A history of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, from its first beginnings to the present time; including chapters of newly-discovered, Vol. II, Part 78

Author: Harvey, Oscar Jewell, 1851- [from old catalog]
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: Wilkes-Barre [Raeder press]
Number of Pages: 683

USA > Pennsylvania > Luzerne County > Wilkes-Barre > A history of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, from its first beginnings to the present time; including chapters of newly-discovered, Vol. II > Part 78

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The Hon. Stewart Pearce, who took special pains to inform himself relative to the life and deeds of Capt. Lazarus Stewart, printed in his "Annals of Luzerne County " (1860 and 1866) considerable authentic information concerning Captain Stewart. He states ("Annals," page 117):

"On the morning of the battle they [the Westmorelanders] were assembled in Forty Fort, when a council of officers was convened to decide on the propriety of march- ing out to meet the foe. Colonel Butler and others deemed it advisable to remain in the fort. Captain Stewart was prominent among those in opposition, who contended for a prompt and speedy conflict with the invaders in the open field. The debate became ani- mated, and was marked with warm words. Stewart contended that the enemy were increasing in numbers; that they would plunder the settlements of all their property; that they would burn the dwellings and destroy the crops and leave nothing for subsist- ence during the coming Winter; that there was now no hope of reenforcements on their own side, and that if the savages should carry the fort by storm, when they were wasted by fatigue and famine, they would all, together with their women and children, perish in an indiscriminate slaughter. A large majority were in favor of marching out to encounter the enemy. Who shall say that this was not the better policy?"

The Rev. James May of Wilkes-Barre, in an address delivered in Kingston Township July 3, 1832 (see Chapter XXVII), relative to the battle of Wyoming, said *:

" It was about three o'clock P. M. when the settlers reached the bank of Abraham's Creek. There, as they had understood, they were to meet the enemy; but none were in sight. Colonel Butler, apprehending an ambush, deemed it prudent to halt at this point and to make no further offensive movement. But his foresight was disregarded by others, and his remonstrances were ineffectual. * * At last, contrary to his own judgment, but finding the step necessary to preserve the confidence of some of the officers who had put themselves under his command, and who were more ardent than prudent, he gave orders for advancing."

Colonel Stone, in his "Poetry and History of Wyoming " (page 203), says :

"A council of war was held on the morning of the 3d of July, to determine upon the expediency of marching out and giving the enemy battle, or of awaiting his advance. There were some who preferred delay, in the hope that a reenforcement would arrive from the camp of General Washington. *

: * The result of the council was a determi- nation for an immediate attack. As soon as the proper dispositions could be made, Col- onel Butler placed himself at the head of the undisciplined force, and led them forward."

Miner, in his "History of Wyoming " (page 219), says :

"Colonel Butler called a council of war [in the fort], and opinions were freely expressed. Many, and among the rest Colonel Butler, Colonel Denison and Lieut. Col-

* See The Susquehanna Democrat (Wilkes-Barre), July 18, 1832.

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onel Dorrance, were of the opinion that a little delay would be best-that the alarm of the sudden irruption would subside-that the absent militia companies would arrive. * * To these wise and weighty considerations it was replied: That the enemy had now been three days in the town; that they were fast carrying on their work of conquest and murder. * Unless led to action, each man would fly to the protection of his own family. * * We must depend on God and ourselves. To attack and defeat the enemy was the only hope of salvation for the settlement. A large majority accorded with these sentiments, and the minority, though with reluctance, finally yielded their assent."

Mr. Miner further says (Appendix, page 20):

"Capt. William McKerachan was the first officer of the Hanover company. Evin- cing at once a spirit of singular modesty and patriotism, he said to Captain Stewart on the morning of the battle : 'My pursuits in life have thus far been those of peace; you have been used to war and accustomed to command. On parade I can manœuvre my men, but in the field no unnecessary hazard should be run; a mistake might prove fatal. Take you the lead; I will fight under you with my men, as an aid, or a private in the ranks. Your presence at the head of the Hanover boys will impart confidence.'"

Col. H. B. Wright, in his "Historical Sketches of Plymouth" (published in 1873), follows Stone and Miner in telling the story of the events preceding the battle of Wyoming, and then says (page 183):

"The decision of the council of war to adopt immediate offensive action may possi- bly have been premature. From the limited knowledge, however, of the circumstances which is left to us at this remote period of time, we cannot help concluding that the decis- ion was right. The men who made it were not aware of the numerical strength of their enemy; and the sequel, as developed afterwards upon the field, is pretty conclusive that a hundred men more could not have saved the day."

