USA > Washington > History of Washington; the rise and progress of an American state, Vol. III > Part 25
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Hanville Gikall
THE RISE AND PROGRESS
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. ... . sadred Haller he had received oss she thought jurifod him in taking the om bo - bo Kad dready cnused the river. d & 19 -na and men, all mounted, a pack train Hab perw-os in a mali and « howitzer. It was directed lo tery droghe he Wasuma Valley and tooperate with Slaoglors, es far as witha tu spomary or desirable.
Granville G.Stallen
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Just as this expedition was about to start, or soon after it had departed, an Indian brought news to the fort that a large band of Klikitats had crossed the divide, separating the Yakima from the Columbia, and were in the neighborhood of the Cascades, or on the Salmon River, and another force of twenty men was sent off in that direction to investigate. This report proved to be unfounded, but when it reached the Willamette, and the settlements along the Columbia and Cowlitz, it produced the greatest consternation. It was apparently started by the return of the party of Klikitats from the Cathlapootle to their own country, as described by Gibbs, for Haller's party crossed their trail a day or two later, and supposed it to indicate that the Indians were massing to oppose them.
Haller's force left the Dalles October 3d, and proceeded rapidly northward. On the 6th it had crossed the divide, and just as the advance was descending its northern slope, into the valley of one of the upper tributaries of the Simcoe River, it encountered a strong body of Indians, a large part of whom were concealed in the timber growing along the banks of the streams. At some distance, on a high, barren hill, a chief appeared, who called loudly to his warriors, apparently inciting them to action, and they responded with a series of whoops and yells, which convinced the troops that the enemy was present in large force. An effective charge was immediately made, by which the Indians were driven from the timber, and forced back over the hills. The losses of the command at this point were one killed and seven wounded.
The troops now took possession of a high ridge, from which most of the surrounding country could be readily seen. They had advanced so far that there was no longer any timber
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THE RISE AND PROGRESS
beyond them, in which the Indians could conceal themselves, except at one place on the left, in which a number of them had taken refuge. It was apparent that they already out- numbered the troops, and several large war parties soon after- ward arrived, which greatly increased their confidence. A battle had begun and the Indians, relying on their numbers, were determined to make a stand. Arrangements were accordingly made, as quickly as possible, to dispose the troops in the most advantageous position. To do this Cap- tain D. A. Russell, who occupied the left of the line, made a charge, with a small force, to dislodge the Indians from the bushes in his front, as they held this point of vantage in con- siderable numbers, and with some persistence. They were not driven from it without difficulty, and night came on before they were finally compelled to abandon it.
After the wounded had been collected and cared for, the command advanced about a mile, to a more desirable position, on a higher ridge, where it would be more secure against a night attack. It was dark before this position was gained, and from the noise made by the Indians it was, for a time, thought they were preparing to attack. One of the guides who had accompanied the party, made an inspection of their line, and reported that their preparations indicated such an attempt, but no attack was made until after daylight on the following morning.
During the night Major Haller ascertained that the posi- tion he now occupied was no doubt defensible, but as it was destitute of wood, grass and water, it was evident that it could not long be held.
On the morning of the 7th the little force found itself nearly surrounded by fully seven or eight hundred Indians, whose numbers were doubled by fresh arrivals during the day.
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Taking advantage of an opening in the Indian line, Major Haller sent off a courier to the Dalles, with a request that Lieutenant Day and the forty-four men of the third artillery who remained there might be sent to his assistance.
During all of Sunday the troops held their position, although suffering greatly for water. The Indians at no time attacked them in force, but annoyed them by advancing small parties of skirmishers, which were driven back by repeated bayonet charges. At sunset neither side had gained any particular advantage, but the troops could not much longer maintain their ground without water, and Haller accordingly determined to draw off, during the night, and return to the Dalles. His losses during the day had been two soldiers killed and thirteen wounded, and it was apparent that the retreat would be very greatly encumbered by having to care for these disabled men.
That night all the horses that could be spared were turned loose, much of the baggage and provisions were destroyed, and the troops were safely withdrawn from the position which they had held during the day. But unfortunately the rear guard became separated from the advance, and a halt was made by the column which Haller himself com- manded, and which had the wounded in charge, at a short distance from the battlefield, in a place which offered some advantages for defense. Here fires were kindled by the soldiers to notify their comrades of their position, but these also gave notice to the Indians that the troops were escaping, and the fight was almost immediately resumed. Haller's force now amounted to only forty-four effective men, and these, on the morning of the 8th, resumed the retreat. A running fight ensued, which continued nearly the whole day. Near sundown the soldiers made a final charge on their
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pursuers, by which they drove them off, and they were not again molested.
