USA > Washington > History of Washington; the rise and progress of an American state, Vol. III > Part 26
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Rains was not ready to move northward, from his camp opposite the Dalles, until October 30th. So deliberately had his preparations been made, that by that time Nesmith and his volunteers were quite as ready to advance as he was. On that day a start was made with 350 regulars, and six companies of volunteers, all mounted, and with provisions for twenty days. A few days later, two other companies of volunteers joined these, increasing Nesmith's command to 553 men.
The objective point for which the expedition started was Father Pandozy's mission on the Ahtanum, which, Sheridan
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says, "could be reached by two different routes, and though celerity of movement was essential, our commanding officer strategically adopted the longer one, and thus the Indians had ample opportunity to get away with their horses, cattle, women and children and camp property." On the second day Sheridan, with his twenty dragoons, struck a small body of Indians, but was unable to do them any particular injury, beyond getting possession of a considerable quantity of their winter food, which they were compelled to abandon. The whole command halted to learn the measure of his suc- cess, and then resumed its march into the lower Yakima Valley. As they entered it, a few Indians were seen, who were pursued for some distance, but none of them were cap- tured, nor was any considerable number discovered.
On the following day the march was resumed, up the valley parallel with the river, and shortly after noon a large war party was discovered on the opposite bank. Preparation was made to cross and attack them, but the river was cold and deep and swift, and none of the troops got over except Sheridan's dragoons. "The troops made a rush into the water," says Major Rains, in his report, "but, being on foot, tried again and again to cross the river, but failed, the swift current sweeping away two of their best men, who were thus drowned; whereupon I sent back to Colonel Nesmith for two companies of his soldiers, who, with the dragoons, drove headlong into the foaming torrent and, reaching the opposite shore, charged the enemy, who fled away over the hills, one of their balls striking, but fortunately not wounding, Colonel Nesmith's horse." Sheridan, being in advance, got over ahead of the volunteers and, because the regulars could give him no assistance, was, for a time, in a most pre- carious situation, but dismounting his men he received the
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savages, who immediately assailed him, with a fusillade, which, he says, "brought them to a halt, with some damage and more or less confusion."
As soon as Nesmith and the volunteers got over, the Indians fell back to the crest of a high ridge, on which they made many hostile demonstrations, threatening to charge down its face. According to Sheridan they numbered about six hundred, and "although the chances of whipping them did not seem overwhelmingly in our favor, yet Nesmith and I concluded we would give them a little fight, provided we could engage them without going beyond the ridge." But their efforts to bring on a battle were not successful, for if they advanced the Indians retreated, and if they drew back the Indians reappeared and renewed their noisy demonstra- tions, "beating their drums and yelling lustily." It soon became apparent that these noisy demonstrations were kept up only to cover the escape of the women and children to a place of safety in the mountains, and when this had been accomplished the Indians retired, and the troops recrossed the river and went into camp.
Next morning both the regulars and volunteers moved northward, but without crossing the river. Later in the day the Indians crossed, and rapidly moved ahead of the troops, leaving behind small parties of their boldest warriors to retard the advance as much as possible, by opening fire at long range, from such places as offered them concealment. This did but little harm, but it so far retarded the advances that, as General Sheridan says, "the patience of everyone but Major Rains was well-nigh exhausted."