When Mr. May (who was rector of St. Stephen's Protestant Epis- copal Church in Wilkes-Barré) wrote and delivered his address, afore- mentioned, there were a dozen or more hale and hearty, intelligent and sensible, old men living in Wyoming Valley who were survivors of the battle and massacre of Wyoming, and whose recollections of the circum- stances connected with those events were distinct and positive. From those men Mr. May derived his information concerning the matters which he described, and it is quite probable that, had there occurred on the 3d of July, 1778, such dissensions and acts of insubordination as have been described by Dr. Peck and Mr. Jenkins, those old survivors would have remembered and talked about them, and Mr. May would have referred to them in his address. It is a noticeable fact, however, that by neither word nor implication does Chapman, May, Stone, Miner, Pearce or Wright connect Lazarus Stewart or any other American officer with any wrangle, mutiny or act of insubordination at Wyoming preced- ing the battle of July 3, 1778.

There is no doubt that Capt. Lazarus Stewart (although only forty- four years of age when he fell in that battle) possessed more military knowledge and experience-particularly concerning Indian warfare- than any other officer, with the exception of Lieut. Col. Zebulon Butler, Capt. Robert Durkee and Capt. Samuel Ransom, who marched out of Forty Fort to meet the invading Tories and Indians on that disastrous 3d day of July. More than that, Lazarus Stewart knew the value of, and the absolute necessity for, martial discipline in the presence of such dangers as they there faced. And in this respect all the other officers and many of the men in the ranks of the Americans were like him. Not a few of them were old campaigners, as we have previously shown -some having taken part in the last colonial war, others having but recently participated in several battles of the War for Independence and undergone the hardships of Valley Forge, while still others had seen active military service in both colonial and revolutionary times. But, above all, the great majority of the inen assembled there were New

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Englanders, taught from their earliest youth to reverence the laws- civil and military-by which they were governed, and to respect and obey the officers charged with the execution of those laws; and they well knew-every man of them-that they were embodied there, on that important occasion, as a part of the lawfully-established militia of the State of Connecticut. If ever there was an occasion when harmony and accord were desirable and wrangling and insubordination undesirable, it was then.

To every one of that company of Wyoming patriots it must have been obvious that delay meant ruin to the Valley; that the enemy surely purposed to plunder the settlements of all kinds of property-thus accu- mulating the means of carrying on hostilities against the inhabitants, who would themselves become gradually weaker; that the harvest would soon be ripe, and would be gathered or destroyed by the enemy-where- by the inhabitants would be deprived of all their means of sustenance for the succeeding Winter; that the work of devastation and death would be urged on with savage cruelty. No reasonable ground exist- ing for supposing that any help would come from abroad that day, surely the only hope was in a decisive blow.

A large majority took this view of the case, and, disastrous as the issue was, it appears to us at this day that the conclusion was the only one to which, in the circumstances, they could come; and the result was no worse than it would have been had they remained within the wooden walls of Forty Fort-without cannon, with a small supply of provisions, with a limited quantity of ammunition, and with a helpless crowd of women and children. We see no reason whatever for seeking extraneous influences to account for the determination of the patriots to march against the invaders, with the bold design of driving them back or perishing in the attempt. The influence which impelled them to this determination was a sentiment of no uncommon character. In all ages and in all countries it has existed, and is tersely expressed in these verses of an unknown poet :

"On to the strife ! for 'twere far more meet To sink with the foes who bay you, Than crouch, like dogs, at your tyrants' feet, And smile on the swords that slay you."

It was shortly after three o'clock when Colonel Butler gave the order to cross Abraham's Creek, form in column, and march up the road* in the direction of Wintermute's Fort. Without making a halt, and without the occurrence of any unusual incident, the patriots marched about two miles in a north-easterly direction. They were now within a mile of Wintermute's Fort, and again they were halted by their com- mander, who immediately sent forward Capt. Robert Durkee, Capt. Samuel Ransom, Lieut. James Wells, Sr., and Lieut. Peren Ross to select and mark off the ground on which to form in line of battle. These preliminaries having been attended to, the column advanced and then deployed to the left, and in a few minutes the little army was arranged in battle-formation. The right of the line rested near the edge of the slope, or declivity, separating the bottom-lands, or flats, from the elevated plain (as described on page 991), and from that point the line extended .