Captain Russell's portion of the command was not attacked during the retreat, having taken a separate trail, and there- fore escaped the observation of their pursuers. All the wounded reached the Dalles in safety, but the howitzer was spiked and abandoned during the retreat. The total loss, during these three days of fighting, was five soldiers killed and seventeen wounded. The Indian loss was never known, but was believed to have been much larger.
Lieutenant Slaughter learned of the failure of Haller's expedition shortly after he had crossed the mountains, and realizing that his small force would be entirely at the mercy of the Indians should they assemble in force to attack him, he fell back through the Nachess Pass, and took up a position on the White River, from which he reported to Captain Maloney.
CHAPTER XLV. THE WAR EAST OF THE MOUNTAINS.
T HE news of Haller's defeat, and of Slaughter's retreat across the range, filled the settlers in both territories with alarm. They realized that war was upon them, and that they were almost wholly unprepared for it. It was likely to be a war of the most merciless and distressing kind-a war in which a lurking enemy might be met anywhere, by the roadside, behind any tree, at the border of the settler's clearing, or at the door of his cabin-a war in which those who went forth to fight must leave their wives and children almost wholly unpro- tected, and perhaps to be butchered by those whom they had heretofore regarded, and perhaps still regarded, as their friends.
For such a war, or for any war, the settlers were but poorly prepared. They would certainly be greatly outnumbered, if all the Indians should join those who had already taken up arms. There were in the two territories, at that time, not more than forty thousand white people, of whom only five thousand were in Washington, where the war was to be fierc- est and most general. Of these not more than sixteen hun- dred were capable of bearing arms. They were scattered in widely separated settlements, from Bellingham Bay to the California line, and from the ocean to the Cascades, along the Columbia, on both shores of Puget Sound, and along the Strait of Fuca. Many of these isolated settlements would be hopelessly at the mercy of their Indian neighbors if they should become hostile. And yet, dangerous as the situation was, there were some who did not realize it, and persisted in believing that no Indians would harm them, or that all Indians were so docile and harmless as not to be dangerous. The confidence of these only increased the difficulties of the situation, since those in authority felt
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themselves as much bound to protect them as any others. These settlers were almost without arms. Considering the fact that they had recently come so. far with their families, through a wild country which they knew to be inhabited only by wild beasts and savages, it is surprising how defenseless they were in this respect. A few of them had rifles, which had been more or less neglected and unused since their arrival in the territory; some had shotguns, old army mus- kets, or guns of even more ancient and useless pattern, all more or less valueless for purposes of war. The territory had no arms, those which the national government would otherwise have provided having been refused by Secretary Davis, when Governor Stevens had asked for them, on the ground that no militia had been organized to receive them, as the act of Congress required.
The few troops which the national government had sent into the two territories were wholly insufficient for their pro- tection. At Fort Steilacoom there were two companies of infantry, of 152 men; at Fort Vancouver two companies of infantry, 194 men; at the Dalles three companies, two of infantry and one of artillery, 231 men; at Fort Lane, in the Rogue River Valley, two companies of dragoons, 115 men; and at Port Orford one company of artillery of 47 men, making a total of 741 men. In addition to these Lieutenants P. H. Sheridan and R. S. Williamson had recently arrived at Vancouver, with an escort composed of a small detach- ment of dragoons and about 100 soldiers belonging to the Fourth Infantry, which had been sent up from California as an exploring expedition.
Inadequate as this small force was for the defense of the settlers, it was made still more so by the incompetence of its principal officers. The commander-in-chief was Major
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General John E. Wool, whose headquarters were at Benicia, California. He was now nearly seventy-two years of age, having been born February 20, 1784. But he was a tough old soldier and eight years later was still rendering his country good service in the war between the States. He had seen service in Mexico, but had had no experience in Indian war- fare. He wholly misunderstood the character of the uprising in Washington and Oregon, and from the first persisted in believing that the troubles were designedly caused by the settlers themselves, and that the Indians were blameless. He was not a graduate of West Point, and was apparently more or less influenced by that feeling which subsists in the army between those who have graduated from that institu- tion and those who have not. He had taken a special dislike to Governor Stevens, who, it is said, while in San Francisco, on his return to the territory with his family in 1854, had offended Wool by disputing some pretension made by him, at a dinner party, at which several other officers were pre- sent, to have won the battle of Buena Vista. The offence thus given promised, at a later time, to be the cause of almost as many woes to the people of Oregon and Washington, as the dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles had brought upon the Greeks at the seige of Troy.
The active command at the beginning of hostilities fell to Major Gabriel J. Rains, an officer of no great capacity. He lacked enterprise, the first and great qualification of the successful soldier, and failed to command the respect of his troops for that reason and, as General Sheridan says, because of "a general belief in his incompetency." He wasted his opportunities, and seemingly concerned himself about matters of form, rather than about inflicting serious injury on the enemy. His one campaign was a failure, and he
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quickly returned to his headquarters, leaving the war to be prosecuted by the volunteers.
