, and so long as these could be held New York was safe from that side. Gen. Greene took full advantage of this natural breastwork and covered the passes be-

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HISTORY OF LONG ISLAND.

tween the hills through which an enemy must pass.

Behind these hills a series of forts ex- tended from the Wallabout to the Red Hook.

Fort Stirling commanded the water-front at what is now the junction of Hicks and Pierrepoint streets.

Fort Putnam (now Fort Greene).

Fort Greene, near the present intersection of Nevins and Dean streets.

Forts Putnam and Greene were connected by an oblong redoubt.

Cork Screw Fort was on the space now lying between Atlantic, Pacific, Court and Clinton Streets.

There was also a small redoubt eastward of Fort Putnam, near the Jamaica road.

Fort Box, a redoubt (four guns) on the slope of Bergen Hill west of Smith street, not far from Hoyt and Carroll streets.

No one can look at a map of early Brooklyn without seeing that these defenses were skill- fully planned so far as their situation goes to protect the town behind them ; but as has been said, the main purpose of Greene was to pre- vent any passage across the chain of hills which nature had placed ready to his hand for purposes of defense. Of course, could the landing of any force have been contested, an even better defense might have been insured; but his force was too small to guard an ex- tensive-stretch of territory ; there was no way of telling which the enemy, if he did land at all, might select; and it was not an age when the telegraph could instantly give warn- ing of an approach, and when the means were at hand for quickly massing large forces of men at any given point. Besides, his troops were not numerous enough to do more than guard the defenses, and so he wisely determined to concentrate his attention on them and leave the landing to fate.

Meanwhile General William Howe was not idle. He left Boston on March 17, landed with his forces at Halifax some ten days later and remained there until the middle of June. By that time communication had been entered

into with the home Government, reinforce- ments promised and new plans for the sub- jugation or submission of the Colonies, war- like and pacific, duly considered and agreed to. In accordance with these General Howe gathered up his army and again set sail, ar- riving on Staten Island on June 29. A land- ing was soon effected and the British troops went into camp. New York was naturally greatly excited by the appearance of the vis- itors, and the excitement deepened as time went on and no hostile demonstrations of any account were made, showing that re-inforce- ments were expected. The whole of Staten Island was at once under the control of Howe, even the local militia organization renewing its allegiance to the king, and, until the close of the conflict, it so remained. The posses- sion of the island naturally gave the British a commanding position in front of New York. By it they controlled a wide section of the water-front : they commanded, indeed, the en- trance to New York harbor, while it afforded many landing places for their troops safe from all interference or obstruction except in the remote and unlikely event of an attack from the Jersey side, across the Kill von Kull. Reinforcements continued to arrive, but it was not until July 14 that, with the arrival of Admiral Lord Howe and his fleet, the Brit- ish felt strong enough to begin their plans for bringing about peace either by persuasion or compulsion. Into the story of the first of these we need not here enter: they belong to the general history of the country. It was perfectly understood, however, in the Contin- ental camps that there was no hope of peace as long as surrender was the basis of the British proposals, and so the work of defense was carried forward with incessant zeal.

The defense of Long Island was pushed on with especial haste, and as the position of the British indicated whence an attack on New York might possibly come the hills that en- circled Brooklyn were thoroughly covered by the Continental leader. He also, it is said, prepared for the eventuality that the enemy

203

THE BATTLE OF BROOKLYN.

weakest. It should be remembered that a system of spies was carefully maintained by both sides. Every movement on Staten Island appeared to be known at once to Washington and doubtless the same espionage brought to a knowledge of the Howes the weak points arrangements, but it must be remembered that ` in the long and tortuous line of defense.

might land on Long Island, pass his chain of defenses and by making a detour endeavor to gain the narrow passages towards Hell Gate and so gain possession of the upper part of Manhattan Island. Much discussion had been created as to the military value of Greene's his plan was fully approved by Washington, who visited the works several times while in course of formation, and, also, that before his arrangements were fully completed he was seized with fever and compelled to take to his bed, unable even to discuss his plans with General Sullivan, who was appointed tempor- arily to the military command of the island. We know the adage about the impropriety of swapping horses while crossing a stream, but the "swap" had to be made in this instance and with the usual. results.

