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CHAPTER XXI
THE WINNING OF INDEPENDENCE-SAN JACINTO
The actual winning of Texas independence was consummated during one short campaign lasting hardly six weeks. Within three months after the fall of the Alamo and the massacre at Goliad the Mexican forces were retreating to the Rio Grande, and domination from the south was never again seriously threatened.
Throughout the session of the convention there were alarms of invasion, the hostile army was known to be on Texas soil, the letters of Travis from the Alamo told the condition of the siege at that place, although the news of the fall did not reach the town of Washington until the 15th. Immediately on his reappointment as commander in chief, Houston set to the work of preparation for war, sending orders to Fannin to join him that he might march to the relief of Travis. But the impos- sibility of getting an adequate army together prevented any aggressive movements, and Houston was still at the headquarters in Gonzales when the calamity of the Alamo was reported. He had arrived at Gonzales on March IIth and taken command of "three hundred and seventy-four effective men, without two days' provisions, many without arms, and others without any ammunition"-according to his own report.
Rumors of the fall of the Alamo having reached Gonzales, on the 13th Houston sent out Deaf Smith, Henry Karnes and R. E. Handy to discover the exact fate of Travis and his command. About twenty miles from Gonzales they met Mrs. Dickinson, who, besides confirming the worst fears concerning the Alamo, reported that a division of the Mex- ican forces under General Sesma was already marching eastward. The return of the scouts, with Mrs. Dickinson, created consternation at Gon- zales. The families of the thirty-two patriots, who a short time before had joined the Alamo garrison, were frantic with grief over their loss, while the approach of Sesma's forces threatened all the survivors with a similar fate. Aware that his force was too small to resist, Houston
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at once prepared to retreat. The baggage was thrown away, the only cannon were cast into the river, and by midnight inhabitants and soldiers were hastening to the Colorado on the first stage of the "runaway scrape," the burning buildings of the town lighting up the sky in their wake.
Leaving Gonzales on the 13th of March, the army moved eastward to the Colorado, where it arrived, in the vicinity of the present town of Columbus, on the 17th. By this time the force had increased to six hundred men. Two days were spent at Burnham's on the west side of the river, when a crossing was effected and the Texans moved around the bend to Beason's ford. Hardly had this position been taken when a division of the Mexican army under General Sesma arrived on the opposite side of the river.
After the fall of the Alamo and the successful operations of his forces in the vicinity of Goliad, Santa Anna underestimated the remaining strength of the rebellion. The retreat of the Texan army and the hasty evacuation of the country by the settlers certainly confirmed his opinion. Thus deceived, he gave his attention to occupying the country at the key positions, for this purpose dividing his army into several divisions. General Gaona was ordered to march up the San Antonio road to Nacogdoches, Generals Sesma and Woll toward San Felipe and thence to Harrisburg, while General Urrea was to advance along the coast. Santa Anna himself was preparing to return to Mexico, when he was informed of the concentration of Houston's forces at the Colorado. He then or- dered Gaona, after crossing the Colorado at Bastrop, to direct his course toward San Felipe, and Urrea to proceed to Matagorda and thence to Brazoria. Santa Anna and Filisola, with their staffs, left San Antonio on March 31st, and on the 5th joined Sesma's division at the Colorado.
Houston and his army remained on the east side of the Colorado a week. Volunteers arrived until his force was between twelve and fourteen hundred. The number of Mexicans opposed to him were no greater. This seemed a most opportune time to deal the invaders a crushing blow, and why Houston did not take advantage of the occasion does not seem ever to have been explained satisfactorily, unless he had mapped out a general plan to withdraw into eastern Texas and engage the enemy when at a distance from supplies and when overconfident with previous success. From this point on to the final overthrow at San Jac- into every detail of the campaign became a theme of subsequent contro- versy. While the debate has clouded the glory of individual actors, the
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actual performances cannot be disputed, and later generations are prob- ably disposed to accept the facts and let the credit go.
