An illustrated history of Skagit and Snohomish Counties; their people, their commerce and their resources, with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington, Part 23

Author: Inter-state Publishing Company (Chicago, Ill.)
Publication date: 1906
Publisher: [Chicago] Interstate Publishing Company
Number of Pages: 1172


USA > Washington > Skagit County > An illustrated history of Skagit and Snohomish Counties; their people, their commerce and their resources, with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington > Part 23
USA > Washington > Snohomish County > An illustrated history of Skagit and Snohomish Counties; their people, their commerce and their resources, with an outline of the early history of the state of Washington > Part 23


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For several days more Governor Stevens labored in vain to get the Indians to accept his terms of peace, namely, that they must throw aside their guns and submit to the justice and mercy of the government, surrendering all murderers for trial. The Indians would conclude no peace on other terms than that they should be left in possession of their territory as before the treaties. On the 19th Governor Stevens directed his march westward. His battle with the Indians on that date and the incidents of his return were thus summarized in his official report :


"So satisfied was I that the Indians would carry into effect their determination, avowed in the coun- cils in their own camps for several nights previously, to attack me, that, in starting, I formed my whole party and moved in order of battle. I moved on under fire one mile to water, when, forming a corral of the wagons and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on the stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to defend my position and fight the Indians. Our position in a low open basin five or six hundred yards across [he was attacked on what is known as Charles Russell's ranch] was good. and with the aid of our corral, we could defend ourselves against a vastly superior force of the enemy.


"The fight continued till late in the night. Two charges were made to disperse the Indians, the last led by Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw in person, with twenty-four men; but, whilst driving before him some hundred and fifty Indians, an equal number pushed into his rear, and he was compelled to cut his way through them towards the camp, when. drawing up his men, and aided by the teamsters and pickets who gallantly sprang forward, he drove the Indians back in full charge upon the corral. Just before the charge the friendly Nez Perces, fifty in number, who had been assigned to hold the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by the enemy they came not to fight the Nez Perces but the whites. 'Go to your camp,' said they, 'or we will wipe it out.' Their camp, with the women and children, was on a stream about a mile distant,


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and I directed them to retire, as I did not require their assistance and was fearful that my men might not be able to distinguish them from hostiles, and thus friendly Indians be killed.


"Towards night I notified Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe that I was fighting the Indians, that 1 should move the next morning and expressed the opinion that a company of his troops would be of service. In his reply he stated that the Indians had burned up his grass and suggested that I should return to his camp and place at his disposal my wagons in order that he might move his whole command and his supplies to the Umatilla or some other point, where sustenance could be found for his animals. To this arrangement I assented and Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe sent to my camp Lien- tenant Davidson, with detachments from the com- panics of dragoons and artillery with a mounted howitzer. They reached my camp about two o'clock in the morning, everything in good order and most of the men at the corral asleep. A picket had been driven in by the enemy an hour and a half before, that on the hill south of the corral, but the enemy was immediately dislodged, and ground pits being dug, all points were held. The howitzer having been fired on the way out, it was believed nothing would be gained by waiting until morning and the whole force immediately returned to Lieu- tenant-Colonel Steptoe's camp.


"Soon after sunrise the enemy attacked the camp but was soon dislodged by the howitzer and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe's command. On my arrival at the camp, I urged Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe to build a blockhouse immediately, to leave one company to defend it with all his supplies, then to march below and return with an additional force and additional supplies, and by a vigorous winter campaign to whip the Indians into submission. I placed at his disposal for the building, my teams and Indian employes. The blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than ten days. My Indian storeroom was rebuilt at one corner of the stockade. "On the 23d day of September we started for The Dalles, which were reached on the 2d of October. Nothing of interest occurred on the road.