After Haller's defeat he called upon the governor of Oregon for four companies of volunteers, and upon Governor Mason for two. These were promptly furnished; indeed both governors did more than he asked of them. Gover- nor Curry, of Oregon, called for eight companies, which were assembled and sent forward to the Dalles, where it was expected Rains would furnish arms for them, and where they arrived quite as soon as he was ready to receive them. Governor Mason raised two, one at Olympia, commanded by Captain Gilmore Hays, and one at Vancouver, under Captain William Strong. Another special company was enlisted to be commanded by Indian Agent B. F. Shaw, which was to be sent to the rescue of Governor Stevens, then known to be returning through the hostile country, from his council with the Blackfeet, and about whose safety the settlers, in both territories, were considerably concerned.
The Washington volunteers were mustered into the service of the United States, but those of Oregon were not. Gover- nor Curry seems, even thus early, to have distrusted the regular officers. There had been ample opportunity for , him to observe their conduct in southern Oregon, where the Indians had been more or less troublesome since Governor Lane's time, and it is quite possible, as was charged at the time, that his purpose was, in calling for eight companies instead of the four asked for, to raise a force large enough to entitle it to be commanded by an officer who would outrank Rains. If this was his purpose it was amply justified by events.
Major Rains' letter to the governors, asking for volunteers, was dated October 9th, and Governor Curry's proclamation,
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calling for eight companies, was issued on the 11th, or as soon as it was received. By the 19th enough men had been enlisted to justify the election of regimental officers, and several of the companies had been sent forward to the Dalles. At the election J. W. Nesmith was chosen colonel by a prac- tically unanimous vote, J. K. Kelley lieutenant-colonel, A. N. Armstrong first major, and N. A. Chinn second major.
When the volunteers arrived at the Dalles Major Rains refused to accept more than the four companies he had asked for. He was naturally displeased because they were not to be mustered into the United States army, and placed under his command. But he was certainly more displeased because the officer who would command them would have a title superior to his own, and a command proportionately larger. Rains was one of those soldiers who fancy that their own importance is determined by the style of the shoulder straps they are entitled to wear and that their place in history will be fixed by the number of men they may sometime command, rather than by the use they make of them. He refused to issue arms, or supplies of any sort to the volunteers unless they would be mustered, and several letters were exchanged between him and Colonel Nesmith in regard to this matter. Nesmith offered to give him his own and other security for the arms, camp equipage, and other supplies that the soldiers were in need of, but Rains persistently refused to issue them, and urged Nesmith to permit four of his companies to be mustered into regular service, with himself as their com- mander, with the title of major, as that number of men would justify. But this Nesmith refused, as he was compelled to do, since he was under the orders of the governor, and the volunteers had been enlisted under assurance that they would be commanded by their own officers, and because he
1
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believed, and with reason, that the volunteers called for were no more than would be needed during the campaign.
Nesmith promptly informed Governor Curry of the diffi- culties he was encountering, both with Rains and in getting his supplies up the river, and he was efficiently supported both by the governor and his staff. By their energetic action most of the difficulties in the way of arming and supplying the volunteers were overcome, and they were ready to move into the hostile country almost as soon as Rains and his troops were, although they were already enlisted, armed, equipped, drilled and on the ground before the volunteers were called for.
Acting Governor Mason was early informed of the contro- versy between Rains and Nesmith, and attempted to solve the difficulty by appointing Rains a brigadier-general of volunteers. This appointment was apparently received with much satisfaction and was promptly accepted, though the effect of it was to increase his authority, importance and efficiency in no respect except in his own estimation. Indeed, it seems rather to have been a detriment than otherwise, since Sheridan says: "The command was not in accord with the commanding officer because of a general belief in his incompetency, and on account of the fictitious rank he assumed."
While this correspondence was going on, Nesmith's atten- tion was directed to the possible need of sending a force up the river to the Walla Walla country, at the same time that the main expedition moved into the Yakima Valley, some- thing that Rains apparently took no thought about. Nesmith consulted about this matter with Major Haller, but the latter thought the number of the enemy in the latter region would be such as to call for the presence of the entire force, both
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volunteer and regular. Rains was of this opinion also, as he wrote Nesmith : "We are too few, now, to meet the enemy, multiplied wonderfully, as we have reason to think, since the check of the troops in the field." And yet, too few as they were, he was still more concerned to have Nesmith put himself under his own command, with four hundred of his volunteers, than to have the hearty cooperation, which Nesmith promised, of the whole eight companies.
