Memoirs of Rhode Island officers who were engaged in the service of their country during the great rebellion of the South. Illustrated with thirty-four portraits, Part 7

Author: Bartlett, John Russell, 1805-1886. cn
Publication date: 1867
Publisher: Providence, S.S. Rider & brother
Number of Pages: 606


USA > Rhode Island > Memoirs of Rhode Island officers who were engaged in the service of their country during the great rebellion of the South. Illustrated with thirty-four portraits > Part 7


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Part 1 | Part 2 | Part 3 | Part 4 | Part 5 | Part 6 | Part 7 | Part 8 | Part 9 | Part 10 | Part 11 | Part 12 | Part 13 | Part 14 | Part 15 | Part 16 | Part 17 | Part 18 | Part 19 | Part 20 | Part 21 | Part 22 | Part 23 | Part 24 | Part 25 | Part 26 | Part 27 | Part 28 | Part 29 | Part 30 | Part 31 | Part 32 | Part 33 | Part 34 | Part 35 | Part 36 | Part 37 | Part 38 | Part 39 | Part 40 | Part 41 | Part 42


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there, and without slacking rein, rode thirty-six miles to Carter's, on the Watauga river, to draw in all his garrisons and put them on the march. On the 2Ist, while at Carter's, he received peremptory orders to join General Rosecrans without delay. He had already started most of his troops down the river, and now he was moving his last man. On the opposite bank of the Watauga river, however, was intrenched a considerable force of the enemy, commanding the bridge which there spanned the stream. If General Burnside burnt the bridge, his movement in retreat would be discovered. If he left it intact, he gave to the enemy an avenue for pursuit. His safety lay in attack, and he resolved to force the enemy's position at daylight. The 22d dawned. But no fight took place. The foe had burnt the bridge during the night, and had himself taken flight. Our troops were immediately put upon the march, and before noon were well on the way to Knoxville. On the 24th, General Burnside met the Ninth Corps, then arriving from Ken- tucky. All the troops were concentrated at Knoxville during the next few days, and General Halleck was notified of the fact.


By that time, General Burnside had become informed of the cause of the contradictory and embarrassing orders that he had received from Wash- ington. General Rosecrans, in continuing his advance, had encountered the enemy upon the banks of the Chiekamauga creek, and on the 19th had been attacked with great fury. General Longstreet had reenforced General Bragg, and the combined armies had fallen upon our troops. A two days' bloody battle ensued, the result of which was, that General Rosecrans was checked, defeated, and pushed back to the defences of Chattanooga. The enemy's forces had evidently stolen a march upon. General Halleck, for when he was telegraphing in hot haste over the country to General Grant, at Vicksburg, to General Burnside, and others, to hasten to the relief of General Rosecrans, General Bragg had already been strengthened. It was clearly impossible for General Grant to help General Rosecrans from Vicksburg, even if he had received the despatch from Washington within two or three days after it was sent. General Burnside was not within one hundred and twenty miles of General Rosecrans on the day of the battle, but was employed in gathering his forces, which General Halleck's previous order had scattered. It was useless to go to Chattanooga after the battle, for the supplies there were inadequate for the army already at that post. It would have been necessary to evacuate East Tennessee for want of subsistence, and to fall back upon Nashville. The fruits of the summer campaign would have been lost, and


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General Halleck's strategy would thus have involved our western army in ruin. By persistently holding Knoxville and the railroad in East Tennessee, General Burnside materially embarrassed all the rebel movements in that direction, and saved the loyal cause from threatened disaster.


