USA > Wyoming > The history of Wyoming from the earliest known discoveries > Part 37
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brought by him to Fort Bridger. One of the horses was kept by one of Washakie's Indians, which I think I can get. Nineteen of the horses are here, which I shall keep until I know the wishes of the general in regard to them."
Governor Evans of Colorado telegraphed to the Secre- tary of War on September 7th, asking that the Second Colo- rado, serving near Kansas City, Missouri, be sent to do ser- vice on the Overland mail route, claiming that unless pro- tection was given to this line of travel that famine would be added to the gigantic Indian war then in progress. Flour, he said, was already $45 per barrel, the supply growing scarcer every day, with none on the way; that the people were fearing an attack of Indians which had been planned to cover a distance of 300 miles of traveled road. He urged that the troops be sent at once; otherwise it would be too late for supplies to reach the west that season. On the 22nd of the same month, Colonel Chivington telegraphed the Sec- retary of War that the Indians were troublesome on the same route and urged him to have troops sent forward. The Secretary of War referred the matter to the headquarters of the Department of Kansas, and Major General Curtis, commanding at Leavenworth, ordered that well garrisoned posts be established on the Overland route at points not over fifty miles apart and troops were ordered forward for this purpose, but there were delays without number. Ben Holliday, with the enterprise and dash for which he was noted, pushed forward new stock tenders along the line to take the places of those who had been killed, and horses in place of those run off. He closed a telegram to General Curtis as follows: "With your advice and assistance and my determination, I know we can put this line in operation so that there will be no further interruption in this service." General Curtis replied that no one was more anxious than himself to protect the mail route, and promised to distribute troops along the line without delay. He also made a re- quest for arms to be distributed to the employes of the stage line and these were finally furnished by the Governor of Kansas. General Mitchell started from Omaha the latter
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part of September with a few troops to place at stations at points near Julesburg. On October 1st, Ben Holliday asked that five soldiers be placed at each station on the Overland and said that unless this was done it would be impossible to keep his men at stations. He also asked that from two to four soldiers be placed on each coach. On October 3rd, stages started out from the east with escorts, and military commanders farther west were notified to see that all stages be furnished with a sufficient number of soldiers to protect the mail and passengers. On October 6th, Major John S. Wood, commanding Fort Laramie, requested that he be al- lowed to furnish provisions to certain friendly Indians about the post. General Mitchell, in approving the request, which was forwarded to General Curtis, explained that he, on his late visit to Fort Laramie, had induced these bands to make war upon hostile Indians and had promised them a reward for every scalp taken. I have examined the rec- ords carefully to ascertain what action General Curtis saw fit to take regarding this request, but can find nothing. I find it difficult to believe that this officer would approve of a reward for scalps. On the night of the 12th, twenty-five Indians attacked the mail ten miles west of Plum Creek. There were several soldiers in the coach at the time and some passengers. The fight was short but sharp. One In- dian was killed and several wounded. Of those connected with the stage, one soldier was severely wounded, and also a passenger. The Indians were finally driven off and the stage proceeded westward. The next night the stage was attacked near Valley Station. Fortunately the escort was a heavy one and gave ample protection to the mail and passengers. Twelve Indians were killed.
With the opening of the lines of communication came additional trouble and Ben Holliday now clamored loudly for the promised protection. He telegraphed the Secre- tary of War that unless immediate measures be taken to stop depredations, he would be obliged to cease running the Overland coaches. He suggested that General Connor be assigned to the duty of protecting Overland traffic. This appeal was successful, as will be shown farther on.