"In the action of the 19th my whole force con- sisted of Goff's company of sixty-nine, rank and file, the teamsters, herders, and Indian employes numbering about fifty men. Our train consisted of about five hundred animals, not one of which was captured by the enemy. We fought four hundred and fifty Indians and had one man mortally, one dangerously and two slightly wounded. We killed and wounded thirteen Indians. One-half of the Nez Perces, one hundred and twenty warriors ; all of the Yakimas and Palouses, two hundred war- riors ; the great bulk of the Cayuses and Umatillas, and an unknown number of the Walla Wallas and Indians from other bands were in the fight. The principal war chiefs were the son of Owhi, Isle


de Pere and Chief Quoltonee ; the latter of whom had two horses shot under him, and showed me a letter from Colonel Wright acknowledging his valuable services in bringing about the peace of the Yakimas.


"I have failed, therefore, in making the desired arrangements with the Indians in the Walla Walla, and the failure, to be attributed in part to the want of co-operation with me, as superintendent of Indian affairs, on the part of the regular troops, has its canses also in the whole plan of operations of the troops since Colonel Wright assumed command.


"The Nez Perces, entirely friendly last Decem- ber and Jannary, became first disaffected in conse- quence of the then chief of the Cayuses, Ume- howlish, and the friendly Caynses going into the Nez Perce country contrary to my positive orders. I refused to allow them to go there in December last, saying to them. 'I have ordered the Nez Perces to keep hostiles out of the country. If you go there your friends in the war party will come ; they can not be kept out. Through them dis- affection will spread among a portion of the Nez Perces.' Ume-howlish, my prisoner, was sent into the Nez Perce country by Colonel Wright, and from the time of his arrival there all the efforts made by Agent Craig to prevent the spread of disaffection were aborted. What I apprehended and predicted had already come to pass. Looking Glass, the prominent man of the lower Nez Perces, endeav- ored to betray me on the Spokane as I was coming in from the Blackfoot council, and I was satisfied from that time that he was only awaiting a favorable moment to join bands with Kamiakin in a war upon the whites, and Colonel Wright's management of affairs in the Yakima furnished the opportunity.


"The war was commenced in the Yakima on our part in consequence of the attempt. first, to seize the murderers of the agent, Bolon, and miners who had passed through their country; and, second, to punish the tribe for making common cause with them and driving Major Haller out of the country. It is greatly to be deplored that Colonel Wright had not first severely chastised the Indians, and insisted not only upon the rendition of the murderers, but upon the absolute and unconditional submission of the whole tribe to the justice and mercy of the government. The long delays which occurred in the Yakima, the talking and not fighting. this attempt to pacify the Indians and not reducing them to submission, thus giving safe conduct to murderers and assassins, and not seizing them for summary and exemplary punishment, gave to Kamiakin the whole field of the interior, and by threats, lies and promises he has brought into the combination one- half of the Nez Perce nation and the least thing may cause the Spokanes, Coeur d'Alenes, Colvilles and Okanogans to join them.


"I state boklly that the cause of the Nez Perces becoming disaffected and finally going into war, is


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the operations of Colonel Wright east of the Cas- cades-operations so feeble, so procrastinating, so entirely unequal to the emergency, that not only has a severe blow been struck at the credit of the government and the prosperity and character of this remote section of the country, but the impression has been made upon the Indians that the people and the soldiers were a different people. I repeat to you officially that when the Indians attacked me they expected Colonel Steptoe would not assist me. and when they awoke from their delusion Kamiakin said, 'I will now let these people know who Kam- iakin is.' One of the good effects of the fight is that the Indians have learned that we are one people, a fact which had not been previously made apparent to them by the operations of the regular troops.


"Is, sir, the army sent here to protect our people and punish Indian tribes who, without cause and in cold blood and in spite of solemn treaties, murder our people, burn our houses and wipe out entire settlements? Is it the duty of General Wool and his officers to refuse to co-operate with me in my appropriate duties as superintendent of Indian affairs, and thus practically assume those cuties themselves? Is it the duty of General Wool, in his schemes of pacifying the Indians, to trample down the laws of congress; to issue edicts prohibiting settlers returning to their claims and thus for at least one county, the Walla Walla, make himself dictator over the country ?"


From the refusal of the Indians to treat with Stevens, and their attack upon the party returning from the council, it would naturally seem that the end of the war was still far in the future. Not so. however. Colonel Wright proved more successful, and yet not more successful, in the efforts he soon after inaugurated to pacify the Indians than had Stevens. The man who pursues the policy of con- ceding to the adverse party all he can ask can hardly fail to be successful in negotiations.


