USA > New York > History of the one hundred and twenty-eighth regiment : New York volunteers (U.S. infantry) ; in the late civil war > Part 15
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The push up the valley and the constant fighting had made our men look quite shabby, some being almost barefoot. Our wagon- train came in on the 11th and reported that it had been attacked by Moseby's gang, which was ever operating in the rear and preying upon our supplies. Each company of the regiment drew six pairs of shoes on the 12th, not half enough to supply the demand. No clothing could be issued. The nights now were very cool. Gladly we set about our camp fires when off duty. We carried only a rubber blanket. Overcoats had been left behind. Shelter tents were open and afforded little protection from the wind. Showers and rains were frequent.
Sheridan had supposed Early with the greater part of his force, at some distance ; but Kershaw's men, who had not partaken of the feast we had given the rest of the enemy on our forward movement, thought they would like to try their hand. Accordingly near noon on the 13th, this new officer moved up near the Union lines, and added to the dinner table of Crook's men, by plumping a number of shell into their camp. Thoburn at once moved out a brigade of the . eighth corps, pushed them forward as skirmishers, and drove back the rebels after some quite sharp firing. We of the nineteenth corps, fell in line, and remained in our rifle-pits until night. Our cavalry had also been attacked on the right, but easily repulsed the enemy. We left our entrenchments at daylight the next morning, and with several brigades of the nineteenth corps went out on a reconnoissance, to ascertain the strength of the confederates. We found them in force in the vicinity of Fisher's Hill, and so returned to camp about noon. Learning that the enemy was strong from the re-enforcements received, we went to work for several days on our defenses strengthening them.
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SECTION XIX.
CEDAR CREEK BATTLE.
After Sheridan's great success in the valley, it was Grant's idea that he should push eastward along the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad to Charlottesville and Gordonville, thus closing in on Richmond and at the same time cutting off the enemy from the Shenandoah. This plan was probably the reflected feeling at Washington, or as is charged by Burr in his Life of Sheridan, the changed order of Halleck, he fearing that Early might creep behind Sheridan and again threaten the Capitol. Receiving definite orders from Grant for such a movement on the 12th of October, Sheridan knew he would need all his forces and re-called Wright to Cedar Creek in order to concentrate his whole army. The orders being somewhat changed on the 15th, Sheridan started on his visit to the Secretary of War at Washington. On his way he was overtaken by an officer with a message which had been read by our signal officers from the waving flags of the confederates on the summit of Three Top Mountain. This message claimed to be sent by Longstreet to Early and read as follows : " Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan." Sheridan and Wright both thought this to be a trick to lead them to move back from their present position, and took no action except to be somewhat more on their guard. Sheridan proceeded to Washington, transacted his business, and at noon on the 17th, by special train, started back for Martinsburg and thence to go to Winchester. Supposing his army to be in perfect security, he tarried at the latter place to arrange other business during the 18th.
The army, as it lay at Cedar Creek, was under the temporary command of Wright. The position was a bad one, as it had twice been emphatically condemned by Sheridan. In front flowed the Cedar Creek in its last bend before the waters mingled with those of the Shenandoah. Crook, with his eighth corps, held the partly wooded range on the left or south-east of the Shenandoah pike, and nearly parallel with it, with Thoburn facing the Creek, while Hayes and Kitching's provisional division on the extreme left, faced toward the Shenandoah with their backs toward the road. To the right of the eighth corps, with the left resting on the pike, was Emory with
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the nineteenth corps. This was upon the crest of a hill which rose steeply and distant a hundred and fifty feet from the Creek. Here was planted the most of Emory's artillery in order to defend the bridge of the pike, and the neighboring ford, but the position of these guns was lower than the range of Crook's command. The second division under Grover joined on the road, with Dwight's division formed on the right, the whole line being of a crescent shape. In front of the lines thus far, there were shallow earth trenches and redoubts, and in places, an attempted abattis of fallen trees. The third step of the echelon was composed of the sixth corps, which held no part of the front, but formed a general reserve, with no attempt at entrenchment. Behind, and to the right of the sixth corps, opposite Middletown, lay the cavalry of the middle military division under Torbert, with Custer thrown out far to the right watching a back road crossing.