There was a burst of indignation on the part of the Texans when, on the 26th, continued retreat to the Brazos was ordered. The movement left the settlements unprotected, and several hundred of the volunteers left the army either from dissatisfaction with the policy of the commander or for the purpose of aiding their families in what had now become a general exodus to the eastern frontier. On March 28th the army reached San Felipe, and the next day proceeded up the west bank of the Brazos, on the 31st camping in the timber opposite Groce's landing, a few miles south of Washington. Here was the steamboat Yellowstone, the pos- session of which gave the army means of crossing the river. Mosely Baker, with his company, remained at San Felipe to dispute the enemy's passage there, while Wiley Martin guarded the crossing at Old Fort (now Richmond). On the 29th the reported approach of the enemy caused a rapid withdrawal from San Felipe, and the town was burned by the retreating Texans.
Meanwhile the retreat of the army and the removal of the seat of government from Washington to Harrisburg threw the country into panic. After the atrocities committed by the Mexicans in the west, the settlers could hope for no mercy from the invaders. Every family, there- fore, taking only such property as the limited means of transportation could convey, hurried across the country, and crowded the passages over the swollen streams which every few miles opposed their progress. Before the victorious advance of the invaders, with Houston apparently indis- posed to take any aggressive action, it is not suprising that many Texans were among the fugitives, who, under different circumstances, would have been in the army.
Houston's army lay encamped in the Brazos bottoms at Groce's nearly two weeks. In the meantime, on April 5th, Santa Anna had taken command of Sesma's troops on the Colorado, and then advanced to San Felipe on the 7th. Though the town was in ruins, the crossing was still guarded by Baker's company. Being impatient to end the campaign, Santa Anna, with part of his army, marched down to Fort Bend. Keep- ing Martin's company engaged in defending the upper crossing, he suc- ceeded in gaining the lower ferry and putting his troops on the east side of the river. Here he was joined by Sesma on the 13th, and on the following day set out for Harrisburg, thirty-five miles away, where he
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arrived on the 15th. Under his immediate command Santa Anna had only about 700 men. Sesma was left at Fort Bend with about 1,000; Filisola was between San Felipe and Fort Bend with 1,800; Urrea was at Matagorda, with 1,200; and Gaona was between Bastrop and San Felipe with 725 troops. This distribution of the troops in such a manner that concentration was impossible short of several days' time was the most important fact in the campaign and proved the salvation of Texas.
On April 12th the Texas army began crossing the Brazos. General Rusk, secretary of war, had arrived from Harrisburg to urge upon Hous- ton the necessity, of decisive action. The latter still kept his plans to himself. Perhaps no campaign policy has been subjected to more thor- ough scrutiny than his, and yet it is involved in uncertainty. There is some reason to believe that he planned to retreat as far as Nacogdoches, where he would make a final stand, and in case of defeat be able to withdraw in safety beyond the Sabine under the protection of the Amer- ican forces. It is known that General Gaines, the American commander, was eager to assist the independence cause, and held his forces on the east bank of the Sabine in readiness to attack should there occur an open violation of neutrality. But no plausible pretext for intervention arose. Chafing under the delay and uncertainty, many of the Texans threatened to depose their commander in case he should continue the retreat to East Texas.
On the 14th the army left Groce's, going south. Three miles fur- ther, at Donohue's, was a fork in the roads, the left leading toward Nacogdoches and the right to Harrisburg. Not until the Nacogdoches road was passed were the soldiers fully convinced that the retreat was ended and the advance upon the enemy begun. After heavy marching over the rain-soaked ground the army arrived, on the 18th, at the bayou opposite Harrisburg, The town had been deserted by its inhabitants on the 14th, Santa Anna had taken possession on the 15th, and after tarrying awhile and setting fire to the houses, proceeded down the bayou to Lynchburg and thence to New Washington (Morgan's Point). Baffled in the pur- suit of the government officials, who had fled to Galveston, he then turned back with the evident intention of crossing at Lynch's and carrying the campaign into East Texas.
