USA > New York > History of the state of New York, political and governmental, Vol. III 1865-1896 > Part 13
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In the convention, after resolutions had been adopted indorsing the St. Louis platform and the State platform of 1874, and denouncing the use of troops at elections, Dorsheimer's name was presented, apparently as the final determination of the leaders. The indiscretion of his spokesman, who pictured him as true to the prin- ciples of that great reformer, Martin Luther, did not commend him to the favor of a Democratic conven- tion.19 Calls from the floor for a "Democrat" threatened the Tilden managers with a stampede to Potter. At this point, by the engineering of John Morrissey, Seymour's name was sprung on the conven-
18Statement of Dr. Talcott Williams, who was on the train.
19 Hudson, Random Recollections of an Old Political Reporter, pp. 63, 64.
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tion and received with great enthusiasm. Although he had telegraphed to Kernan saying that because of ill health he could not be a candidate, he was nominated by acclamation, and a committee headed by Lester B. Faulkner was appointed to visit him. The committee went to Utica and received from Seymour a positive refusal. At midnight Seymour telegraphed his refusal to the president of the convention, but the message was not made public. Ex-Mayor Spriggs of Utica tele- graphed Faulkner for the convention to go on and com- plete its work. On the strength of this, Faulkner assumed that Seymour would accept, and the next morning reported that "under the extraordinary condi- tions attending the nomination Governor Seymour feels constrained to obey the wishes of the people who have so often honored him."20 With these assurances the convention nominated Dorsheimer for Lieutenant- Governor, completed its ticket, and adjourned. On September 2 Seymour made his declination final and formal, and the convention had to reassemble on Sep- tember 13. Meanwhile Tilden consolidated his lines, left Dorsheimer to his fate, and had Robinson nomi- nated by acclamation. He also substituted Seymour for John Kelly as head of the Electoral ticket.21
In the spring the Greenbackers had hoped to control the Democratic organization. They held a meeting at Syracuse on March 15, protested against the Tilden
20New York Tribune, September 1 and 2, 1876.
21The ticket was: Governor, Lucius Robinson, Chemung; Lieutenant- Governor, William Dorsheimer, Erie; Canal Commissioner, Darius A. Ogden, Yates; Prison Inspector, Robert H. Anderson, Kings; Judge of the Court of Appeals, Robert Earl, Herkimer.
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POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
[1876
Democratic platform as a surrender to corporate interests, and pronounced the paper currency platform of 1868 genuine Democratic doctrine. Under their call a convention held in New York City on June 1, claim- ing to be the only authorized representative of Democ- racy, elected delegates who sought admission to the St. Louis convention. After the nomination of Tilden they joined the National Greenback party, which had nominated Peter Cooper of New York for President and Samuel F. Cary of Ohio for Vice-President, and on September 26 at Albany nominated R. M. Griffin for Governor. The Prohibitionists nominated Green Clay Smith of Kentucky for President, Gideon T. Stewart of Ohio for Vice-President, and William J. Groo for Governor.
CHAPTER XV THE DISPUTED ELECTION
1876-1877
T ILDEN made a campaign of unprecedented thoroughness in his own State. He had his personal representatives in every school district, and the attitude of each individual voter was taken account of so far as it could be ascertained. Marble's platform with its catchwords was sown broadcast. Notwithstanding Tilden's failure to deal as satis- factorily as Hayes with either the financial or the civil service reform question and the attacks upon him as a railroad manipulator, an income-tax dodger, and a southern sympathizer, the Republicans found it hard to counter the criticism of specific abuses, such as Belknap's corruption and the whiskey ring frauds, for which they were responsible. Nor could they diminish his prestige as the nemesis of Tweed and the canal ring by questioning the result of his reforms or protesting that the decrease in the State budget coincident with his term was not his work but theirs. Conkling took little part in the campaign because of ill-health, but his one speech arraigning the Democracy brought from Tilden a letter pledging the enforcement of the constitutional amendments and opposition to the payment of southern
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[1876
claims, which Abram S. Hewitt, the national chair- man, hastened to publish lest the candidate's character- istic caution should lead on second thought to its suppression.1
Tilden carried New York by 32,742 plurality, receiving 521,949 votes. The Republicans received 489,207, the Prohibitionists 2,359, and the Greenbackers 1,987. Robinson was elected Governor by 35,460 plurality, receiving 519,831 to 484,371 for Morgan, 3,412 for Groo (Prohibitionist) and 1,436 for Griffin. The Republicans, however, elected 17 of the 33 Repre- sentatives in Congress and 71 of the 128 Assemblymen, enabling them to elect George B. Sloan Speaker. Two constitutional amendments were also submitted, one establishing a Superintendent of Public Works, which was carried by 533,153 to 81,832, and one establishing a Superintendent of State Prisons, which was adopted by 530,224 to 80,358. Kelly and Morrissey harmonized their differences in New York City and united in sup- port of Smith Ely for Mayor, who was elected by 54,069 plurality over John A. Dix, the Republican candidate, a plurality 100 larger than that which Til- den received in New York City.