Sullivan was a brave man, but had the repu- tation of being careless at times, knew little of strategy, was a magnificent leader of an on- slaught, and ignorant of mathematical calcula- tions, which enter so largely into warfare. Ru- mors began to thicken that the descent on Long Island was about to be made, and reinforce- ments were sent over from the main army on Manhattan; and then, on Aug. 22, it was definitely learned that the British had actually crossed and had effected a landing at what is now the village of Bath between New Utrecht and Gravesend. As it was also known that they had only three days' provisions with them, there seemed no longer any doubt that they meant to attempt the capture of New York by the most direct land route possible, across the Gowanus range to Brooklyn. Still, al- though everything so indicated, so far as in- formation among the Patriots went, this move- ment might only be undertaken by one part of the army to detract attention from another movement, directed against King's Bridge, so that virtually the entire force at the command of Washington was called into requisition to guard quite a great extent of country against a foe which might throw an overwhelming force at a moment against whatever part was

It did not take long for the mystery of the moment to clear away and the plan of campaign via Long Island to unfold itself, although even after it was seen that the Brit- ish were landed in force at Bath the watchful vigilance all along the shores of Manhattan and the approaches of the Hudson. In fact one of the spies employed by Gen. William

DENYSE'S FERRY-THE BRITISH LANDING PLACE.

Livingston of New Jersey brought in to that patriot such information that he wrote to Washington on the 21st that 20,000 men had already embarked to occupy Long Island and the entrance to the Hudson simultaneously while 15,000 were in readiness for other ser- vice touching New Jersey itself. Washington at once saw that Long Island was the crucial point in the new campaign and as soon as the news of the landing reached him dispatched six battalions of his troops to reinforce the defensive struggle. Five battalions more in New York were held in immediate readiness to cross the East River should their services be needed, but the defense of Manhattan Isl- and demanded their retention there except in case of a great emergency. The stories of

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HISTORY OF LONG ISLAND.

the spies could not always be depended on. Washington afterward (Sept. 9) wrote to Congress : "Before the landing of the enemy on Long Island the point of attack could not be known, nor any satisfactory judgment formed of their intention. It might be on Long Island, on Bergen, or directed on the city."

The landing of the British was conducted in a masterly manner and proceeded without much incident. The movement began in the early morning; by nine o'clock 9,000 troops had been landed and before noon the entire attacking force of 15,000 men with their arms and baggage, stood on Long Island. The movement was clearly seen from the Amer- ican line, but no serious attempt was made to interrupt it. Col. Reed, in a letter dated August 23, indeed wrote: "As there are so many landing places and the people of the island generally so treacherous, we never ex- pected to prevent the landing." For military purposes under all the existing circumstances no better landing point could have been selected. As soon as it was known that the British had landed, an alarm seized New York which the Patriots could hardly allay. On the 24th, Washington at once crossed to Long Island and gave personal instruction as to the defense. He judged that, in accordance with news which had reached him, the first purpose of the invaders was to win the lines held by Gen. Sullivan, either by a surprise after a forced march or an attack in force, and lie strengthened that commander's position with six regiments. Certainly Washington's judg- ment in this instance was in full accord with the dictates of military science, and had Sulli- van understood that science as well, or had he exhibited the watchfulness his position de -. manded, he might have forced the fighting at his lines and so changed the entire aspect of the campaign.

After issuing a stirring address to his troops Washington returned to New York and at once sent General Putnam to take chief command on Long Island. Washington

was not entirely confident of Sullivan's judg- ment, and it is said that the latter justified his commander's doubt by "sulking at being verbally superseded in the direction of affairs by the veteran." Putnam, we are told, had a fair knowledge of the campaigning ground and had the entire confidence of his chief. He at once began to strengthen the defense wherever lie perceived the opportunity or necessity, but the time of his disposal was too limited to enable him to grasp the whole scheme of defense as laid down by Greene, and the absence of that skillful soldier was regretted more keenly by none more than the brave soldier who was thus suddenly called to assume his part. At the same time it should be remembered that the real commander in chief was Washington, and be it also said that he never shirked the responsibility of that po- sition. On the morning of the 26th he again crossed to Brooklyn, rode over in company with Putnam, Sullivan, and other officers much of the line of defense, visited and en- couraged the outposts and carefully exam- ined the position of the British forces, some of whom by that time were near Flatbush. The entire line of defense seemed a strong one, every avenue of approach, it appeared to the hurried investigators, was fully cov- ered, and such as under experienced troops would have formed an impassable barrier. Possibly Gen. Greene alone could have told its weak points, but his usefulness for this cam- paign was a thing of the past.

On the night of the 26th Washington, with a heavy heart but not without strong hope, returned to New York, and it has been calcu- lated that while he was crossing the river the British forces began their forward move- ment.

From the moment of landing on the 22d the British troops had not been idle, but were engaged in a series of movements the precise nature of which was difficult to judge, al- though the Patriots adhered to the view that one of the passes, most likely that held by Sullivan, was to be the object of a concen-

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.

