USA > Rhode Island > Memoirs of Rhode Island officers who were engaged in the service of their country during the great rebellion of the South. Illustrated with thirty-four portraits > Part 3
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in. General Burnside begged for reinforcements. General Fitz John Por- ter's corps had not been engaged and was almost intact. General Franklin's corps had arrived on the field between twelve and one o'clock but had mostly gone over to the right. General Mcclellan declined General Burnside's application for help, and General A. P. Hill made his appearance on the field, having marched in all haste with his light division from Harper's Ferry, and fell vigorously upon the left flank of the Ninth Corps. The attack was promptly met and handsomely repulsed by our men. The enemy now sent troops over from his left, hoping to annihilate or capture the brave little band, that, separated from the rest of the army and unsupported, had carried and held the bridge, and threatened to roll up the rebel line. But the Ninth Corps gradually falling back from its most advanced position near the town, could not be dislodged from the heights across the creek. It still securely occupied the bridge, its approaches, the banks, and the road to Sharpsburg, and stubbornly held its ground. Night put an end to the contest. The battle of Antietam had been fought. The scale of vietory trembling in the balance through the long hours of this September day, at last inclined to the side of the Federal arms. General Lee had fought a defensive battle, and had been forced back from his lines. The credit of the achievement belongs in no small degree to the persistent bravery of the Ninth Corps and its skillful commander.
To show the severity of the conflict, in that part of the field in which General Burnside's command was engaged, it is but needful to glance at the list of casualties. The Ninth Corps had in the action thirteen thousand eight hundred and nineteen men. Of this number, two thousand one hundred and seventy-four were killed and wounded. Among these were many valuable officers. Indeed, this corps suffered the loss of a larger proportion of officers than any other corps that was engaged. Among these none was more deep- ly lamented than Brigadier-General Isaac P. Rodman, of Rhode Island. He, with his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Robert H. Ives, Jr., had fallen mortally wounded, in repelling General Hill's attack in the afternoon. General Rodman had entered the service as captain in the second regiment of Rhode Island volunteers, had been appointed colonel of the fourth regiment Rhode Island volunteers, and had greatly distinguished himself in the campaign in North Carolina. He had been promoted to brigadier-general after the battle of Newbern, and had risen rapidly to the command of a division. He was a most brave, promising, and gallant officer, and a thoroughly Christian man,
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and had greatly commended himself to the admiration and regard of all the officers and men of the corps. His death, which took place a few days after the battle, was most sincerely mourned, and by none more than by his friend and commander, General Burnside. Lieutenant Ives was one of our most promising young officers. A graduate of Brown University, the heir of great wealth, occupying the finest social position, he gave himself a sacrifice to his country, and died in the discharge of a sublime duty.
After the battle of Antietam, the army of the Potomac lay idle upon the banks of the Upper Potomac for five or six weeks, obtaining clothing and other supplies. General Lee had retreated across the river into Virginia, on the 19th of September, with but little molestation ; and a month afterwards, General MeClellan prepared to follow. On the 26th of October, two divisions of the Ninth Corps were thrown across at Berlin, and occupied Lovettsville, and the remainder of the corps followed in the course of the next few days. For the two subsequent weeks, the army moved on the east side of the Blue Ridge, and parallel to it, making Warrenton the objective point. General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was in the advance, and after considerable skirmishing with the enemy at the different gaps in the mountains, the army of the Potomac, on the 9th of November, was well concentrated in Warren- ton and its neighborhood. The line extended from Waterloo, (held by the Ninth Corps,) to New Baltimore, the cavalry picketing the front as far as Hazel river, within six miles of Culpepper Court House, and on both flanks, from Rappahannock station, on the Rappahannock river, to Flint Hill, upon the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge. The enemy was posted, with General Longstreet in front at Culpepper, Generals Jackson, A. P. and D. H. Hill in the Shenandoah valley, near Chester and Thornton's Gaps. On the 5th of November, by order of the President, General McClellan was relieved of the command of the army of the Potomac, and General Burnside was designated as his successor. On the 7th this order was received at head-quarters, and on the 9th General Mcclellan transferred the command.