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Late in October, the Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes began depredations on the North Platte and also on the Lar- amie Plains. General Connor having made a good record in suppressing Indians, General Halleck telegraphed him from Washington to give all the protection in his power to the Overland route between Fort Kearney and Salt Lake, without regard to department lines. In reply to this, Gene- ral Connor asked that the troops along the line be subject to his orders. This General Halleck did not approve, but said that the troops of the different departments should act to- gether. Governor Evans of Colorado was rendering every assistance in his power and was rejoiced over the fact that the Indians were to be chastised by this successful Indian fighter. About the 1st of November, General Connor sent a cavalry force of 200 from Fort Douglas to co-operate with other troops on the Overland road, while he himself took the stage for Denver to investigate the condition of affairs along the stage road. It was his opinion that a winter cam- paign should be made against the hostiles. He wrote the commander of the Department of the Pacific, on the eve of his departure for Denver:
"I design proceeding hence to Denver by stage next week, where I hope to be able to gather the necessary in- formation, after examining the field, to guide the future movements of my troops. Should I find it practicable and advisable to make a winter's campaign, with a fair proba- bility of severely punishing the savages, of which I now en- tertain little doubt, I will make such arrangement and dis- position of the troops as may be necessary, and immediately return to this post by stage. As soon thereafter as every- thing necessary for a vigorous campaign can be prepared, I propose to return and assume personal command of the expedition, making Denver the base of operations. As my absence from the district (with which I will be in constant communication) will be but temporary, not exceeding, per- haps, a fortnight, I will retain command, leaving a compe- tent officer here to attend to details. Should my confident expectations regarding the possibility of a winter campaign against the Sioux, Arapahoes and Cheyennes not be real- ized after personal examination I purpose to make imme-
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diately, my troops will go into winter quarters, ready for such service as may be required by the exigencies of either district. There is no doubt that until the savages eastward of Denver shall have been thoroughly defeated and severely punished, no permanent peace can be hoped for; nor can their frequent raids upon the Overland route be prevented by any number of troops at the disposal of the government. I am equally clear in the opinion that the winter or early spring is the only time when Indians can be successfully pursued, punished and brought to terms. If this be possi- ble, as I now think it is, I need hardly add that the most vig- orous measures will be taken at the earliest possible day. Your instructions in the premises have been most carefully noted and will be strictly obeyed. I trust that the move- ments above set forth will meet with the approbation and concurrence of the General commanding the department, to whom I will report from time to time regarding my future actions."
Everything seemed to be in readiness for a winter cam- paign when suddenly there appeared no further necessity for troops on the Overland. The 200 cavalry which had started out from Fort Douglas to go east over the Overland road were halted at Fort Bridger, making the force at that post about 300 men. The general impression prevailing in military circles was that the Overland Stage Company had become timid and required an escort for their stages when there was really no necessity for it. There was considera- ble travel in the stages, and these people were not slow in assisting the stage company to secure protection for the mail and passengers. The general government had all it could do in the south, so no additional troops could be spared for the west. The stage company and the telegraph company, assisted by the Mormons, were anxious to get rid of the troops at Fort Douglas. The two former desired Connor's forces to be distributed at many points along the stage line, while the latter worked actively to get Connor and his soldiers sent to the Army of the Potomac. Brigham Young was often indiscreet and said things which proved his disloyalty, and General Connor, who was a patriot as well as a loyal soldier, wished for an opportunity to punish the head of the Mormon church, and had it not been for
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Colonel R. C. Drum, Assistant Adjutant General of the De- partment of the Pacific, there might have been trouble. He advised Connor not to do anything that would precipitate matters and bring on an insurrenction of the Mormons. On one occasion he writes General Connor:
"The condition of affairs at Salt Lake, as reported by you, is very critical, not only as regards your own command, but as regards this department and the whole country. The question is, are we at this time, and as we are now situated, in a condition to undertake to carry on a war against the Mormons -- for any cause whatever-if it can possibly be avoided; not whether there are not matters that require to be changed; bad government and worse morals to be cor- rected and the authority of the national government to be more thoroughly enforced; but can we not be able to pass all these by for the present, at least, and thus avoid weaken- ing the general government, now taxed to its utmost and struggling for its very existence."
Connor was a man of decided character, discreet, and above all things loved the flag under which he fought, and this it was that enabled him to endure the sneers and threats of Brigham Young. It was a great satisfaction to General Connor that in spite of the strongest efforts put forth by the Mormons to have Camp Douglas removed, the post still remained and he was its commander. The Mormon city was under his guns and it could be reduced to ashes at any time. Brigham Young's forces numbered 5,000 well armed men and there came to General Connor many reports that these troops were intended for the capture of Camp Douglas. He writes to Colonel Drum in the midst of all this excitement, "Finding that I am prepared to resist any attack, and know- ing that the city is at the mercy of my guns, and will be surely destroyed if my troops are attacked, the Mormons seem to be quieting down somewhat, although armed forces are assembling inside of Brigham's yard and having nightly drills with artillery and infantry. My impression is that there is no immediate probability of conflict." General Connor firmly believed that the Mormons were responsible for the uprising of the Indians and for the murder and rob- bery which had been perpetrated on the Overland road, and -(27)
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believing this, it is not at all strange that he should feel like administering punishment to the people who instigated the robberies and murders, as well as to the Indians who com- mitted them. The known disloyalty of Brigham Young and his followers offered the opportunity and General Connor found it difficult not to administer the punishment.
