Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. II, Part 8

Author: Carroll, Charles, author
Publication date: 1932
Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co.
Number of Pages: 716

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PARTY STRENGTH AFTER 1860-Seth Padelford in 1860 polled the normal strength of the Republican vote in Rhode Island, 10,000 to 11,000 votes, as indicated by the elections in 1860, 1861, 1863, 1865, 1868 and 1870, in each of which years except 1865 there was a real contest. He had received more votes than any earlier candidate for Governor except William W. Hoppin in the Know Nothing triumph of 1855, and yet was beaten by William Sprague, whose 12,278 was not surpassed until 1874 and 1877. The total vote of 23,158 in 1860 was not equalled until 1877, when 24,456 votes were cast. The vote for William Sprague in 1860 and 1861 was not a revelation of Democratic party strength so much as of Governor Sprague's personal popularity, for William Sprague, although indorsed by Democrats in 1860 and nomi- nated by the party again in 1883, was scarcely a Democrat; as Senator in Congress he was

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staunchly Republican, voting with Senator Anthony against President Johnson in the impeach- ment trial. Party designations in those days sat rather lightly on politicians, however; Sal- mon P. Chase, father-in-law of Senator Sprague, and one of the founders of the Republican party, discovered in 1868 that his own political principles were akin to those of old-time Dem- ocrats and was willing to accept nomination for the Presidency by the Democratic convention. The elections of 1860, and of 1861 and 1862, in the last two of which William Sprague was the "Union" candidate for Governor, are to be discounted as extraordinary; Rhode Island was normally Republican even then, and promptly returned to electing Republican Governors and other general officers in 1863, when Governor Sprague had become Senator Sprague.

The results of the Civil War were disheartening to Democrats, not because Northern Democrats had not remained steadfast and loyal to the union, but because the success of the Northern armies had the effect, psychologically at least, of establishing the Republican party's ascendancy. Thus it was in Rhode Island. The Democratic vote of 7672 in 1863 was approached but not equalled in 1864, when with a popular candidate for President in the per- son of General George B. McClellan and a split in the Rhode Island Republican party as Amos C. Barstow opposed James Y. Smith, George H. Browne reduced Governor Smith's majority to 132; and was not equalled again until 1882. Democrats, except 100 stalwarts, refrained from voting in 1865, and in the following year began slowly to rebuild their party in the face of normal Republican majorities averaging over 4000. It was true that the Repub- licans had selected as their candidate for Governor in 1866, 1867 and 1868 one who had been a Democrat before the war; but General Ambrose E. Burnside had become a militant Repub- lican. As Senator in Congress he was a vigorous defender of his new party's policies. The Republican party was dominant in state as well as in national politics; the Democratic party was scarcely a challenging minority party. With James Y. Smith, 1863, 1864 and 1865; Ambrose E. Burnside, 1866, 1867 and 1868; Seth Padelford, 1869, 1870, 1871 and 1872; and Henry Howard, 1873 and 1874, the string of Republican victories at the polls was unbroken for a dozen years. In 1875 the Republican party divided nearly equally on the issue of prohibition, and though the two factions cast over 17,000 votes, each failed to obtain the majority required by the Constitution, and the Governor was chosen by the General Assembly. Henry Lippitt was elected twice, 1875 and 1876, by the General Assembly. In the following year the factions combined, with Charles C. Van Zandt, Prohibitionist, as candidate, and won at the polls, although Jerothmul B. Barnaby, Democrat, challenged with 11,783 votes, the largest number cast for any candidate for Governor previously except William Sprague in 1860 and 1861, and Henry Howard in 1874. Governor Van Zandt's total of 12,455 was the largest ever polled by candidate for Governor up to 1877, but was nearly 5000 less than the combined vote of the Republican factions in 1875, as J. B. Barnaby's vote was nearly 4000 greater than the total for any Democratic candidate after the war. The political movement in Rhode Island state politics from the close of the war to 1874 may be characterized as deter- mined by the war. The split on prohibition in 1875 marked the introduction of another factor, which was to continue for a dozen years. The challenge by J. B. Barnaby was a Democratic flare due to organization, prompted by the factional conflict in the Republican party and pro- moted by the wealth of Mr. Barnaby, who was willing to spend freely the price of political preferment.