4
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IV.
IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The order relieving General Mcclellan took General Burnside completely by surprise. There had been no intimation of any movement of this nature, and his elevation to a post of such importance as was that of the command of the army of the Potomac, was as unexpected as it was unwished for. That command had been repeatedly offered to him and declined. General Burnside's sole principle had been, from the beginning of the struggle, to serve the country with all the ability at his command, in whatever position the government chose to place him. But this command carried with it so many labors and such weighty responsibilities as to make acceptance a matter not of quick and inconsiderate decision. He gave the subject a deliberate consideration, and, viewing it in the light of a duty, which he owed to the country, he finally accepted the command. But it was with unfeigned reluc- tance. It was an honor to which he had never aspired. It was a responsi- bility which he did not wish to bear. It was a vast army. All the forces that were guarding the Upper Potomac, and those that were in the defences around Washington, were then subject to the orders of the general command- ing the army of the Potomac. Not only was he to fight the foe immediately before him, but he was also to guard the approaches to the capital by flank and rear. In round numbers, there were, on the 10th of November, two hundred and twenty-five thousand men fit for duty distributed around the points which have been named. Of these, one hundred and twenty-seven thousand five hundred and seventy-four officers and men were in the imme- diate front, facing the enemy. The command of this immediate army was a position and duty of no small magnitude. It was a force which must be used with effect upon the foes of the country. It must not be allowed to remain inactive. Though the season was far advanced, it was yet hoped that a decisive blow might be struck. Early in the autumn, a levy of three hun- dred thousand men for nine months' service had been made, and it would be ruinous to the finances and faith of the country to leave this immense force unemployed. General MeClellan had been greatly averse to another cam- paign. He did not wish again to cross the Potomac, but desired to spend the winter on the upper banks of that river, and in the neighborhood of Wash-
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ington, for the purpose of roerganization, and with possibly the expectation of sending out expeditions to occupy a larger portion of the southern coast. But the country, the President, and the General-in-chief, had become impa- tient of such a policy, and it was thought best that the army of the Potomac should take the aggressive. General Burnside believed that there was ample time yet to carry on a campaign against Richmond. But was he the man to undertake it ? With a genuine and manly modesty, which does him infinite credit, he expressed a consciousness of his inability. It was a great conflict of feeling through which he passed. That which by most men would be eagerly grasped at as a much-desired prize, was regarded by him as a burden which he hardly dared assume. The strength of the Union seemed to be in the army of the Potomac, and he who could lead that army to a success which would break the military power of the rebellion residing in Lee's army, would be hailed as the deliverer of the Republic. It was a glittering prize. But it must not be seized in any spirit of ambition. It was with genuine humility-such as has been felt by the noblest men in history- that General Burnside undertook the great enterprise which had Providen- tially fallen to him for direction. Yet with this noble self-distrust was mingled a faith in the Divine superintendence and help, which, even in the darkest hours of his career, never left him.
In such a spirit-humbly, prayerfully, trustfully -General Burnside, on the 9th of November, assumed the command of the army of the Potomac, hoping for success, with "the cooperation of the officers and men, under the blessing of God." Having decided to take the command, the next step was to devise some plan for future operations. A movement on Gordonsville seemed hardly feasible, as it was liable to the risk of fighting an uncertain battle at a long distance from the base. Indeed, it is possible that General McClellan himself was averse to a further advance in that direction, as he had already given orders for the removal of his pontoon train from Berlin to Washington, with a view to erossing the Rappahannock near Fredericksburg. The superintendent of transportation did not report very encouragingly respecting the condition of the railroad from Alexandria. The President had also very strongly expressed his opinion of the movements of the army, in a letter to General Mcclellan, which was placed in General Burnside's hands at the same time with the order to take the command. In that letter, Mr. Lincoln, after speaking of the superior advantages of position which the army of the Potomac had in relation to Lee's army, and the little fear which there
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was of the enemy's going to Pennsylvania, proceeds to suggest that General McClellan was nearer Richmond than the enemy, "by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march ? His route is the are of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The facility
of supplying you from the side, away from the enemy, is remarkable-as it were with the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub to the rim. I think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him from making an important move without your knowledge, and compel- ling him to keep his forces together for dread of you." This letter was writ- ten to General McClellan on the 13th of October, and was put into General Burnside's hands, at the time of his assumption of command, for his direction. The suggestions were made, not as orders, but as indications of the President's plan of action, and possessed all Mr. Lincoln's characteristic clearness. One portion had been followed-to keep close to the enemy. Was it not time now to adopt the other-to move towards Richmond on the chord of the circle ?