General Burnside, now ready and desirous to take the offensive, submit- ted to General Halleck, on the 30th of September, three distinct plans of operations. 1. To abandon the railroad, and, marching down the north side of the Tennessee river, effect a junction with General Rosecrans. 2. To leave garrisons at Cumberland Gap, Bull's Gap, Rogerville, Knoxville, and Loudon, move down the railroad, and attack the enemy's right-wing at Cleveland, acting in concert with General Rosecrans, and according to his advice. 3. To move a force on the south side of the Tennessee, past the right flank of the enemy, demonstrating against that flank, while the main body, seven thou- sand infantry and five thousand cavalry, should move rapidly down to Dalton, destroy the enemy's communications there,-sending a cavalry force to Rome,-proceed to Atlanta, there entirely destroying the communications, breaking up depots, magazines, etc., and thence make for the coast, living upon the country on the march. General Burnside, preferring the last, thought that it would relieve General Rosecrans, if the enemy should see fit to pursue, and thus enable him to advance, while the celerity of the movable column, coupled with the destruction of bridges in the rear, would give to it favorable chances of escape. It is impossible now to say, what would have been the result of such a movement as was here contemplated. But it can very readily be seen, that here is the germ of what afterwards became, under the wise direction of Lieutenant-General Grant and the facile execution of Major-General Sherman, the grandest campaign of the war. Whether the autumn of 1863, or that of 1864, was the proper time to break the shell of the "Confederacy," is, of course, a matter of question. The latter time had, indeed, a condition which the former did not possess: the fact, namely, that General Grant, and not General Halleck, was then in command of the armies of the United States. The only reply that General Halleck vouchsafed to General Burnside's com- munication was, that General Burnside was "in direct communication with Rosecrans, and" could "learn his condition and wants sooner than" General Halleck could. "Distant expeditions into Georgia are not now contemplated. The object is to hold East Tennessee."


The month of October passed with few events of extraordinary impor- tance. Both sides were, evidently, preparing for a decisive struggle in the


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west. In the east, very little had been done after the battle of Gettysburg and the defeat of General Lee, except to follow the retreating enemy to the line of the Rapidan. The mountain region of northern Georgia was destined to be the theatre of conflict. General Grant was moving up from Vicksburg; General Sherman, after a successful expedition across Mississippi, was march- ing with his corps from Memphis towards Chattanooga; General Hooker had reenforced General Rosecrans with two corps from the army of the Poto- mac. On the 18th of Qctober, General Grant was appointed sole commander of the three armies of Generals Rosecrans, Burnside, and Sherman. The two latter officers were retained in command ; General Rosecrans was relieved by General Thomas, who had saved the army at the battle of Chickamauga. Grant assumed direction of affairs at Chattanooga. On the other side, Gen- eral Bragg had been reenforced by troops from the divisions of Generals Hill and Ewell, besides the corps of General Longstreet, and by some of General Pemberton's paroled prisoners from Vicksburg.


In General Burnside's own department, affairs were conducted with the customary energy of its commander. Early in the month of October, the rebel General Wheeler attempted to break the communications of General Rose- crans, but was promptly driven back. On the 2d, General Halleck informed General Burnside that it would not be necessary for him to join General Rosecrans. During the month, the rebel forces in Virginia made repeated . attempts to drive in our troops on the extreme left, but were foiled, and, in their turn, forced back. On the 10th, a serions engagement took place at Blue Springs, in which the enemy was badly beaten, and compelled to retreat in confusion, leaving his dead and wounded on the field. He was vigorously pursued for several days by General Shackleford, who drove him beyond Bristol into Virginia, burning six bridges, capturing and destroying three locomotives and thirty cars, and threatening the rebel salt-works and the towns of Abingdon and Saltville. On the 16th, a regiment of loyal North Carolina troops captured Warm Springs, and occupied Paint Rock Gap. Several regiments of East Tennesseans were organized. The greater part of the troops were concentrated at Knoxville and Loudon, picketing down to the left of the army at Chattanooga, with scouts and outposts south of the Tennessee, and cavalry clearing the country between the Little Tennessee and the Hiwassee. The line through Tazewell to Cumberland Gap was well · guarded, and the country about and above Greenville closely watched. Occa- sional hostile demonstrations were made upon the south side of the Tennessee,


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as the enemy, forced back from Chattanooga, seemed desirous of extending his right flank. Towards the last of the month, serious indications of a reso- lute attempt of the enemy to regain Knoxville and the railroad began to be evident. On the 20th, Colonel Woolford was attacked near Philadelphia, during the pendency of some negotiations respecting prisoners. After a severe fight of several hours, during which he inflicted greater loss in killed and wounded than he had received, he was forced to retreat to London, leav- ing in the hands of the enemy six small howitzers, with thirty-eight wagons, and between three and four hundred prisoners. Our cavalry afterwards took the offensive, and drove the assailants beyond Philadelphia, capturing many prisoners. But it was soon manifest, that there was a larger force of the enemy near, and that he was feeling our lines. Our troops were withdrawn to the north bank of the Tennessee, opposite Loudon, and put under the com- mand of General Sanders, a gallant and promising young officer. General Burnside hoped to draw a sufficient force away from General Bragg to enable General Grant to fall upon him with damaging effect. On the 28th, the gen- eral commanding visited Loudon, anticipating a serious movement on the part of the enemy. More troops were sent down. But the emergency for the time passed, and General Burnside returned to Knoxville on the 31st, leaving General Potter in command of the defences of London.