* From Abraham's Creek, up the Valley, the road of that day lay nearer the river than the present Wyoming Avenue lies.

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some 300 or 400 yards across the plain in a northwesterly direction. In other words, the line was formed some fifty yards south-west of and parallel with the boundary-line of the townships of Kingston and Exeter -almost exactly where the present Fourth Street, in the borough of Wyoming, is located.

Captain Hewitt's company of Continentals was stationed on the extreme right; next in line was the Lower Wilkes-Barre Company (Cap- tain Bidlack); next, the Upper Wilkes-Barre Company (Captain Geer); next, the Kingston Company (Captain Buck); then the Hanover Company (Captain Stewart temporarily in command), and then the Plymouth Com- pany (Captain Whittlesey) on the extreme left. Lieutenant Bowen and the men of the Huntington and Salem Company were attached to Whit- tlesey's company, while the several commissioned officers and the rank and file of the two "Alarm List " companies were distributed among the various companies named above. Captains Durkee and Ransom, Lieu- tenants Wells, Ross, Timothy Peirce and Phineas Peirce, and Ensign Hol- lenback (some of them being then, and the others having been a short time previously, Continental officers of experience, "in whom great con- fidence was placed"), were given positions on the field as aids-Captain Durkee and Ensign Hollenback being assigned to the right wing, and Captain Ransom to the left wing. Lieut. Colonel Butler, in addition to acting as commander-in-chief, was, more particularly, in command of the right wing ; Major Garrett being second in command of that wing. Colonel Denison took command of the left wing, and was aided by Lieut. Colonel Dorrance.

The force being thus disposed it was determined to send forward a small reconnoitering party to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. Lieut: Colonel Butler rode along the line to invite volunteers for this service, and Abraham Pike (see page 982) and an Irish companion hav- ing offered to perform it, were accepted. They went forward, found the enemy gathered in considerable numbers in the immediate vicinity of Wintermute's Fort, and, without being discovered, started back to report the situation to Lieut. Colonel Butler. When within a short distance of the position occupied by the patriots they met two Indian scouts be- longing to the enemy, by whom they were fired upon, and upon whom they immediately fired in return, but without effect. The Indians hast- ily withdrew in the direction of Wintermute's Fort, while Pike and his companion proceeded on their way.

Every movement of the patriots was being watched by a vigilant and wary foe, and no sooner had the march from Forty Fort begun than news of it was carried by fleet-footed Indian scouts to Major Butler at Wintermute's. Thereupon he despatched a messenger to Jenkins' Fort with orders to the detachment of " Rangers " on duty there to set fire to the fort and repair, with the prisoners in their charge, to Wintermute's. Here, by three o'clock in the afternoon, was gathered the whole force of the invaders, with the exception of a small number of scouts and pickets out on duty. When, about four o'clock, Major Butler learned from his scouts that the patriots were formed in line of battle less than a mile away, he ordered that Wintermute's Fort should be vacated and set on fire. This was done without delay.

Adjoining the fort on its north-westerly side was an open field of six or seven acres, along the upper boundary of which, for some dis-

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VIEW FROM HOSPITAL. HILL, PITTSTON, OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF WYOMING. Mount Lookout is in the middle background, and Mount Lookout Colliery is seen near the left-hand margin of the picture. From a photograph taken in July, 1904.

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tance, ran a log fence .* Beyond this fence was the " fine, open wood," referred to by Major Butler,t and at a considerable distance from the end of the fence farthest from the fort was located the swamp, or morass, previously described. Major Butler posted his "Rangers " behind the log fence, where, in order that they might be more effectually concealed, they lay down. The main body of the Indians was stationed in the swamp, forming, under the command of Sayenqueraghta, the right wing of the enemy's line. Major Butler, divested of his military hat and coat, and with a black handkerchief knotted about his head, took command of the left wing of his force. In the vicinity of the burning fort, and also scattered here and there in the open field, a considerable number of Indians lay-in concealment, so far as possible-for the purpose of serv- ing as skirmishers. The prisoners held by the enemy were sent under

View from Wyoming Avenue, looking east, of a part of the Wyoming battle-field, showing the Jenkins house, which stood on the site of Wintermute's Fort. From a photograph taken in 1878.

guard to the rear-to a point near the river, and about half way between the sites of Jenkins' Fort and Wintermute's. Thither repaired, also, the squaws of the Indians, and such others of the invaders as, for one reason or another, would not take part in the impending conflict.