About two o'clock in the afternoon a range of hills was reached, coming down close to the river on either side, and Rains decided to go into camp, as it was growing late, although
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Sheridan, and perhaps others, thought there was still time to accomplish something if proper effort was made. Sheri- dan proposed to make a charge, with the dragoons, through the lower canyon along the bank of the river, while the infan- try should charge up the hill, and drive the enemy down the other side. In this way he thought they might catch some of the fugitives, and perhaps inflict more serious damage. But Rains refused to have anything done, and so the tents were pitched, out of range of the Indian fire, but near enough to observe their menacing and tantalizing demonstrations. These they kept up until late in the afternoon, when some of the officers and many of the men could endure it no longer, and without waiting for orders, made a charge on their own account upon the offending savages. As soon as "this mob" as Sheridan calls it, got within range, they opened fire, and the Indians ran down the opposite face of the ridge, without offering any resistance. The hill was thus taken by this most unmilitary operation, and no one was hurt on either side. But Rains would not permit it to be held, and the soldiers lighted a large bonfire on its crest, in celebration of their victory, and then marched back to camp. But they had no sooner returned than the Indians reappeared on the summit, and exultingly warmed themselves at the fire which had been so generously built for their benefit, renewing their taunts and gestures of defiance, for the aggravation of their enemies, who were only restrained from making another onslaught by their unwarlike commander.
During the night the camp was strongly picketed but the Indians made no attempt to attack it. In the morning they still held their position on the hill, and at daylight the troops began another advance, two or three companies moving forward to drive them from the summit, while the main
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column led by Sheridan passed through the narrow canyon into the upper Yakima Valley.
This incident, which can scarcely be called a battle, or even a skirmish, took place at the eastern end of the high ridge which skirts the southern bank of the Ahtanum, and approaches the Yakima River so closely that the Northern Pacific right of way occupies nearly all the space between its eastern end and the river bank. It is only a short distance south of the old town of Yakima.
When the troops had passed cautiously through this narrow defile, the Indians had entirely disappeared from their front, except one old man, whose lame horse had prevented him from keeping up with his flying companions. This unfor- tunate was killed by the Indian guide who accompanied the expedition, before Sheridan's troops could prevent such a pitiful murder. The Indians were pursued during the remainder of the day, and as evening approached, the troops went into camp a short distance from Father Pandozy's mission, where Rains apparently intended to wait till rein- forced by Captain Maloney's company, from the direction of the Nachess Pass.
The mission had been plundered by the Indians, before the troops arrived, and little of value was left in or about it, except a considerable herd of hogs which the priests had succeeded in accumulating, and some potatoes and cabbages in the garden. The soldiers helped themselves to these, and while digging the potatoes some one discovered part of a cask of powder, which had been buried in the garden, probably to prevent it from falling into the hands of the hostiles. But some of the soldiers assumed that it had been buried by the priests to supply the Indians, and, before the officers could prevent it, the mission buildings were set
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on fire and entirely destroyed. They consisted of a log house of considerable size, which had been used for a school and church, and of a smaller cabin in which the priests had made their home. Another house near by, which had been Kam- i-ah-kan's home, was also destroyed.
As no news was received from Captain Maloney during the day, Colonel Nesmith and Sheridan were ordered to ad- vance up the river, with a considerable force, to relieve him in case he should have been attacked by the Indians, which the troops had not been able to overtake. They started early on the following morning. Snow was falling as they left camp, and the storm increased during the day, until so much snow had fallen that it became impossible for the horses to travel through it. At nightfall camp was made, some distance above the mouth of the Nachess, and in the morning the volunteers found themselves buried under a heavy blanket of snow. Further progress now being im- possible the detachment returned to camp at the mission.
It was now apparent that the hostile Indians had left the valley. It seemed possible that most of them had gone northward to the Okanogan country, or perhaps westward to attack the settlements on the Sound, and as the troops could not follow them, nor could they subsist where they were, there was nothing to do but return to the Dalles. Pre- parations for the retreat were accordingly made, and the command started by the short route across the divide. The storm continued, and it was evident from the first that the march would be a most difficult one. But this difficulty would be increased by delay, as the snow was rapidly becom- ing deeper, and it was feared that on the divide it would be found so deep as to make marching difficult, if not impossible. Provisions were running low, and for that reason it was
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necessary to make the utmost expedition. Nesmith's soldiers took the advance, followed by Sheridan's troopers. While in the valley they made fairly rapid progress, but as they neared the top of the divide every step they took showed the snow to be growing deeper. When the summit was finally reached it was found to be covered to a depth of nearly six feet, concealing all signs of the trail so thoroughly that the guides became bewildered, and took the wrong direction. After Nesmith had made his way with much labor across the plateau, he found that he was compelled to return, which he did with much loss of time. The work of breaking a new road was then begun, and proved to be most laborious, "exhausting men and horses," as Sheridan says, "almost to the point of relinquishing the struggle, but our desperate situation required that we should get down into the valley beyond, or run the chance of perishing on the mountains, in a storm which seemed unending. About midnight the column reached the valley very tired and hungry but much elated over its success."