The month of November was destined to be more eventful. On the left flank, the demonstrations of the enemy became more determined. He was attempting to divert General Burnside's attention from the more important operations slowly developing below. On the 10th, Colonel Garrard, at Rogersville, was attacked and forced back to Morristown, with a loss of five hundred prisoners, four guns, and thirty-six wagons. It was a severe blow, but beyond the temporary shock which it gave our lines, was of no great moment. Our communications with Kentucky were preserved intact, our posts were again made fully secure, and the enemy gained little by the move- ment. General Willcox, who was in command in that quarter, faithfully kept the enemy off from our lines of communication. The only two reverses which General Burnside suffered in his entire campaign, were those of Phila- delphia and Rogersville, and the balance of captures, not including those at Cumberland Gap, was largely in his favor.


. But the campaign was not yet over. The enemy was vigilant. He was also determined to reoccupy East Tennessee, if that were possible. Without it, the rebel cause was doomed. Such a position, held by the United States


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forces, was the assurance of the final triumph of the Union. While General Jones was attempting our lines in the upper valley, General Bragg was intent upon occupying the lower region. For such a work, he detached his ablest lieutenant with a large force. Quietly did General Longstreet make his preparations and approaches, hoping, by and by, to swoop down upon his intended prey. General Grant himself seemed to be somewhat anxious in regard to the subject, and at one time desired General Burnside to concen- trate all his forces at Kingston, with a view to moving down nearer Chatta- nooga. He even sent Colonel Wilson, of his staff, and Mr. Charles A. Dana- then Assistant Secretary of War, and on a visit to the west-to General Burnside to consult on the situation. They arrived at Knoxville on the 13th. General Burnside fully laid before them his opinions, viz .: That it was best to hold the line from Knoxville through Cumberland Gap, thus having two lines of supply, instead of only one by way of Nashville; that the occupation of the railroad through East Tennessee by our forces was imperatively neces- sary ; that, most of all, it was desirable that General Longstreet should be drawn as far away as possible from the main body of the enemy, under Gen- eral Bragg, and be sufficiently occupied while General Grant should "fall on" with his whole force and annihilate or certainly defeat the foree in his imme- diate front. These opinions were assented to on the part of Mr. Dana, and, on the 14th, he returned, with Colonel Wilson, to General Grant. General Burnside, with a few members of his staff, accompanied them as far as Lenoir's, leaving General Parke in command at Knoxville.


But, while this consultation was going on at Knoxville, events of the greatest importance were occurring below. On the night of the 13th and the morning of the 14th, the movements of the enemy were developed. General Longstreet appeared near Loudon, with a force of fifteen thousand men, threatening the passage of the Tennessee river. At the same time, the enemy's cavalry appeared on the south side of the Holston, opposite Knox- ville, and slowly foreed our own cavalry, under General Sanders, back towards the defenees of the town. This force remained in observation till the 16th, when it disappeared. General Longstreet turned the position opposite Loudon by crossing his advance at Hopp's Ferry, six miles below, and our forces withdrew towards Lenoir's. General Burnside arrived at the front about noon, and ordered our forces to assume the offensive. They gallantly attacked the enemy, and by the latter part of the afternoon had driven him back to the river. The night came on very dark and thick. The