SUFFRAGE QUALIFICATIONS-The qualifications for suffrage established by the Consti- tution of 1842 were summarized briefly by a committee of the General Assembly in 1882 as : "First, that a person before he can vote must have attained the age of twenty-one years. Second, residence in the municipality whose interests his vote may affect. Third, in this state, that he has contributed one dollar in the year preceding that in which he offers to vote to the

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support of the public schools, or that he is liable to pay taxes to the amount of one dollar on property which may bear a part of the taxes he votes. Fourth, if the person is not a native citizen of the United State, or he is not supposed to have any permanent abode in the munici- pality where he may offer to vote, he is required to hold a small interest in land as an evidence of his intention to abide with, and his interest in, the community which his vote may affect."

It is conceivable that the extension of suffrage in 1842, whereby naturalized freeholders and native citizens not freeholders could qualify for voting, might have continued to be a reasonably satisfactory solution of the Rhode Island suffrage problem had Rhode Island ceased "to hold forth a lively experiment." The new factors in the problem were the Civil War, continued immigration and a steady increase in the naturalized citizenry. Veterans of battlefields on which they had fought to save the union resented refusal to admit them to political citizenship. Many of them recalled that they had been welcomed as volunteers and drafted without discrimination to fill up the state's quotas in the union army. Their plight after the war resembled that of the non-freeholding veterans of the Revolutionary War for whom Dorr pleaded vainly in 1841. The Grand Army of the Republic became an advocate of complete political citizenship for veterans, and General Ambrose E. Burnside for a time was prominent as an advocate of "votes for soldiers," although later, in the United States Senate, he declared that he had ceased to be friendly to extending suffrage.

The effect of immigration and the prospect for the future appeared in the summary of vital statistics of 1876, which revealed that children born of marriages in which one or more parents were of alien birth exceeded the number of children born of marriages of purely native stock. Governor Van Zandt in his message to the General Assembly in 1877 said : "The lesson of our late census (1875) teaches only too plainly that the balance of political power is passing into the hands of our illiterate class, who will become by force of circum- stances a caste by themselves through whose barriers it will be found well nigh impossible to break." The Governor recommended education as a remedy, compulsory if need be. Rhode Island had continued to regard the immigrants who flocked to industrial centres and worked in the factories that made fortunes for their owners as essentially "foreigners," though many of the immigrants embraced American citizenship and became naturalized at the earliest oppor- tunity permitted by law. The "foreigners," even so late as the first quarter of the twentieth century, referred to native born Rhode Islanders as "Americans." Rhode Island did not until 1868 remove the common law alien disability with reference to ownership of land. It is true that the General Assembly, before that date, on petition, granted permission to alien residents to acquire title to land. When the Supreme Court decided that an alien could not inherit land in Rhode Island, and that an estate escheated for want of a qualified heir, the heir by blood being an alien, the General Assembly repealed the disability.

It is true that many naturalized citizens purchased land and thus qualified for suffrage ; it is true also that in many instances land was divided into small parcels and assigned to natur- alized citizens, thus to qualify them for suffrage. In spite of both expedients, there was a dis- proportion between the qualified electorate and the mass of male adult citizens of the United States resident in Rhode Island. One ardent advocate of more liberal suffrage argued that "the naturalization laws of the United States are, within the State of Rhode Island, nullified, and the whole political power of the state vested in the native population, while the naturalized citizens, who have renounced all claim to the protection of the country of their origin, and either are, or are entitled to be citizens of the United States, are rendered, unless in exceptional cases, utterly alien to the institutions of their adopted country." The suffrage restrictions in the Constitution of Rhode Island were not considered by the judiciary committee of the United

§ Haight vs. Haight, 9 R. I. 26.

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States Senate a violation of the Constitution of the United States.§§ The Rhode Island Sen- ate did not concur with the House of Representatives when the latter proposed the holding of a constitutional convention in 1867 and again in 1868. General Ambrose E. Burnside and Thomas A. Doyle, Mayor of Providence, had become leaders in the movement for a consti- tutional convention, the principal purpose of which was revision of the suffrage provisions ; the movement continued for a few years, and was abated for want of success. Woman suf- frage was advocated, but made so little progress as might be expected under circumstances in which manhood suffrage was restricted.

