USA > Rhode Island > Memoirs of Rhode Island officers who were engaged in the service of their country during the great rebellion of the South. Illustrated with thirty-four portraits > Part 9
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The proximity of the Ninth Corps to the enemy rendered the men peculiarly liable to become the object of many a sharpshooter's aim. Con- tinually exposed to an unerring fire from morning to night, it became a habit with them to seek cover at every possible opportunity. Duty in the trenches also, during the opening days of a siege, is especially arduous. The season was unusually hot and dry. The consequence was, that the white soldiers, unaccustomed to such severe labors and such a trying exposure, became somewhat weary and partially exhausted. The colored troops, on the con- trary, not having had much fighting, or much heavy work, were compara- tively fresh. They were more accustomed to the hot summer's sun of the south. They were eager to take a more decided and conspicuous part in the conflict than had thus far been allotted them. General Burnside determined to make them his assaulting column at the explosion of the mine, and accord- ingly directed their officers to examine the ground over which they were likely to cross, and to drill them in the rear of our own lines for the particular service which was expected of them. General Ferrero accordingly prepared his men for the assault, and, in the course of a week or two, had infused into them such a spirit of enthusiasm as promised the most flattering success. They were even proud to feel that at last their opportunity had come. They were more than gratified at the expression of confidence in them, which was implied by General Burnside's selection of them for the post of danger and honor.
On the 26th, General Burnside was able to submit to General Meade the plan of attack, which he had proposed to himself, and for which he had pre- pared his troops. That was, to explode the mine just before daylight in the morning, or about five in the afternoon. Then he would immediately send in his division of colored troops in two columns of attack, the leading regiments of each to deploy into line as soon as they had passed through the breach, each column to wheel outward and sweep the enemy's line in both directions right and left, thus taking the foe in reverse and flank. Meanwhile, the other three divisions of white troops would follow and complete the work, by occu- pying Cemetery Hill, and compelling the enemy to evacuate his line of works.
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The colored division would then enter the town. The other corps of the army, of course, were to furnish support and aid as these were needed. Up to this time, General Meade had determined to explode the mine without an assault. On the 28th, he had an interview with General Burnside, in which the subject was discussed. General Meade had now decided to make an assault, but dis- approved of General Burnside's plan in its main features. He would not allow the colored division to lead the assault, nor would he allow the forma- tion of the troops as proposed. A white division must attack, and instead of sweeping the enemy's lines, the troops were to "rush for the crest." In vain did General Burnside urge upon his attention the fact, that the white troops were almost worn out by their labors in the trenches, and were to a certain extent demoralized by their long and unwonted .exposure both to the heat and the enemy's unremitting fire, while the colored troops were fresh, strong, unwearied, and eager to participate in the contest more conspicuously than as yet they had had an opportunity of doing. But General Meade was inexorable. From the persistence with which he opposed the adoption of General Burnside's plan, one would suppose that he still believed that "acceding" to it might not be "consistent with his position as commanding general" of that army. After considerable discussion he agreed to refer the matter to the decision of General Grant. That officer had no personal knowledge of the subject, and could judge of the case only as it was sub- mitted by General Meade. Of course, the decision was adverse to General Burnside; the colored troops were ruled out, and the whole plan of attack was deranged. On the 29th, General Meade again met General Burnside, and declared the result of his conference with General Grant. It was not far from noon. The mine was to be exploded at daylight on the 30th. The time for preparation was now very short. The commanders of the three white divisions met General Meade at General Burnside's head-quarters, and
received verbal instructions. Written orders were transmitted from both officers to the corps and division commanders later in the day. The orders of General Meade were for General Burnside to assault with his white troops, make for the crest at once, sieze it and effect a lodgment there; for General Ord, with the eighteenth corps, and General Mott's division of the second corps, to relieve the troops in the trenches, form in rear of the ninth corps, and support the attack; for General Hancock with the second corps to follow up the attack as circumstances favored; for General Warren with the fifth
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corps to concentrate his troops on his right and support the Ninth Corps; and for General Sheridan to move his cavalry corps against the enemy's right.