On the ISth, Harris was sent out with a brigade of Thoburn's division of the eighth corps, to find out where Early was, and what he was doing. Returning at night, he reported that he had been to Early's old camps and found them deserted. How far the party had been, or what they had seen, can not be conjectured. The report gave a fancied security to much of the army, though Emory expressed his fears to Wright, and various signs had been seen which forboded that the enemy were not all asleep or absconded. It was even determined to send, on the following morning, the nineteenth corps, to make a reconnoissance in force.
Meanwhile Early was making his plans. His army was lying in force at their stronghold on Fisher's Hill. General John B. Gordon tells us that on that ISth of October, he went to the summit of Massanutten Mountain where the confederates had a signal corps stationed, and with his field-glass took observations. "There was a magnificent view," he says : "The Shenandoah was the silver bar between us. On the opposite side of the river, I could distinctly see the red cuffs of the artillerists. Why, I had so good a view, I could see the sore spots on the horses backs in your camps. In front of Belle Grove mansion I could see members of Sheridan's staff com- ing and going. I could not imagine a better opportunity for making out an enemy's position and strength. I could even count the men who were there. The camp was splendidly exposed to me. I marked the position of the guns, and the pickets walking to and fro, and observed where the cavalry was placed." With this wonderful panorama of our army before him, he saw the weak spots as well as
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the strong. It flashed upon him how to make the attack. Sheridan was expecting, from the position of his army, an attack from the right if any was made. The left was protected mostly by the Shenandoah River. Gordon saw an old farm road running along the side of that south mountain range which could be utilized. Going back to Early, he proposed the plan, which, after some expla- nations, was promptly acted upon by the rebel commander. That night, Gordon tells us, he ordered his men to leave behind their canteens, sabres, and everything that could make a noise, and, with the strongest injunction of silence and secrecy, moved forward in single file along the mountain side. By another discovered pass an entire brigade of cavalry was moved. It was a desperate under- taking, but the confederates were becoming desperate, and hinged all upon a last struggle in the valley. All night long these silent figures moved forward with beating hearts. "I instructed the cavalry," says Gordon, "that as soon as I got ready to move, they were to proceed in my front, rush across the river, open on the cavalry pickets, and capture them if possible. If they could not do this, they were to put their horses to full speed, ride right through the federal camp, firing their pistols to the right, and to the left as they passed through, and make directly for Sheridan's headquarters and capture him." This was the daring and desperate scheme to take Sheridan, whom they feared more than an army of soldiers, they not knowing of our leader's absence.
But other and complete arrangements were made by Early for a last attempt against our army in the Shenandoah. The rest of the confederate forces also spent the most of the night in getting into position for this wild-cat spring, and were arranged in the following order : On the right of the rebel line and diagonally facing Kitch- ing, in position to enfilade his entire line, Lomax and Payne with their cavalry. Next in order, and prepared to make the first onset against the eighth corps in front and flank, were the infantry of Pegram, Ramseur and Gordon. In front of the nineteenth corps were a part of Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps and all of Wharton's. Directly in front of the position held by our brigade, whose left rested on the pike, forty-eight pieces of artillery were massed, supported by dismounted cavalry. On their extreme left was Rosser's cavalry and some light artillery. In this attitude Early's forces awaited sufficient light to make the leap. Concerning this movement, Irwin says : " Bold as was Early's design of surpris- ing and attacking the vastly superior forces of Sheridan under con-
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ditions that must inevitably stake everything upon the hazard of complete success, it may well be doubted whether in the whole history of war an instance can be found of any similar plan so carefully and successfully arranged and so completely carried out in every detail, up to the moment that must be looked for in the execution of every operation of war, when the shock of battle comes and puts even the wisest prevision in suspense."
We now quote mostly from the Personal Record of Lieutenant Benson as being the best possible authority to obtain .