The Texans were apprized of these movements on their arrival at Harrisburg, and then also received definite information that Santa Anna was with this division of the invading army. On the 19th Houston and
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Rusk addressed the troops and gave them assurance that the decisive battle was to be fought and that the Alamo and Goliad were at last to be avenged. The baggage and a guard for the sick and disabled were left at Harrisburg, while an army of 783 men marched down below the mouth of Sims' bayou, where they crossed in boats to the right side of Buffalo bayou, and then followed the route taken by the Mexicans, across Vince's bridge, and with only a few hours' rest, between midnight and daybreak, arrived at Lynch's ferry early in the forenoon of the 20th.
The site of the San Jacinto battleground is the margin of an ex- tensive prairie that lies in the angle formed by the Buffalo bayou at its junction with the San Jacinto river. It was in the semicircular bend of the bayou about half a mile from the junction that the Texas army encamped on the 20th. The banks of the bayou at this point are high, and well screened with timber, the fringe of trees following the bayou off to the southwest. On the left of this position the ground descends to marshy levels along the river, on the opposite side of which lies the village of Lynchburg, reached by Lynch's ferry. From the high ground near the bayou the prairie has an easy descent to a "draw" about two hundred yards to the south, followed by an equally gentle rise to the crest of the prairie about a quarter of a mile distant. At the border of this latter elevation, near the river, is a grove, but with this exception the space before the Texas camp was almost uninterrupted prairie to the south and southwest.
Santa Anna coming up the road along the San Jacinto bay and river toward Lynch's, found, on arriving about noon of the 20th, the position already occupied by the Texans. He accordingly halted his army on the high ground in front of the Texas camp, his right wing being partly protected by the woods near the river, and the rest of his forces being drawn out across the ridge, with his cannon in the center. The Mexicans had one cannon, while the Texans had received, just before leaving the Brazos, two six-pounders, called the "Twin Sisters," which had been presented to Texas by the people of Cincinnati.
Early in the afternoon Santa Anna advanced his cannon, under cover of the cavalry, to a little clump of trees somewhat to the right of the Texas position, and opened fire, which was returned by the Twin Sisters. In this artillery duel Colonel Neill was wounded, this being the first casualty among the Texans. Later in the day Colonel Sherman obtained permission to advance with mounted volunteers and dislodge the enemy
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from this position. As soon as Sherman started the Mexicans withdrew their cannon, but when he continued on towards the enemy's left he was met by their cavalry. A lively skirmish ensued in which two Texans were wounded, and Sherman retired without having effected any im- portant advantage.
During the remainder of the day the Texas army obtained refresh- ment and rest from their strenuous march of the preceding two days. The Mexicans were engaged in strengthening their line by constructing of packs and baggage a fortification about five feet high across the ridge, their artillery being placed at an opening in the center and their cavalry on the left wing. On the morning of the 21st Santa Anna was reinforced by the arrival of some four hundred men under General Cos, so that his total force on the day of the battle was about twelve hun- dred. "This gave the latter considerable advantage over Houston, and the Texans became apprehensive that in consequence their general would again try to avoid battle and continue the retreat across the San Jacinto. As time passed and no preparation was made to attack, their fears, they thought, were justified, and the old question of deposing the commander-in-chief was revived."*
The situation was such that all hope of success for the Texans depended upon an immediate attack, while Santa Anna could very well afford to delay action for several days until his armies could be better concentrated. The Texans had no reserves that could be ordered up, and with the exception of a few scattered volunteer companies still en route to headquarters, the sole defenders of the Texas cause were the less than eight hundred men encamped on Buffalo bayou. The arrival of Cos in the morning was a warning that other Mexican troops were probably on the way, so that, barring the impossible alternative of retreat, the only resource was to check the approach of more reinforce- ments and to crush the enemy where they lay. It was in view of these circumstances that the destruction of Vince's bridge became an im- portant piece of strategy. Though the removal of the bridge was not a permanent obstacle to communication, it did serve to delay any force that might attempt to cross the stream at that point, and had Santa An- na's army been able to retreat in good order or had reinforcements ap- proached before the conclusion of the battle, this delay would have proved a decisive advantage to the Texans. As it was, the destruction
* Eugene C. Barker in Tex. Hist. Assn. Quarterly, Vol. IV.