The question with General Burnside and his division commanders was now directed to the selection of the assaulting column. Which division should attack ? Each was equally good with the other. There was no choice between them. It was agreed to decide by lot, and the lot fell upon the first division. General Ledlie immediately set about making his preparations, but the day closed before he had finished his examination of the ground. General Burnside issued his orders. The mine was to be exploded at half- past three o'clock in the morning of the 30th. General Ledlie was to move immediately and crown the crest, occupying the cemetery. General Willcox was to follow General Ledlie, bearing to the left, in order to protect the left flank of the leading column, and seize the Jerusalem plank road. General Potter was to move to the right of General Ledlie, and "establish a line on the erest of a ravine, which seemed to run from the Cemetery Hill, nearly at right angles to the enemy's main line." General Ferrero was to follow Gen- eral Willcox to the front of our advanced line, then pass "over the same ground that General Ledlie moved over," and, moving through our line, to occupy, if possible, the village to the right. The short summer night passed anxiously away. General Burnside was somewhat chagrined that his care- fully elaborated plan of attack should have thus been sunnmarily disposed of. General Ferrero and his division were disappointed, and the other command- ers were more or less disturbed. Nevertheless, General Burnside accepted the situation, complied strictly with General Meade's instructions, and issued his orders exactly in accordance with those of the commanding general. If there was to be any failure, it would not be because the commander of the Ninth Corps had not made every preparation, as directed by his superior officer.
The night deepened; the morning drew on, and General Ord had not yet relieved the troops in the trenches. But, under General Meade's direc- tion, General Ledlie was moved out, and the trenches were vacated. Soon after two o'clock, A. M., on the 30th, General Burnside left his head-quarters, and repaired to a battery on the front, known as "the fourteen gun battery," to direct the operations of his corps. General Meade soon after occupied the former head-quarters of the corps-a shady grove, nearly a mile in the rear, where nothing of the contested ground could be seen. Here General Grant
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joined him. The "commanding general" was not in an amiable mood that morning, and he became more petulant and impatient as the day wore on.
At half past three, Colonel Pleasants fired the fuses of the mine. The rebel redoubt was silent, and its garrison was all unconscious of the danger which was threatening. All eyes were anxiously directed upon the doomed work. Fifteen minutes passed, and all continued as before. No movement indicated any uncommon disturbance. Indeed, most of the enemy's forces had been moved to the north side of the James to repel a feigned attack made in that quarter on the previous day. Half an hour passed. There was no explosion. The garrison opposite began to bestir itself. The enemy's troops were returning from the other side. What was the cause of the delay ? asks General Meade. General Burnside cannot reply because he is himself ascertaining the cause. The fuses had gone out. The powder had become damp in the places where the splices had been made. At quarter past four o'clock, two men, Lieutenant Jacob Douty and Sergeant (afterwards Lieu- tenant) Henry Rees of the 48th Pennsylvania regiment, volunteered to go into the mine, to ascertain where the fuses had failed, to put them once again in order, and to relight them. They coolly and bravely performed that duty, relighted the fuses, and at sixteen minutes before five o'clock the mine exploded.
Then ensued a scene that beggars description. The ground heaved and trembled. A terrific sound-like the noise of great thunders-burst upon the morning air. Huge masses of earth, mingled with cannon, caissons, eamp equipage and human bodies, were thrown up. It seemed like a mountain reversed, enveloped in clouds of smoke and sand, upheaved by the explosion of four tons of powder. A moment more, and where stood a formidable fort now yawned a great crater, two hundred feet long, fifty wide, and twenty-five deep, with the debris of the material of what had been one of the strongest of the enemy's works. The effect upon the enemy's troops was wonderful. Some were paralyzed with fear and astonishment. Others fled, and for half an hour scarcely a gun was fired from the enemy's lines. General Ledlie's gallant men at once started to their work. Parapets were levelled, abattis were removed, and the division prepared to charge forward through the smoking ruins, to gain the erest beyond. But here the leading brigade (Gen- eral Marshall's) made a temporary halt. It was said, at the time, that the men feared a counter-mine, and were themselves somewhat shocked by the terrible seene which they had just witnessed. It was, however, but a delay
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of a few minutes. In less than quarter of an hour, the division was beyond the intrenchments and pushing bravely and rapidly forward across the open space in front. The ground was more difficult and broken than was supposed, but the troops made their way over every obstruction, and approached the enemy's lines. They descended into the crater. They struggled on through the disintegrated soil and sand. Many men of the enemy's forces were lying about among the ruins, half-buried, and vainly trying to extricate themselves. They called for mercy and for help. The soldiers stopped to take prisoners, to dig out guns and other material. Their division commander, General Ledlie, was not with them. He had remained behind when his men went forward. There was no head. The ranks were broken, the troops were becoming confused. Precious time was passing. The rebels were recovering from their panic. Our artillery, which had opened immediately after the explosion of the mine, began to receive a spirited response.