The summer which had passed so quietly on the Over- land trail was followed by exciting events on the mail road both in Nebraska and Kansas and as the winter approached the Indians became more aggressive in the west. The op- portunity for a winter campaign did not offer, and so Gene- ral Connor remained inactive, but all things were placed in readiness for the next year and the future promised great events in military operations against the Indians.
The event which closed the Indian wars of 1864 was the battle of Sand Creek, which took place November 29th. The affair caused much severe comment throughout the entire country. Colonel John M. Chivington, the Commander of the District of Colorado, led the expedition in person and the result was the killing of a large number of Indians. The battle, while it did not occur in Wyoming, had an important effect on Indian affairs in this state and along the Overland trail. Colonel Chivington had been so unfortunate as to make many bitter enemies in Colorado, and these people de. nounced the Sand Creek affair as a massacre and succeeded in bringing about an official investigation by the joint com- mittee on the conduct of the war, at the second session, thirty-eighth congress, 1865. This subject was thoroughly discussed at the time in the newspapers of the country and much said for, as well as against, the officer commanding the troops on this occasion. The matter, even to this day, remains in dispute as to whether it was honorable warfare, such as the government was urging against Indians, or "a horrible massacre," as charged by those who did not like Colonel Chivington. A large number of prominent citizens of Colorado were in this battle, some of whom I have been personally acquainted with for many years, and I have yet to hear a single one of them condemn the methods of the
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commander in this fight. They claim that there was great provocation. Women and children, as well as men, had been killed by Indians and their bodies horribly mutilated. The white people had reached a condition of terror and they must either flee from the country or rise up in their might and destroy these Indians root and branch. Major E. W. Wynkoop, First Colorado Veteran Cavalry, claimed at the time that the Sand Creek affair cost the lives of hun- dreds of white people, who were afterwards killed in re- venge by the savages, but this officer proves by his volumi- nous writings on the subject that he was fond of notoriety, as well as having an exalted opinion of his own ability as a military commander. For the sake of brevity, I will confine the Sand Creek affair to the official report of Commander Chivington, which reads as follows:
"Having ascertained that the hostile Indians had pro- ceeded south from the Platte and were almost within strik- ing distance of Fort Logan, I ordered Colonel George L. Shoup, Third Regiment Colorado Volunteer Cavalry, 100- days' service, to proceed with the mounted men of his regi- ment in that direction. On November 20th I left Denver, and at Booneville, Colorado Territory, on the 24th of No- vember joined and took command in person of the expedi- tion, which had been increased by battalion First Cavalry of Colorado, consisting of detachments of Companies C, E and H. I proceeded with the utmost caution down the Arkansas River, and on the morning of the 28th ultimo arrived at Fort Lyon, to the surprise of the garrison of that post. On the same evening I resumed my march, being joined by Ma- jor Scott J. Anthony, First Cavalry of Colorado, with 125 men of said regiment, consisting of detachments of Com- panies D, G and K, with two howitzers. The command then proceeded in a northeasterly direction, traveling all night, and at daylight of 29th November striking Sand Creek, about forty miles from Fort Lyon. Here was discov- ered an Indian village of 130 lodges, comprised of Black Kettle's band of Cheyennes and eight lodges of Arapahoes with Left Hand. My line of battle was formed with Lieu- tenant Wilson's battalion, First Regiment, numbering about - men, on the right; Colonel Shoup's (Third) regiment, num- bering about 450 men, in the center, and Major Anthony's battalion, numbering 125 men, First Regiment, on the left.