"My knowledge of this battle, from beginning to end, was acquired from personal observation, my facilities for obtaining it · being superior to many who were asleep when the engagement opened. On the night of the 18th, I was in charge of the picket and reserve in front of the nineteenth corps to the right of the main pike road, at a point about two and a-half miles in advance of our main line, designated as the "Stonewall Post." During the night, which was cold and made us shiver with our light clothing, though everything in our immediate front was quiet, I had an uneasy feeling as if some danger was impending, and did not close my eyes for a moment and made frequent visits to the picket line.
Shortly before daybreak of the 19th, Colonel Alfred Neafie, the field officer of the day, rode up through the darkness and mist, and dismounted. Standing with his hand on the saddle of his horse, he asked the usual questions as to occurrences during the night. Har- ing made my report, he informed me that if I heard firing on the left, to give myself no concern, as there was to be a reconnoissance in force at daybreak, by our entire division. He had barely finished speaking when from the position held by the eighth corps a sheet of fire burst forth, followed by the rattle of musketry and the shouts of the combatants, and announced the dawn of another day of blood- shed. I asked the colonel, in a joking way, if that was the recon- noissance. He made no reply, but threw himself into the saddle and dashed off in the direction of the firing. At this time, the day was just beginning to dawn and a heavy fog hung over the ground which prevented our seeing what was taking place in our immediate front. but I knew our time would come soon. Getting over the stone wall and going towards our pickets to direct them to the reserves, I had barely gone forty yards when I discovered the enemy advancing in heavy skirmish order. Running back to the stone wall, I found the ' Boys' already in line and perfectly cool. At about thirty yards they discovered us and yelled : 'Throw down your arms, you d-d
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AND TWENTY- EIGHTII REGIMENT.
Yanks.' Instead of grounding arms, three quick volleys were fired into them at less than thirty yards, which checked their advance very perceptibly and alarmed our camps, two and a-half miles in our rear. As day was breaking rapidly, and the ground was opened towards the creek, I took advantage of the momentary check we had given them, to return under cover of the fog, to the creek, where there was a rude corduroy bridge, used for hauling wood. Crossing this, I took a position in the wood that commanded the bridge and the open ground in front. While in this position, an aide from head- quarters rode down and ordered me to remain where I was until further orders. At this time we had some fifty or sixty men, pickets having joined us from various parts of the line, and a heavy skirmish fire was kept up. I waited patiently for orders which never came. Instead we received a fire from the rear, and to save our- selves from capture I ordered a retreat to the right, down the line of Cedar Creek, under a galling fire from the enemy on both sides of us. We lost some twenty men prisoners, the rest of us pulled through and regained the regiments." These twenty men, the writer would say, refers to those from this retreating squad. The writer himself, being on the advance picket line, had two posts under him as corporal just south of the pike and down in a hollow. Not hearing any command, the men of these posts stood their grounds until shots from the rear showed them their danger, and, in trying to retreat, found themselves surrounded by a skirmish line of con- federates, dressed in Union blue, and were obliged to surrender. The whole number of men of the 128th captured on the picket line, together with some who were taken in the trenches on this day numbered 82, the names of whom the writer has a complete list. "The foregoing," says Lieutenant Benson, "relates to the opening of the battle and the part taken by the picket detail of the 128th N. Y. Vols, and I claim that the first shot fired in front of the nine- teenth corps was by this detail, and the only one so far as I saw or heard. This is also the opinion of the field officer of the day. The battle was now at its height."