General Willcox's division followed General Ledlie's, bearing slightly to the left, as ordered. General Potter led his division forward, and began to pass beyond his intrenchments. But the enemy was now showing signs of activity. The crater, and the open space between it and our lines, were filled with men. The enemy opened upon them from the right and left of the crater, and from the crest beyond. Our artillery could not keep down the fire which the enemy poured in from his batteries on the flanks of our advancing columns. Our men in the centre were checked. They struggled through the yielding sand, and climbed the slope. They stood upon the further lip of the crater. Here they were met by a severe and destructive" fire of shrapnell and canister from a battery posted on the crest. The result anticipated by General Burnside was painfully evident. Despite the orders to press forward, the men began to seek cover. They halted to intrench. The enemy's ground was cut up by rifle-pits, covered ways and traverses, in every direction, and the opposing forces had to be driven out man by man. The movement to sweep the enemy's lines had been disapproved, and the advance movement could not be made except with extreme difficulty. More men poured into the crater. General Meade's orders to General Burnside were short and peremptory : "All your troops are to be pushed forward to the erest at once." The supporting corps did not attempt to make a diversion. The enemy at one time had abandoned his works in front of the fifth corps to engage in the battle around the crater. They could have been taken with a rush. But the fifth corps did not stir. General Meade's orders to General
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Warren were, to attack if he thought it "practicable," or found an "oppor- tunity." They were discretionary. General Warren did not think it practi- cable, and made no attack nor even a demonstration. One division of General Ord's command attempted an advance, but it was made with no enthusiasm, and accomplished nothing.
The lines are formed anew, with General Potter's division on the right, General Ledlie's in the centre, and General Willcox's on the left. Again our troops advance to the charge in the midst of the infernal fire from all sides. They pass the crater. They push up the acclivity. Some almost gain the crest. General Meade, from his head-quarters in the shady grove, where he can hear the roar of battle, but see nothing, orders General Burnside to " push forward" his "men at all hazards, white and black," and to have them "rush for the crest." General Ferrero is ordered in. Lieutenant-Colonel (now Brevet Major-General) Loring-General Burnside's inspector general- who had been forward and knew the nature of the ground and the confused state of affairs, remonstrates and countermands the order. But it is peremptory. It is a written order to General Burnside, curt and short, and must be obeyed. The colored troops go upon the field handsomely and enthusiastically. They pass through the crater and make a "rush for the crest." They capture and send to the rear a stand of colors. Then they are checked, repulsed and driven back. General Ord is ordered by General Meade to move forward his troops and prepares to do so, but finds that his position in rear of the Ninth Corps prevents his advance, and he can do little more than put men under fire without results. The troops, by their formation according to General Meade's order, are crowded together and cannot deploy, or form, or charge. They are suffering severely from the cross-fire to which they are subjected. Can nothing be done to relieve the struggling, all-sacrificing Ninth Corps?
At half past six o'clock, General Burnside notifies General Meade, that it is about time for General Warren to be ready to attack. General Meade replies that "there is no object to be gained in occupying the enemy's line." Is the Ninth Corps then to be sacrificed, and no attempt made to stop that enfilading fire from the enemy's line? General Potter's division on the right and General Willcox's on the left, cach hold about two hundred yards of the enemy's rifle-pits, but that is small relief. Again our troops essay an advance, white and colored attempting to gain the crest. At 7.20 o'clock, General Burnside telegraphs to General Meade: "I am doing all in my power to push the troops forward, and, if possible, we will carry the crest. It is hard
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work, but we hope to accomplish it." Ten minutes later, General Meade sends a written despatch: "What do you mean by hard work to take the crest? Do you mean that your officers will not obey your orders to advance ? If not, what is the obstacle? I wish to know the truth, and desire an imme- diate answer." At 7.35 o'clock, General Burnside replies to the above ill- tempered effusion: "I do not mean to say that my officers and men will not obey my orders to advance to the crest." Then he adds: "I have never in any report said anything different from what I conceived to be the truth. Were it not insubordinate, I would say, that the latter remark of your note was unofficer-like and ungentlemanly"-which it undoubtedly was.