The difficulties of the retreat were now over and in due time the expedition reached the Dalles, where, according to Sheridan, "almost everyone connected with it voted it a wretched failure." Rains blamed everyone but himself and, as often happens in such cases, charges were preferred against some of the officers, who, in turn, preferred charges against Rains, but nothing came of it all, as nobody was ever tried.
While this expedition was engaged in its inglorious cam- paign in the Yakima country, Major Chinn, with two com- panies of the Oregon volunteers, had started from the Dalles along the south bank of the river from the Walla Walla coun- try. They arrived at Wells' Springs on the 17th, and there
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Chinn received the letter from Narcisse Raymond, informing him of the threatening state of affairs in his neighborhood. Feeling that his force was not strong enough to afford relief to the settlers, he advanced only to the Umatilla River, where he built a fort which he called Fort Henrietta, in honor of Mrs. Granville O. Haller. Here he found an abundance of water and timber, and enough grass for his animals, and, feeling that he could successfully meet any attack that was likely to be made on him at that point, he determined to wait there until reinforcements should come up.
From the beginning Colonel Nesmith had hoped that, at the conclusion of the Yakima campaign, he would be able to march down the river to its mouth, where he was confident the troops were more urgently needed than in the neighbor- hood of Father Pandozy's mission. Before commencing the retreat, he had consulted with his officers about the advisa- bility of attempting to carry out his original plan, but it had been deemed best, by all concerned, to fall back with the regular troops to the Dalles, and be governed by the infor- mation they should find there upon their arrival.
The news from Chinn, as well as that received from other sources, indicated that he might be in urgent need of rein- forcements. After pillaging Fort Walla Walla, the Indians had burned the Umatilla mission, and the houses of several settlers, and driven away the cattle of Brooke, Bumford & Noble. It was also learned that Peo-peo-mox-mox had boastingly sent word to Governor Stevens, who he then knew to be returning from the Blackfoot council through the country of the Spokanes, that he intended to kill him and take his scalp. This message had been sent by a slave who had been promised his liberty if he delivered it, and it was delivered.
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Colonel Nesmith immediately sent forward three com- panies to Chinn's relief, numbering 175 men, under the command of Captains Munson, Wilson and Cornoyer. He also applied to Major Rains, and to General Wool, who had then recently arrived at Fort Vancouver, for two howitzers, with ammunition and artillerymen to man them. But Rains would not grant this request, nor would Wool, although he might have done so without difficulty, as he had brought with him from San Francisco three hundred tons of stores and ammunition, together with two thousand stands of arms.