* The site of Wintermute's Fort, marked by the scanty remains of the dwelling-house erected on the spot by Col. John Jenkins (as mentioned on page 807), may be described by present-day conditions or landmarks as lying four or five rods south of the junction of Valley Avenue and Battle Street, in that part of the borough of Exeter locally known as Sturmerville. Just a short distance north of where Val- ley Avenue lies, and in a course almost parallel with it, ran the log fence mentioned above.

t See his report to Lieut. Colonel Bolton, on page 1046.

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About four o'clock Lieut. Colonel Butler, having received the report brought by Abraham Pike and his fellow-scout, decided to move upon the enemy. Whereupon he made a short address to the men under his command. "Men, yonder is the enemy," he said. "The fate of the Hardings tells us what we have to expect if defeated. We come out to fight, not only for liberty, but for life itself ; and, what is dearer, to pre- serve our homes from conflagration, our women and children from the tomahawk. Stand firm at the first shock, and the Indians will give way. Every man to his duty !" The order to advance was then given, and, without any change in formation, the thin, but unwavering, line of Wyoming's defenders moved forward for almost a mile-the extreme right of the line keeping near the edge of the declivity previously described.

When the right had arrived within about 150 yards of the blazing ruins of Wintermute's Fort a halt was ordered. The line was now only a short distance off from, and almost parallel with, the lower edge of the open field previously mentioned, and the enemy was believed to be close at hand. Final instructions and orders were here given to the men by their officers, and everybody made ready for the coming action. By this time it was nearly five o'clock, but as the sun, shining brightly and hotly from a clear sky, would not set for two and a-half hours yet, there was ample time, before the close of the day, for the patriots of Wyoming to attempt to carry out their plans.

All being in readiness Lieut. Colonel Butler gave the command to advance, and the line moved forward. Soon it emerged into the open field in front, and was displayed in its entirety to the watchful and eager enemy. Slowly and steadily the patriots held their onward way, while here and there the enemy's skirmishers, singly and in couples, emerged from their lurking-places in the field and in the thickets near Winter- mute's, fired their muskets at the advancing line, and then fled to cover in the depths of the morass or beyond the log fence previously mentioned. When the line had moved up to within about 200 yards of this fence- being parallel with it and extending for nearly the same distance-the discovery was made that the enemy was lying in wait behind the fence, from end to end. In quick response to the immediate order of Lieut. Colonel Butler the whole line fired a volley straight at the fence. Halt- ing long enough to reload, the unbroken line moved forward a short distance and then fired another volley. Once again these same tactics were pursued, without drawing a single shot from the enemy, and appar- ently without causing any particular commotion among the men behind the fence. By this time the Americans had arrived within about 100 yards of the enemy, and, as they raised their muskets to fire a fourth volley, the "Rangers" sprang up from their hiding-place, fired at the Americans, and, deliberately and in order, fell back some distance. "See, the enemy retreat! Stand fast, and the day is ours!" cried Lieut. Colonel Butler. His men answered him with a hearty cheer, which was echoed by a yell of defiance from the enemy. The battle was now on.

At once the firing became general along the lines on both sides, and soon the Americans felt that they were making headway and driv- ing the enemy before thein-that is, the body of the enemy stationed on the other side of the log fence. This impression prevailed particu- larly among the men on the right, where Captain Hewitt's company

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had gained about thirty yards of ground. No part of the left wing had advanced as near to the log fence as had the extreme right, but the entire left wing, under the animating influence of its fearless and watch- ful officers, was maintaining its position well. However, too much atten- tion was being devoted to the movements of the enemy in front, to properly observe and understand the situation in another quarter.