Issues affecting suffrage were tensely drawn, and, in the effort to qualify so many as pos- sible, several questions were carried to the Supreme Court for decision, thus (1) That the writ of mandamus will not be issued to compel a town council to restore a name removed from the voting list, 1869 ;* (2) that the court will not review the action of a board of can- vassers with reference to refusing to place a name on the voting lists, unless it be shown that the board acted dishonestly and with wilful purpose to deprive a voter of his rights, 1878 ;; (3) that a moderator may reject the ballot of a qualified elector whose name is not on the voting list, and that a statute which permits such rejection is constitutional and valid, 1881 ;} (4) ·that a person assessed for personal property is not required to register annually, 1877 ;** (5) that the provision qualifying an elector by payment of a tax within a year refers to the period extending twelve months previous to election and not to the preceding calendar year, 1882;}} (6) that a person taxed for real estate may vote even if his taxes are in arrears, the tax payment requirement being limited to personal property voters, 1882;## (7) that a provision in a city charter for Newport excluding registry voters from voting for members of the city council was unconstitutional and void, the restriction in the Constitution applying expressly only to the city of Providence, 1883 ;*; (8) that "residence" means "home" or "domicile," and that the word "residence" as used in the Constitution with reference to suf- frage was not to be understood in the restricted sense of actual habitation or abode, 1883 ;*¿ (9) that under a statute establishing for a wife a separate estate in her land, thus abolishing the husband's marital estate, a husband may qualify as an elector (a) through his estate of courtesy initiate by the birth of an heir, or (b) through his marital estate already existing and not abolished by the statute if the property had been acquired and the marriage had occurred previous to the enactment of the statute, 1878 .* §

COMMITTEE REPORT ON PROPOSED CHANGES-The General Assembly by joint resolution passed February 3, 1882, referred to a joint committee consisting of Senators Thomas A. Doyle of Providence, Augustus O. Bourn of Bristol and Samuel H. Cross of Westerly, and Representative William P. Sheffield of Newport, Royal C. Taft of Providence, William A. Pirce of Johnston, Edward L. Freeman of Lincoln, and David S. Wilkinson of North Smith- field, "all memorials, petitions or other matters relating to a revision of the present Consti- tution of the state or to the amendment thereof, or to the framing of a new Constitution, now in the files of the Senate, or which may be received at this session." The joint special com- mittee held five public hearings, at which appeared "persons of respectability, who presented their case, with but few exceptions, with entire candor, marked ability and perfect fairness";

§ § Amendments XIV and XV.

*Weeden vs. Richmond, 9 R. I. 128 ; McCaughey vs. Canvassers, 28 R. I. 545, contra, if the name is removed erroneously.

Keenan vs. Cook, 12 R. I. 52.

#Advisory opinion, 13 R. I. 729.

** In re Registry Law, 12 R. I. 580.

ttIn re the Providence Voters, 13 R. I. 737.

** In re the Realty Voters, 14 R. I. 645.

** In re Newport Charter, 14 R. I. 655. Decision cancelled by Bourn amendment, 1889.

** State vs. Aldrich, 14 R. I. 171.

*§In re the Voting Laws, 12 R. I. 586.

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the committee holding that "the number of petitioners, and the importance of the subject they presented for consideration entitled the petitioners to a respectable and patient hearing . ... and the right to be informed of the reasons" for refusal to grant their petition. The petition- ers presented and the committee considered questions involving (I) the right to call a con- stitutional convention ; (2) the qualifications of voters; (3) the discrimination between native and naturalized citizens; and (4) inequality in representation in the General Assembly. With reference to the latter it was alleged that the General Assembly had "changed the basis of representation of the towns and cities in both houses of the Assembly" by consoli- dating some towns and dividing others, and that the city of Providence was not adequately represented.