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enemy had been checked, but he was in too large force to be held back. Dur- ing the night and the following day, General Burnside drew off his troops, artillery and trains to Lenoir's. Here a halt was made, and the army was put in position. The enemy made his appearance late in the afternoon, but his advance was stopped by our artillery. Our troops prepared to fall back to Campbell's station. At midnight the enemy attacked again, but was speedily repulsed. At Campbell's was the junction of several roads, which it was necessary to reach and occupy. The enemy endeavored by a flank march to anticipate us. Early in the morning of the 16th, the troops began to move. But, though the roads were horrible, our troops made good time, and the leading brigade, under Colonel Hartranft, reached the cross-roads about fifteen minutes in advance of the foe. General Burnside immediately sent this brigade out on the Kingston road, on which the enemy was march- ing, forming the troops across the road with the left thrown forward, to cover both the junction and the Loudon road, on which were our trains and the rest of our little army. This disposition checked the enemy, until every man, animal and wagon had passed the threatened point, and our forces had seized the cross-roads. Then General Burnside arranged his line of battle, forming it en echelon along a low range of hills about half a mile in the rear of the junction of the roads, posting out upon the country roads what little cavalry he had, withdrawing his troops, regiment by regiment, and sending on his wagon-trains to Knoxville. At eleven o'clock, the enemy made a des- perate charge upon Colonel Christ's brigade, our extreme right. The attack, furious as it was, was entirely unsuccessful, and the assaulting column was handsomely broken and driven back. Soon after this, a similar attack was made upon General White's brigade of the twenty-third corps, on our left- centre with similar results. General Burnside posted each brigade and divis- ion, and the soldiers, fighting under the immediate eye of their commander, performed prodigies of valor. The enemy was thwarted and repulsed every- where. At two o'clock, P. M., there was a lull in the storm of battle. General Longstreet was massing his troops upon our left, hoping there to find the weak place. General Burnside withdrew as before to a second range of hills, about a thousand yards in rear of the first position and commanding it. The line was formed en potence on either flank, having the rear open, making almost the figure of a square of three sides. The front was across and perpendicular to the road, the right and left refused and parallel to the road. The light artillery was posted on the left, the heavy artillery in the centre. The enemy


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came on with yells to the attack. He was received with musketry and artil- lery fire of the hottest description, at short range. It tore into the ranks of the assaulting column with fearful carnage. The enemy's troops went down like grass before the scythe of the mower. The dead and wounded lay in heaps. The assailants were staggered and broken, and finally fled down the slope in confusion. No further attempt was made upon our position, and General Burnside, after collecting his wounded, slowly fell back towards Knoxville, and, late in the night, the troops, trains, artillery and wagons were all within the lines of the town. The General entered the town about eleven and one-half o'clock, and was joyfully received at head-quarters by those members of his staff who had remained there anxiously awaiting tidings from below. General Sanders's cavalry had been ordered across the river, and sent out on the Kingston and Loudon roads, to check the pursuing columns of the enemy. General Longstreet, foiled in the attempt to cut off and. capture the little army that had been posted near Loudon,-not even having succeeded in defeating it,-was preparing to besiege Knoxville. The battle of Campbell's station had taught him that the work of reoccupying East Tennessee was not so easy as he had supposed. The results of that battle had ensured the safe withdrawal of our forces, and the security of Knoxville itself. They had also given assurance to General Burnside, that he had, in the Ninth Corps, supported by the twenty-third, soldiers whom he . could trust anywhere upon an equal battle field, and, behind the defences of Knoxville, against double their number. He therefore strengthened his fortifications, called upon the inhabitants of the town for aid, announced that there was to be no retreat, and, with great alacrity of spirit, responded to General Grant's order, to hold on at all hazards. Further and further away from General Bragg was General Longstreet now allured, and, with an increased force, he marched to the investment of Knoxville.


The town and its garrison were ready. The fortifications were connected with a continuous line of rifle-pits. Skirmishers were kept out from five hundred to a thousand yards in front. The roads were well picketed. The heights on the opposite side of the Holston were held and fortified. The men were in good spirits, and supplies had accumulated, which, with economy, would suffice for four or five weeks' consumption.


On the 17th, the enemy's cavalry appeared on the roads leading up from the south and the southwest. General Sanders, who had been sent out to cover the rear of our retreating forces, soon came in contact with General


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Longstreet's advance. His outposts were smartly attacked, and, withdrawing towards Knoxville, his little force was concentrated about a mile from the town. On the 18th, the enemy again attacked. A sharp engagement followed, in which the rebels were severely punished. But General Sanders himself paid for the temporary victory with his life. He was mortally wounded while, in the thickest of the conflict, he was leading his troops, and encouraging them by word and example. He was tenderly conveyed into the town, and all that could be done for him was faithfully applied. But human skill could not avail. The consolations of religion were administered. General Burnside and his staff gathered around his bedside, and the brave and gallant young soldier breathed his last, with the words upon his lips: "I have done my duty. I am not afraid to die." His death cast a gloom upon the hearts of all who had known and learned to love him for his fidelity and daring. A portion of the fortifications received the name of Fort Sanders, in honor of his memory. The enemy gradually enlarged his lines of circum- vallation. His forces were moved up the right bank of the Holston, and were posted between the river and the Clinton road. Our communications with Cumberland Gap were cut. A considerable force was also sent over upon the south side of the river.