While General Meade was thus working himself into a rage, time was passing, and the men in front, pressed back from the slope, were crowding into the crater, there mingling with those who had been sent forward by General Meade. At eight o'clock, we held the breach in the enemy's line and no more. The enemy was now emboldened to make an attack upon our troops in the crater, but was vigorously repulsed. General Burnside asked that the fifth corps might be ordered to attack, that a diversion 'might thus be made. His request was refused. The troops in front, finding that no supports were to be given them, and no demonstration made on any part of the line, began to give way. General Meade at nine and one half o'clock, directed all offensive operations to cease, and Generals Burnside, Warren and Ord to withdraw their troops to their own lines. Fifteen minutes later, he repeated the order peremptorily to General Burnside. The supporting corps were accordingly marched off in the sight of the enemy. General Meade, having crowded as many men as possible into a very limited space, having sent one entire corps and part of another into a chasm of yielding earth, directly under the guns of the enemy, and having tried to fight a battle without seeing a foot of the ground, retired to his own head-quarters in a pet, leaving the Ninth Corps still in the erater, and with no assistance from the rest of the army, to enable it to retire in safety. Through the entire action, General Burnside had not been allowed the slightest discretion in moving or fighting his troops, and he was now left to withdraw them as best he could.
How to extricate his troops from the dangerous position in which Gen- eral Meade's orders had placed them, was now an anxious question for the commander of the Ninth Corps to answer. The intervening space between our lines of intrenchment and the crater, was swept by the enemy's fire.
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The supporting corps, with the exception of a part of the eighteenth, that was holding the line of intrenchments, had marched to their former positions, or were on the way. Offensive operations had eeased upon our side. General Burnside at one time thought that the erater could be held as a salient, and be connected with our advanced works by lines of intrenchment. He gave orders to working parties from General Ferrero's division to throw up some rude breast-works to cover our men as they retired. But General Meade was positive in ordering the withdrawal of the troops, and there was no option but to obey. He also seemed impatient to have the men out of the erater, sending at different times to know about their condition. General Burnside accordingly communicated the orders to his division commanders, and the troops commenced retiring. The enemy, finding that he was not to be molested by the other parts of our army, concentrated his forces, and made several fieree attacks upon our men in the erater. These brave fellows were now exhausted. They knew that there could be no reenforcement. They could not withstand the enemy's attack. They hastily withdrew, suffering severe loss in so doing. A few gallant spirits-among whom was the fourth Rhode Island regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel M. P. Buffim-stubbornly held their ground, and fought desperately against the fearful odds. Colonel Buffum and some of his officers, the brave General Bartlett, the gallant Colonel Weld, of Massachusetts, and many other officers and men fell into the hands of the enemy. A large number of our troops were captured.
At two o'clock, P. M., all was over. General Burnside had retired to his head-quarters, sorrow-stricken by the contemplation of the lamentable result. It was especially mortifying to feel that so promising a plan, and one so well prepared, should have failed so completely. General Meade attempted to try General Burnside by court martial, and prepared elaborate charges and speci- fications. But they were extremely frivolous, and were disapproved by .Gen- eral Grant. The losses in this engagement amounted to about five thousand, in killed, wounded and missing, nine-tenths of which fell upon the Ninth Corps, and were in large proportion incurred during the withdrawal. The second and fifth corps did not lose over fifty men. The cavalry met with inconsiderable loss in a smart engagement with the enemy's cavalry upon our extreme left.