The reform sentiment that carried Tilden to victory in his own State swept Connecticut, New Jersey, and Indiana and gave him 184 Electoral votes, only one less than a majority, without counting the votes of South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana and one vote in Ore- gon, which were in dispute.
1Rhodes, History of the United States, VII, p. 223.
1876]
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THE DISPUTED ELECTION
"Visiting statesmen" of both parties rushed south to supervise the count. Charges of fraud were rife on both sides. The Republicans controlled the election machinery in the three southern States and used the canvassing boards of Florida and Louisiana in more than a ministerial capacity to throw out Democratic votes on the ground of intimidation and fraud. Intimi- dation and fraud had undoubtedly been used in large measure for the suppression of the negro vote, but the Republicans went to extremes in rejecting votes on slight evidence-sometimes it would seem on general principles. On the other hand, Democrats were accused of trying to buy the votes of these States.
The subsequent discovery and publication of the famous cipher dispatches justified this charge. These telegrams, along with others that passed between political managers of both parties, were obtained from the Western Union Telegraph Company by a Congres- sional committee in 1877 and came into the New York Tribune's possession after they had supposedly been re- turned to the company and destroyed. No one could make anything out of them until John R. G. Hassard of the Tribune staff and Colonel W. M. Grosvenor, who had come from St. Louis and entered the service of the same journal, worked out the keys to the ciphers and the Tribune published the translations in 1878.2 These showed that Marble, in Florida, had been in communi- cation with William T. Pelton, Tilden's nephew, who dwelt in Tilden's house, about the purchase of votes in that State. Marble telegraphed on November 22:
2New York Tribune, beginning October 8, 1878.
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[1876
"Have just received proposition to hand over a decision of board and certificates of Governor for $200,000." Pelton thought this too much and Marble suggested that one Elector could be had for $50,000. Pelton wanted to defer payment until after the Elector had voted. Marble's final reply on December 5 was: "Proposition failed. Tell Tilden to saddle Black- stone." Tilden had a horse named Blackstone. Perhaps this was a hint to prepare for private life, perhaps to resort to law in the count. Smith M. Weed telegraphed from South Carolina, saying that the majority of the board could be secured for $80,000 and asking to have the cash sent in three parcels to Baltimore. Pelton met Weed in Baltimore without the money and started for New York to get it, but it was then too late. These revelations confirmed the impression already made by the few Oregon cipher dispatches that the committee had before succeeded in translating. J. N. H. Patrick telegraphed to Pelton from Oregon asking for $10,000 to buy one Republican Elector, and Pelton replied: "If you will make obligation contingent on result in March it will be done." Patrick said this would not do. Then on January 1, 1877, $8,000 was deposited to his credit, but that also was too late.