The enemy's cavalry, under Gordon's direction, had captured the pickets in front of the eighth corps. Then Kershaw, dashing forward with a division of infantry, plunged upon the sleeping camp of Crook, and put Thoburn's division into utter confusion. It was the custom of the nineteenth corps when in the presence of the enemy, to stand at arms at daybreak. The most of the nineteenth corps were also expecting to go out on a reconnoissance that morn-
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ing, and had already prepared their breakfast, and were waiting orders to march. Emory himself was dressed, his horses saddled, and he preparing to make the start. The rebels, under Kershaw, had come with a rush over the breastworks of the eighth corps, and seized the guns. They now turned this artillery upon Hayes to the extreme, and down upon the nineteenth corps. Gordon at the same time had made an unexpected attack upon the exposed flank of Hayes and Kitching. Our whole army on the left of the pike being routed, Gordon and Kershaw moved together against the uncovered left and rear of Emory. The retreat and confusion of the eighth corps men, threatened to destroy the efficiency of the nineteenth, while the enemy, inspired by the success already attained, were pressing forward with the determination to crush all before them. This flank movement necessitated a change of front of our entire corps, one of the most difficult movements under fire known to military science, so as to bring our line parallel to the main pike or nearly so. Although this was attempted, there was not time to com- plete this movement in the force of the tremendous fire from the enemy. The engagement had now opened along our whole lines. The forty pieces of Early's artillery were brought to bear upon our troops. Gordon was moving to our rear, with the intention of breaking up the nineteenth corps. "But," says Benson, "he reckoned without his host, for here took place the most desperate fighting during the battle, the bayonet and the clubbed musket being freely used. How the old corps fought is best told by General Sheridan's official report, 1,595 brave men killed and wounded. The corps at this time consisted of only two divisions of seven brigades, of five regiments each, in all thirty-five regiments, ranging from two hundred to four hundred each." Haley had lost forty- nine horses killed in harness. Three guns of the First Maine battery were abandoned. Taft lost three pieces of the Fifth New York battery. Three guns of the 17th Indiana, and two of the Rhode Island battery were left behind. Grover was slightly wounded ; McCauley of our brigade severely. Emory . had lost both horses and was commanding his corps on foot. Birge rode a mule. Crook had lost seven guns which had been turned upon us, and now the sixth corps gives ground. Pressed in front by Longstreet's men, and the entire line enfiladed by the rebel artillery, the ninteenth corps began to retire. "Successively," says Irwin, "the brigades of the nineteenth corps began to give way ; yet as they drifted toward the right and rear, in that stress the men held
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AND TWENTY-EIGHTH REGIMENT.
well to their colors, and although there may and must have been many that fell out, not a brigade or a regiment lost its organization - for a moment." This statement is confirmed by Benson when he writes : " It must not be inferred that in falling back there was a mad rush to get to the rear. On the contrary, the movement was slow, the ground being stubbornly contested. I was within twenty feet of General Grover, our division commander, who was wounded, his horse walking, his shattered arm hanging by his side. Our men were massed around him. Occasionally he gave the word 'steady,' when he noticed any hurried movement of the men."
The entire army now fell back fighting to a point between New- town and Middletown, a distance of four miles, before we could get our line straightened out, and ready to fight on equal terms. "But here," as we quote from Benson, " a stand was made, and our shat- tered battalions began to pull themselves together, and throw up, without the aid of intrenching tools, light breastworks of rails and stones, our (2d) division in front."
It was now about 10 A. M. and the battle had been raging about five hours. Then came a lull of nearly two hours. It was during this period that the confederates, according to Early, were gloating over our captured camp and partaking of the rations so hastily abandoned by the Union soldiers. There is a strong basis for this opinion. In fact the rebel commanders had prepared for this very thing in obliging their men to leave canteens and things behind. An all night march along the side of the mountain range, and the absence of water to quench the thirst, made it impossible for men to continue for these hours and to resist the temptation when passing a despoiled camp. General Gordon denies this charge as a slander upon the soldiers and lays the blame upon Early, declaring that Early asserted that a sufficiently grand victory had been obtained for one day and that it was useless to attempt more with their tired soldiers.
While the lull in fighting was continued, Wright was planning for new work. "He deployed his line " says Irwin, " according to the ground, from the south wall of the cemetery overlooking Meadow Brook on the left. in a rough echelon of divisions to Marsh Brook on the right, in order of Grant. Kiefer, Wheaton, Grover, McMillan. Between the arms of Marsh Brook, in front and behind the Old Forge road. Emory formed his corps in echelon of brigades.
The enemy, meantime, was also preparing for further work and drew up his line. " From the right at Middletown to the left at Red
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HISTORY OF THE ONE HUNDRED
Hill, the new line was formed by Pegram, Ramseur, Kershaw and Gordon, with Wharton behind Pegram. On the right of this line also, Early massed the forty guns of his artillery augmented by some of the twenty-four pieces taken from the Union army."