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of the bridge by Deaf Smith and his two companions on the morning of the 21st had no bearing on the issue of the battle .*
A council of war was held about noon, and the decision taken to make an attack on the morning following. The announcement was sullenly received. It was then determined to get the opinion of the sol- diers themselves. Going around from mess to mess the captains put the question of fighting at once or on the morrow, and the eager and almost unanimous answer was for immediate attack. The individual soldiers were in command at San Jacinto, and the rank and file won the victory the laurels of which were subsequently contested among so many of the nominal leaders.
At half past three the officers were ordered to parade their com- mands. The troops displayed alacrity and spirit and were anxious for the contest .; The conscious disparity of number seemed only to in- crease their enthusiasm and confidence, and heighten their eagerness for the conflict.
The situation of the camp partly screened by woods made it possible to make arrangements for battle without exposing the designs to the enemy. The first regiment, commanded by Colonel Burleson, was as- signed the center. The second regiment, under command of Colonel Sherman, formed the left wing. The artillery was placed on the right of the first regiment, and the cavalry, under Mirabeau B. Lamar, was the extreme right. The first movement was to dispatch the cavalry toward the enemy's left, followed by the entire line in rapid advance. The Texans charged out of the timber so quickly that they had reached the little valley and were pressing up the slope toward the Mexican breast- works before the enemy realized what was taking place. Santa Anna was asleep and most of his followers were resting in their quarters. From their camp the Mexicans could not see the Texans in the low ground, and were apprized of their approach by the firing from the breastworks and the loud battle-cry of "Remember the Alamo" which
* The statements frequently found that Vince's bayou presented the only obstacles between the San Jacinto and the Brazos seem to overlook the existence of Sims' and Bray's bayou, both of which are southern branches of Buffalo Bayou and, at the present time, much more formidable streams than Vince's. Alphonso Steele, the last survivor of the battle, is authority for the statement that at that time the road between Harrisburg and Lynch's ferry followed Buffalo bayou more closely than the modern highway, and that Vince's, where it was bridged, was a boggy, treacherous place, with high banks, so that the removal of the bridge would have made a wide detour necessary to get over.
t Following Houston's report of the battle.
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came up from below. The action was commenced by Sherman's on- slaught upon the enemy in the woods near the river, quickly followed by the assault of the whole front on the line of fortification. According to Houston's report, the conflict lasted about eighteen minutes from the time of close action until the Texans were in possession of the enemy's encampment. "The conflict in the breast works lasted but a few minutes ; many of the troops encountered hand to hand, and, not having the ad- vantage of bayonets on our side, our riflemen used their pieces as war- clubs, breaking many of them off at the breech. The rout commenced at half past four, and the pursuit by the main army continued until twilight. A guard was then left in charge of the enemy's encampment, and our army returned with the killed and wounded. In the battle our loss was two killed and twenty-three wounded, six of whom mortally." No ac- curate report of the Mexican losses could be made, though more than half of their army were either killed or wounded. Many of the fugitives were overtaken in the marshes at the rear of the battlefield and were shot down or slaughtered with the bowie-knife.
As a mere military achievement, San Jacinto has a place among bat- tles that are won by impetuosity of attack and individual gallantry over su- perior numbers that are perhaps better disciplined but lacking in morale and individual effectiveness. In its results this battle was decisive. It marked the triumph of American expansion over the Southwest, and the subsequent war which extended the dominion from the Rocky mountains to the Pacific was, in many respects, a consequence of San Jacinto. From this point, the results of the brief engagement in which the whole number of contestants were little more than two full regiments have continued as active forces through every epoch of American history and affecting every department of national life.