October 19th Wright was instructed by General Wool to proceed in person at the earliest possible date to the Walla Walla country and to attend to the establishing of a post there. In the order Wool used the following significant language :


"It is also of the highest importance that you, the senior officer (the chief man), should see and talk with all the tribes in that region in order to ascertain their wants, feelings and disposition to- wards the whites. Warned by what has occurred, the general trusts you will be on your guard against the whites and adopt the most prompt and vigorous measures to crush the enemy before they have time to combine for resistance, also check the war and prevent further trouble by keeping the whites out of the Indian country."


As to the post above referred to, the site selected for it was a point on the bank of Mill creek, six miles above its junction with the Walla Walla river.


The rest of the order was duly complied with. A council was called and forty Indians condescended to attend, practically all of whom denounced the treaty of 1855 and Chief Lawyer, of the Nez Perces, as the one by whom, mainly, the Indians were induced to sign it. Wright seemed more than will- ing to condone the perfidions wretches who signed the treaty as a deliberate act of treachery, and then when they had lulled the whites into a feeling of security, began assiduously the work of dissemi- nating hostile feeling and of organizing a general war, for the purpose of exterminating or expelling the white race. His assurance to the Indians was : "The bloody cloth should be washed, and not a spot should be left upon it. The Great Spirit, who created both the whites and the red men, com- manded us to love one another. All past differ- ences must be thrown behind us. The hatchet must be buried and for the future perpetual friendship must exist between us. The good talk we have this day listened to should be planted and grow up in our hearts and drive away all bad feclings and preserve peace and friendship between us forever. Put what I say in your hearts and when you return to your homes, repeat it to all your friends." In his letter to General Wool reporting the proceedings of his council, Wright laid all the blame of the war upon the Walla Walla treaties. "Give them back those treaties," said he, "and no cause of war exists."


Such maudlin sentimentality, such shameful truckling with the enemies of those it was Wright's duty to defend, seemed akin to treason. Indignant and hurt, Governor Stevens wrote to the secretary of war: "It seems to me that we have in this territory fallen upon evil times. I hope and trust that some energetic action may be taken to stop this trifling with great public interests, and to make our flag respected by the Indians of the interior. They scorn our people and our flag. They feel that they can kill and plunder with impunity. They denom- inate us a nation of old women. They did not do this when the volunteers were in the field. I now make the direct issue with Colonel Wright, that he has made a concession to the Indians which he had no authority to make ; that by so doing he has done nothing but get a semblance of peace; and that by his acts, he has in a measure weakened the influence of the service having the authority to make treaties and having charge of the friendly Indians. He has, in my judgment, abandoned his own duty, which was to reduce the Indians to submission, and has trenched upon and usurped a portion of mine."


The citizens of the two territories, Oregon and Washington, were thrown into a furor of indig- nation by the conclusion of his shameful peace. The sacrifice of money and effort in equipping the volun- teers, the sacrifices of the volunteers themselves, the traversing of dusty plains, the scaling of lofty and forbidding mountains, the sufferings of that dread


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winter campaign in the Walla Walla valley, the loss of life and limb, the brilliant and well-deserved victories of the volunteer arms-all these were for nothing. The regular officers step in and rob the country of all the fruits of victory, concede to the Indians everything they could ask, and then, to add insult to injury, General Wool says he hopes that Wright "warned by what has occurred, will be on his guard against the whites and prevent trouble by keeping the whites out of the Indian country," and that under the existing arrangements he doesn't "believe that the war can be renewed by the whites."