Events soon demonstrated that there was urgent need for troops in the Walla Walla country. On learning of Haller's defeat Nathan Olney, the Indian agent, had hastened from the Dalles to Fort Walla Walla, in order to prevent, if possible, a combination of the Indian tribes in that neighborhood-comprising the Walla Wallas, Umatil- las, Cayuses, Palouses, and the disaffected among the Nez Perces-from forming a combination with Kam-i-ah-kan. He also took with him the $500 which the commissioners had promised, at the Walla Walla council, to pay to Peo- peo-mox-mox as soon as it could be got to him, and he con- fidently hoped by making this payment, to convince that sordid savage of the good intentions of the Great Father, and that the government intended, on its part, faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the treaties.
On arriving at the fort he found this chief and his tribe encamped on the west side of the Columbia near the mouth of the Yakima, a circumstance which was certainly alarming, although under the treaty he had a right to be there, as he was authorized to establish a trading house at that point. But it was evident enough that he had not gone there with so many of his warriors, at that time, for purposes of trade. Olney's suspicions were confirmed by learning that the old chief had declared that his lands had not been sold,
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and that he would not permit any white settlers to invade them.
After conferring with James Sinclair, the trader in charge of Fort Walla Walla, which was still a Hudson's Bay post, Peo-peo-mox-mox was sent for, and told that Olney had brought with him the money and goods which Stevens and Palmer had promised should be paid him. But he was unwilling to receive them, repudiated the treaty, said he would receive neither money nor goods, and that he wanted the whites to leave his country. His conduct was so defiant that both Olney and Sinclair became alarmed, and after the chief had departed they determined, after carefully consider- ing the situation, that the fort should be abandoned, and all the ammunition in it, as well as everything that could be used for war purposes, destroyed. All the powder at the place was thrown into the Columbia, to prevent its falling into the hands of the Indians, and Olney gave Sinclair an official receipt for all the goods in the fort, relieving him of all respon- sibility for their loss. These goods were valued at $37,000, and there was a considerable stock of government stores in addition, which had been left there by Governor Stevens when he started for the Blackfoot country. Unfortunately these were not destroyed, and most of them fell into the hands of the Indians, who were thus enabled to begin the war better clothed than they ever had been in their lives, since they promptly pillaged the fort after Olney and Sinclair and the Hudson's Bay employees had abandoned it.
Before leaving for the Dalles, Olney issued a general warning to the white settlers in that part of the territory, nearly all of whom were old Hudson's Bay men, notifying them that the Indians were about to begin war, and advising them to prepare to leave the country as soon as a military
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escort, which he had asked to be sent from the Dalles, should arrive. Meantime they were to take such precautions as might seem best calculated to insure their own safety. He also cautioned them against showing any unnecessary alarm by making their preparations too openly, as that might cause an immediate outbreak.
This warning was issued on October 12th, one day after Governor Curry had made his call for volunteers. Two days later Narcisse Raymond sent a letter to the command- ing officer of the volunteer force, which he, for some reason, supposed to be on the way to the Walla Walla Valley, saying that Peo-peo-mox-mox was now openly showing his hostility, and had begun active war on the Americans. He had taken possession of the abandoned fort and pillaged it, taking both the Hudson's Bay and government property which it con- tained, and had removed his whole force, then thought to consist of a thousand warriors, to the south side of the river. The young men of the Umatillas were also for war, though most of their chiefs were still undecided, but two of them, with their people, had joined the Cayuses, and were doing all in their power to induce them to expel the Americans. The chiefs in the Walla Walla Valley, where he himself resided, were still opposed to war, and would not, he thought, join the hostiles. Their conduct since Mr. Olney's de- parture had been commendable, and they had done all they could to prevent Mr. Brooke's house, near Waiilat- pu, from being burned and pillaged, but they had not succeeded.
So far as he could learn, the Nez Perces would not join in the war. He had seen Joseph and Red Wolf, and both had assured him that they would suffer no hostile Indians to remain among them.
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He had been informed that it was the intention to send a force of only one hundred and fifty men into that country. As affairs then stood, he was convinced that this force would not be sufficient. He and his neighbors were few in num- bers, and entirely without arms or ammunition, and their situation was daily becoming more serious. The sooner assistance was sent the better, for Peo-peo-mox-mox was daily threatening to burn their houses and kill them, and he was not the only enemy they had to treat with.
From this information, as well as from that brought by Olney, it was evident enough that Nesmith was right in sus- pecting that a force ought to be sent up the river into the Walla Walla country, as soon as possible. But the purpose, both of Governor Curry and Governor Mason, as well as of all the volunteers themselves, was to cooperate with Major Rains in whatever he should think it expedient to do. They were willing to be guided by him, so far as he showed ability and willingness to make a successful campaign, and protect the settlements from hostile invasion, but they were not disposed to put themselves at the mercy of his incom- petency or inactivity.
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