On the following day, near Vince's bridge, while trying to make his escape to the Brazos, Santa Anna was captured, in disguise as a common soldier, and was taken to the Texas camp, where he was soon identified as the dictator and author of all the calamities of Texas. It was with difficulty that the Texans were restrained from hanging him at once, and during his subsequent captivity in Texas he was saved from vengeance only by the vigilance of the authorities. An armistice was soon arranged providing for a cessation of hostilities until a permanent peace could be negotiated, and in the meantime the Mexican troops on the Brazos and vicinity were to be withdrawn.
Soon after the battle Santa Anna was taken to the temporary capital
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at Galveston island, whence the government, with the illustrious prisoner, moved to Velasco. Here, on May 14th, Santa Anna signed two treaties, one of them being a secret agreement, according to which he was to send the Mexican forces out of Texas and to lend his aid in securing the rec- ognition of the independence of Texas. The public treaty was forwarded to General Filisola, chief in command of the remaining Mexican troops in Texas, and was ratified by him toward the end of May.
The forces under Filisola were at the Brazos when the news of the overthrow of Santa Anna came, and he at once began concentrating the different divisions and retreated to the Colorado. The Mexicans were al- most without provisions and had suffered severely from the long cam- paign across the abandoned country. The way to the Colorado was one scene of hardships owing to the heavy floods and scarcity of food, and it was an emaciated and worn-out army that reached Victoria about the mid- dle of May. Here the troops that had been stationed at San Antonio joined in the retreat. In the meantime the Mexican government had learned of the disastrous ending of the invasion. Instructions were at once forwarded to Filisola to hold the territory already gained, and that, as the treaty with Santa Anna had been signed while he was a prisoner, it was annulled, and that the independence of the revolting state should not be recognized. But these orders from the central government did riot reach Filisola until his troops had crossed the Nueces on the route to Mata- moros, and at a consultation of the officers it was decided that, owing to the 'destitute condition of the army and the treaty already approved by Filisola, the retreat should continue. By the middle of June, therefore, the Mexican forces, once so brilliantly arrayed and well equipped but now so gaunt and disorganized, had crossed the Rio Grande, within less than four months after Travis had sent out final appeals for help from the Alamo.
Santa Anna was detained in Texas, at Velasco and Columbia, for several months, finally being sent to Washington in the United States, and thence returned to Mexico, where he had been previously defeated for the office of president. Mexico by no means resigned her Texas province ungrudgingly, and the treaty of Santa Anna was never ratified. Prepara- tions were begun for another invasion, but owing to political troubles at home the troops at Matamoros never crossed the Rio Grande. The in- dependence of Texas existed in fact from the victory at San Jacinto, and the subsequent expeditions across the borders of the two countries are hardly to be regarded as part of the war for Texas independence.
CHAPTER XXII
TEXAS AS A REPUBLIC
The Republic of Texas existed as a unit in the family of nations nearly ten years, or from the declaration of independence on March 2, 1836, until February 19, 1846, when President Jones surrendered the executive authority to the newly elected governor of the state.
In exercise of the powers conferred by the constitution, in September, 1836, occurred an election for the offices of president, vice president, and senators and representatives to congress. Stephen F. Austin and the late governor, Henry Smith, were the first presidential candidates to be put forward. They represented the political factions in Texas before the revolution. Two weeks before the election, meetings at Columbia and elsewhere proposed the candidacy of General Houston. Houston's ex- altation in the minds of the people after his successful campaign is shown by the fact that he was chosen by a large majority over Stephen F. Aus- tin, whose noble and consistent patriotism was for the time dimmed by the military glory of the former. Mirabeau B. Lamar was elected vice president. The appointment of Austin to the office of secretary of state and Smith as secretary of war was the result of Houston's determination to harmonize the political factions and secure unity of action for the wel- fare of the republic.
At the same time with the election of the new government, the peo- ple gave unanimous approval of the constitution, and also practically the total vote in favor of annexation of Texas to the United States. By provision of the constitution Houston was not to enter office until the following December, while congress assembled on the first of October. By mutual agreement, the president and vice president of the provisional government retired from office on October 22d, and on the same day Houston was inaugurated, this irregularity being sanctioned by congress.
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