Tilden before the Potter committee denied all knowl- edge of these telegrams or of any cipher dispatches. Marble, who had just published "A Secret Chapter of Political History," full of highly moral reflections on corruption in the count, was in a sad plight. He pro- tested that his telegrams were merely reports of the situation and of the offers made by corrupt men. Weed
1876]
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THE DISPUTED ELECTION
admitted his part as a plan of fighting fire with fire, and Pelton testified that he had expected to get the money from Edward Cooper. Cooper said the demand for $80,000 to be sent to Baltimore was his first knowledge of the scheme, that he immediately informed Tilden, who put a stop to the negotiation.3 Without doubt politicians around Tilden were ready to buy the elec- tion if they could, and justify themselves on the claim that the Republicans were using their power fraudu- lently, but there was no proof that Tilden himself was a party to this. On the contrary his whole attitude seemed to be that calmness and a quiet insistence on the rights of the House of Representatives in the count would insure his election.
The votes of all three southern States for Hayes were transmitted under certificates of Governors of the States. The question in Oregon turned on the ineligibility of a deputy-postmaster named Watts, one of the three Republican Electors. The Democratic Governor gave a certificate to Cronin, his highest Democratic opponent. The undisputed Republican Electors refused to act with Cronin, but accepting the resignation of Watts, who had meanwhile left the post office, they exercised their power to fill vacancies in their number by electing him, and cast their votes for Hayes. Cronin proceeded to appoint two associates and they cast one vote for Tilden and two for Hayes. The Electoral commission later refused unanimously to recognize Cronin or his appointees.
3Bigelow, Life of Tilden, II, pp. 182, 286; Testimony in Relation to Cipher Telegraphic Dispatches, pp. 200, 274.
1877]
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which should be submitted for decision any question that might arise as to the validity of any return, and its decision should stand unless rejected by the concurrent vote of both houses. The Republican Senate named three Republicans and two Democrats, the House three Democrats and two Republicans. Four Supreme Court Justices-Clifford and Field, Democrats, Miller and Strong, Republicans-were named in the bill, and they were authorized to select a fifth Justice. It was gen- erally understood that David Davis, an Independent, was to be the fifth Justice, but on the day after the Senate passed the bill Democrats and Independents in the Illinois Legislature elected Davis to the United States Senate. He declined to sit on the commission, and the place was filled by Justice Bradley, a Repub- lican.
Tilden's own course in the controversy was weak and lacking in leadership. He did not approve of the Electoral commission plan, but urged that only by the House standing firm could the Democrats get acces- sions in the Senate. Yet he was overborne by Bayard and Thurman and the southern Senators. In the Senate 26 Democrats and 21 Republicans favored the plan and 16 Republicans and 1 Democrat opposed it. The vote in the House was: For, 160 Democrats, 31 Republicans; against, 60 Republicans, 17 Democrats. The retirement of Judge Davis was a great disappoint- ment to the Democrats, but it came too late for them to draw back without confessing that the plan, which they favored more than the Republicans, was based on the expectation of Davis's support. They were also disap-
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POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
[1876-7
In this crisis the result depended on the method of counting the votes in Congress. Republicans put forth the theory that the President of the Senate had the power to decide the validity of any return. The Demo- crats, harking back to the joint rule of 1865, held that no vote could be counted except with the concurrence of both houses, and as they controlled the House of Representatives acceptance of that plan meant the election of Tilden. Feeling ran high on both sides, no agreement on procedure seemed possible, and civil war was even talked of. Neither side, however, was pre- pared to push matters to this extreme. George William Curtis eloquently expressed the feeling of the great body of followers of both Hayes and Tilden when, before the New England Society in New York on December 22, he said : "The voice of New England, I believe, going to the capital, would be this, that neither is the Republican Senate to insist upon its exclusive partisan way, nor is the Democratic House to insist upon its exclusive partisan way ; but Senate and House, representing the American people and the American people only, in the light of the Constitution and by the authority of the law, are to provide a way over which a President, be he Republican or be he Democrat, shall pass unchallenged to his chair."4 A joint committee was appointed to agree on the method of counting the votes, which on January 18, 1877, reported the Electoral commission bill. It provided for a commission composed of five Senators, five Repre- sentatives, and five Justices of the Supreme Court, to
4Cary, Life of Curtis, p. 249.