The actual changes in towns and cities after 1842 resultant from action by the General Assembly were ( I) the exchange of the Rhode Island town of Fall River for the Massachu- setts towns of East Providence and Pawtucket as part of the agreement, 1862, for adjusting the eastern boundary line; (2) the incorporation of Woonsocket by partition from Cumber- land, 1867; (3) the division of Smithfield into three towns, Smithfield, Lincoln and North Smithfield (first called Slater), 1871; (4) the annexation of part of North Smithfield to Woonsocket, 1871; (5) the annexation of parts of Cranston, 1868 and 1873, and parts of North Providence, 1873 and 1874, to Providence; (6) the annexation of part of North Providence to Pawtucket, 1874. Pawtucket was incorporated as a city, 1885, and Woon- socket became a city, 1888. The effect of the creation of new towns was an increase in the membership of the Senate from 32 to 36, and a change in the apportionment of membership in the House of Representatives. Providence was affected both by the constitutional restric- tion to one-sixth of the membership of the House, and increase in population incident to annexation of closely populated areas of suburban towns, without change in the limitation. With 22.21 per cent. of the state's population (1840) Providence was restricted to 16.67* per cent. of the membership of the House of Representatives by the Constitution of 1842; the restriction continued, although the population of the city, increased by normal growth of pop- ulation and the influx of population to thriving economic centres, was further increased by annexation, and had reached 37.68 per cent. of the state population in 1880, and 38.83 per cent in 1885. Proposed amendments for readjusting representation were rejected by the electors several times earlier ; there was no change in the limitation to 16.67 per cent. until 1904. The population of the city was 41.37 per cent. of the state population in 1905, and 41.33 per cent. in 1910.

Senator Doyle and Representative Wilkinson did not sign the report of the committee of 1882, nor did they present a minority report. The majority of the committee rejected all petitions and memorials, but reported, nevertheless: "But whatever may be the views of the individuals composing your committee upon the propriety of adopting or rejecting any amendment to the Constitution, they are united in the belief that the authority existing in the electors reserved to them in the Constitution to adopt amendments thereto, implies the right in the electors, upon their reasonable request to the General Assembly therefor, to have amend- ments to the Constitution submitted for their consideration and action. Two thousand one hundred and fifty-six persons, with four organized associations, have petitioned the General Assembly to call a constitutional convention; your committee are of the opinion that the Gen- eral Assembly has no authority to call such convention; but, nevertheless, considering the number and standing of the petitioners, your committee, without reference to the opinions of the members of the committee as to the results which the petitioners desire to attain, have con- cluded that it was their duty to recommend to the General Assembly to propose to the elec-

*In instances in which the unit for representation is a municipality or other unit based on local solid- arity of interest reasonable restriction of representation is accepted as sound policy.

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CITY HALL AND PROVIDENCE BILTMORE HOTEL FROM THE PARK, PROVIDENCE

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tors of the state an amendment to the Constitution, which they herewith submit, which amend- ment, if adopted by the people, will authorize the General Assembly to call a constitutional convention." The resolution proposed that the General Assembly be given authority to call a constitutional convention consisting of delegates elected by the several towns and cities cor- responding in number to their total representation in both houses of the General Assembly, the convention to "revise, alter or amend the Constitution," subject to approval of revision, alteration or amendment by the qualified electors, a majority to consist of three-fifths of the electors voting. The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly of January, 1882, approved by the next General Assembly at the May session, 1882, and submitted to the elec- torate on November 7, 1882 ; it was rejected 5125 against, 4393 for. The qualified electors had answered through the referendum; they did not choose to share their political preroga- tives with new classes of voters. The voters under the Constitution of 1842 were reacting to proposals for reform in much the same way as had the landholders previous to 1842.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DISCUSSED-Not all members of the General Assembly were content with the decision of the voters; some recognized elements of justice in the petitions for revision, and ventured to propose that the General Assembly order a constitu- tional convention without asking approval by the voters. There were precedents for such action by the General Assembly; conventions had been called without referenda in 1824, 1834, 1841 and 1842. Section 10 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1842 declared: "The General Assembly shall continue to exercise the powers they have heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution." To quiet discussion, the Senate adopted resolutions in which the opinion of the Supreme Court was requested. The resolutions recited "a difference of opinion has arisen among members of the General Assembly (1) as to the legal competency thereof under the Constitution of the state to call upon the electors to elect members to con- stitute a convention to frame a new constitution of the State, and to provide that the new constitution should be submitted for adoption, either to the qualified electors of the state or to the persons who would be entitled to vote under said new constitution, for adoption, and if a majority of such electors or persons voting should vote in favor thereof, whether the new constitution would then become the legally adopted constitution of the state and be binding as such upon all the people thereof ; (2) as to whether it is legally competent for the General Assembly to submit to the qualified electors the questions whether said electors will call a convention to frame a new constitution, and to provide by law if a majority of the electors voting upon said question shall vote in favor of calling such convention, that the same be held, and the new constitution framed by said convention be submitted to the electors for their adoption, either to the electors qualified by law, or to the persons who may be qualified to vote under such new constitution, and whether if a majority of the electors or persons voting thereon vote for the adoption of such constitution, whether the constitution so to be framed and adopted would be the legal constitution of the state, and as such be binding upon all the people thereof."