With these suggestions in mind, General Burnside prepared his plan. He was decidedly against any policy of inactivity, and in favor of the utmost celerity of movement compatible with the safety of the capital and the effi- ciency of the army. What should he do with the command ? was the ques- tion which now agitated his thoughts. Should he go into winter quarters ? That was distasteful to himself, and would hardly be borne by an impatient country. Yet the winter was rapidly approaching, and the season for active operation nearly at an end. What was to be done, must be done quickly, if at all. Should he march to Gordonsville ? That was hardly to be thought of, under existing circumstances. Was there not a shorter way to Richmond ? Was there not, indeed, a more direct way, which was undefended by the enemy, and one along which an army could march almost without opposi- tion ? General Burnside thought that there was such a route, and that it lay by way of Fredericksburg. His plan of operations was therefore projected upon this basis, viz .: To make a rapid march to Falmouth, to cross the Rap- pahannoek upon pontoons, and,-with "small stores," ammunition and beef- cattle, to be sent from Washington to Falmouth,-push on towards Richmond,
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upon the numerous roads leading to the rebel capital ; have supplies in wait- ing at York river, then cross the peninsula rapidly to the James, and, with that for a base, march directly upon the city of his destination.
The first part of the plan-to march from Warrenton to Fahnouth, and there, meeting the pontoons, small stores and beef-cattle, to cross the Rappa- hannock and seize the heights in the rear of Fredericksburg-was communi- cated to the authorities at Washington on the 11th of November. After reaching Fredericksburg, wagon trains were to be "organized and filled with at least twelve days' rations, when a rapid movement" was to be made "upon Richmond direct, by way of such roads as would be open" to the army. "The details of the movement beyond Fredericksburg," writes the General to Gen- eral McCollum, "I will give you hereafter." On the 12th, General Halleck visited General Burnside at Warrenton, the whole subject was discussed, and it was understood by all parties, that the army of the Potomac was to make a quick march to Falmouth, and there cross the Rappahannock by means of the pontoons to be sent thither from Washington. Of these pontoons, a por- tion were then lying in the stream at Alexandria, a portion were parked in Washington, and a portion had been already ordered by General Mcclellan to be sent from Berlin down the Potomac or by means of the canal. General Halleck, in his report to the Secretary of War, November 15, 1863, endeavors to make it appear that this plan was not approved, but that another verbal plan was submitted at this interview, according to which the army was to cross the Rappahannock at the upper fords. But from General Halleck's own testimony before the committee on the conduct of the war, given December 22, 1862, and from the testimony of other officers who overheard the discus- sion, it is evident that the plan was to cross the army at Falmouth, and Gen- eral Halleck even telegraphed from Warrenton to General Woodbury, at Washington; in charge of the pontoons, to send them to Aquia Creek. This plan, matured after hours of self-communion and anxious thought, and after consultation with other officers, was submitted to the President for final approval. General Sigel had suggested the practicability of pushing forward to Gordonsville, and thence to the James above Richmond. This was rejected on account of insufficiency of supplies for so long a march, and the risk of being caught by inclement weather in a hostile territory. General Burn- side's plan was fortified by the suggestions contained in the President's letter, and by the probable intentions of General Mcclellan. It had also the addi- tional advantage of placing along the entire line of march, a river between
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our forces and those of the enemy. A flank march in the presence of an alert foe is always a .hazardous manœuvre. But General Burnside would have been at least twenty-four hours in advance of the enemy, and would have as protection to his flank, the Rappahannock, Rapidan, Mattapony, and Pamumkey rivers. His own army was well in hand, communications with Washington would at all times be open, and the enemy's forces had not yet wholly emerged from the Shenandoah valley. In the personal interview with General Halleck, General Burnside had been assured that every facility should be given him for carrying out his plan of operations, provided the President approved it. Every augury of success became apparent.