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The attack was immediately made upon the Indian camp by Lieutenant Wilson, who dashed forward, cutting the enemy off from the herd, and driving them out of their camp, which was subsequently destroyed. The Indians, numbering from 900 to 1,000, though taken by surprise, speedily formed a line of battle across the creek, about three-fourths of a mile above the village, stubbornly contesting every inch of ground. The commands of Colonel Shoup and Major An- thony pressed rapidly forward and attacked the enemy sharply, and the engagement became general, we constantly driving the Indians, who fell back from one position to an- other, for five miles, and finally abandoned resistance and dispersed in all directions, and were pursued by my troops until nightfall. It may perhaps be unnecessary for me to state that I captured no prisoners. Between 500 and 600 Indians were left dead upon the ground; about 550 ponies, mules and horses were captured, and all their lodges were destroyed, the contents of which have served to supply the command with an abundance of trophies, comprising the paraphernalia of Indian warfare and life. My loss was eight killed on the field and forty wounded, of which two have since died. Of the conduct of the Third Regiment, 100 days' service, I have to say that they well sustained the repu- tation of our Colorado troops for bravery and effectiveness, were well commanded by their gallant young Colonel, George L. Shoup, ably assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel L. L. Bowen, Major Hal Sayr, and Captain Theodore G. Cree, com- manding First, Second and Third Battalions of that regi- ment. Of the conduct of the two battalions of the First Regiment, I have but to remark that they sustained their reputation as second to none, and were ably handled by their commanders, Major Anthony, Lieutenant Wilson and Lieutenant Clark Dunn, upon whom the command devolved after the disabling of Lieutenant Wilson from wounds re- ceived. Night coming on, the pursuit of the flying Indians was of necessity abandoned and my command encamped within sight of the field. On the 1st instant, having sent the wounded and dead to Fort Lyon, the first to be cared for, the last to be buried upon our own soil, I resumed the pursuit in the direction of Camp Wynkoop, on the Arkansas River, marching all night of the 3rd and 4th instant, in hopes of overtaking a large encampment of Arapahoes and Cheyennes under Little Robe Little (Raven), but the ene- my had been apprised of my advance, and on the morning of the 5th instant, at 3 o'clock, precipitately broke camp
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and fled. My stock was exhausted. For 100 miles the snow had been two feet deep, and for the previous fifteen days (excepting on November 29th and 30th) the marches had been forced and incessant. Under these circumstances, and the fact of the time of the Third Regiment being nearly out, I determined for the present to relinquish the pursuit. Of the effect of the punishment sustained by the Indians you will be the judge. Their chiefs, Black Kettle, White Antelope, One Eye and Knock Knee were among the killed, and their bands almost annihilated. I was shown the scalp of a white man found in one of the lodges, which could not have been taken more than two or three days previous. The evidence is most conclusive that these Indians are the worst that have infested the routes on the Platte and Ar- kansas Rivers during the last spring and summer. Amongst the stock captured were the horses and mules taken by them from Lieutenant Chase, First Cavalry of Colorado, last Sep- tember. Several scalps of white men and women were found in their lodges; also various articles of clothing belonging to white persons."
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CHAPTER XXXIII.
THE BLOODY YEAR ON THE PLAINS.
INDIANS BECOME EXPERTS IN KILLING AND ROBBING-HOSTILITIES OPEN ON JANUARY 7-CAPTAIN O'BRIEN'S DESPERATE FIGHT AGAINST OVER- WHELMING NUMBERS-THE BURNING OF JULESBURG STATION-THE ATTACK ON MUD SPRINGS STATION-COLONEL COLLINS BRINGS RE- LIEF-FIGHT AT RUSH CREEK-DESTRUCTION OF THE TELEGRAPH LINE-COLONEL COLLINS RETURNS TO FORT LARAMIE-HIS RECOM- MENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT-ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPART- MENT OF THE PLAINS-GENERAL CONNOR PLACED IN COMMAND- INDIANS ATTACK DEER CREEK STATION-COLONEL MOONLIGHT'S Ex- PEDITION TO WIND RIVER-RENEWED TROUBLE AT JULESBURG- CAPTURE OF TWO FACE AND BLACKFOOT-THEIR EXECUTION AT FORT LARAMIE-RESCUE OF MRS. EUBANKS-THE SCHUYLER COLFAX PARTY.