The weary days of the siege passed slowly away. Skirmishing with the outposts, and cannonading between the hostile batteries, were almost contin- uous. Head-quarters were at several times the object of the enemy's aim, .. and though no one was struck, the missiles were sent sufficiently near to cause a lively sense of danger. A few conflicts between the opposing parties gave variety to the situation. On the night of the 20th, a brilliant sortie was made by a detachment of the seventeenth Michigan, which destroyed some houses that sheltered the enemy's sharpshooters. On the night of the 23d, the enemy made an attack upon our lines, gaining a temporary advan- tage. On the 24th, Colonel Hartranft, with the forty-eighth Pennsylvania and the twenty-first Massachusetts regiments, made a counter assault, which reestablished our lines. On the same day, Colonel Mott had a smart engage- ment, near Kingston, with the enemy's cavalry, under General Wheeler, and handsomely whipped them. But General Longstreet was now getting impa- tient. He began to perceive the blunder which he had made. General Grant had dealt a staggering blow upon the enemy at Lookout Mountain, on the 23d and 24th. General Sherman was fast closing up on Chattanooga. General Longstreet could not retreat to General Bragg. ITis pride would not allow


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him to raise the siege without a battle, and retreat through East Tennessee, north of the Holston. He determined to risk an assault. Fort Sanders was the point selected. Saturday, the 28th, was the day appointed, but every- thing was not ready, and the attack did not take place until the next day. It had been anticipated and provided against.


Early on Sunday morning, the 29th, the skirmishers on our front were driven in. During the night, indeed, there had been more or less firing, but no serious demonstration. In the gray of the morning, the assaulting col- umn, composed of three picked brigades appeared. The garrison of the fort was on the alert. The parapet had been strengthened, the diteh enlarged, trees felled in front, and wires stretched from stump to stump. Supports were brought up. to be ready for any emergency. It was the brave Ninth Corps, and the day was glorious in its calendar. Onward came the masses of the foe. They struck and stumbled over the wires. But this obstruction was soon passed. Amidst the deadly fire of our men, they pressed steadily on, with a courage that extorted admiration from their opponents. They cut away the abattis, they filled the ditch. Their way was marked by carnage and death. Would nothing stop those brave men? They looked into the mouth of the cannon, which blazed with fire and slaughter. They pushed each other up to the parapet. A few gained its top. But they could go no further. A terrible hand to hand conflict ensued. Grenades were flung into the ditch. Muskets were clubbed. Bayonets, sabres, even axes and spades were employed in the dreadful work. A part of our troops made a sortie. An infernal and enfilading fire was poured upon the enemy. The assaulting columns were taken in flank. They faltered, reeled, hesitated, stopped, were hopelessly broken, and at last retired in great confusion. General Longstreet had attempted too much. He had sent his chosen men to useless slaughter. He lost. that day a thousand men and more. He had been told that Knoxville was impregnable to his assaults. General Burnside offered to the enemy- by flag of truce-the privilege of burying the dead, and removing the badly wounded. The permission was graciously received, and before night, Fort Sanders wore its wonted aspect.


This was the last important event of the siege. General Grant had sent General Sherman to relieve Knoxville, as soon as that officer, with his com- mand, became available. General Longstreet, baffled, disappointed, defeated, on the night of the 4th of December, raised the siege. On the 5th, General Sherman arrived within one day's march of the town, and was warmly thanked


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by its beleagured commander. The enemy retreated through East Tennessee, almost free from pursuit, except from the direction of Cumberland Gap, for General Burnside had no troops available, and General Sherman was nearly two days in the rear. There were two smart engagements-one at Blain's cross-roads, the other at Bean's station-but General Longstreet got safely off, wintered in the valley of the upper Holston, leisurely made his way into Virginia, and finally joined General Lee for the momentous campaigns of 1864 and 1865. After his departure, East Tennessee was not again troubled by the presence of a hostile force. During the siege, General Will- cox had held the command in the upper valley, had repulsed the enemy from that part of our lines, and had participated in the annoyance of the enemy on his retreat. On the 16th of November, General Burnside had been relieved of the command of the department of the Ohio, by General John G. Foster. But General Foster was stopped at Cumberland Gap, by the operations of the siege, and it was not till nearly the middle of December, that he could assume command. General Burnside left Knoxville on the 14th, and arrived at his home in Providence on the 23d, to recover health and strength for the arduous labors that still demanded his fidelity. For the duties already performed in the department of the Ohio and in East Ten- nessee, Congress tendered him its thanks.




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