In addition to his advancing age, the general was not then in good health, but this doesn't seem to have been his sole reason for refusing this request, or for leaving the campaign to be prosecuted entirely by the volunteers. He had appar- ently made up his mind, before leaving San Francisco, that the war was already unnecessary, and no evidence to the con- trary, or appeals for assistance, could move him from his determination to do nothing. In the preceding May, Gover- nor Stevens had written him a long letter from the Walla Walla council grounds, giving in detail information from his own observations, and from the reports made to him by his Indian agents, in regard to the numbers and location of the various tribes, and their disposition, as well as the topography of the country, and the advantages it offered for a military station. In this letter he had strongly urged that the greater portion of the troops assigned to the territory should be stationed there, because the location was central, and a force there could be most effectively used to control the hostile tribes and protect the immigrants. The information and suggestions which this letter contained, coming from a man of Stevens' observation and experience, would have been welcomed by any unprejudiced officer. That it was most
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excellent, subsequent events amply demonstrated. But the fact that Stevens had offered it seems to have been sufficient reason for Wool to disregard it. He immediately withdrew all the regulars into garrison, and left the campaign to be prosecuted by the volunteers, without giving or offering them the assistance of even such arms, supplies and camp outfit as he might easily have furnished. He ordered the Washing- ton companies, which had been mustered into the service of the United States, and thereby placed under his control, to be disbanded, and would undoubtedly have disbanded the Oregon volunteers, but for the fact that they had not been mustered, and he had no control over them. He even disbanded the company which B. F. Shaw commanded, and which had been raised for the express purpose of going to Governor Stevens' assistance, and sent a messenger to the governor advising him not to return through the Indian country, but to make his way back through the Eastern States to the Atlantic, and return by way of Panama.
Being left thus to their own resources the Oregon volun- teers were compelled to abandon the campaign, as the regu- lars had done, or continue it with the insufficient arms, clothing, camp outfits and other supplies they then had, or which the territory could furnish them. Some of the men had returned from the campaign in the Yakima country in a disabled condition. They had not been provided with suitable clothing, or tents to protect them from the inclement weather which they had encountered. All of them had suffered severely. "Many of the men were frostbitten on the late expedition," says Nesmith in his report, "and can hardly be called fit for duty." Many of their horses were also disabled. There was much complaint among them because they were so poorly provided for, and because of the arduous
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service they were required to perform. Some of them asked to be discharged, and some were discharged, upon recom- mendation of the surgeon. Some who had urgent business, requiring their personal attention, were furloughed for a short period, and the remainder were sent forward to the Walla Walla country as rapidly as they could be made ready.
On the 28th of November Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, with the companies of Captains Bennet and Cornoyer, left the Dalles for Umatilla, and two companies under Major Armstrong were stationed on the Columbia, in the vicinity of the Des Chutes and John Day rivers. Nesmith turned over the command to Kelly, who assumed control of opera- tions in the field. When he arrived at Fort Henrietta, with the two companies above mentioned, his force amounted to 475 men. With these he immediately began preparations to advance into the country of the hostile tribes. By the evening of December 2d he was ready to march, and as soon as it was dark the command moved out, leaving a guard of only twenty-five men to protect the fort. By daylight, on the morning of the 3d, the Walla Walla River was reached, and camp was made near the fort which had so recently been abandoned, and which had now been pillaged, and its build- ings and furniture much defaced.
On the morning of the fifth a party of Indians appeared on the opposite bank of the river, with their camp outfits, and so much other baggage as to indicate that they were on their way to join the hostiles, with a considerable supply of provisions. As there were no boats by which the troops could cross the river to attack, a small detachment was sent to take post on a low point, which projected so far into the water as to give some hope that they might there be
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within range of the enemy. Here they opened fire, which was returned, but, owing to the width of the river, it was without effect on either side.
While this skirmish was going on, a party of about fifty warriors appeared on the hill north of the camp but did not attack it and, after surveying it for a long time from a safe distance, moved off toward the north. Colonel Kelly had already received information that the main camp of the Walla Wallas and their allies might be looked for in this direction, and accordingly made preparations to move out to the attack. Directing Major Chinn, with two companies, to move the baggage and supplies up the river to the mouth of the Touchet, and there await the return of the main force, he started at daylight next morning, with two hundred men, in search of the hostiles. His march was without incident until late in the afternoon, when, as Captain Cornoyer, who was in advance, was approaching the Touchet, at a point some twelve or fifteen miles above its mouth, he was met by Peo-peo-mox-mox and five or six other Indians, who displayed a flag of truce, and asked for a parley. They were on horseback, and were accompanied by a consider- able number of other Indians, also on horseback, who were at first concealed by the hill on top of which the old chief and his party had halted, but who, as the parley proceeded, gradually advanced, extending their line so as to enclose Cornoyer and the few soldiers who were with him. Observ- ing this, the captain leveled a rifle at the chief's head and declared he would shoot him, in defiance of his flag, if the advance was not immediately stopped. This had the desired effect. The old chief shouted an order to his warriors, who immediately halted, dismounted, and each stood beside his horse. Their position was such that they might remount
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in a moment and kill Cornoyer and his party, or take them prisoners, but his coolness, the certainty that he would carry out his threat, and perhaps the knowledge that Kelly and the remainder of the command were within sound of their rifles, should an attack be made, restrained them.