During the next fortnight, but little was done, except occasional skir- mishing, in which the Ninth Corps had its share. The enemy sprang a counter-mine with but feeble results. Our lines were gradually extended, and the enemy driven into eloser limits. A court of inquiry, ordered by the
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President "to examine into and report the facts" attendant upon the assault of July 30th, was in session at the head-quarters of the second corps, at different times, from the 6th of August to the 9th of September. General Burnside was relieved from the command of the Ninth Corps on the 13th of August, and immediately left the army for his home in Providence. He was not again called into active service, though the President refused to accept his resignation. The active operations of the army of the Potomac closed with the surrender of General Lee and his army, on the 9th of April, 1865. General Burnside now pressed his resignation; it was finally accepted, and on the 15th day of April, he was freed from all official connection with the army of the United States.
Two bodies have investigated the facts and circumstances of the assault of the 30th of July. One, the congressional committee on the conduct of the war, examined a large number of witnesses in the month of December, 1864, and in the report which was submitted to Congress, exonerated General Burnside from blame in the matter, and declared that the disastrous result of the attack was owing to the frustration of his plans, and the total disregard of his suggestions, "by a general who had evinced no faith in the successful prosecution of the work, had aided it by no countenance or open approval, and had assumed the entire direction and control only when it was com- pleted, and the time had come for reaping any advantages that might be derived from it." The other, the court of inquiry, censured General Burnside for not forming his troops so as to ensure a reasonable prospect of success; for not preparing his parapets and abatis for the egress of his assaulting columns; for not employing engineer officers; and for neglecting to execute General Meade's orders, respecting the prompt advance of General Ledlie's troops from the crater to the crest, or, failing in that, for not withdrawing those troops and allowing others to take their place, who were more willing and able to perform the work. The court also censured the division officers, Generals Ledlie and Ferrero, for not accompanying their divisions to the crater, and General Willcox for not pushing forward his division with suffi- cient energy. This is hardly the place for discussing the points made by the court. It may, however, be stated briefly, that General Burnside formed his troops according to the direction of General Meade, who ordered every move- ment that was made, and who thrust in the troops, declaring that time must not be lost in "making formations," but that the troops must "rush for the crest;" that it was not possible to level the parapets and remove the abatis,
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without making the movement known to the enemy, such was the proximity of the hostile lines; that this must have been an unimportant omission, since more troops passed out of the lines of intrenchment and beyond the abatis, than it was possible to handle to advantage; that one regiment, with its proper officers, accompanied each division, armed, equipped and supplied as engineers; that General Burnside executed every order of Gen- eral Meade respecting the movement of his troops, through his division com- manders-the only way in which he could execute them-that his orders were, on this point, remarkably clear and direct; that he could not order his troops out, as General Meade was continually ordering them in; and that, finally, General Burnside cannot be blamed for allowing the enemy to con- centrate his fire against the troops in the erater, since it was the business of the remainder of the army to employ the enemy sufficiently to prevent any such concentration. Certainly, that three corps should stand by, and permit the entire army of the enemy to pour its fire into one corps that was in a perilous position, is a fact not discreditable to General Burnside, who was not allowed to make a suggestion about his own corps, much less respecting those of other commanders, without a rebuke, but to General Meade himself, who had exercised the supreme control of every movement of every corps. The division commander,-for there was but one,-General Ledlie, who did not accompany his troops into the crater, was indeed censurable, but it is hardly just to blame General Burnside for his neglect of duty. General Ferrero, by the affidavits of his staff officers and others, is proved to have been with his division through the entire fight, and to have conducted himself-as was to be expected from his record-like a brave, skillful and gallant officer. It may also be stated, that the composition of the court was not such as would ensure an impartial verdict. General Hancock, its president, was in command of a supporting corps. General Miles was in command of a brigade in Gen- eral Hancock's corps. General Ayres was in command of the division on the left of the Ninth Corps, and which was expected to take part in the battle. Colonel Shriver, the judge advocate, was inspector-general on the staff of General Meade. It was not a disinterested court. General Hancock, who is a gallant and honorable soldier, protested earnestly, but in vain, against its composition. The testimony was ex parte. Members of General Burnside's staff, who were actually in the midst of the engagement, were not called upon to testify, while General Ayres, himself a member of the court, took the stand as a witness. Finally, the decision is contrary to fact in some
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