On the 14th of November, General Burnside received the following dis- patch from General Halleck : "The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks that it will succeed if you move rapidly ; otherwise not." On the same day, he received a dispatch from General Woodbury, on whom devolved the duty of forwarding the pontoon train, informing him that that train would start from Alexandria on the 16th or 17th. General Woodbury also waited on General Halleck to urge him to delay the movement of the army for a few days, until it should be rendered certain that the pontoons would meet the army at Falmouth in season for the contemplated advance. General Halleck declined to issue any order enjoining such delay. Accordingly, General Burnside, supposing that the General-in-chief at Washington was doing everything to forward the consummation of his plans, put the army in motion. First making a small movement across the Rappahannock as a feint, he moved the whole army rapidly down to Falmouth. On the 15th, the advance started under General Sumner. General Burnside left Warrenton on the next day. On the 17th, General Sumner reached the vicinity of Fal- mouth, where General Burnside himself arrived on the 19th. But there was no pontoon train at Falmouth ; there were no means of crossing the river. The fords were at that time impracticable for crossing, and below Falmouth there was no ford, or any place where a wheeled vehicle could cross. More- over, rain was falling ; the river began to rise ; supplies were short; and the roads were in bad condition. The enemy's cavalry had followed the army, occasionally skirmishing with our rear guard. The movement was developed, but the pontoon train was most unfortunately delayed, and the well concocted plan of operations had utterly failed. The whole movement depended for its success upon the celerity with which it should be conducted. That celerity was conditioned upon the seasonable arrival of the pontoon train at Falmouth.
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That train was to be forwarded from Washington. It was already in Wash- ington or in Alexandria, when General Halleck authorized the movement of the army. General Woodbury had promised to start in time, but had been delayed for several days at Washington, because he was not apprised by General IIalleek that any important movement was to be made, and because he had no authority for impressing horses, teamsters and wagons for the necessary transportation. General Halleck had assured General Burnside that he would urge General Woodbury forward. But he had failed to do so, and the pontoon train actually lay in camp for five days, while the army was on the march, and anxiously awaiting its appearance at Falmouth. The responsibility for this delay unquestionably rests with General Halleck. For he, knowing the importance of the movement, did nothing to hasten the departure of the pontoons from Washington, or to apprise the commander of the engineer forces that anything depended upon his speedy action. A brief summary of the dates of these transactions may not be without interest or importance. On the 6th of November, the pontoon train was ordered to Washington. A portion of it reached there on the 14th. November 12th, General Woodbury was ordered to have it in readiness to go forward. November 14th, the President assented to the plan. November 14th, General Woodbury telegraphed to General Burnside that the train would probably start on the 16th or 17th, about the same time going to General Halleck, to ask him to delay the army. November 15th, General Sumner started with the advance column. November 16th, General Burnside left Warren- ton. November 17th, General Sumner reached the neighborhood of Fal- mouth, where General Burnside arrived, November 19th. On the same day, the pontoon train actually started from Alexandria, became mired on the road several times, found the Oecoquan too high to cross with safety, except by laying bridges, and was ultimately floated down the Potomac to Aquia Creek and reported at head-quarters on the 25th.