The advisory opinion of the Supreme Courtt held "that the mode provided in the Con- stitution for the amendment thereof is the only mode in which it can be constitutionally amended. The ordinary rule is that where power is given to do a thing in a particular way, there the affirmative words, marking out the particular way, prohibit all other ways by impli- cation, so that the particular way is the only way in which the power can be legally executed. . The provision for amendment in our Constitution is singularly explicit. .... Evi- dently the purpose was to insure the calm and considerate action of both the Assembly and the people. . . . . The object was not to hamper or baffle the popular will, but to insure its

#14 R. I. 649.

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full expression. .... If our Constitution had no provision for amendment, then, indeed, a power in the Assembly to call a convention or to initiate amendments in some other manner might be implied ex necessitate. The Assembly, under the Charter, exercised such a power because the Charter had no such provision; though it is proper to remark that under the Charter the legislative power of the Assembly was practically unlimited. Again, if the pro- vision for amendment was impracticable, there might be, if no legal reason, yet some excuse for disregarding it. But it is practicable, as a successful resort to it in several instances had demonstrated. . Any new constitution, therefore, which a convention would form, would be a new constitution only in name; but would be in fact our present Constitution amended. It is impossible for us to imagine any alteration, consistent with a republican form of govern- ment, which cannot be effected by specific amendment as provided in the Constitution. . ... A power to call a convention is prohibited by implication, and as was clearly shown in Taylor vs. Place,* an implied is as effectual as an express prohibition." The court rejected the con- tention "that there is a great unwritten common law of the states, which existed before the Constitution and which the Constitution was powerless to modify or abolish, under which the people have the right, whenever invited by the General Assembly-and, as some main- tain, without any invitation-to alter and amend their constitution. If there be any such law -- for there is no record of it, or of any legislation or custom in this state recognizing it-then it is, in our opinion, rather a law-if law it can be called-of revolutionary than of constitu- tional change. Our Constitution is . . .. by its own terms 'the supreme law of the State.' We know of no law, except the Constitution and laws of the United States, which is para- mount to it." The advisory opinion of the Supreme Court coincided with the opinion of the majority of the committee of the General Assembly of 1882, and had the effect, for the time being, of quieting discussion of the possibility of revising the existing Constitution or adopt- ing a new constitution through a constitutional convention. The discussion was to be renewed at a later date.

PROHIBITION AS A PARTY ISSUE-Traffic in alcoholic liquors was taxed in the colonial period principally for revenue rather than for regulatory purposes. Drunkenness was pun- ished as disturbance of the peace, but there appears to have been no serious disposition to prohibition except with reference to sales to negroes and Indians. The distillation of molasses and sugar into rum was one of the most profitable of colonial enterprises, and was an impor- tant adjunct of the trade with Africa and the West Indies. The Brown brothers, particularly John, were distillers. Bills prohibiting the distillation of grain into spirituous liquor failed of concurrent action in the General Assembly in 1812 and 1817; the former probably was a war measure, the latter was prompted by scarcity and high prices. Horse racing and liquor selling within one mile of the Seventh Day Baptist Church in Hopkinton were forbidden in 1792 ; thirty years later the same prohibition of sales of rum, wine or strong liquor was made effective within a mile of any meeting being held for the worship of Almighty God. The Gen- eral Assembly in 1822 enacted a license law with an excise to be collected by town officers and paid by them into the general treasury; fees for making collections were allowed subse- quently. Probably the first Rhode Island public meeting in opposition to the liquor traffic was conducted in the First Baptist Meeting House in Providence in April, 1827. The first Sunday closing law was enacted in 1834; it was a local option law, giving town councils power to make closing ordinances. A statute increasing liquor taxes was repealed after less than a year's trial in 1833. Sunday sales and sales to habitual drunkards were forbidden by statute in 1839, and two years later sales to minors and intoxicated persons were prohibited. License fees were increased, but the state permitted towns to retain eighty per cent. as local revenues,

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Rhode Island : three centuries of democracy, Vol. II, Part 8

Author: Carroll, Charles, author Publication date: 1932 Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co. Number of Pages: 716

Author: Carroll, Charles, author
Publication date: 1932
Publisher: New York : Lewis historical Pub. Co.
Number of Pages: 716