Elwood Evans, who was himself a citizen of Washington territory at the time and a participant in some of its public events, may be assumed to have correctly summarized the general opinion of the people in the following paragraphs from his history of the Northwest:


"That quasi peace was but the proclaimed con- tinuance of the assurance by the United States army officers to the hostile Indians, 'we came not into your country to fight, but merely to establish posts.' It now officially announced the close of a war by General Wool, which he had never commenced to prosecute as war. It was but the unblushing pub- lication of a policy inspired alone by him, and exe- cuted under his orders by officers whom he had handicapped in the enemy's country by instructions, the observance of which was but the triumph of Kamiakin. It was the official, humiliating conces- sion to the hostiles of everything that they had demanded, or had inaugurated a war to accomplish, viz., the keeping of white settlers out of their country-save alone the isolated faet, that the Indians had made no resistance to or protest against the establishment of military posts within their ter- ritory. "That failure to protest against the erection of posts was the only evidence of passive submission by the hostiles; yet with what avidity was the fact seized by General Wool to assure him that he was occupying the Indian territory by his troops, and that those troops were remaining there in peaceable possession ! What a naked and barren victory, which proved too much ; for it meant nothing except that armed troops within fortified posts were the only white men who could occupy such country. It too palpably demonstrated a suspension of hos- tilities patched up by appealing to the Indian: 'Let my troops stay here; and I will protect you and keep out the white settler.'


"General Wool, in the execution of this plan of campaign by his army of occupation, not for making war, had effectually accomplished the aim of Kam- iakin in the instigation of the outbreak. The com- manding general had avowed upon several occa- sions his policy of protecting the hostile Indians against the whites, and of expelling them from and keeping them out of the country. In fact, there appears to have been a common object actuating both Kamiakin and General Wool : Both were


equally determined that the whites should not settle in nor occupy the country of Kamiakin or Peo-peo- mox-mox ; both were equally hostile to the volun- teers of the two territories, who sought to save the country for white settlement; both were averse to any hostile demonstrations against the Indians ; both were willing that Governor Stevens should be cut off and his party sacrificed, when official duty com- pelled his presence in the Indian territory; both alike cordially hated the people of the two terri- tories. Could Kamiakin have asked more than the performance of Wool's orders ?- 'Leave a company and a howitzer to protect the Cayuse Indians against the volunteers.' *


* 'Warn Colonel Shaw and his volunteers to leave the country ; and should they fail to comply, arrest, disarm and send them out.' How it must have delighted old Kamiakin when he had interpreted to him that interdict against white settlement: 'No emigrant or other white person will be permitted to settle or remain in the Indian country.' Glorious duty for American troops to protect the blood-stained murderers of our people, to stand guard that the spirit of treaties shall be violated, that Americans may not occupy America and every part of its domain !"


The regulars soon discovered that they had been crying "peace, peace, when there was no peace," for it was not long until there began to be apprehensions of a renewed outbreak. These conditions obtained throughout the entire year 1857 and during the winter of that year the Catholic fathers reported that they feared an uprising in the spring. The Spokanes and Cocur d'Alenes, among whom the emissaries of Kamiakin had been spreading dis- affection ever since the peace had been patched up in 1856, announced that the soldiers must not show themselves in their country. It was the scheme of the wily Kamiakin to first unite the tribes in oppo- sition to the whites, then draw a detachment of soldiers into the country and treat them as he treated Haller in the Yakima valley.


The plan worked admirably. He cultivated the friendship of Tilcoax, a skilled Palouse horse-thief, and induced him to organize a pillaging expedition against the stock belonging to Fort Walla Walla, well knowing that sooner or later a counter expe- dition must be made by the soldiers to recover the lost animals. He also caused the murder of Colville miners, hoping that the whites there would ask for troops. They did call for troops. Their petition could not be disregarded, and in May, 1858, Colonel E. J. Steptoe set out to the Colville country, disre- garding the warnings of the Indians that no whites would be allowed to travel through their lands. Steptoe, or more strictly speaking. his subordinates, committed a most egregious and incomprehensible blunder in starting from Walla Walla. On account of the great weight of provisions and baggage, a brilliant quartermaster conceived the idea of leaving behind the greater part of the ammunition, by way


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of lightening the load. As Joseph MCEvoy ex- presses it, the force was beaten before it left Walla Walla.


The expedition was made in May. The wild torrent of Snake river was running bank full from the floods of summer as the command crossed. Timothy, a chief of the Nez Perces, with a few followers, was living then at the mouth of the Alpowa, and by his efficient aid the soldiers crossed the stream in good order and good time, and con- tinued on their way, the brave old chief accompany- ing them.