Seeing that this small advance guard was not to be taken by surprise the old chief demanded to know if Agent Olney was with the party. He was told that he was not, but that he was coming up with Colonel Kelly and the main com- mand, and would soon arrive. With this information he expressed satisfaction, saying that he would understand better than anyone else what he wished to make known. Olney, accompanied by Kelly and some others, soon came up, and to them the old chief declared that he was no longer in favor of war, and his people did not wish to fight. He wished to make peace, and proposed that the troops should remain where they were, and that he would come on the following day and make a new treaty.
Suspecting that this was only a ruse to gain time to remove the women and children in his camp out of the reach of danger, and make ready for battle, Kelly told him he had come to chastise him for the outrages he had already com- mitted, and that he would attack his camp immediately, unless he and the five or six other Indians who were with him would give themselves up as hostages and remain with his command until all difficulties were settled. "I told him," Kelly says, in his report, "that he might go away under his flag of truce, if he chose; but, if he did so, we would forthwith attack his village. The alternative was distinctly made known to him; and, to save his people, he chose to remain with us, as a hostage, for the fulfilment of his promise, as did also those who accompanied him. He at the same
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time said that on the following day he would accompany us to his village; that he would then assemble his people and make them deliver up all their arms and ammunition, restore the property which had been taken from the white settlers, or pay the full value of that which could not be restored; and that he would furnish fresh horses to remount my command, and cattle to supply them with provisions, to enable us to wage war against other hostile tribes who were leagued with him. Having made these promises, we refrained from making the attack, thinking we had him in our power, and that on the next day his promises would be fulfilled. I also permitted him to send one of the men who accompanied him to his village, to apprise the tribe of the terms of the expected treaty, so that they might be prepared to fulfil it."
This is the story of this famous conference, as Kelly gives it, but some of the volunteers who are still living say that he was, at one time, so far convinced of the genuineness of the old chief's pretensions, that he accepted his invitation to go with him to his camp and hold the conference there. The volunteers were without provisions or tents, all their baggage having been sent with Chinn to the mouth of the Touchet. The weather was growing colder, and snow was beginning to fall. As no provisions were to be had except in the Indian camp, and its principal chief had promised to supply them, it seems probable that Kelly would try to procure them if he could. It was while on the way to the hostile camp, Kelly and his small escort and the Indians riding together, and just as they were entering a dangerous defile in the hills, that Olney, or the interpreter, overheard Peo-peo-mox-mox making some remark to one of the Indians with him, in a language which he had not before used during
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the conference, and which he doubtless hoped none present would understand, indicating that he was leading the party into an ambush. Instantly the alarm was given and the Indians were made prisoners .*
The party now returned to camp. The volunteers who were tired, hungry, and without fire, tents or sufficient clothing, while the night was cold and snow falling, were in no very good humor to guard prisoners who had thus deceived them. Some wished to have them shot; some were for moving immediately to attack the Indian camp. But discipline was maintained, and the troops passed a very miserable night. Their discomforts and annoyance were increased by Indians who approached near enough to the line of sentinels, during the night, to call to the prisoners and be answered by them. What they said was not under- stood by any of the interpreters present, but the meaning of it was discovered soon after daylight, when it was found that the Indians' camp had been abandoned, and all the provisions and cattle, which the prisoners had so generously promised the night before, removed beyond reach.
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