Could the failure in any way be remedied ? The pontoons having failed, were the fords practicable ? General Hooker, with two corps and two divis- ions, had been halted at or near the United States ford. Could that force be thrown across, seize the opposite bank, march down and occupy Fredericks- burg ? General Hooker himself suggested the question as to the practica- bility of crossing and marching with his grand division to Sexton's Junction, about half-way between Fredericksburg and Richmond. But this plan was decided not to be feasible on account of an insufficiency of supplies, and also
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because it would be in effect dividing the army in the face of an enemy-a movement which General Hooker subsequently tried with disastrous result. General Burnside at once made an examination of all the fords, and he was able only to say, writing from Falmouth, on the 19th, that "an examination of the fords here to-day demonstrated that the infantry and artillery cannot pass. By keeping the horses well separated, the cavalry can cross over." Yet he hoped to "cross over by the United States ford some cavalry and infantry with some light pieces of artillery." No enemy had yet appeared on the opposite bank in any great force, and General Burnside still expected to move his command across the Rappahannock. He could not now throw a small force across. If he moved at all, it must be with his whole army. For General Lee was also moving. But the means of crossing were upon the banks of the Potomac, and he waited in vain for their coming. Precious time was passing. General Lee and the rebel government were somewhat puzzled to understand the reason of the sudden disappearance of our troops from Warrenton, and their as sudden reappearance at Falmouth. The con- tinued halt of the army of the Potomac before Fredericksburg, after having summoned that city, was still more inexplicable. . But whatever might have been the reason, General Lee's duty was, evidently, to meet this force as speedily as possible and check its advance. Accordingly, he hurried across the country and occupied the heights behind Fredericksburg. The golden opportunity had passed. . The United States ford could not be crossed with artillery. The unguarded avenue to Richmond was barred. The gates were closed. When General Burnside awoke on the morning of the 22nd of November, and looked across the river, he saw rebel cannon frowning on his position and rebel bayonets gleaming in the early light. The delay in mov- ing the pontoons had defeated the entire plan of operations, and rendered its future success extremely problematical. General Burnside had moved rapid- ly, according to the President's suggestion. He had expected that the Gen- eral-in-chief would assist him by sending the pontoons with equal alacrity. But General Halleck seemed to take no further interest in the movement, and, by his neglect, he frustrated the entire operation. It is possible that General Burnside erred in not sending an aide-de-camp to Washington to give a personal supervision to the transportation of the pontoon train. Per- haps he should not have moved his army until he had positive information that the pontoons had started. But he trusted in General Halleck's assur- ances, and in General Woodbury's dispatches. Between the two, the move-
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ment failed, and General Burnside paid dearly for his misplaced confidence. He felt constrained to write to General Collum, to say that he could not make the promise of success with the faith that he had when he supposed that all the parts of the plan would be carried out.
The question with General Burnside now was: "Shall I put my army into winter quarters, or shall I order it to do the work which the country expects of it?" The decision to which he came was: "I did not take command simply to idle away another winter in inaction, but to do what I could to end the rebellion. The strength of this mighty iniquity resides in the rebel army on the other side of the Rappahannock. I must at least try to break it. If I fail, it will not be for want of effort. If I succeed, I ask for nothing but the consciousness of having faithfully performed my duty." He was now convinced that the army of the Potomac must fight. The indolence of win- ter-quarters was as distasteful to himself as it could possibly be to the public. He determined to fight, and, with his characteristic and accustomed energy, he set about the preparations. In the course of the next two weeks he made himself and his command ready to deliver battle.
Where and how ? It soon became evident that General Lee had no intention of assuming the offensive. He had been badly shattered by the unsuccessful invasion of Maryland, and the battle of Antietam. He wished to recuperate his forces by giving them a winter's rest along the Rappahan- nock, and, for convenience of subsistence and supplies, on the line of the rail- road between Fredericksburg and Richmond. He therefore brought down his army to the heights behind Fredericksburg, and occupied the country in the rear and below, reaching as far as Bowling Green in-one direction, and Port Royal in the other. The hills behind Fredericksburg were soon covered with earth-works, large and small redoubts, connected by rifle-pits. Rude works were also thrown up opposite the fords. The south bank of the river was picketed for a distance of fifteen or twenty miles. Guinea's station became the chief depot of supplies, and General Lee made his head-quarters at Alsop's, five or six miles distant from the river. The rebel army was pre- paring itself for a desperate resistance against any attempt to dislodge it from its position, or to seize the road to Richmond.
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