I now come to that important year of Indian troubles in this section, 1865. The hostiles were in arms in Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, the greater part of Wyoming, and in what is now North and South Dakota. The Indians did not wait for grass for their ponies, but subsisted their forces on the goods they could capture along the mail and passenger routes running west from the Missouri River. They were successful in their marauding expeditions and consequently were encouraged to push their hostility to the farthest limit. That will ever be known as the bloody year on the plains. There was trouble on the Smoky Hill road in Kansas, also along the Arkansas and on the Republican in the same state. Hostile bands were prowling along all roads leading into Denver and along the Platte River. By some means they possessed themselves of plenty of arms and ammuni- tion and an encounter with them was by no means an event devoid of danger. The hostile attitude of the savages and their intention to wage a bloody war that season was well known to the government. Captain Nicholas J. O'Brien had been sent the fall before to the mouth of Pole Creek with instructions to build a post in that vicinity. The lo-
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cality was in the neighborhood of Julesburg, an important . station on the Overland, as it was a distributing point for stores. The new post when completed was called Fort Sedg- wick and Captain O'Brien was made the commander. This post, like others on the road, sent out escorts with freight trains and coaches and the garrison was kept busy during the winter.
The Indians had by this time become experts in killing and robbing. They had learned the value of government trains loaded with clothing, blankets, ammunition, subsist- ence and supplies and they made strong efforts to capture these, together with the teams of fine government mules. The stage stations also contained a large amount of choice goods, a fact that was well known to the Indians.
On January 7th, 1865, a large force of Indians under Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses and other chiefs made an at- tack on an incoming stage and came very near capturing it, but fortunately it escaped to the station, having one man and one horse killed. Captain O'Brien discovered the Indi- ans and hastily mounted thirty-seven men and leaving twelve at the fort in charge of two pieces of artillery, he dashed down on the savages. Riding to a bluff about half a mile from the fort, they discovered that the Indians were in strong force, but the little band was not dismayed at this. The charge was sounded and the gallant heroes, with the clatter of hoofs and shouts, were soon in the midst of the savages, fighting, as never soldiers fought before, the large force opposed to them. The Indians in their turn, with overwhelming numbers, charged back upon the white men and for a time the carnage went on. At last Captain O'Brien, finding nearly half of his men killed, ordered the remainder to fall back, which they did, but kept up a fire which prevented the Indians from cutting them off from the fort, which the now exulting foe were attempting. Fourteen of the thirty-seven enlisted men lay dead on the field. The Indians, with savage shout and maddened fury, now attempted to storm the fort. Fortunately the garrison possessed two pieces of artillery and these were brought out
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and served with telling effect on the advancing savages. This checked their ardor and held them at bay. Night came on and the Indians withdrew and the next morning it was found they had left the neighborhood. A party was sent out to the battlefield of the day before to gather up the dead. They found them lying where they fell, but their bodies had been stripped and horribly mutilated. The dead soldiers were carried to the fort and buried with the honors of war, but each living comrade registered a vow beside these graves to avenge the death of his brothers in arms. It was never fully determined how many Indians were killed in this bat- tle, but after peace had been declared they admitted their loss to have been sixty-three. The blood of the Indians was now fairly aroused and they determined to capture the goods at the stage station, and on February 2nd they at- tacked the place, secured a portion of the stores and suc- ceeded in setting the buildings on fire while Captain O'Brien and five of his men were on escort duty down the river. On their return they discovered the smoke of the conflagration at the stage station. In the stage which they were escorting were four passengers and one a woman. Ascending a hill, Captain O'Brien discovered the Indians. Returning to the coach, he had every man, passengers and all, carefully ex- amine his arms, and caused the coach to proceed slowly along. Soon the road neared the bank of the river, and here he met some teamsters with wagons, who, beyond a pistol or two, were unarmed, and who had left the station for some object, less than a half hour before. They now became aware of the situation, and were greatly alarmed. These men the Captain ordered to return and keep near the stage, which they did, all moving slowly toward the station and fort. Meanwhile the heads of Indians were popping up quite frequently over the bluffs in the distance. Arriving near one of these, the Captain boldly rode to the top and taking his blanket swung it three times over his head. The Indians saw this and supposed he had a large force in the rear which he was signaling to come up, and they began to flee. The river was frozen and sand had been scattered
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