Up to the time that the Americans had advanced to within 100 yards of the fence the Indians under the command of Sayenqueraghta, lying concealed in the dense thickets of the morass (which was situated at a considerable distance to the left of the Americans' left wing), had not shown themselves, nor had they fired a single shot. Thus their presence in the swamp was actually unknown to and unsuspected by the Americans. But now, breaking forth from their covert, they rushed

Photo-reproduction of the "Massacre at Wyoming," painted by Alonzo Chappell in 1857.

tumultuously forward, firing their pieces and yelling like demons. They concentrated their attack on the left wing of the American line-par- ticularly on Captain Whittlesey's company, only one man (John Caldwell) of which had fallen up to the time the Indians made their onslaught. Miner says ("History of Wyoming," page 223): "On the British Butler's right his Indian warriors were sharply engaged. They seemed to be divided into six bands, for a yell would be raised at one end of their line, taken up, and carried through, six distinct bodies appearing at each time to repeat the cry. As the battle waxed warmer that fearful yell was renewed again and again, with more and more spirit. It appeared to be at once their animating shout and their sig- nal of communication."

The battle having been waged furiously by both sides for nearly half an hour, the effect of vastly superior numbers commenced to tell upon the Americans. Then came the beginning of the end, when Sayenqueraghta's savages managed to outflank completely the left wing

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of the Americans. The perils which, in consequence, menaced that wing, were quickly comprehended by Colonel Denison, who forthwith ordered the Plymouth company (on the extreme left) and the Hanover company (stationed next) to fall back and form a line at right angles with the main line-"to flank off to the left," states Colonel Franklin in his account of the battle-so as to present an unbroken front to the flanking enemy. The Colonel's orders were fully understood by some of the officers and men of the companies mentioned, and they attempted to execute them; but by the other members of those companies the order to fall back, or "flank off," was understood to be an order to retreat, and accordingly these men began to retire-some of them rather pre- cipitately. The mistake was an irreparable and a fatal one, and utter confusion and disorder ensued, of which the practised enemy, familiar- ized with warfare on many a battle-field, was quick to take advantage.

Setting up their blood-curdling war-whoop, dropping their guns and brandishing their spears and tomahawks, the savages rushed like a whirlwind upon the broken and confused left wing of the Americans. Then a fierce hand to hand conflict took place. Meanwhile the officers of the left wing made every possible effort to restore order, to have their commands understood, and to bring their men to face the enemy and stand their ground. But it was too late. " Broken, borne down by overwhelming numbers, and pressed by an irresistible force, the left gave way and fell back on the right. The movement was rapid and con- Iron spear-head found on the battle-field of Wyoming, and now in the collections of The Wyoming Historical and Geological Society. fused, and brought confusion to the right. From confusion to disorder, from disorder to broken lines, and thence to flight, were but steps in regular gradation." The rout became general along the whole line, and the Americans fled in every direction.

Before the rout began the Americans had, unquestionably, fought boldly and courageously. Lieut. Colonel Dorrance was wounded and cap- tured by the enemy, who subsequently put him to death. Major Garrett was killed at the height of the conflict. Captain Durkee was wounded, and later killed, as described on page 1023, post. Captain Ransom was wounded, captured, and tortured to death. (See page 895.) Captain Bidlack was wounded, captured, and burned to death by the savages, as described on page 1000 .* Near the close of the conflict one of Captain Hewitt's officers said to him : "The day is lost! See, the Indians are sixty rods in our rear. Shall we retreat ?" "I'll be damned if I do !" was his answer. "Drummer, strike up!" he then cried, and strove in vain to rally his men. Thus he fought, and there he fell. "Every Captain that led a company into action was slain, and in every instance fell on or near the line," states Miner. "As was said of Bidlack, so of Hewitt, Whittlesey, and the others-' they died at the head of their men.' They fought bravely-every man and officer did his duty-but they were overpowered by twofold their force."

George Cooper and Cherrick Westbrook were privates in the Upper Wilkes-Barre company. "Our men are retreating; we are nearly alone. Shall we go?" said Westbrook. "I'll have one more shot first," replied

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A history of Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, from its first beginnings to the present time; including chapters of newly-discovered, Vol. II, Part 78

Author: Harvey, Oscar Jewell, 1851- [from old catalog] Publication date: 1909 Publisher: Wilkes-Barre [Raeder press] Number of Pages: 683

Author: Harvey, Oscar Jewell, 1851- [from old catalog]
Publication date: 1909
Publisher: Wilkes-Barre [Raeder press]
Number of Pages: 683