"While we were halted and busy re-forming," says Benson, "preparatory to resuming the fighting, loud cheering was heard to the left of our line. We were not kept long in suspense as to its cause. Sheridan had arrived, mounted on a powerful black horse he rode at great speed down the front of our line, waving his hat and call- ing out words of encouragement to our men." Sheridan had spent the night at Winchester, and in the morning started with his staff to return to his army. He had not proceeded far before he heard firing, and soon understood the sounds he was approaching. Putting spurs to his black horse Winchester, he pushed forward, and soon met men running to the rear as fast as they could go. Stretching his cavalry guard across the valley to check and turn about these fleeing soldiers, he crowded to the front on that ride which has become famous in song and history. He called out to his men to face about and drive the enemy before them. He was met with shouts along the way as he passcd, and the men did face about by hundreds to take hold with new courage. Riding to the front, he assumed command at once, and looked over the grounds to see that all was in readiness. Passing down his lines he produced, as he ever did, an enthusiasm in all the men, and a new confidence of success.
"Shortly after Sheridan had passed, between one and two o'clock, the enemy. under Gordon and Kershaw, were seen advanc- ing directly for the centre of our (Grover's) division. On they came confident of crushing all opposition. Perfect quiet reigned within our lines until they arrived within about forty yards of us when the entire division arose and delivered their fire. The fire was frightfully effective. The enemy fairly staggered, attempted to rally, and finally broke and fled. This was the turning point in the battle. . Almost immediately our bugles sounded to fix bayonets and then to charge. Our (2d) divison was in the advance. Every position taken by the enemy was carried. Simultaneously with our advance, the cavalry charged diagonally across our rear to the left, over the meadows, and the route of the enemy was complete. We never halted, but kept them on the jump until our old camps were reached. Looking toward the creek, and covering acres of ground, we could see a complete mass of debris, composed of guns,
1
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caissons, ammunition and baggage wagons ; while men, horses and mules mingled with them in inextricable confusion, unable to move, owing to the jam at the bridge. The shells thrown from our guns were bursting among the struggling mass. It was a scene that defies description. It was Il'ar pictured in its most ghastly form, and so vividly impressed on the mind that its horrible features can never be effaced from the memory. In changing back to our camps, the ground was fairly sprinkled with the dead and wounded. I noticed that many of our dead had been stripped of their clothing by the enemy. I saw the body of our dead field officer stripped of every- thing but a bloody undershirt. The number of prisoners and guns captured at the bridge was very large. The whole night was spent in clearing away the jam at the creek."
It was sundown when the infantry planted their colors again on their own breastworks which they had left in the morning, and, be- cause the crossing was impeded, were not able to follow the fleeing rebels. But the cavalry pursued in hot glee. At Strasburg, and as it is said, by the misplacement of a plank, nearly all of Early's artillery was impeded and captured. There were captured in all forty-eight cannons, fifty-two caissons, all the ambulances, many wagons and seven battle-flags. Twenty-four of these pieces of artillery were those which had been lost by our army in the morning. The capture of the field artillery was probably the largest of any battle during the war. About 1,200 prisoners were taken and a loss · in killed and wounded as reported by Early, of 1,860.
Our own losses, as reported by Sheridan, were in all killed 644, wounded 3.430 and captured or missing, 1,591. Of these the nine- teenth corps had 257 killed, 1,336 wounded. The loss in the 128th in killed, wounded and missing numbered over 100, about every third man.
The command of our brigade now devolved upon Lieutenant- Colonel Alfred Naefie, of the 156th New York. He, in speaking of the coolness and efficiency of the different officers who came under his notice, mentions particularly Captain Charles E. Anderson, of the 128th New York.
The pursuit was kept up by our cavalry under Merritt and Custer until the night was well advanced, " but their captures became so heavy in men and material that help was needed to care for them, so barely an hour after going into camp the jaded infantry of Dwight once more turned out and marched with alacrity to Strasburg. Grover's division followed in the early morning. The road was
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