CARL SCHURZ
Carl Schurz; born in Liblar, Germany, March 2, 1829; pursued classical studies; came to the United States in 1852 and located at Philadelphia, Pa .; moved to Watertown, Wis., in 1855; studied law and was admitted to the bar; unsuccess- ful candidate for lieutenant governor of Wisconsin; engaged in the practice of law in Milwaukee; delegate to the Chicago convention of 1860; appointed minister to Spain in 1861 but soon resigned; appointed brigadier general of volunteers in the union army; engaged in newspaper work after the war in St. Louis, Mo .; delegate to the Chicago convention of 1868; elected as a republican to the United States senate and served from March 4, 1869 to March 3, 1875; secretary of the interior in the cabinet of President Hayes; editor of New York Evening Post, 1881-1884; contributed to Harper's Weekly, 1892-1898 ; president of national civil service reform league, 1892-1901; died in New York City, May 14, 1906.
WILLIAM L. STRONG
William L. Strong, last mayor of New York City previous to the formation of Greater New York; born in Richmond county, O., March 22, 1827; drygoods salesman in Worcester and later in Mansfield, O .; went to New York City in 1852 and engaged in similar business; elected mayor of New York City and served from 1895 to 1898; republican in politics and elected on a fusion ticket with anti-tammany indorsement; died, New York City, 1900.
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POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
[1877
pointed that Conkling did not serve on the commission. He had taken an active part in passing the bill at the special request of the President and made the greatest speech in its favor. His biographer says that he declined to serve, but it was generally believed at the time that the Republicans left him off because they were afraid of him.5 He was understood to believe that the vote of Louisiana rightfully belonged to Tilden, and up to the last it was expected that he would speak in opposition to counting it for Hayes, but he absented himself when the Louisiana vote was taken. On the vital questions submitted to it, the commission by a vote of 8 to 7 favored the Republicans, though Bradley on some questions voted with the Democrats. Bradley as the final arbiter of the issue has been much criticised, but he doubtless sought to discharge his difficult task with judicial impartiality. The Demo- crats were overmatched in the presentation of the case by William M. Evarts, the chief Republican counsel, who, dealing with all the States, laid down consistent principles of decision skillfully calculated to impress the mind of Bradley, the only member of the commis- sion who was expected to forget his predilections. The count was completed on the morning of March 2 and Hayes was declared to have 185 Electoral votes and Tilden 184.6
5Rhodes, History of the United States, VII, p. 263.
6This chapter attempts merely a brief summary of events involving New York men and having a bearing on New York politics. For a more complete account of the contest see Rhodes, History of the United States, VII, ch. xliv.
CHAPTER XVI FACTION RENDS BOTH PARTIES
1877
T HE policy of President Hayes soon put him at odds with the Republican organization in New York. He refused to honor its initial draft for the appointment of Thomas C. Platt to the Post Office department,1 which was made in an effort to sidetrack Evarts. He offered the English mission to George William Curtis, who declined,2 and sent Bayard Taylor, then of the Tribune staff, to Germany. Evarts, the Secretary of State, was everywhere honored as a great man and a great lawyer, but he was of no use to the politicians. Carl Schurz, the Secretary of the Interior, was even more actively disliked by them. The withdrawal of Federal support with the consequent collapse of the last survivals of radical government in the southern States, was resented as a betrayal of the party, a desertion of the blacks, and an abandonment of the whole scheme of reconstruction.
Even more bitterly did the politicians resent the President's efforts to carry out his civil service reform
1New York Tribune, February 28, 1877; Williams, Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, II, pp. 24 and 235.
2Cary, Life of Curtis, p. 253.
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POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
[1877
pledges. As early as 1865 Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island had proposed in Congress to establish a merit system of appointments. In 1871 Congress authorized the President to prescribe regulations for appointment and promotion, and under this authority Grant appointed a commission headed by George William Curtis to make rules and apply tests, but thereafter Congress refused to make appropriations for the work. Without waiting for further legislation, Hayes attempted by Executive action to reform the service, appointing Dorman B. Eaton Civil Service Commis- sioner. He established a system of competitive exami- nations for certain places and forbade office-holders to take active part in political campaigns, though he did not forbid them to vote or express their views on public questions provided their acts did not interfere with their public duties. He also forbade assessments for political purposes, and on June 22 issued an Executive order making the rule applicable to all departments and telling officers that they were expected to conform to it. Some of the President's own appointments, par- ticularly the rewards bestowed on "visiting statesmen" who had helped him in the canvassing of the southern votes, and his failure to remove some notoriously bad officials, somewhat discredited his efforts. The attacks upon his title by Democrats, with which many Repub- licans sympathized, also injured his prestige.