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THE BATTLE OF BROOKLYN.

trated attack. The army was steadily ex- tending itself over the level country between the sea and the hills, gradually forcing the American outposts back to the latter and seizing the various roads. Many skirmishes took place between the outposts, but the pre- cise design of the enemy was cleverly con- cealed, and until the 26th the main purpose of the British was to wear out the raw con- tinental levies by keeping them continually on the alert. On the 26th the Hessian troops under De Heister took possession of Flat- bush, while Sir Henry Clinton, the real com- mander of the forces, occupied Flatlands, and General Grant carried his column within sight of General Stirling's division. Still the precise purpose of all these movements was concealed, or rather nothing offered a better explanation than that one of the defensive posts was to be carried by force. General Howe's spies were better informed than those of the Continentals and he knew and seized upon the weakest spot in the whole line of defense. The Battle of Brooklyn was a battle of strategy and it is no disgrace to say that on that point the Patriots were worsted. Their strategist was lying hovering between life and death. He alone knew the full scope of the plan he had conceived and put into effect.

Washington had not time to review the ground thoroughly, neither had Putnam, neither for that matter had Sullivan, the next in command, but he might have saved the day, or changed its entire aspect, had he been more watchful at the moment when watch- fulness was most needed.

In the early hours of the morning of Au- gust 27th word was brought in by pickets that a column of the enemy under General Grant had moved against the lines held by Stirling. The latter, in accordance with orders received from Putnam, advanced toward Gowanus creek with Hazlet's Delaware regiment and Smallwood's Maryland regiment. At the creek they were joined by Col. Atlee's Penn- sylvania regiment, which had been stationed

around there as an advanced outpost. The advance of the British was soon heard and Stirling ordered the Pennsylvanians to await the foe in an orchard on the left of the road, while he with his Delaware and Maryland men took possession of a ridge which over- looked the route the enemy must pass. Word was at once sent back to the main body urging reinforcements, as it seemed that the expected battle was to open at that point. When the light began to dawn the approach of the enemy was clearly perceived and their strength in the wavering light was at once overestimated. The Pennsylvanians fired sev- eral volleys at the approaching column and then retired to a position on the left of the ridge held by Stirling's troops. That force had already been strengthened by Kichline's regiment of riflemen which was scattered around the base of the ridge and well under shelter so as to retard any advance which might be made to storm the position by an attack in force. That seemed likely when some of Grant's troops in advance of the col- umn took possession of an orchard about 150 yards away and commenced firing into the ranks of the Patriots. For two hours there- after, until long after the darkness had dis- appeared, a battle of musketry was kept up between the two forces, with the view of "drawing each other," or in other words in the hope of each gaining a clearer under- standing of the movements of the opposing side. On the part of the British Stirling's purpose was divined as to keep them in check until his forces were strengthened so that he could give them battle. Grant's purpose was to keep Stirling so employed until a certain crisis in the engagement was reached. Two field pieces were hurried to Stirling's aid and placed in position to sweep the roadway along which the British would advance, and Grant brought up some artillery and after much de- ploying took up a position about 600 yards from the Americans, occupying also a series of ridges. Thereafter there was a continuous firing by the artillery of the armies, but

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HISTORY OF LONG ISLAND.

neither was inclined to attempt a general en- gagement. Grant was carrying out his part of the British leader's scheme by keeping Stirling in front, while Stirling, unaware of the strength of the enemy, could only with safety hold the invader in check until his request for reinforcements should be complied with or until General Putnam should appear to take command at the point with a strong force.

Meanwhile another part of the British plan was put in operation and failed. It was to land a force on Manhattan Island, but con- trary winds defeated that purpose. The ships with the troops could not get through the Nar- rows and after several efforts landed their men at Bath, and one of the ships, the Roe- buck, bombarded Fort Defense on Red Hook and in that way added to the uncertainty of the Patriot leaders as to the exact nature of the entire movement. The four eighteen- pounders in the fort made a gallant response to the Roebuck's five and prevented any salient damage at that point, although it must be ad- mitted that the noise of these cannons aided the success of the British plans.

Meanwhile another part of the British strategical movement was being played with marked success. De Heister's Hessians at Flatbush commenced an artillery attack on the fort held in the hills in front by Col. Hand of General Sullivan's division. Sulli- van himself at once repaired to the spot and was apparently convinced that the attack in force was to be made against his lines. But the British made no advance and contented themselves with a brisk fire, which was an- swered as briskly from the hills.

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A history of Long Island, from its earliest settlement to the present time, Part 34

Author: Ross, Peter. cn Publication date: 1902 Publisher: New York ; Chicago : The Lewis Publishing Co. Number of Pages: 1188

Author: Ross, Peter. cn
Publication date: 1902
Publisher: New York ; Chicago : The Lewis Publishing Co.
Number of Pages: 1188