On May 16th the force reached a place which George F. Canis, on the authority of Thomas B. Beall, chief government packer of the expedition, describes as low and marshy, with big swales and thickets of quaking asp abounding, and surrounded by hills without timber. Mr. Beall locates the place as near the present town of Spangle. There is, however, much difference of opinion among the survivors as to where all this happened. But wher- ever it was, there the Indians gathered with hostile intention. Steptoe, realizing the dangerous odds, decided to return.


The next day, as the soldiers were descending a canyon to Pine creek, not far from where Rosalia is now located, Salteese, sub-chief of the Coeur d'Alenes, came up with an interpreter for a con- ference with Steptoe. The chief was making great professions of friendship, when one of the friendly Nez Perces struck him over the head with a whip, nearly knocking him from his horse. "What do you mean by speaking with a forked tongue to the white chief?" demanded the Nez Perce brave. Salteese. very angry, rode away in defiant mood. No sooner were the retreating forces well in the canyon than the attack was made. Second-Lieutenant William Gaston's forces were the first to draw the fire of the enemy. Steptoe ordered Gaston to hold fire. When again asked for orders he gave the same command, but Gaston disobeyed and soon the firing became general. Gaston and Captain O. H. P. Taylor were in command of the rear guard, and, with amazing courage and devotion, kept the line intaet, foiling all efforts of the Indians to rush through. They sent word to Steptoe to halt and give them a chance to secure more ammunition. But Steptoe deemed it safer to make no pause, and soon after those gallant heroes fell. A fierce fight raged for pos- session of their bodies. The Indians secured that of Gaston, but a small band of heroes, fighting like clemons, got the body of the noble Taylor. One notable figure in this death grapple was De May, a Frenchman, who had been trained in the Crimea and in Algeria, and who made havoc among the Indians with his gun-barrel used as a saber, but at last he, too, went down before numbers, crying, "Oh, my God, for a saber!"


At nightfall they had reached a point as to the exact location of which there is much difference of


opinion. Here the disorganized and suffering force made camp, threw out a picket line for defense, and buried such dead as they had not been forced to leave. In order to divert the Indians they deter- mined, having buried their howitzers, to leave the balance of their stores. They hoped that if the Indians made an attack in the night they might succeed in stealing away. The Indians, however, feeling sure that they had the soldiers at their mercy. made no effort at a night attack. But it is stated that Kamiakin, head chief of the Yakimas, urged them to do so. Had he carried his point, the night of May 17, 1858, would have been one of melan- choly memory. Another massacre would have been added to the series of frontier outrages which have darkened our earlier annals.


There was but one chance of salvation, and this was by means of a difficult trail which the Indians had left unguarded, as the Nez Perce chief, Tim- othy, discovered by reconnoitering, the savages rightly supposing it to be entirely unknown to the whites. But by the good favor of fortune or Prov- idence, Timothy knew this pass. But for him the next day would doubtless have witnessed a grim and ghastly massacre. During the dark and cloudy night, the soldiers, mounted and in silence, followed Timothy over the wretched trail. Michael Kinney, a well-known resident of Walla Walla, was in charge of the rear guard, and is our chief authority for some portions of this narrative.


The horrors of that night retreat were probably never surpassed in the history of Indian warfare in the Northwest. Several of the wounded were lashed to pack animals, and were thus led away on that dreadful ride. Their sufferings were intense, and two of them, McCrossen and Williams, suffered so unendurably that they writhed themselves loose from their lashings and fell to the ground, begging their comrades to leave some weapons with which they might kill themselves. But the poor wretches were left lying there in the darkness. During the night the troops followed, generally at a gallop, the faithful Timothy, on whose keen eyes and mind their lives depended. The wounded and a few whose horses gave out were scattered at intervals along the trail. Some of these finally reappeared, but most were lost. After twenty-four hours the troops found that they had reached Snake river. Here the unwearied Timothy threw out his own people as guards against the pursuing enemy and set the women of his tribe to ferry the force across the turbulent river. This was safely accomplished and thus the greater portion of the command reached Walla Walla in safety from that ill-starred expedition.




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