Nevertheless the better elements of the community approved of his efforts and looked to see the Republican organization cooperate with him. This Conkling had no intention of doing. Hayes's nomination had been
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1877]
Conkling's failure. The New Yorker had honest doubts about his election. He was a radical on south- ern questions and the inheritor of the traditions of New York politics, which sanctioned the ruthless use of spoils for party purposes under the stern discipline of party leaders. Later his antagonism grew and he came in conversation to speak contemptuously of the Presi- dent as "that fraud in the White House."3
Hayes attributed Conkling's attitude to personal dis- appointment and to an egotism that led him to measure fidelity to party duty and country by his own desires and to betray his party repeatedly when he could not control it. In his diary recording Conkling's death in 1888, Hayes wrote that Conkling's fidelity to supporters and skill in flattery, with an impressive presence and manner, were his chief points, and added: "After I went to Washington and after the delivery of the inaugural, he was profuse in admiration of my opinions and course-this to me personally-until the announce- ment of my cabinet, when he became hostile, never again calling on me. We never spoke with each other afterwards. He wanted Platt for Postmaster-General. That was the condition of his support."4
The State chairman, Cornell, who was also Naval Officer of the Port of New York, in calling the Repub- lican State convention together at Rochester on September 26, with an emphasis significant in view of
3Conversation in 1879 with General William T. Sherman and D. D. S. Brown, repeated by the latter to the writer. See also George F. Hoar, Autobiography, II, p. 44.
4Williams, Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, II, p. 235.
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[1877
the President's order to office-holders, remarked that he was acting in accordance with the custom that had always prevailed in Republican State conventions. But it was left for Thomas C. Platt, temporary chairman, proudly professing to represent what he then called "the old guard," to reveal the organization's bitterness toward the President. He sneered at civil service reform as a "shibboleth" put before "a nauseated public" by "Pecksniffs and tricksters," and he made scarcely veiled reference to Secretary Evarts as a "demagogue." Conkling's more subservient followers applauded the speech, but many who were by no means partisans of Hayes considered it in bad taste, and the feeling it had aroused was evident when, after the com- mittee on organization had reported Conkling for permanent chairman, the Senator declined and moved the continuation of Platt, who, he said, had "occupied the chair thus far with the acceptance of us all." The motion was carried, but only by a vote of 311 to 110 after Forster of Westchester had made a ringing speech calling attention to the impropriety of Platt, who had been a candidate for Postmaster-General, vilifying the administration from which he had sought favors and the New Yorker preferred to him for the cabinet.
The platform as reported did not indorse the admin- istration. It took no square issue with the President's southern policy, but somewhat equivocally expressed the hope that it would result in tranquillity and justice. It declared squarely, however, against the President's order excluding public servants from politics and turned against the President his own declaration in his
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1877]
letter of acceptance that an "officer should be secure in his tenure so long as his personal character remained untarnished and the performance of his duty satis- factory," and suggested legislation giving to officers a fixed term and making them removable only on charges openly preferred and adjudged. This would, of course, prevent any such restriction of political action as Hayes had prescribed. The platform also pointed out that there were 7,465 Federal officers in the State, and their exclusion from political action would amount to prac- tical disfranchisement of a great body of citizens.
The friends of the President considered this platform a challenge, and George William Curtis responded with an amendment reciting that Hayes's title was as clear and perfect as George Washington's and com- mending his efforts for the pacification of the southern States and for correction of abuses in the civil service.5 He supported this resolution in one of his most powerful speeches. He contrasted Platt's bitter remarks with the organization's talk of harmony. The party had announced its principles and it could not fail to commend the agent who was carrying them out with- out shaking the confidence of the country. He analyzed the abuses of the spoils system and defended the Presi- dent's order as intended to restore to the great body of Republicans their rights, not to invade those of anybody else.
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